The game has a great points system. I recommend you study it in detail.
The point system is the best one I’ve ever seen in a wargame with the level of complexity that AE has.
The historical context that backs up the point system is absolutely magnificent. This is one of the reasons
that I think this is the best strategic wargame ever designed.
As for Japan, the Outlaw commented on the two ways that Japan can win under this system.
I’ve provided that commentary below along with a few of my own comments in italics.
The Idea is that Japan can conduct an active defense by a series of operations that buy time.
This prevents the Allied player from achieving his victory conditions.
The Outlaw:
Japan will experience an economic implosion. As it should because that is historically accurate.
But it does not follow that the Japanese player is doomed to lose the game.
Japan has two ways of winning in AE. One is by achieving an auto victory which can occur
at any time after 1 January 1943. I see too many Japanese players who recklessly throw everything
to achieve an auto victory on 1 January 1943 and failing to do so then they reap the consequences
of their poor play. They forget that unless their opponent plays very badly, a later auto victory
which builds on thoughtful play throughout 1942, is the road to take.
A very good example of properly approaching an auto victory is found in Cribtop's recent AAR
where a Japanese auto victory on 1 January 1944 was assured (provided he did not lose his head waiting)
and an auto victory in the last quarter of 1943 was very much on the cards.
Cribtop AAR:
https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.a ... age=1&key=
Note that there were a number of House Rules agreed to and listed in Post #4.
I don’t believe they made a difference in the game. I don’t think they were needed.
In Post #40 Cribtop explains his war strategy and that he subscribes to the Q-Ball Theory:
I’m sure it was not originally the Q-Ball Theory but the ultimate Allied strategy in the Pacific War.
Two main objectives of the Allies are:
1) To cut the flow of raw materials from the SRA to Japan.
2) To seize bases within range of the Home Islands to allow for a strategic bombing campaign.
Conversely, the strategic objectives of Japan are, at a minimum,
1) seizure of the Oil bases in the SRA.
2) capture of a defensible perimeter ensuring that convoys can move from the SRA to the industry of the Home Islands.
In Post #2189 Cribtop gives his retrospective of the operations he conducted:
fb.asp?m=3477619
The Outlaw:
The other approach to achieve a Japanese victory is to prevent the Allied player from achieving either
an auto victory or a decisive victory at the end of the scenario. AE's victory conditions are very much
shaped by the historical outcome which equates to the game's auto/decisive victory conditions.
A Japanese player who prevents the Allied player from achieving that outcome, has in fact performed
much better than Japan did historically and therefore can consider to have won their race.
As to the strategy of digging in, at least in terms of how most interpret that strategy,
they simply get it wrong. The correct approach has always been for Japan to employ an active,
not passive defense.
Again a very good discussion on how to conduct an active defense is found in Cribtop's AAR.
The fact is that the simplified and abstracted logistics model, combined with
certain "switches" which greatly augment Japan's historical at start asymmetrical advantages
and initiative, a good Japanese player can keep the initiative until he achieves victory.
Supply is overrated. Or more correctly, the lack of supply is unnecessarily feared. This is due
to the simplified abstracted logistics model. In AE a division which has zero supply still fights
at 25% of its theoretical combat power. In real life, such a unit, without water, puts up zero resistance.
In AE a unit with zero supply is only in trouble if it is called upon to do prolonged fighting or is confronted
by an overwhelming enemy force. In AE Japan will always be able to produce more supply than it was able to historically.
The ability to fly planes consuming only rice instead of avgas, means there is always the potential of flying air missions.
The issue really is not the production of supply per se but the distribution of supply to where
it is really needed. What usually happens is that Japanese players tend to look at their supply
distribution network and priorities only when it is too late. Not too many Japanese players consider
how much supply will be subsequently needed, and how to get it there, before embarking on their operations.
Cost benefit analyses do not figure prominently in their planning.
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