Taming the Tiger or Slaying the Bear......loki100 (Axis) vs Speedy (SU)

[loki100]

T52 – 14 June 1942

So we get to celebrate one year of this, rather large, mistake. I'm just over automatic defeat (HWM test) and 170 short of a sudden victory (I have 3 turns to reach the next test point) - I think we can all guess what that means.

Still at least the Soviets carry on fleeing to the Urals, thats another 9,000 refusing to fight any more.



What remains of them are both busy and nosy.

But the pocket from last turn held.



Spot the first appearance of non-Gds Rifle Corps, so can assume there are at least 16 of the damn things. Actually found #18 around Orel. A lot seem to be facing AGN and AGC.



Anyway, in reality I think this is the turn I know I've lost with no remaining illusions. Couldn't manage an encirclement at Orel but should manage something next turn. Goal really is to keep the Soviets busy on multiple sectors so that hopefully one remains weak.



1 and 4 Pzr tried to generate some sort of small pocket west of the Don. Again too many reserve reactions and increasingly strong second lines means I have to concentrate too much even to make a small gap.



Mostly infantry attacks along the Donets.



To put things in context, that is the state of my on map Pzr and tank formations (incl Rumanian and Hungarian units). 11A was really hit in the Sevastopol battles so won't be available for at least another 3 turns.



Tank pools (German only), including stuff out of production. There is no practical way to recover my losses or those under-strength divisions.



Guess you need to take re-assurance where you find it. At least this ratio looks ok.



And I get the Italian reinforcements, at the worst that gives me some flank/rear protection.

But time to be realistic about where this is going.

Current VP chart, so I pass the October HWM loss. I can't see how I'm going to take more than 2 more of that list (& maybe not even that), so lets say I get a HWM of 610.



So for the Soviets to regain the initiative they need to knock 61 off this. They are well placed for time bonus so each lost city will be 16 not 10. Given where the front is, Stalino, Orel (I am assuming I will take that), Kharkov and Kursk are all easy losses (the +6 for Kursk is already claimed). That is then 58, a few for theatre boxes and we are looking at an initiative change in say October/November.



Given what I've not taken, the time bonuses are then allocated. This is going to be around +42 (locations never taken that were taken).

The Soviets then get the VP for the cities they hold at that stage. That is going to be well over 400 (in my Soviet AAR I had 340 on initiative change and the only ahistoric hold was Stalingrad).

So, a loss in early 1943?

Should note not blaming the game system. I made enough mistakes in the second half of the summer of 1941 to have set this up. The reality is I have turned 1942 into 1943, in reality I should go over to the strategic defensive now and try to maximise my options in that phase rather than lose more making increasingly limited gains.

[erikbengtsson]

The reality is I have turned 1942 into 1943, in reality I should go over to the strategic defensive now and try to maximise my options in that phase rather than lose more making increasingly limited gains.

Sounds like a smart plan. You have enough troops and mobile formations intact to be able to respond well to any Soviet offensives. Manstein's Kharkov counterblow, one after another..

[RoadWarrior]

Doesn't seem remotely historical - Russian on the offensive in 42.
What happened to the magical spring 42 German recovery everyone talks about?

1. SHC is unhistorically rewarded to retreat a few hexes a turn until the logistic chain stops GHC in the center and south. An Army that is simply marching forward turn after turn and hardly fighting is using very few supplies, this is just basic math!!!!!! Supplies shortages for Germans and Russians were caused by heavy fighting or fuel by long advances, not both sides holding hands taking a summer walk together 30 miles a week to the east.
2. So moral, KIA and factory loses are far lower than historical, supplies for some reason are low based on a lack of combat?????
3. By 1942 German Army is at 1943 levels and Russian Army at 1944 levels. There is no 1942, which is why games will end in 44.
The massive encirclements of spring and summer of 1942 are not possible because SHC has 1/2 dozen Armies that can easily break open almost any pocket in 1942, when historically that simply was not the case. Supplies and replacements were a major issue in 42 for SHC, but not in this game. The combat tempo of 41 is simply not happening and a logistics system that is hard wired to output data that says the combat tempo is high when it simply is low, very low if the hand holding is done right.
4. The logistics system is a single system for both sides when historically it simply was not. This is by far the biggest problem with the game.
5. Because of the logistic system (1 system for both sides) simply is not working historically; it causes a feedback loop where the attack never runs out of supplies. When historically the Russians took months to build up supplies for major operations and then had to stop after some small gains because they ran out.

Summer 1941 was a blood bath. The Russians caused supply issues for the Germans, because they attacked causing shortages and delaying German advances. The 1941 supply issues were not caused long summer walks.

The logistic system appears to need allot of tweaking, allot.

Sadly I would have to say 1.0 is more of a historical simulation than 2.0.

[GloriousRuse]

Leaving aside the fact that we have several games...including yours RW...where the retreating soviets gets caught and destroyed, let's address the false claim that it was only hard fighting that gave the Germans logistics problems. To cite David Glantz, AGC alone, if meeting no Russian resistance in its drive to Moscow, would have a requirement for 33x trains of supply a day. It could, at best, generate 24 trains a day. In mid July, 5-6 trains a day werr arriving at Minsk before transloading on to trucks for round trips of up to 700km on mostly unimproved roads.

To mind, keeping AGC in fuel for one day of normal operations would take 12 trains. Simple rations for the day would use 2 trains. And if you actually needed to replace a basic load of ammo, 36 trains.

So...yeah. Walks eastward would actually drain the Heer. After heading east of the Dnepr, if anything th German player gets a bit of a helping hand to let him keep playing without a sudden paradigm shift on T5 or so.

[erikbengtsson]

I think the biggest difference is a Soviet player has historical hindsight, and doesn't commit the catastrophical and self-defeating errors that Stalin and Stavka did in 1941 and during much of 42.

Germany lost the war on June 22nd of 1941. Soviet errors simply made that less than obvious for a while.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: RoadWarrior
...

4. The logistics system is a single system for both sides when historically it simply was not. This is by far the biggest problem with the game.
5. Because of the logistic system (1 system for both sides) simply is not working historically; it causes a feedback loop where the attack never runs out of supplies. When historically the Russians took months to build up supplies for major operations and then had to stop after some small gains because they ran out.

Summer 1941 was a blood bath. The Russians caused supply issues for the Germans, because they attacked causing shortages and delaying German advances. The 1941 supply issues were not caused long summer walks.

The logistic system appears to need allot of tweaking, allot.

Sadly I would have to say 1.0 is more of a historical simulation than 2.0.

lets agree that for one reason and another there is a balance issue at the moment.

But ... this is really not a valid point. It takes a degree of myopia to describe the logistics system as simple compared to the binary approach in WiTE1. What it does, well, is to force both sides to keep to the better supply corridors, or (& you can do this), carefully construct the infrastructure to support something different.

and I can't even start to see how #1 gets described as more historical than #2 with its endless tricks to manipulate the game systems (most of which are now much harder)

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: erikbengtsson

I think the biggest difference is a Soviet player has historical hindsight, and doesn't commit the catastrophical and self-defeating errors that Stalin and Stavka did in 1941 and during much of 42.

Germany lost the war on June 22nd of 1941. Soviet errors simply made that less than obvious for a while.

yep, fully agree.

assuming a reasonable match, then the axis shouldn't be able to win (in the sense that the Soviet Union is reduced to some sort of rump state over the Urals).

What we are currently seeing is reports of quick German wins (usually in the sense the Soviet player gives up leaving no real idea of how well they can recover). Take 'received wisdom' and Leningrad. At one stage in testing, it was declared it was impossible to take, then players started to work out how to take it. Ok, we now see games where Leningrad is taken. Its a nice VP bonus, shortens the line, but beyond that?

My concern at the moment is a feeling that the balance pt should be roughly the historical German advance in 1941. No its feasible, and sensible, that German players may wish to pull up short of this, but that should be something regularly seen. And its actually near to impossible, even vs the AI (on 110) you can forget about achieving it

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: loki100

My concern at the moment is a feeling that the balance pt should be roughly the historical German advance in 1941. No its feasible, and sensible, that German players may wish to pull up short of this, but that should be something regularly seen. And its actually near to impossible, even vs the AI (on 110) you can forget about achieving it

I think what the engine is struggling to replicate is the German ability to produce significant tactical results even when their units were close to being burnt out and lacking supplies. Obviously I haven't had as much experience with the game as some others, but to me it seems that the combination of level 1 fortifications being built to quickly and the drain on German CV through losses and the breaking down of logistics saps German ability to move the front far faster than was historically the case.

Another problem that I feel is the engine overstates Soviet offensive capabilities in 1941 and early 1942. Those hastily raised formations that were forced to conduct offensive operations had a significant lack of experience and competent NCOs. Currently reading Stahel's Retreat from Moscow and he works out in detail how Red Army formations were incapable of executing even the most basic offensive maneuvers, regularly smashing frontally into fortified German positions and failing to work with combined arms. Soviet losses during the Winter offensive of 41-42 were absolutely horrendous and I don't think the engine currently is capable of reflecting that.

[erikbengtsson]

Another problem that I feel is the engine overstates Soviet offensive capabilities in 1941 and early 1942. Those hastily raised formations that were forced to conduct offensive operations had a significant lack of experience and competent NCOs. Currently reading Stahel's Retreat from Moscow and he works out in detail how Red Army formations were incapable of executing even the most basic offensive maneuvers, regularly smashing frontally into fortified German positions and failing to work with combined arms. Soviet losses during the Winter offensive of 41-42 were absolutely horrendous and I don't think the engine currently is capable of reflecting that.

Good point.

I think one thing that can easily be done to change the balance somewhat, and reducing Soviet combat capability in 41, is to remove the ability to use assault HQ's until just before the start of the historical winter offensive (turn 24, when the Soviet manpower boost is released is a suggestion). I would suggest the same for spring and summer of 1942.

Without assault HQ's, Soviet combat units will have a harder time draining axis CV, both in defence and when counterattacking.

[loki100]

My feeling (& its not much more than that), is the problem of Soviet recovery (which is too fast) comes off a few issues:

a) in the main the game models Soviet capacity rather than practical capability

This is close to the Soviet pre-37 defensive plan where an offensive is absorbed by the first echelon forces, stalled by the second echelon and thrown back by the third. Now the latter was clearly an over-estimate (& mostly is not what is happening) but the first 2 reflect what we are often seeing?

b) some easy hits on capability

b1) raise the command divisor to /14 for army level till say 1 December, its not much but it removes the real value of getting the top 10 commanders into the main forces early on
b2) as others have said, no assualt fronts before december and only 1 then. That not only hampers the CPP regain, it adds to the leadership problems.

In testing, most Soviet players didn't go for early assault fronts as the perception was there were better uses for the admin pts. In consequence the game played a lot better - now its inevitable that people experiment, report and that gets copied, and we get a new feeling for overall balance.

b3) Admin movemement is removed after an attack, that should stop the hit and run stuff that a lot of Soviet players now indulge in. Worth remembering that Kravchenko's tank victory in late Sept 41 was essentially a defensive ambush not a mobile operation.

c) don't mess with logistics, despite some claims the system works and hits both sides in the right way

d) I'd be cautious about reducing the time to level 1 fort, mainly as that could make a real mess of any later Axis defences in the Ukraine

If there is a simple fix, its take off Soviet assault fronts in 1941. I'd be more interested in that than any of the more esoteric house rules being adopted. As above, I know that until quite late in testing it wasn't regularly used and it did make for very different play dynamics. I don't think there have been any really major code changes since then so (wearing my social policy evaluation hat), if there is something big and different focus on that rather than something small and marginal?

[carlkay58]

I would like to point out that Glantz, Sharp, and Neufizinger (sp?) all agree that Soviet losses by the end of December 41 were close to 6M men. At the start of May 42 WitE2 has 10M men total available for the Soviets - so if the Soviets have lost 5M by May 42 then the Soviets will have 5M able to be on the map. I am not sure how many men are available to the Soviets by Jan 42 but I also don't know of any Axis player who has hit the 6M Soviets out of the war by then. All of the sources also agree that the Soviets lost about 1M men in Dec 41 so Soviet losses should be about 5M by the end of Nov 41. Once again, I don't know if any Axis have achieved that yet.

So where did they lose those men? The opening border battles (and pockets), Kiev, and Operation Typhoon. Soviet players are aided by historical knowledge to avoid Kiev and very few Axis players launch a major operation like Typhoon that late in 41. So it goes both ways here. It seems that the Soviet players are benefiting more from historical knowledge than the Axis players are. Without those large losses in 41 the Soviets SHOULD be in a better place in 42.

As to Assault commands, the Soviets use them to reduce their Command Point penalties - which I think is the major change for the Soviets. Without the increased command levels of the Assault Fronts the Soviets suffer immense command penalties that essentially eliminate leadership above the corps/army level and seriously hinder the army level with the penalties for direct army attachment until the end of Nov 41. With an assault HQ and a good Front commander the Soviets are much better on leadership than historically.

[DeletedUser1769703214]

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: erikbengtsson

I think the biggest difference is a Soviet player has historical hindsight, and doesn't commit the catastrophical and self-defeating errors that Stalin and Stavka did in 1941 and during much of 42.

Germany lost the war on June 22nd of 1941. Soviet errors simply made that less than obvious for a while.

yep, fully agree.

assuming a reasonable match, then the axis shouldn't be able to win (in the sense that the Soviet Union is reduced to some sort of rump state over the Urals).

What we are currently seeing is reports of quick German wins (usually in the sense the Soviet player gives up leaving no real idea of how well they can recover). Take 'received wisdom' and Leningrad. At one stage in testing, it was declared it was impossible to take, then players started to work out how to take it. Ok, we now see games where Leningrad is taken. Its a nice VP bonus, shortens the line, but beyond that?

My concern at the moment is a feeling that the balance pt should be roughly the historical German advance in 1941. No its feasible, and sensible, that German players may wish to pull up short of this, but that should be something regularly seen. And its actually near to impossible, even vs the AI (on 110) you can forget about achieving it

Reading this makes me want to find another game if the Germans can't or should never win . Game wise you have a game that is going to see a mass exodus of players leaving once the realization is that playing Germany is a no-win scenario. Matter of fact I already see that with a few die hards trying to prove it is possible to still win as Germany. Well the question should be, "Is it possible at the same skill level"? Is it? Probably not, so why play a game then when you can't win? Most won't. I am one of those die-hards that loves the German side & will try my best but even my best I don't feel is going to be good enough.

[DeletedUser1769703214]

ORIGINAL: carlkay58

I would like to point out that Glantz, Sharp, and Neufizinger (sp?) all agree that Soviet losses by the end of December 41 were close to 6M men. At the start of May 42 WitE2 has 10M men total available for the Soviets - so if the Soviets have lost 5M by May 42 then the Soviets will have 5M able to be on the map. I am not sure how many men are available to the Soviets by Jan 42 but I also don't know of any Axis player who has hit the 6M Soviets out of the war by then. All of the sources also agree that the Soviets lost about 1M men in Dec 41 so Soviet losses should be about 5M by the end of Nov 41. Once again, I don't know if any Axis have achieved that yet.

So where did they lose those men? The opening border battles (and pockets), Kiev, and Operation Typhoon. Soviet players are aided by historical knowledge to avoid Kiev and very few Axis players launch a major operation like Typhoon that late in 41. So it goes both ways here. It seems that the Soviet players are benefiting more from historical knowledge than the Axis players are. Without those large losses in 41 the Soviets SHOULD be in a better place in 42.

As to Assault commands, the Soviets use them to reduce their Command Point penalties - which I think is the major change for the Soviets. Without the increased command levels of the Assault Fronts the Soviets suffer immense command penalties that essentially eliminate leadership above the corps/army level and seriously hinder the army level with the penalties for direct army attachment until the end of Nov 41. With an assault HQ and a good Front commander the Soviets are much better on leadership than historically.

I am turn 7 "Operation Typhoon" in my game with Jubjub which will have an update later today. No German player that I know of has hit 5 million Soviet Losses sustained to the Soviets in 41. I have had a 4.2 million but that is as close as I have gotten in 41. My estimate to turn 16 in my Jubjub game, if I keep current pace, is ~2.5 million to ~ 3 million Soviet losses. To turn 25, which is too faint in the crystal ball for this game should be ~3.3 to ~4.3 million if nothing catastrophic happens to me. And those losses are me staring at the map long hours to figure out how to get them. But please note without the VL path that was left open in this game the number of losses to the Soviets would have been far far less. I have already given my 2 cents on the issues I see in the game and looks like you said the same thing I have iterated before.

[erikbengtsson]

ORIGINAL: loki100

My feeling (& its not much more than that), is the problem of Soviet recovery (which is too fast) comes off a few issues:

a) in the main the game models Soviet capacity rather than practical capability

This is close to the Soviet pre-37 defensive plan where an offensive is absorbed by the first echelon forces, stalled by the second echelon and thrown back by the third. Now the latter was clearly an over-estimate (& mostly is not what is happening) but the first 2 reflect what we are often seeing?

b) some easy hits on capability

b1) raise the command divisor to /14 for army level till say 1 December, its not much but it removes the real value of getting the top 10 commanders into the main forces early on
b2) as others have said, no assualt fronts before december and only 1 then. That not only hampers the CPP regain, it adds to the leadership problems.

In testing, most Soviet players didn't go for early assault fronts as the perception was there were better uses for the admin pts. In consequence the game played a lot better - now its inevitable that people experiment, report and that gets copied, and we get a new feeling for overall balance.

b3) Admin movemement is removed after an attack, that should stop the hit and run stuff that a lot of Soviet players now indulge in. Worth remembering that Kravchenko's tank victory in late Sept 41 was essentially a defensive ambush not a mobile operation.

c) don't mess with logistics, despite some claims the system works and hits both sides in the right way

d) I'd be cautious about reducing the time to level 1 fort, mainly as that could make a real mess of any later Axis defences in the Ukraine

If there is a simple fix, its take off Soviet assault fronts in 1941. I'd be more interested in that than any of the more esoteric house rules being adopted. As above, I know that until quite late in testing it wasn't regularly used and it did make for very different play dynamics. I don't think there have been any really major code changes since then so (wearing my social policy evaluation hat), if there is something big and different focus on that rather than something small and marginal?

I really like this.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: erikbengtsson

I think the biggest difference is a Soviet player has historical hindsight, and doesn't commit the catastrophical and self-defeating errors that Stalin and Stavka did in 1941 and during much of 42.

Germany lost the war on June 22nd of 1941. Soviet errors simply made that less than obvious for a while.

yep, fully agree.

assuming a reasonable match, then the axis shouldn't be able to win (in the sense that the Soviet Union is reduced to some sort of rump state over the Urals).

What we are currently seeing is reports of quick German wins (usually in the sense the Soviet player gives up leaving no real idea of how well they can recover). Take 'received wisdom' and Leningrad. At one stage in testing, it was declared it was impossible to take, then players started to work out how to take it. Ok, we now see games where Leningrad is taken. Its a nice VP bonus, shortens the line, but beyond that?

My concern at the moment is a feeling that the balance pt should be roughly the historical German advance in 1941. No its feasible, and sensible, that German players may wish to pull up short of this, but that should be something regularly seen. And its actually near to impossible, even vs the AI (on 110) you can forget about achieving it

Reading this makes me want to find another game if the Germans can't or should never win . Game wise you have a game that is going to see a mass exodus of players leaving once the realization is that playing Germany is a no-win scenario. Matter of fact I already see that with a few die hards trying to prove it is possible to still win as Germany. Well the question should be, "Is it possible at the same skill level"? Is it? Probably not, so why play a game then when you can't win? Most won't. I am one of those die-hards that loves the German side & will try my best but even my best I don't feel is going to be good enough.

I think there are 2 issues and you are conflating them [;)] a wee bit.

Could the Germans win this war - I actually don't think so. Laying aside they were stretched everywhere else, quite simply the Soviet system was that horrible (to deal with) combination of very robust and very dispersed. Once it stoppped losing on the battlefields it was going to start winning. Now maybe that spins off into a long brutal slogging match but only one side wins when wars in this era in the end come to raw resources.

Now should a German player have a route to win the game? Yes, and they are in the game (quite a few of them). There are enough vs AI reports of German players managing this.

My main concern here, is less can the German win, more why are we not seeing them lose historically? I actually think the answer to one (in game turns) is the answer to the other.

[DeletedUser1769703214]

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: loki100




yep, fully agree.

assuming a reasonable match, then the axis shouldn't be able to win (in the sense that the Soviet Union is reduced to some sort of rump state over the Urals).

What we are currently seeing is reports of quick German wins (usually in the sense the Soviet player gives up leaving no real idea of how well they can recover). Take 'received wisdom' and Leningrad. At one stage in testing, it was declared it was impossible to take, then players started to work out how to take it. Ok, we now see games where Leningrad is taken. Its a nice VP bonus, shortens the line, but beyond that?

My concern at the moment is a feeling that the balance pt should be roughly the historical German advance in 1941. No its feasible, and sensible, that German players may wish to pull up short of this, but that should be something regularly seen. And its actually near to impossible, even vs the AI (on 110) you can forget about achieving it

Reading this makes me want to find another game if the Germans can't or should never win . Game wise you have a game that is going to see a mass exodus of players leaving once the realization is that playing Germany is a no-win scenario. Matter of fact I already see that with a few die hards trying to prove it is possible to still win as Germany. Well the question should be, "Is it possible at the same skill level"? Is it? Probably not, so why play a game then when you can't win? Most won't. I am one of those die-hards that loves the German side & will try my best but even my best I don't feel is going to be good enough.

I think there are 2 issues and you are conflating them [;)] a wee bit.

Could the Germans win this war - I actually don't think so. Laying aside they were stretched everywhere else, quite simply the Soviet system was that horrible (to deal with) combination of very robust and very dispersed. Once it stoppped losing on the battlefields it was going to start winning. Now maybe that spins off into a long brutal slogging match but only one side wins when wars in this era in the end come to raw resources.

Now should a German player have a route to win the game? Yes, and they are in the game (quite a few of them). There are enough vs AI reports of German players managing this.

My main concern here, is less can the German win, more why are we not seeing them lose historically? I actually think the answer to one (in game turns) is the answer to the other.

Who is conflating what now ? . Seems you just did it too. For instance you are comparing with AI vs player we are not comparing the same apple. When the conversation deviates from player vs player I am out since I already know the bread and butter money maker is player vs AI with the majority of the player base playing against the AI.

@ last para are we talking in PvP game terms or in PvAI game terms?

I still feel the Germans can win even if it is a Phricc victory in 44 after getting beat to crap with current ruleset. It will be a long tough road with equal skilled players for the Germans. At least that is what I am trying to prove. This is just what I read, and then wrote about, is the "feeling" I got from reading all the above comments in the previous post.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

...
Who is conflating what now ? . Seems you just did it too. For instance you are comparing with AI vs player we are not comparing the same apple. When the conversation deviates from player vs player I am out since I already know the bread and butter money maker is player vs AI with the majority of the player base playing against the AI.

@ last para are we talking in PvP game terms or in PvAI game terms?

I still feel the Germans can win even if it is a Phricc victory in 44 after getting beat to crap with current ruleset. It will be a long tough road with equal skilled players for the Germans. At least that is what I am trying to prove. This is just what I read, and then wrote about, is the "feeling" I got from reading all the above comments in the previous post.

I thought you were conflating what would be a real world axis victory (impossible in my opinion) with how an axis win is represented in game - if not then my apoligies

I think its been made clear before that the great majority of players only play the AI, a substantial further number do both AI and HtH, pure HtH is a small minority. Hence all the work that went into (& goes into) the AI development.

So, and many apologies for this, but yes I will carry on talking about both HtH situations and those vs AI.

[AlbertN]

The point in general is that - besides some AI improvements - once the game is balanced HvH, it will 'naturally' be also vs the AI as a player fine-tune the AI with percentages and the like.
The Master level player going vs the AI will probably seek a 90 my own side, 120 AI side type of conflict - if they stick to play vs the AI.

The Human vs Human does not have this type of 'scaling' (or well it is not common that anyone is to accept to play at 100 and give the other side 110). But in general what is balanced and tuned for HvH goes hand in hand with the gameplay vs the AI.
The issue is that the AI cannot get 'smarter' unless coded in deeper and more time consuming detail. A player tend to improve as the game goes. Til their own limits or game limits (or a mix) are reached.

[loki100]

T57 – 19 July 1942

I'll do some reports as this progresses, not least there are no other 1942 AARs being reported so it has some value. Even if the outcome is scarcely in doubt.

Nothing much has happened for AGN. Somewhat to my surprise I took Pushkin last turn.

Some localised Soviet attacks but have a decent reserve, so can rotate out a battered division and replace it with fresh. Defensive line is mostly divisions, that plus forts and terrain mean it will take a serious effort to really dent my lines.



This is what passes fora summer offensive. Finally took Orel a few turns back, 2 and 4 Armies are in good defensive terrain and I'm building up a fort belt back towards Smolensk. 2 and 3 Pzr basically grind there way north a hex a turn. Every now and then I surround a hex. Essentially pointless but I can't face just sitting on the defensive till the Soviets are able to launch an offensive.



I lost most of the armour of 1 Pzr A in an attack towards Voronezh so lack both the capacity and interest in doing anything here. Can fall back to a well fortified line along the Donets under pressure.



11A has finally recovered from the Sevastopol battles so I'll try something here next turn together with 4 PzrA. Not going to achieve anything but may damage some of the Soviet rail net.



State of my Pzr divisions. All those are combined divisions (regiments just die), about 60% of some use.

Production is building up so its a delivery issue. Would rather not release them to the national reserve as I have the problem of regaining their trucks when they return but I'll do that if needed.



OOB. Best I can say is I'm stopping the growth of the Red Army, that slow offensive north does generate a lot of routs and the occassional shatter.



Losses.



Destroyed units – you can see the pattern of small pockets. Not going to make any difference.



Manpower pools, unfortunately the Soviets can form up quite a lot, guess they are a bit short of admin pts.




And the VP chart. At least I won't lose in October 1942. I guess I might take Tula (but I really doubt it), so may just get a HWM over 600.

As it is the Soviets will get +36 bonus on initiative change and then the early bonus for retaking Orel, Kharkov etc (they have already had Kursk). Reckon on a net -66 just for the cities in the south. So I doubt we'll see an end game as once they attack seriously they'll meet one of the sudden death tests.



Really the only merit to this game now is that the Soviets deserve the chance to be on the offensive and its going to be interesting to see a HtH game where the initiative changes naturally – and at least in 1942 not at T10.

Not worth saying much about logistics. I would have set it up better but its fine. My issue is not MP or really CV, its the endless wall of Soviet formations.

[Chama]

Is this the only pvp AAR that goes into 42?