AAR vs Seminole

[DesertedFox]

ORIGINAL: xhoel

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox

Only about 13 % if the Soviet tanks modern T-34 and KV. So how does this justify your claim the battle in question from this game is "pure fantasy" when compared to Brody? It doesn't.

What? Learn to write first, then we can talk.

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox
Time frame doesn't matter.

Yes it does, because I specified that the Soviets didnt have the abilities in July 1941 and you used an example of a Soviet attack in November 1942.

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox
The 11th Panzer division was completely surrounded at one stage and if the Soviet Corp had not wandered off into nowhere the outcome could have been different.

A lot of things could have been differnt in the war, if different decisions had been made or different events have happened. What a shocker!

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox

You have provided no evidence what so ever that the outcome in this game's battle was "pure fantasy".

I have and also countered your claims. No point talking to fanboys that pretend they are being objective. You entered this talk by attacking a strawman position, have shifted the goalposts multiple times and have made constant bad faith arguments. You are clearly not interested in a discussion, nor are you interested in hearing what others have to say about the game.

There is no point talking to you and I wont waste any more of my time with it. Enjoy fighing strawmen arguments, you seem to be brilliant at it.

More useless rhetoric without any facts or evidence.

[AlbertN]

I think people can look at history - with this or that episode.

A battle could have gone this way and another that way. Etcetera.
But there are patterns and situations.
Did Soviets had stalling counterattacks in the 41? Stalling, no. Delaying yes.
Did Germans had successful offensives in '44? Local ones, yes. Heck, they even had successes in Hungary. Has that changed the whole business of the war? No.

The grand scheme must be seen.
The general pulse of the game felt.

You can go back and forth on percentages and whatnot as much as you like.

But it seems more players -that play / profess to play- are showing struggling times on Axis side.

[vvs007]

ORIGINAL: xhoel
-We are talking about a single battle on the 6th of July 1941

-We already have historical precedent of such an event happening in the Battle of Brody (23-30 June 1941) but the result contradicts your claim. 3.5k Soviet tanks going agains a much smaller German force of 750 tanks. The result: 200 German tanks lost vs 800 Soviet tanks lost (4:1 ratios)

-No point talking to fanboys that pretend they are being objective

hmm... from total 3k RU tanks (Dubno-Brody area 23/06-1/07), on 8/07/41 mech corps had less than 600 tanks. thus, the losses amounted to 2.5k. so the fanboy of the Red Army is you, Herr xhoel! (reduced losses by three times) ...

Remind you that we considered the losses in AlbertNs AAR (89 German tanks in a week's battle), which you claim to be unrealistic, let's compare the situations again:

1. Main force
IRL 1941 150k vs 150k (1:1) AAR 100k vs 16k (6:1)

2. German aviation activity, IRL 1941 very strong, AAR - nothing

3. The range of the mechanized corps marches to the battle areas (lvl OP losses), IRL 100-150 km, AAR -40 km max

4. and Most importantly, for whom did the battlefield remain? This is an important indicator because the main losses in the AAR of German tanks are "damaged" and "abandoned", and in real history about 60-70% of Russian tanks were killed not in direct battle, and even less so from German tank guns.

I hope the difference is obvious?

Thus, the historical battle of Dubno-Brody does not in any way deny the "historicity" of the battle that was brilliantly carried out in this AAR (bravo Seminole!), the ground battles of WITE2 have become much more real than in WITE1. But aviation, unfortunately, needs to be seriously rebuilt.

[DesertedFox]

ORIGINAL: vvs007

But aviation, unfortunately, needs to be seriously rebuilt.

+1.

[HardLuckYetAgain]

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox

ORIGINAL: vvs007

But aviation, unfortunately, needs to be seriously rebuilt.

+1.

I guess this conversation if going to go how great the Soviets are in the Air and how the 109's are too invincible in the game. I hope not but I am sure it will go that way

[DesertedFox]

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox

ORIGINAL: vvs007

But aviation, unfortunately, needs to be seriously rebuilt.

+1.

I guess this conversation if going to go how great the Soviets are in the Air and how the 109's are too invincible in the game. I hope not but I am sure it will go that way

Wrong in that case for me HL.

I feel that direct air support in ground combat could be beefed up a bit.

I am not sure how effective interdiction actually is in the game, but the German airforce gave the Soviets deploying for the attack at Brody a big workover.

[HardLuckYetAgain]

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: DesertedFox




+1.

I guess this conversation if going to go how great the Soviets are in the Air and how the 109's are too invincible in the game. I hope not but I am sure it will go that way

Wrong in that case for me HL.

I feel that direct air support in ground combat could be beefed up a bit.

I am not sure how effective interdiction actually is in the game, but the German airforce gave the Soviets deploying for the attack at Brody a big workover.

Jubjub is doing pretty good Ground attacks to my 1941 Germans. So I hope it isn't beefed up anymore since I am losing 150-300 men per bombing run and he is making up to 3 runs on a hex before attacking. So lord I hope not from that perspective. I will post some of his bombings in my AAR when I get back from grabbing a sandwich for lunch.

I know I don't use the German airforce much in 41 because I want the supply for ground forces. Thus I have not done much Ground Attacking. But interdiction in the early stages of beta was crazy that I saw. Now it might be a bit low but I am still on the fence on interdiction.

[Jango32]

But only V Fliegerkorps participated during the border battles at Lutsk-Dubno-Rovno-Lvov with 109 single engine fighters and 247 twin engine bombers (exclusively He-111s and Ju-88s with the sole exception of 2 Bf-110s) that were completely unsuited for low interdiction and ground support (see Imgur links above)...

[carlkay58]

There were some major changes in the use of the air force for interdiction, ground attack, and ground support early in the design of WitE2. Without those changes the sheer numbers of the VVS were overwhelming the ability of the Axis to go anywhere after turn 1. The problem was that the air effectiveness in WitW was WAY too powerful when moved to the eastern front.

[GloriousRuse]

Re: HYLA, radios, and coordination.

The early Germans did have more radios, hands down. As it relates to this question, that really gave them increased tactical level ability and the ability to be agile in and around the structure of a plan. When it comes to actually making a multi division plan in WW2 though, it's paper, acetate, and in person meetings. That all travels by courier and hard copy. At a technological level, how you assemble and put the planning framework in place for Kursk or Yelna look pretty much the ssame...the Germans are just way better at it professionally in '41. But just getting 800 tanks to the starting line and pointed the right way would have looked like paper and acetate for both sides.

After that is when radios matter, but even then you have to account the vast doctrinal differences. Let's take you point , "but how would tanks know how to go to the next objective" as an example.

The German lesson from 1918 was that small units, well handled and with iniative and agility would break a front, and it was only a matter of adding mobility and traveling fire support and you would be able to actually sustain what the lessons of 1918 had already taught you how to win. Their answer to your question is a horrified stare that the very small units they relied on for big successes would ever not have the communication to enable and exploit a breakthrough, rolling notbjust on to new objectives but picking their own and letting higher know. You can't coordinate that without radio.

The soviets learned a very different lesson set. That local success was ultimately pointless unless tied into a successive series of hammer blows that didn't just penetrate, but obliterated, the front in depth. Their answer to your question would be "we could call the commander if he's alive, and he can take a moment to talk to his people in person, or just signal flag them to follow. But why are we going to a new objective? The first echelon got in a fight, that is what it's there for. Someone else will be passing througb" Where the Germans wanted wild and flukd big results from small units, thesoviets wanted small and predictable results from big units that could be chained together. Both doctrinaly and dogmatically many soviet theorists thought small professional armies were madness. And if you had to accept that a massive army drawn from the people to create a series of ever strengthening blows to break the enemy was the way to win a war, then you dint really care if a company could go to a second objective at a moments notice. That was someone else's job. All you cared about was that they achieved what you told them to do up front, and you could parse what you wanted to do later. So for them coordinating 800 tanks tactically wasn't that hard. Give them objectives and sectors. Give the second echelon deeper objectives. There you go.

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[loki100]

just to add to this, doctrinally the last efforts of a Soviet offensive formation would not be to look to move into the next line of objectives but to secure the area they already held so that any follow through formations could do so with minimal interdiction and delay.

So the first echelon are there to break the line and, as securely as possible, clear the passage for the follow on formations.

Once the battle has past, it will re-organise and move on ... or to quote someone 'quantity has its own quality', it also has its own doctrinal models

[HardLuckYetAgain]

ORIGINAL: GloriousRuse

Re: HYLA, radios, and coordination.

The early Germans did have more radios, hands down. As it relates to this question, that really gave them increased tactical level ability and the ability to be agile in and around the structure of a plan. When it comes to actually making a multi division plan in WW2 though, it's paper, acetate, and in person meetings. That all travels by courier and hard copy. At a technological level, how you assemble and put the planning framework in place for Kursk or Yelna look pretty much the ssame...the Germans are just way better at it professionally in '41. But just getting 800 tanks to the starting line and pointed the right way would have looked like paper and acetate for both sides.

After that is when radios matter, but even then you have to account the vast doctrinal differences. Let's take you point , "but how would tanks know how to go to the next objective" as an example.

The German lesson from 1918 was that small units, well handled and with iniative and agility would break a front, and it was only a matter of adding mobility and traveling fire support and you would be able to actually sustain what the lessons of 1918 had already taught you how to win. Their answer to your question is a horrified stare that the very small units they relied on for big successes would ever not have the communication to enable and exploit a breakthrough, rolling notbjust on to new objectives but picking their own and letting higher know. You can't coordinate that without radio.

The soviets learned a very different lesson set. That local success was ultimately pointless unless tied into a successive series of hammer blows that didn't just penetrate, but obliterated, the front in depth. Their answer to your question would be "we could call the commander if he's alive, and he can take a moment to talk to his people in person, or just signal flag them to follow. But why are we going to a new objective? The first echelon got in a fight, that is what it's there for. Someone else will be passing througb" Where the Germans wanted wild and flukd big results from small units, thesoviets wanted small and predictable results from big units that could be chained together. Both doctrinaly and dogmatically many soviet theorists thought small professional armies were madness. And if you had to accept that a massive army drawn from the people to create a series of ever strengthening blows to break the enemy was the way to win a war, then you dint really care if a company could go to a second objective at a moments notice. That was someone else's job. All you cared about was that they achieved what you told them to do up front, and you could parse what you wanted to do later. So for them coordinating 800 tanks tactically wasn't that hard. Give them objectives and sectors. Give the second echelon deeper objectives. There you go.

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I see. Thanks for the write-up

[HardLuckYetAgain]

ORIGINAL: loki100

just to add to this, doctrinally the last efforts of a Soviet offensive formation would not be to look to move into the next line of objectives but to secure the area they already held so that any follow through formations could do so with minimal interdiction and delay.

So the first echelon are there to break the line and, as securely as possible, clear the passage for the follow on formations.

Once the battle has past, it will re-organise and move on ... or to quote someone 'quantity has its own quality', it also has its own doctrinal models

Ya, Flooding with manpower was probably the only good Soviet quality.

[GloriousRuse]

At first, perhaps. The rebirth of the red army is an entirely dogma appropriate dialectic synthesis of initially over grandiose theory and insuffient emphasis tactical proficiency that create a brutal operational machine that no one will figure out how to beat on a conventional battlefield until the 2nd offset of the 1975-89 range. There's a reason NATO did not maintain a no first use policy, and it's largely because for decades after the end of WW2 they really don't internally believe they can stop that machine. In many ways what we would now think of as the Western way of war - exquisite war machines, precision munitions, expensive soldiers for all of those, and an ultimate faith in technology to win on the conventional field- that all arises because no one can figure out how to beat the soviet system without nukes for 30 years.

[vvs007]

ORIGINAL: GloriousRuse
Both doctrinaly and dogmatically many soviet theorists thought small professional armies were madness. And if you had to accept that a massive army drawn from the people to create a series of ever strengthening blows to break the enemy was the way to win a war, then you dint really care if a company could go to a second objective at a moments notice

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain
Ya, Flooding with manpower was probably the only good Soviet quality.

It seems that you want to explain the tragedies of Russians in the first days of the war by the lack of "fashionable" super-doctrines, the "usual" disregard for the lives of soldiers for Russian commanders, etc., which is reflected in the invented (in computer games) strategy of human waves (hello hoi4).

1919, near the city of Tsaritsyn, Comrade Stalin concentrated all Red artillery in one sector of the front, which inflicted terrible damage on the elite units of the White Army advancing on the city. So the city was renamed Stalingrad [;)]. The doctrine of the Russians was the same as that of the Germans, with massive artillery fire (not sparing the shells, but sparing the lives of the soldiers - this is a direct quote Stalin 1940 ) to suppress the enemy's resistance, break into the defenses and encircle and destroy with mobile units (call it "classic Сannes").

Аn example of such a successful operation is the Khalkhin-Gol (Nomonkhan) 1939 where Zhukov surrounded and destroyed the Japanese, and mind you, he was not prevented by the lack of radio for every soldier [;)].

Russian commanders tried to do the same in counterstrikes and offensives since 1941 throughout the all war (Dubno - Brody, Soltsy are encirclement-idea operations), another thing is that total german air superiority did not allow secretly concentrating forces for a strike).

The main reason for the tragedy of the Red Army in 1941 is the unexpected, unpredictable destructive power of the Luftwaffe (an approximate effect like the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor). All the successes of the Germans are closely related to aviation, when the total advantage in the air was contested by the Russians (or the weather), the victories also stopped.

Аs for small professional armies or more exotic doctrines of that time (victory only by aviation), real history has shown that Russian theorists guessed right, a war against tribes can be won in this manner, but against a large industrial country, you need to strain all your potential and put under arms as many soldiers from the people as possible, and the task of professional commanders is to train them quickly and efficiently.

[Jango32]

What total German air superiority? The Germans at Dubno were completely outnumbered in the air, with only V Fliegerkorps dedicated to operations supporting the border battles, running interdiction and also fighting the VVS in the air over a very wide operational area. By contrast the VVS in this area only experienced 277 aircraft losses during bombing runs at the end of the first day, with an unknown number lost in aerial combat - this still leaves the VVS with over a thousand aircraft in the Kiev Military District (later to become the Southwestern Front) ready to commit to the fighting.

During the Lepel offensive the Luftwaffe was not a decisive element in the battle's outcome either - the closest LW fighter unit was 350km away from Lepel (never mind Luftflotte 2 having to fend itself off against the VVS in the air and also providing air support for all of Army Group Center) while the VVS still had the major airbases at Ulla, Vitebsk and Orsha.

Overwhelming Luftwaffe air superiority and overwhelming Luftwaffe air numbers to the extent claimed simply weren't there. The Red Army's woes were much more chronic, endemic and problematic - from divisional TOE structures, from divisional TOE shortages present in units, a chronic lack of vehicles needed to support the simultaneously existing 61 tank divisions and 31 mechanised divisions leading to shortages everywhere, C&C problems and the list goes on. Blaming it chiefly on the Luftwaffe across the entire frontline was nothing more than an excellent scapegoat for army personnel to shift the blame to the air force.

https://www.operationbarbarossa.net/wp- ... th-411.pdf
https://imgur.com/a/x6HBHM6
https://imgur.com/a/hBQidBl
https://imgur.com/a/T8VqLZk