This is some data from an in depth US study of the battle of Kursk:
THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS of the KOSAVE II Study are:
(1) Soviet initial personnel in theater were 66 percent higher than German, and initial Soviet tanks in theater were double the German level. A considerably larger fraction of the German units in the Kursk campaign was engaged in combat and incurring casualties for a longer time than was the case for Soviet units. The majority of German units were continually attacking from 5 July through 12 July 1943, but all had ceased attacking by 17 July. The Soviets defended until they counter-attacked on 12 July. German progress peaked on 16 July at 46 kilometers (km) northern advance from initial 4 July positions.
(2) Daily Soviet personnel casualties and casualty rates were much higher than German. The Germans also consistently destroyed tanks and heavy antitank (AT) weapons in the Soviet force at a much higher rate than the Soviets achieved against them. However, for both personnel and tank/ heavy AT weapons, high fractional exchange ratios in favor of the Germans were sporadic and not sustained during the campaign.
(3) Over the entire KDB campaign, the Soviets consumed 44 percent more tank/AT ammunition that the Germans. The Germans expended three times the Soviet artillery tonnage, two times the Soviet rocket tonnage, and tree times the Soviet small arms/AA tonnage expenditure.
(4) The Germans generated more tactical aircraft sorties than the Soviets. The roles with the most sorties were ground attack for the Germans and air-to-air for the Soviets.
(5) The Soviets always had unengaged reserves, while the Germans were always fully committed and engaged. Only 2/3 of Soviet personnel, tanks, and heavy AT weapons were, on average, in contact with the enemy, compared with averages of 92-97 percent for the Germans. This suggests that the German force was subjected to more wear and tear from the effects of nearly constant combat than was its opponent. Also, since rest and replenishment are minimal in a heavily committed force, the effectiveness and efficiency of German combat elements probably deteriorated over time relative to the Soviet force.
As far as regaining the initiative after a Soviet offensive is concerned, you just can't compare the '41 winter offensive with Uranus. What the Soviets did in 42 was MUCH uglier to the Germans than what happened in 41. The German's lost the strategic initiative once the Soviets went over to offensive at Stalingrad and never regained it... they never even really got close.
That's not to say that the Germans couldn't really take it to the Soviets once in awhile.
You can't compare the strategic situation of such a significant theatre of war from one year to the next. The world was different in 1942 than it was in 1941. There's nothing to measure the concept of 'typical' with on the strategic scale.
Bagration: I see the 44 Belorussian offensive as the Soviet masterpiece of the war. They pulled off some serious strategic surprise on the Germans and were able to dynamically modify operational plans and get troops moving super well. So much went so right for them...
Tomo
Soviet military development throughout WW2 and how its reflected in SPWAW
Moderator: MOD_SPWaW
I've seen the US Study. I got the distinct impression that it was not an objective analysis. Why? perhaps because the SU was our most likely opponent post war. The Soviets did little clear up the situation, preffering to cloak their abilities in secrecy. Soviet cababilities have been continually underestimated by US studies, even in recent times
If all these things had happened as described in the analysis, the Soviets should not have won.
Given the slugfest nature of the offensive and the actual German progress vs their projected progress it seems hard to believe that the defender could be consistantly suffering higher casualties than the attacker. The Soviet practice of holding back reserves only works if a very *finite* level of troops and weapons fights tenaciously to bleed white the attacker. They did not have an endless supply of reinforcments at Kursk or in any other battle for that matter
Had all these things taken place then yes, Kursk might be considered a minor "setback" for the Wehrmacht instead of the defeat that it was.
There was indeed a general 'pattern' to the offensive/defensive operations between the seasons. I did'nt say that the scale of the defeats/victories were the same. In 41, the Germans were savaged but not to the same degree as in 42 when in addition to the large scale equipment losses they also lost a entire large Army's worth of combat troops to boot.
The "Pattern" was i was reffering to was that the German war machine generally operated with it's best efficiency during the summer season while the opposite was true during the harsh winters.
All this debate has certainly rekindled my interest. I'll see if i can dig up some of the old sources.
[ July 17, 2001: Message edited by: Nikademus ]
If all these things had happened as described in the analysis, the Soviets should not have won.
Given the slugfest nature of the offensive and the actual German progress vs their projected progress it seems hard to believe that the defender could be consistantly suffering higher casualties than the attacker. The Soviet practice of holding back reserves only works if a very *finite* level of troops and weapons fights tenaciously to bleed white the attacker. They did not have an endless supply of reinforcments at Kursk or in any other battle for that matter
Had all these things taken place then yes, Kursk might be considered a minor "setback" for the Wehrmacht instead of the defeat that it was.
There was indeed a general 'pattern' to the offensive/defensive operations between the seasons. I did'nt say that the scale of the defeats/victories were the same. In 41, the Germans were savaged but not to the same degree as in 42 when in addition to the large scale equipment losses they also lost a entire large Army's worth of combat troops to boot.
The "Pattern" was i was reffering to was that the German war machine generally operated with it's best efficiency during the summer season while the opposite was true during the harsh winters.
All this debate has certainly rekindled my interest. I'll see if i can dig up some of the old sources.
[ July 17, 2001: Message edited by: Nikademus ]
Tombstone, you're entirely correct that everything was completely different between '41 & '42. The Russains were in the middle of modernizing their miltary in '41. The new equipment had all been designed and accepted, but issue to line units was only beginning. Also, the Soviets had completely overestimated the capabilities of their air force. They thought that, sinply because their fighters were the fastest and their bombers were the heaviest, that they were best. And they also had to contend with several senior officers, who had Stalin's ear, who had no concepts of modern war and felt they should revert to WWI style divisions and artillery methods. More reasons why they got their butts kicked in the beginning.
Cracker
"Artillery is the God of Battle"
"Artillery is the God of Battle"
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CaptainBrian
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Bagration was certainly the most effective offensive the USSR conducted vs. Germany. One book I read refered to it as "Barbarosa in reverse." In fact, based on numbers alone, it was the most catastophic German defeat of the war. 17 Divisions utterly destroyed and 50 more rendered combat ineffective. More men and material were lost during the course of Bagration than was lost at Stalingrad.Originally posted by Tombstone:
Bagration: I see the 44 Belorussian offensive as the Soviet masterpiece of the war. They pulled off some serious strategic surprise on the Germans and were able to dynamically modify operational plans and get troops moving super well. So much went so right for them...Tomo
In the western world Bagration, coming on the heels of Normandy, (combined with our tendency to disparage Soviet military accomplishments) has been all but ignored.
IMHO the crown jewel of Red Army performance in WWII was Operation August Storm, the August 1945 offensive vs. the Japanese in Manchuria. Although the Kwangtung Army were hardly the equals of Army Group Center, the scale of victory achieved in the Far East surpasses Bagration. Many of the tactics, techniques and procedures used in Manchuria were first employed in Bagration. Also, 2 Combined Arms Armies (5th & 39th) that played key roles in Manchuria were veterans of Bagration.
CaptainBrian
1945 in Manchuria does have the Soviet war machine running in nearly perfect order. It indicated a honing of the operational skills of the Soviet military.
Kursk: Kursk was no 'minor setback' just cause Germany didn't take heinous losses doesn't mean that resources weren't used.. It cost Germany time and equipment and just went further toward the German army slipping down the slope.
What's to disbelieve in a study made in 1998 conducted by our own US Army Concepts Analysis Agency? Well a translated Soviet General Staff Study of the Battle of Kursk states that they lost 47% of their tank strength from 6-14 July, and in "The Battle of Kursk", by David Glantz (who has been studying the Soviet Military for like 20 years or something) puts the 5th Guards Tank Army's losses at 374 out of 615, this information quoted from a source published in Moscow(M. Kolomiets and M. Spirin, Kurskaia duga -Moscow:EksPrinte NB, 1998). Another source in his book (which is too long to type, and is in russian) states that the Voronezh front lost from 4 July to 22 July, 1204 tanks irrevocably, and 655 more that were repairable.
4th Pz Army started with about a 1000 tanks and had near 500 by the 14th, but that actually went up over time (minus the withdrawl of 2nd SS Pz Corps) until Rumianstev when the losses kicked up again.
The reality of Kursk is that the Soviets could afford the losses, personally don't think that they were all necessary, a lot of units were mismanaged from an operational standpoint.
I agree that wehrmacht was at its best in summer, but after 42 they never had the initiative strategically. Just cause they planned an offensive doesn't mean they had strategic control over the situation.
Tomo
Kursk: Kursk was no 'minor setback' just cause Germany didn't take heinous losses doesn't mean that resources weren't used.. It cost Germany time and equipment and just went further toward the German army slipping down the slope.
What's to disbelieve in a study made in 1998 conducted by our own US Army Concepts Analysis Agency? Well a translated Soviet General Staff Study of the Battle of Kursk states that they lost 47% of their tank strength from 6-14 July, and in "The Battle of Kursk", by David Glantz (who has been studying the Soviet Military for like 20 years or something) puts the 5th Guards Tank Army's losses at 374 out of 615, this information quoted from a source published in Moscow(M. Kolomiets and M. Spirin, Kurskaia duga -Moscow:EksPrinte NB, 1998). Another source in his book (which is too long to type, and is in russian) states that the Voronezh front lost from 4 July to 22 July, 1204 tanks irrevocably, and 655 more that were repairable.
4th Pz Army started with about a 1000 tanks and had near 500 by the 14th, but that actually went up over time (minus the withdrawl of 2nd SS Pz Corps) until Rumianstev when the losses kicked up again.
The reality of Kursk is that the Soviets could afford the losses, personally don't think that they were all necessary, a lot of units were mismanaged from an operational standpoint.
I agree that wehrmacht was at its best in summer, but after 42 they never had the initiative strategically. Just cause they planned an offensive doesn't mean they had strategic control over the situation.
Tomo
In 'Barbarossa' (Alan Clark, 1965) it says 'Lucy' was Stavka's Swiss agent.Originally posted by Tombstone:
I heard somewhere that "Lucy" was Brit feeding Enigma info to the Soviets....
Tomo
And as someone mentioned earlier the info was *so* good that at first the Soviets thought Lucy was actually an Abwehr agent on a mission of disinformation.
(Barbarossa, pg 151):
"In what remains an astonishing performance, and one finally accepted by Moscow as genuine, 'Lucy' supplied up to date data on the German order of battle, with day-to-day changes, as well as being able to answer inquiries about high level matters dealing with the German army. Such was Lucy's role that one highly valued Soviet agent considered that '...in the end Moscow very largely fought the war on Lucy's messages' "
Jim NSB 
Kursk
Look at the article someone else posted about Kursk. The article has 2-3 references including one by glantz already mentioned.
After sicily was invaded only 1 of the three divs in II SS Pz corps was transfered out. This corps which lead the offensive in the south had three SS Pzgren divs. With a total of 300 tanks just before the offensive statred. No Panthers, only 15 tigers and most of these tanks were PZIIIs and older PzIVs.
2 sov tank armies were cut to 200 tanks total. On the 12th they were joined by a fresh tank army with 650 tanks making 850 tanks total 500 of which were T-34s. The ger corps from above had just over 200 tanks at this point. The sov lost 650+ tanks this day and the gers lost 48.
This was the last sov reserve meant for the south. It was suppoosed to be saved for evental counter attacking. Within a couple of days 2 (of 5) sov armies in the salient had been encircled from the south. The gers had a corps of 3 fresh, experianced Panzer divs in the south.
The off should never had been launched because the gers were ready to go two months earlier but had to wait for Hitlars untried superwaepons, 200 panthers. Two months of preparation helped the sov far more then the germans. That germany was able to achieve the success they did is reamarkable. That the offensive would be cancelled after barely a week was stupid. The germans had almost achieved a desicieve victory in the south. A victory in the south might have lead to a bigger overall victory.
The sovs claimed a much higher number of ger tanks present and killed then had a relation to reality. They were just trying to cover up why they had almost lost. Despite 2 months prep and higher numbers of tanks.
This is the impression you get reading the article. There just might be some truth behind it. The kursk story, up until now, may be just as much myth as pol cav charging ger tanks.
Look at the article someone else posted about Kursk. The article has 2-3 references including one by glantz already mentioned.
After sicily was invaded only 1 of the three divs in II SS Pz corps was transfered out. This corps which lead the offensive in the south had three SS Pzgren divs. With a total of 300 tanks just before the offensive statred. No Panthers, only 15 tigers and most of these tanks were PZIIIs and older PzIVs.
2 sov tank armies were cut to 200 tanks total. On the 12th they were joined by a fresh tank army with 650 tanks making 850 tanks total 500 of which were T-34s. The ger corps from above had just over 200 tanks at this point. The sov lost 650+ tanks this day and the gers lost 48.
This was the last sov reserve meant for the south. It was suppoosed to be saved for evental counter attacking. Within a couple of days 2 (of 5) sov armies in the salient had been encircled from the south. The gers had a corps of 3 fresh, experianced Panzer divs in the south.
The off should never had been launched because the gers were ready to go two months earlier but had to wait for Hitlars untried superwaepons, 200 panthers. Two months of preparation helped the sov far more then the germans. That germany was able to achieve the success they did is reamarkable. That the offensive would be cancelled after barely a week was stupid. The germans had almost achieved a desicieve victory in the south. A victory in the south might have lead to a bigger overall victory.
The sovs claimed a much higher number of ger tanks present and killed then had a relation to reality. They were just trying to cover up why they had almost lost. Despite 2 months prep and higher numbers of tanks.
This is the impression you get reading the article. There just might be some truth behind it. The kursk story, up until now, may be just as much myth as pol cav charging ger tanks.
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Belisarius
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....aaand the fact that most the majority of the (quite competent) officer corps were terminated during Stalin's cleansings in the 30's. Well, as you all know, that went on throughout the war. I guess he (stalin) was glad in the end that he didn't put Zhukov away permanently :rolleyes:Originally posted by Cracker:
Tombstone, you're entirely correct that everything was completely different between '41 & '42. The Russains were in the middle of modernizing their miltary in '41. The new equipment had all been designed and accepted, but issue to line units was only beginning. Also, the Soviets had completely overestimated the capabilities of their air force. They thought that, sinply because their fighters were the fastest and their bombers were the heaviest, that they were best. And they also had to contend with several senior officers, who had Stalin's ear, who had no concepts of modern war and felt they should revert to WWI style divisions and artillery methods. More reasons why they got their butts kicked in the beginning.
Got StuG?
Germany needed to land a knock-out punch against the Soviet Union no later than 1942.
Its state of readiness was never good for a protracted conflict, its early victories the product of initiative, surprise and temporary tactical and strategic advantages that were lost as early as 1942, never to be re-gained.
In both world wars Germany was doomed to defeat because of the personalities of their supreme leaders, and the unthinking obedience of the General Staffs and other authorities in the land.
Their poor choice of allies, the belief that they could do anything and better than anybody else, their tendency to fight too many enemies on too many fronts and their failure to accept that their goals would not be achieved until it was way to late counted for much more than the superiority of tactics, soldiers and equipment. Their relative geographical position has always been a major strategic weakness.
The Soviets may have expended many lives and much equipment in defeating them, but they could afford to do so. Time was on their side. After 1942, the outcome was never in doubt.
The battle at kursk resulted in a German strategic defeat for a simple reason: at that point in the war, attacking was no longer a sensible option, as they no longer had the resources necessary to claim, let alone maintain the initiative for long enough.
[ July 18, 2001: Message edited by: Fabs ]
Its state of readiness was never good for a protracted conflict, its early victories the product of initiative, surprise and temporary tactical and strategic advantages that were lost as early as 1942, never to be re-gained.
In both world wars Germany was doomed to defeat because of the personalities of their supreme leaders, and the unthinking obedience of the General Staffs and other authorities in the land.
Their poor choice of allies, the belief that they could do anything and better than anybody else, their tendency to fight too many enemies on too many fronts and their failure to accept that their goals would not be achieved until it was way to late counted for much more than the superiority of tactics, soldiers and equipment. Their relative geographical position has always been a major strategic weakness.
The Soviets may have expended many lives and much equipment in defeating them, but they could afford to do so. Time was on their side. After 1942, the outcome was never in doubt.
The battle at kursk resulted in a German strategic defeat for a simple reason: at that point in the war, attacking was no longer a sensible option, as they no longer had the resources necessary to claim, let alone maintain the initiative for long enough.
[ July 18, 2001: Message edited by: Fabs ]
Fabs
I dusted off my copy of the old SPI board game Kursk by Jim Dunnagin (circa 1970)
(Anyone else remember Father Dunnagin of the Simulation Priesthood Incarnate ?
Replaying the historical July scenario and the What-if scenarios for May and June shows that a Ger attack in May with only 1 defensive belt in place along the salient should result in Germany snipping off the salient and pocketing the front line troops. A June assault against a 2 hex fortified belt resulted in draw. The July historical scenario mirrors reality. The addition of the Tiger brigade, Panthers, and Elefants is not enough to overcome the 3 hex deep fortifications and massive reserves the Soviets were able to buildup. based on this. Germany's best option was mount an assault in May, after the mud from the Spring thaw had dried. The overall effect would have straightened their lines, but by '43 the Ger mans had lost initiative and the inevitable strategic outcome was no longer in doubt.
[ July 18, 2001: Message edited by: Easy8 ]
(Anyone else remember Father Dunnagin of the Simulation Priesthood Incarnate ?
Replaying the historical July scenario and the What-if scenarios for May and June shows that a Ger attack in May with only 1 defensive belt in place along the salient should result in Germany snipping off the salient and pocketing the front line troops. A June assault against a 2 hex fortified belt resulted in draw. The July historical scenario mirrors reality. The addition of the Tiger brigade, Panthers, and Elefants is not enough to overcome the 3 hex deep fortifications and massive reserves the Soviets were able to buildup. based on this. Germany's best option was mount an assault in May, after the mud from the Spring thaw had dried. The overall effect would have straightened their lines, but by '43 the Ger mans had lost initiative and the inevitable strategic outcome was no longer in doubt.
[ July 18, 2001: Message edited by: Easy8 ]
"The problem with the future is that it keeps turning into the present" -Hobbes
An excellent book on this is "Stalin and HIs Generals". I don't recall the editor/publisher, but its a compilation of articles written by Russian officers and senior officials about their experiences with Stalin during the war.Originally posted by Belisarius:
....aaand the fact that most the majority of the (quite competent) officer corps were terminated during Stalin's cleansings in the 30's. Well, as you all know, that went on throughout the war. I guess he (stalin) was glad in the end that he didn't put Zhukov away permanently :rolleyes:
Cracker
"Artillery is the God of Battle"
"Artillery is the God of Battle"
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Belisarius
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ouch...it would help a lot if you'd remember the title... that'd be a most interesting book to read..Originally posted by Cracker:
An excellent book on this is "Stalin and HIs Generals". I don't recall the editor/publisher, but its a compilation of articles written by Russian officers and senior officials about their experiences with Stalin during the war.
Got StuG?
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Charles2222
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Charles2222
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I stand self-corrected. Those books are not 'XXXX and His Generals', but 'XXXX's Generals'. They're all done in the same cover style, however the authors are different.
Here's Stalin's Generals (I notice the book cover is different now, assuming Amazon has the cover in it's present state):
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0753800020/qid=9957661 41/sr=1-12/ref=sr_sp_re_1_12/202-5990680-2651058
Here's a review of Hitler's Generals:
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v10/v10p248_Clive.html
And here is Churchill's Generals:
http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/ts/exchange-glance/Y03Y5429902Y9518416/qid=995766426/sr=1-1/ref=aps_sr_z_2_1/107-4642052-4322113
[ July 21, 2001: Message edited by: Charles_22 ]
Here's Stalin's Generals (I notice the book cover is different now, assuming Amazon has the cover in it's present state):
http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0753800020/qid=9957661 41/sr=1-12/ref=sr_sp_re_1_12/202-5990680-2651058
Here's a review of Hitler's Generals:
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v10/v10p248_Clive.html
And here is Churchill's Generals:
http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/ts/exchange-glance/Y03Y5429902Y9518416/qid=995766426/sr=1-1/ref=aps_sr_z_2_1/107-4642052-4322113
[ July 21, 2001: Message edited by: Charles_22 ]