Soviet military development throughout WW2 and how its reflected in SPWAW
Moderator: MOD_SPWaW
Soviet military development throughout WW2 and how its reflected in SPWAW
This is an extremely interesting issue in WW2, and one that few know a great deal about. This relationship is one of the most critical factors in any game modeling WW2 combat. I think it is a worthy discussion.
What was it that changed in the Soviet army from 1942 to 1943?? They went from getting pounded to pounding back VERY hard.
This change certainly exhibited itself earlier, but to what degree? How much does this affect the quality of the Soviet soldier or tanker?
We should focus the discussion on how can it best be modeled in SPWAW just to keep it real (heh, know what I mean?)
Tomo
This change certainly exhibited itself earlier, but to what degree? How much does this affect the quality of the Soviet soldier or tanker?
We should focus the discussion on how can it best be modeled in SPWAW just to keep it real (heh, know what I mean?)
Tomo
Originally posted by Tombstone:
What was it that changed in the Soviet army from 1942 to 1943?? They went from getting pounded to pounding back VERY hard.
This change certainly exhibited itself earlier, but to what degree? How much does this affect the quality of the Soviet soldier or tanker?
We should focus the discussion on how can it best be modeled in SPWAW just to keep it real (heh, know what I mean?)
Tomo
well compared to 41 i think the biggest improvement would be from half trained and demoralized to better trained but still a mix of seasoned and unseasoned. I think WAW has tended to even out the extremes in the current game for the sake of "playability". I've noticed that even during the worst periods for army's like the Red Army and Italian army that their exp ratings tend to be higher than in previous versions.
Actually until Stalingrad, not a whole heck of a lot changed for the Red Army due to the huge losses they suffered. What "changed" was the battlefield. Once the Wehrmacht gave up fighting a fluid battle of movemen and chose to fight for yards of city block instead of miles of steppe they found themselves facing an opponent who's tenaciousness in defence and bravery and stamina equaled if not exceeded their own.
The Germans, who were so used to mopping up hordes of demoralized Russians could'nt contemplate much less accept that their hated foe was'nt suffering attrition at leaste as bad as they were. This was not the case and like Kursk in 43, while battalion after battalion bled themselves white in the rubble of Stalingrad against the fanatic defenders entrenched in the rubble, the STAVKA was able to concentrate fresh reserves of a counteroffensive. (Uranus and Mars)
Going back to the summer of 42, the better trained and motivated Siberian troops used during the winter counteroffensive had been bled white and were shells by the spring. The failed Karkov spring offensive showed that the Russians still had alot to learn about armored warfare and suffered heavily.
The shortage of trained tankman coupled with the huge AFV losses force the Russians to utilize the tank Brigade as the basic operational unit (a good portion of which were kept in reserve)
There were some more seasoned troops opposite Moscow of course too but there they would mostly stay, the occasional thrust for Rzhev a goal. Mars would turn out to be failure for Marshall Zhukov.
The divisions in the less vital southern front where the German offensive broke like a clap of thunder in 42 were outnumbered and were mostly conscripts IIRC.
43 was the turning point. After Stalingrad it was the turn of the Germans to lose massive amounts of experienced troops and allowed the Russians to build up the experience of their units and learn better operational methods. more Tank Brigades were combined to form tank armies etc etc, however i'd still say the edge was with the Germans.
Not a national charasteristic. I see issues like this being from the simple common sense approach of simply who has more operational experience? who has the greater cadre of experienced tank crews, infantry etc etc.
However by summer 43, the Germans let themselves get drawn into yet another type of fight best suited to the largely conscript drawn Red army. A defensive fight against a highly motivated enemy. The Russians had already proved their ability to develop formidable defences and at Kursk they perfected it with the pakfront, allowing the Germans to batter themselves silly against it, then unleashing fresh tank reserves held back for just this moment.
late 43-44 would show a "bump up" further on the exp factor as the Russians would have to conduct their own first "summer" offensive spearheaded by armored formations. (Batragon)
I've read that the STAVKA was keenly aware of the limitations of their troops and tailored their tactics to exploit their strengths, in other words, none of the "classic" hack and slash Blitzkreig of highly mobile forces that require a high degree of coordination and radio communicaiton, hence the reliance on artillery and mass breakthrough, hammer and anvil.
As for "specifics". WAW factors in certain tactical improvements via the AFV's and other weapons systems. T-34/85 improves crew # and FC improvements reflect the adoption of 3-man turrets. An increase in the chance of radios, and of course, increase in leadership skill ratings and crew morale and experience.
Not sure if artillery delay times reflect this. I remember in "Kampfgruppe" days that improvements in tactical control were simulated by lowering the "delay" time between when you issued an order and when the troops actually began to implement the command (The game worked on a pre-plot system with the combat resolved in a turn broken down into 4 "pulses")
41-42, the Germans had a big edge here having a very low "pulse" delay and therefore reacted to changing conditions far faster than the Soviet player who was saddled with a long "pulse" delay that could span multiple "turns".
By 43 the German edge was still there but much reduced
44, even.
45, The Germans actually had a longer delay (to simm all the young conscripts) and the more seasoned Russians now had a supeior reaction time.
Obviously this cant be simulated in a game like WAW, though command and control does to a degree (though certain mechanics of the orders generation confounds me still)
I think its been said here before but given the "scope" of WAW much of the factors discussed here cannot really be simulated as these are more "operational" in nature.
Primarily the "difference" between nations will have to be represented to a large degree by differences in FC and exp and morale ratings.
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Tom Terror
- Posts: 57
- Joined: Wed Jun 06, 2001 8:00 am
That is actually a very interesting theme.
I think it was in 1942 when Stalin, disapointed by the poor performance of his front commanders, ordered that each commander had to have a political educated "kommissar" as his deputy.
Those men from political schools of the communist party had to ensure that nobody runs from the enemy and that signs of cowardice or negative influence on the fighting spirit were eliminated on the spot.
That task included shooting at own people if nessesary. The Kommisars also had the task of political indoctrination and spreading propaganda within their district.
In doing so they managed to raise the will to stand and fight within the red army for reasons of fear of being shoot if not obeying and not to forget also because of extremly stirred up emotions through propaganda. (german cruelties behind the front actually helped soviet propaganda a lot)
How important the kommissars were for the red army and the soviet government shows the example of Nikita Chruchtschov the later Premier of the Soviet Union. He was a Polit-Kommissar to one of the big soviet general. Sorry, but I forgot for whom. I have to look this one up. IIRC he was involved in the battle for Stalingrad.
Soviet propaganda also changed with the time. When Stalin noticed that communist slogans alone wouldn´t do, he decide to come up with the term "Great Patriotic War" which refers to the russian struggle against Napoleon.
That was a very clever move of Stalin because with that switch in propaganda he triggered the national and nationalistic feelings of the russians. Even and most important of them who were not symphatizing with the communist party.
I think that the explained above had a great influence of the development of the red army.
But I can imagine that it is absolutely of no importance for SPWaW.
And no help either.
Tom
I think it was in 1942 when Stalin, disapointed by the poor performance of his front commanders, ordered that each commander had to have a political educated "kommissar" as his deputy.
Those men from political schools of the communist party had to ensure that nobody runs from the enemy and that signs of cowardice or negative influence on the fighting spirit were eliminated on the spot.
That task included shooting at own people if nessesary. The Kommisars also had the task of political indoctrination and spreading propaganda within their district.
In doing so they managed to raise the will to stand and fight within the red army for reasons of fear of being shoot if not obeying and not to forget also because of extremly stirred up emotions through propaganda. (german cruelties behind the front actually helped soviet propaganda a lot)
How important the kommissars were for the red army and the soviet government shows the example of Nikita Chruchtschov the later Premier of the Soviet Union. He was a Polit-Kommissar to one of the big soviet general. Sorry, but I forgot for whom. I have to look this one up. IIRC he was involved in the battle for Stalingrad.
Soviet propaganda also changed with the time. When Stalin noticed that communist slogans alone wouldn´t do, he decide to come up with the term "Great Patriotic War" which refers to the russian struggle against Napoleon.
That was a very clever move of Stalin because with that switch in propaganda he triggered the national and nationalistic feelings of the russians. Even and most important of them who were not symphatizing with the communist party.
I think that the explained above had a great influence of the development of the red army.
But I can imagine that it is absolutely of no importance for SPWaW.
And no help either.
Tom
-
Larry Holt
- Posts: 1644
- Joined: Fri Mar 31, 2000 10:00 am
- Location: Atlanta, GA 30068
I posted this a long time ago but it has relevance to this thread:
A Brief summary of Soviet Operational Art
by Larry Holt (lholt@atl.sita.int)
Since Matrix is working on operational level games, I thought that an article on this area would be of interest and use.
While the US military only acknowledged a level of war between tactical and strategic in the 1980's, the Soviet Union has studied the conduct of operations by large formations of the Armed Forces since before WWII. Briefly warfare can be divided into three levels:
Strategic: wars waged on a global scale by nations using all national means; military, economic, political and social.
Operational: campaigns waged in a theater of operations (e.g. Western Europe, Pacific) scale fought by theater military forces only; fronts, numbered armies and army groups, numbered or named fleets.
Tactical: battles and engagements fought by corps and below.
WWI showed the Soviet General Staff the need to wage combat with multiple armies and to conduct campaigns versus single battles. They saw that strategic warfare was broken into a series of operations by time and area objectives. This was the start of an operational art intermediate between tactics and strategy. It has sometimes also been called grand-tactical.
Operational maneuver was seen as the key to victory at the operational level. This is maneuver to the full depth and width of the operational area. This was a change from the previous doctrine of battles along a front with rear areas left unassailed until the front was pushed back. Now, the battle was to be waged simultaneously at the front and also in the enemy's rear area without waiting for the battle at the front to be decided. This was to be accomplished by inserting groups into the enemy rear area from the air, from naval landings and by pushing groups through a ruptured front. These latter groups would not be bothered with attacking defenders along the front but rather would push up to 100 Km into the enemy rear attacking soft targets and generally disrupting the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations.
The Soviet 1920's doctrine for operational maneuver called for shock armies to penetrate to operational depths with cavalry and reserves but it failed because the forces available were too fragile. 1929 regulations called for deep battle by combined arms forces to penetrate past tactical defenses but they still did not have the forces to carry out this doctrine.
The deep battle concept called for employing forces up to 100 Km deep in exploitation of tactical success. These forces were to use tanks and aircraft to obtain the desired speed and shock. To this end the force structure was expanded to create tank corps, airborne forces, mobile groups. The designations of corps with subordinate brigades were used for these deep battle forces while division and regiment were used for conventional forces that were to conduct conventional tactical operations. While this was all well and good doctrine, Stalin's purges disrupted this process.
The experience of the Spanish Civil war demonstrated major shortcomings of the Soviet deep battle doctrine such as the vulnerability of armor and the unwieldiness of some formations. In response the Soviets slowed the pace of change and broke up some larger formations. However the 1940 German success in France showed the Soviets that they had learned incorrect lessons from the Spanish Civil war. In response to this they tried to reconstruct their deep operations forces and realized that the Germans could attack them next. The Soviets stripped armor from their armies to reconstitute their forces but they could not synchronize all the various forces (e.g. logistics, communications, training, weapons modernization) needed to make this a success.
In June, 1941 the Soviets were in the process of creating a second defensive echelon and a defense in depth when the Germans rendered their efforts moot by invading. Within two weeks the Soviet armor force was destroyed and 60% of all starting forces were combat ineffective. Only massive mobilization saved them.
The Soviets rose to the challenge and adjusted. They reconstituted their operational forces but this time with smaller units that were easier to control and synchronize and further stripped armor from the general forces. While this gave them a force in being, it had poor penetrating power and could not achieve operational level encirclements.
Partisan forces could be used to some extent to conduct deep operations. While they were not capable of operational maneuver and could not move into the German rear areas, conventionally the German rear area moved to them. The Soviets had trained for partisan warfare prior to WWII in some areas that the Germans now found to be infested with irregular and regular forces.
In 1942 the Soviets had redeveloped their armored forces while again massive reserves saved the day. They tested theories of force structure and employment. They had to determine a balance of armor, cavalry and infantry and decide where and when to commit their preciously rebuilt and hoarded mobile forces.
By 1943 the Soviets were starting to get it right. They had developed both the structure and doctrine to penetrate and exploit deep. The battles of Belgrod and Karkov saw the first use of forward detachments to clear the way for operational maneuver groups. They still had problems coordinating forward and main forces however.
In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets achieved successes that are models for current doctrine. The Vistula-Oder operations against a prepared defense and the scope of the Manchuria campaign are models of operational success. Operations in Berlin showed the need for more infantry and a more balanced, less tank heavy force.
In the 1950's and 1960's the development of nuclear weapons were determined to be an influence on the battlefield. It was thought that large infantry formations could not survive. What was needed were more agile units which lead to the development of the motor rifle divisions. Of note is that the U.S. take on nuclear operations was the opposite of the Soviet view. The US Army introduced the pentathional (?) division with a base of five units to bulk up divisions with extra troops to compensate for increased casualties during nuclear war.
In the 1960's nuclear weapons were determined to dominate the battlefield. The inferiority of the Soviet nuclear forces implied that NATO would use its advantage over them. The increased role of nuclear forces reduced the role of ground operational maneuver forces. The Soviets organized their Groups of Forces in Europe (organizations destined to become Fronts in wartime) with more tanks in the first echelon (as opposed to holding them back for exploitation) and no special purpose organized exploitation group. Exploitation to the operational depths was to be by follow on Front echelons, Warsaw pact forces and Fronts mobilized from the Western Military Districts in the USSR.
Growing Soviet nuclear parity with NATO in the 1970's caused them to reconsider the dominate role of battlefield nuclear weapons, that they might not be used at all. Without nuclear weapons to cause destruction in the operational depths of NATO, operational maneuver groups (or OMGs) made their reappearance. Soviet echelons were to be shallower to hug close to NATO forces and avoid nuclear targeting.
At this time the role of spetznatz reappeared. This term, meaning special purpose or designation forces, was first applied to units in WWII that were trained to infiltrate or insert bend enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance or sabotage and controlled by high level (army and front) commands. Spetznatz units, operating in 10 man teams would gather information at operational depths needed to conduct operational maneuver. They could also be used to conduct strikes against high payoff targets. They were covertly inserted and used during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan to disrupt command and control (Indeed in Afghanistan they shot everyone at the presidential palace.) Spetznatz are subordinated to the intelligence staff of ground and naval forces at the army/fleet and front level. They train on mockups of NATO equipment and conduct very realistic and physically demanding exercises. However, there are no special purpose insertion aircraft similar to the US Combat Talon. Spetznatz teams must infiltrate covertly before the start of hostilities or count on slipping in through the confusion of a general invasion. During peacetime they may recon their combat targets under the guise of being tourists or international transportation crews. The average Spetznatz trooper is a two year conscript which does not provide much time to gain difficult technical skills. Spetznatz officers speak target languages fluently while enlisted are expected to speak common phrases.
The 1980's brought much change to Europe. New technology, neutron weapons (no they were artillery shells, not bombs), precision munitions, NATO force modernization (the deployment of improved armor tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as well as the urbanization of the terrain meant that changes were needed. Emphasis was placed on maneuver and balanced forces. The old critique of Berlin operations during WWII was pulled out and dusted off. They began deploying a fourth generation of motor transport vehicles able to keep up with tanks for logistical support during combat. Upgraded HIP, HOOK and HALO heavy lift helicopters were introduced for rapid, heavy logistical support at the Front level. Army Aviation branch was created to provide support for rapid advances by ground maneuver forces. Attack helicopter regiments were resubordinated from Front to Army level to provide more responsive support to ground troops.
It is ironic that this modernization of Soviet forces depended upon the development of ideas that were only available through perestroika. This very contact with the West that lead to an increase in Soviet military capabilities also lead to reigning it in.
Lessons from the Soviet experience:
Military efficiency dictated organization (do what is possible)
Morale is supported by ideals (nationalism, communism, etc.)
Tactical deficiencies can be overcome by mass, discipline and acceptance of losses
Necessity of building up forces quickly
Deep operations are key to success at the operational level
Conduct operations (deception, economy of force, etc.) over a broad front rather than attacking across a broad front
At the operational level, the Soviets recognized two types of maneuver:
Encirclement; used against a prepared defense and with a low correlation of forces
Broad front attack: used against a partially prepared defense or with a high correlation of forces.
Trends from the Soviet experience:
Non-linear war
Blurred distinction between offense and defense
Combined arms tailoring of forces
Increased engineering and logistical support of deep forces to maintain independence of action
New forms of fire; recon/strike groups
New forms of maneuver; BMPs maneuvering while troops are dismounted
And finally the principles of Soviet Operational Art:
Mobility:
capability for full use of combat power for quick accomplishment of the mission
ensure superiority on important axes
disperse to avoid attack by weapons of mass destruction
mass secretly and quickly to create striking power
shift effort quickly when needed
Tempo:
maintain average rates of advance (up to 40 Km per day)
surmount defensive zones quickly after defensive fires have lifted and before defenders can recover
keep the enemy from maneuvering from operational depths and laterally
keep the enemy from withdrawing to regroup
avoid or move quickly though contaminated areas
shift efforts to the operational depths after insertion of operational forces
Concentration of main effort/superior combat power at the decisive place and time:
use massed fires from dispersed weapons to avoid targeting by weapons of mass destruction
balance principles of mass and economy of force
Surprise:
Unexpected action which leads to the achievement of success in battle, operations and war.
Achieved by surprise use of all types of weapons (OK this is circular logic but its what is in the Soviet Military encyclopedia, 1976)
Combat Activeness:
bold, decisive, energetic decision making
a bold attack raises troop morale and multiplies troop effectiveness
Preserve combat effectiveness:
In so far as is needed to accomplish the mission retain/preserve a capability to conduct decisive combat operations
(Note that it is OK to destroy all the combat effectiveness of a unit as long as the mission is accomplished. Subsequent missions will be taken up by follow on echelons)
Conformity of the goal to actual conditions:
maintain flexibility
don't under estimate the enemy
Coordination
skillful use of each component's capabilities
provide for continual, mutual assistance an interworking of units
Depth:
Gain an advantageous position
(How deep is deep?)
Sources:
Notes from class A352, Principles of Operational Art, US Army Command and General Staff college (USCGSC)
Selected Readings in Soviet Army Operations, USCGSC text, 1990
A Brief summary of Soviet Operational Art
by Larry Holt (lholt@atl.sita.int)
Since Matrix is working on operational level games, I thought that an article on this area would be of interest and use.
While the US military only acknowledged a level of war between tactical and strategic in the 1980's, the Soviet Union has studied the conduct of operations by large formations of the Armed Forces since before WWII. Briefly warfare can be divided into three levels:
Strategic: wars waged on a global scale by nations using all national means; military, economic, political and social.
Operational: campaigns waged in a theater of operations (e.g. Western Europe, Pacific) scale fought by theater military forces only; fronts, numbered armies and army groups, numbered or named fleets.
Tactical: battles and engagements fought by corps and below.
WWI showed the Soviet General Staff the need to wage combat with multiple armies and to conduct campaigns versus single battles. They saw that strategic warfare was broken into a series of operations by time and area objectives. This was the start of an operational art intermediate between tactics and strategy. It has sometimes also been called grand-tactical.
Operational maneuver was seen as the key to victory at the operational level. This is maneuver to the full depth and width of the operational area. This was a change from the previous doctrine of battles along a front with rear areas left unassailed until the front was pushed back. Now, the battle was to be waged simultaneously at the front and also in the enemy's rear area without waiting for the battle at the front to be decided. This was to be accomplished by inserting groups into the enemy rear area from the air, from naval landings and by pushing groups through a ruptured front. These latter groups would not be bothered with attacking defenders along the front but rather would push up to 100 Km into the enemy rear attacking soft targets and generally disrupting the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations.
The Soviet 1920's doctrine for operational maneuver called for shock armies to penetrate to operational depths with cavalry and reserves but it failed because the forces available were too fragile. 1929 regulations called for deep battle by combined arms forces to penetrate past tactical defenses but they still did not have the forces to carry out this doctrine.
The deep battle concept called for employing forces up to 100 Km deep in exploitation of tactical success. These forces were to use tanks and aircraft to obtain the desired speed and shock. To this end the force structure was expanded to create tank corps, airborne forces, mobile groups. The designations of corps with subordinate brigades were used for these deep battle forces while division and regiment were used for conventional forces that were to conduct conventional tactical operations. While this was all well and good doctrine, Stalin's purges disrupted this process.
The experience of the Spanish Civil war demonstrated major shortcomings of the Soviet deep battle doctrine such as the vulnerability of armor and the unwieldiness of some formations. In response the Soviets slowed the pace of change and broke up some larger formations. However the 1940 German success in France showed the Soviets that they had learned incorrect lessons from the Spanish Civil war. In response to this they tried to reconstruct their deep operations forces and realized that the Germans could attack them next. The Soviets stripped armor from their armies to reconstitute their forces but they could not synchronize all the various forces (e.g. logistics, communications, training, weapons modernization) needed to make this a success.
In June, 1941 the Soviets were in the process of creating a second defensive echelon and a defense in depth when the Germans rendered their efforts moot by invading. Within two weeks the Soviet armor force was destroyed and 60% of all starting forces were combat ineffective. Only massive mobilization saved them.
The Soviets rose to the challenge and adjusted. They reconstituted their operational forces but this time with smaller units that were easier to control and synchronize and further stripped armor from the general forces. While this gave them a force in being, it had poor penetrating power and could not achieve operational level encirclements.
Partisan forces could be used to some extent to conduct deep operations. While they were not capable of operational maneuver and could not move into the German rear areas, conventionally the German rear area moved to them. The Soviets had trained for partisan warfare prior to WWII in some areas that the Germans now found to be infested with irregular and regular forces.
In 1942 the Soviets had redeveloped their armored forces while again massive reserves saved the day. They tested theories of force structure and employment. They had to determine a balance of armor, cavalry and infantry and decide where and when to commit their preciously rebuilt and hoarded mobile forces.
By 1943 the Soviets were starting to get it right. They had developed both the structure and doctrine to penetrate and exploit deep. The battles of Belgrod and Karkov saw the first use of forward detachments to clear the way for operational maneuver groups. They still had problems coordinating forward and main forces however.
In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets achieved successes that are models for current doctrine. The Vistula-Oder operations against a prepared defense and the scope of the Manchuria campaign are models of operational success. Operations in Berlin showed the need for more infantry and a more balanced, less tank heavy force.
In the 1950's and 1960's the development of nuclear weapons were determined to be an influence on the battlefield. It was thought that large infantry formations could not survive. What was needed were more agile units which lead to the development of the motor rifle divisions. Of note is that the U.S. take on nuclear operations was the opposite of the Soviet view. The US Army introduced the pentathional (?) division with a base of five units to bulk up divisions with extra troops to compensate for increased casualties during nuclear war.
In the 1960's nuclear weapons were determined to dominate the battlefield. The inferiority of the Soviet nuclear forces implied that NATO would use its advantage over them. The increased role of nuclear forces reduced the role of ground operational maneuver forces. The Soviets organized their Groups of Forces in Europe (organizations destined to become Fronts in wartime) with more tanks in the first echelon (as opposed to holding them back for exploitation) and no special purpose organized exploitation group. Exploitation to the operational depths was to be by follow on Front echelons, Warsaw pact forces and Fronts mobilized from the Western Military Districts in the USSR.
Growing Soviet nuclear parity with NATO in the 1970's caused them to reconsider the dominate role of battlefield nuclear weapons, that they might not be used at all. Without nuclear weapons to cause destruction in the operational depths of NATO, operational maneuver groups (or OMGs) made their reappearance. Soviet echelons were to be shallower to hug close to NATO forces and avoid nuclear targeting.
At this time the role of spetznatz reappeared. This term, meaning special purpose or designation forces, was first applied to units in WWII that were trained to infiltrate or insert bend enemy lines for the purpose of reconnaissance or sabotage and controlled by high level (army and front) commands. Spetznatz units, operating in 10 man teams would gather information at operational depths needed to conduct operational maneuver. They could also be used to conduct strikes against high payoff targets. They were covertly inserted and used during the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan to disrupt command and control (Indeed in Afghanistan they shot everyone at the presidential palace.) Spetznatz are subordinated to the intelligence staff of ground and naval forces at the army/fleet and front level. They train on mockups of NATO equipment and conduct very realistic and physically demanding exercises. However, there are no special purpose insertion aircraft similar to the US Combat Talon. Spetznatz teams must infiltrate covertly before the start of hostilities or count on slipping in through the confusion of a general invasion. During peacetime they may recon their combat targets under the guise of being tourists or international transportation crews. The average Spetznatz trooper is a two year conscript which does not provide much time to gain difficult technical skills. Spetznatz officers speak target languages fluently while enlisted are expected to speak common phrases.
The 1980's brought much change to Europe. New technology, neutron weapons (no they were artillery shells, not bombs), precision munitions, NATO force modernization (the deployment of improved armor tanks and infantry fighting vehicles as well as the urbanization of the terrain meant that changes were needed. Emphasis was placed on maneuver and balanced forces. The old critique of Berlin operations during WWII was pulled out and dusted off. They began deploying a fourth generation of motor transport vehicles able to keep up with tanks for logistical support during combat. Upgraded HIP, HOOK and HALO heavy lift helicopters were introduced for rapid, heavy logistical support at the Front level. Army Aviation branch was created to provide support for rapid advances by ground maneuver forces. Attack helicopter regiments were resubordinated from Front to Army level to provide more responsive support to ground troops.
It is ironic that this modernization of Soviet forces depended upon the development of ideas that were only available through perestroika. This very contact with the West that lead to an increase in Soviet military capabilities also lead to reigning it in.
Lessons from the Soviet experience:
Military efficiency dictated organization (do what is possible)
Morale is supported by ideals (nationalism, communism, etc.)
Tactical deficiencies can be overcome by mass, discipline and acceptance of losses
Necessity of building up forces quickly
Deep operations are key to success at the operational level
Conduct operations (deception, economy of force, etc.) over a broad front rather than attacking across a broad front
At the operational level, the Soviets recognized two types of maneuver:
Encirclement; used against a prepared defense and with a low correlation of forces
Broad front attack: used against a partially prepared defense or with a high correlation of forces.
Trends from the Soviet experience:
Non-linear war
Blurred distinction between offense and defense
Combined arms tailoring of forces
Increased engineering and logistical support of deep forces to maintain independence of action
New forms of fire; recon/strike groups
New forms of maneuver; BMPs maneuvering while troops are dismounted
And finally the principles of Soviet Operational Art:
Mobility:
capability for full use of combat power for quick accomplishment of the mission
ensure superiority on important axes
disperse to avoid attack by weapons of mass destruction
mass secretly and quickly to create striking power
shift effort quickly when needed
Tempo:
maintain average rates of advance (up to 40 Km per day)
surmount defensive zones quickly after defensive fires have lifted and before defenders can recover
keep the enemy from maneuvering from operational depths and laterally
keep the enemy from withdrawing to regroup
avoid or move quickly though contaminated areas
shift efforts to the operational depths after insertion of operational forces
Concentration of main effort/superior combat power at the decisive place and time:
use massed fires from dispersed weapons to avoid targeting by weapons of mass destruction
balance principles of mass and economy of force
Surprise:
Unexpected action which leads to the achievement of success in battle, operations and war.
Achieved by surprise use of all types of weapons (OK this is circular logic but its what is in the Soviet Military encyclopedia, 1976)
Combat Activeness:
bold, decisive, energetic decision making
a bold attack raises troop morale and multiplies troop effectiveness
Preserve combat effectiveness:
In so far as is needed to accomplish the mission retain/preserve a capability to conduct decisive combat operations
(Note that it is OK to destroy all the combat effectiveness of a unit as long as the mission is accomplished. Subsequent missions will be taken up by follow on echelons)
Conformity of the goal to actual conditions:
maintain flexibility
don't under estimate the enemy
Coordination
skillful use of each component's capabilities
provide for continual, mutual assistance an interworking of units
Depth:
Gain an advantageous position
(How deep is deep?)
Sources:
Notes from class A352, Principles of Operational Art, US Army Command and General Staff college (USCGSC)
Selected Readings in Soviet Army Operations, USCGSC text, 1990
Never take counsel of your fears.
The move turned out to be almost as disasterous as the 1941 summer season. After the German 42 offensive broke morale in the Red army plunged into the nether regions.Originally posted by Tom Terror:
That is actually a very interesting theme.
I think it was in 1942 when Stalin, disapointed by the poor performance of his front commanders, ordered that each commander had to have a political educated "kommissar" as his deputy.
Those men from political schools of the communist party had to ensure that nobody runs from the enemy and that signs of cowardice or negative influence on the fighting spirit were eliminated on the spot.
That task included shooting at own people if nessesary. The Kommisars also had the task of political indoctrination and spreading propaganda within their district.
In doing so they managed to raise the will to stand and fight within the red army for reasons of fear of being shoot if not obeying and not to forget also because of extremly stirred up emotions through propaganda. (german cruelties behind the front actually helped soviet propaganda a lot)
How important the kommissars were for the red army and the soviet government shows the example of Nikita Chruchtschov the later Premier of the Soviet Union. He was a Polit-Kommissar to one of the big soviet general. Sorry, but I forgot for whom. I have to look this one up. IIRC he was involved in the battle for Stalingrad.
Soviet propaganda also changed with the time. When Stalin noticed that communist slogans alone wouldn´t do, he decide to come up with the term "Great Patriotic War" which refers to the russian struggle against Napoleon.
That was a very clever move of Stalin because with that switch in propaganda he triggered the national and nationalistic feelings of the russians. Even and most important of them who were not symphatizing with the communist party.
I think that the explained above had a great influence of the development of the red army.
But I can imagine that it is absolutely of no importance for SPWaW.
And no help either.
Tom
The Commissars exaserbated the problem, espeicially since most (if not all) were not military oriented (rather they were politically oriented) and made impossible demands on the commanders and troops.
Stalin quickly realized this as the 42 crisis mounted and partially reversed the earlier decision, dampening down the broad powers of the commissars and reinstituting some of the "perks" enjoyed by officers of other nations (such as sylized uniforms, medal/promotion grades etc etc)
Most importantly though command decisions were placed back into the hands of said commanders. The tactic worked and the Red army began to get it's confidence back.
You really have to give the Red army tremendous credit for surviving the 1941-42 debacles. You can't discount the geography and Allied assistance, but the Rebound was conducted very logically. First setting lines they could hold, after trading space for time in 41 and early 42. Really I think a huge key was evacuating industry in 41. How deep is deep; read up on the preparations the Soviets made for the Kursk battle in 1943. By Late 43 they were ready to handle some offensive as opposed to the counterattack after Stalingrad. Zhukov gets too much credit, but men like Rokossovky and Cheryakovsky, Koniev, and Vatutin were really first rate. Finally as distasteful as it is to commend him, Josef Vissarionovich kept his eye on the prize and subordinated everything and everyone to achieving it.
"It ain't the gun, Sonny. It's the operator" Bob the Nailer
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Charles2222
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Actually there is a myth that the USSR was late in the war giving it worse than it got. At www.achtungpanzer.com they state tank loss (not attempt to compare personnel losses) ratio by certain periods. There was only 1 time period where losses were even, and even the last period of the war showed German AFVs 30% better off (1.3:1) despite heavier odds against them then (see below)
German vs. Soviet AFV losses - 1941-45.
Period: Ratio: Period: Ratio:
06/41-02/42 1:5.0 12/43-06/44 1:1.4
03/42-05/42 1:6.6 07/44 1:4.0
06/42-10/42 1:7.9 08/44 1:2.0
11/42-03/43 1:1.3 09/44 1:1.0
04/43-08/43 1:5.7 10/43-11/44 1:1.3
09/43-11/43 1:2.5 - -
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/prod.htm
German vs. Soviet AFV losses - 1941-45.
Period: Ratio: Period: Ratio:
06/41-02/42 1:5.0 12/43-06/44 1:1.4
03/42-05/42 1:6.6 07/44 1:4.0
06/42-10/42 1:7.9 08/44 1:2.0
11/42-03/43 1:1.3 09/44 1:1.0
04/43-08/43 1:5.7 10/43-11/44 1:1.3
09/43-11/43 1:2.5 - -
http://www.achtungpanzer.com/prod.htm
Zhukov deserves a fair amount of credit, he gets an exaggerated rap because he was at the head of things... that's natural. Patton and Rommel are overrated too... (not that Zhukov is a Patton or a Rommel -I think he was more like an asshole manager, but hey... what works, works.)
I agree that the Soviet conduct in WW2 was very impressive. Stalin's utilized the advantages of a dictorship rather well... a lot of his decisions were faulty but that's also natural. I think its funny how Hitler is seen as such a bad guy historically (he was a bad guy, don't get me wrong!) when Stalin was so much worse, and so much more successful at his evil deeds. Hitler appears to me a child in a temper-tantrum next to a scary bully named Stalin.
The fact that the it has been the Russians mostly, that have written the book on modern warfare has been a very interesting thing for me to learn. I've spent the last three years absorbed in the development of operational warfare. I think a lot of it has to with lessons from WWI, and the Russian Civil War. 1920 taught a lot of the right people a lot of the right stuff... Too many of us believe that the Russians just love throwing away lives mindlessly. Make no mistake, the Russians do LOVE throwing away lives... but they certainly do not do it mindlessly. It's all very scary. I think WW2 was the 'experiment' that brought all the opertaional theory into a more practical art. Certainly it was an awful school to learn in, but I think the results are very big... I'm reading a Belorussia 44:The Soviet General Staff Study right now, and it (and many other books) is very illuminated.
Tomo
I agree that the Soviet conduct in WW2 was very impressive. Stalin's utilized the advantages of a dictorship rather well... a lot of his decisions were faulty but that's also natural. I think its funny how Hitler is seen as such a bad guy historically (he was a bad guy, don't get me wrong!) when Stalin was so much worse, and so much more successful at his evil deeds. Hitler appears to me a child in a temper-tantrum next to a scary bully named Stalin.
The fact that the it has been the Russians mostly, that have written the book on modern warfare has been a very interesting thing for me to learn. I've spent the last three years absorbed in the development of operational warfare. I think a lot of it has to with lessons from WWI, and the Russian Civil War. 1920 taught a lot of the right people a lot of the right stuff... Too many of us believe that the Russians just love throwing away lives mindlessly. Make no mistake, the Russians do LOVE throwing away lives... but they certainly do not do it mindlessly. It's all very scary. I think WW2 was the 'experiment' that brought all the opertaional theory into a more practical art. Certainly it was an awful school to learn in, but I think the results are very big... I'm reading a Belorussia 44:The Soviet General Staff Study right now, and it (and many other books) is very illuminated.
Tomo
Those tank losses are largely a result of the preponderance of Panzerfausts. Tank to tank stopped being relevant in the war between Russia and Germany. Even then, it's natural for the attacker to take more significant losses (which wasn't the case in late-war east front, germany was getting hammered.)
Tomo
Tomo
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Charles2222
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Oh come on... before Stalingrad the Soviets were doing all kinds of stuff wrong. (Granted, it goes both ways) The german's had better tanks (usually) and were better at using them. When Zhukov busted out of the Kuestrin bridgehead and rolled toward berlin he took HUGE tank losses to Panzerfausts. I'm not saying anything about soviet lack of anti-tank personel, but they certainly never had anything like the panzerfaust in the numbers that they were to be found in german hands. Tactically speaking, the Germans had it over the Soviets no problem (as long as they were experienced tank units). Remember, they did a real number on tank kill ratio's at Kursk too... Oh, and I forgot to mention in the above post that Germany was on the losing end of the ratio of losses in MEN, not tanks... and I meant to say that tank to tank became less relevant LATE in the war.
Tomo
Tomo
Tomo
Tomo
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Paul Vebber
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I'm reading an excellent book called teh Russian Way of War:Operational Art 1904 to 1940. Reading it along side "Manuever warfare anthology". Really points out the differences between the classic Russian "Operational Art" (dealing with army group operations primarily and their planning) and "manuever warfare" which operates typically at lower levels. Both books are good reads as is "Combined Arms Warfare in the 20th century".
Frank Cass publishing is my favorite source for russian operational theory and military history. http://www.cassbooks.com/ they have good a series on Soviet Military History.
Tomo
Tomo
From a episode on WW2 Armor I taped, From May 44 to the end of the war, the German army fielded an average of 400 tanks at any one time while the allies fielded 20,000.
The tally by the end of the war was
Russia lost 5 tanks for every German tank lost and 7 men for every German soldier.
Before anyone starts with the BT justification, the Germans also fielded hoardes of antiques during that time.
The West lost 4 tanks for every German tank and the troop count I can't remember, but not as bad as the Russians. Bearing in mind that most of the German tank losses in the west were from Fighter Bombers and their crews destroying their own machines when out of fuel or breakdowns.
I've been reading a couple of posts about Blitzkrieg being so ho hum and the allied combined arms doctrine so supperior. I could only hope to achieve those results in the early years with a force like the Germans had against the then Frances reported most powerfull army in the world, not to count the rest of the armies they ground through to get to the French. The Germans had fewer tanks of which 2 out of 3 was a PZ1 or PZII, fewer troops and less mechanized mobility than the Allies of 40. Their use of horse transport increased every year throughout the war. So called Blitzkrieg stopped working when they ran out of the fuel reserves they hardly had anyways. Their failure to cut Russias fuel source by not taking Stalingrad after cracking the southern front wide open in summer 42,when it was virtually undefended. Moving the 6th army armor and 4th Panzer army's armor into the mountains of the Caucasus and letting 6th army march to Stalingrad virtually on foot instead I think sealed their doom. Ploiesti was getting bombed soon after so no more reserves and no more fuel source for Germany. I'm not sure even the store house of the west, the US, could even come close to providing the fuel the Russian army would have required. The Germans had enough trouble with supply for the tiny number of tanks they had in comparison. What would the Russians have done, made fuel from Pine trees like the Japanese did for their fighter defence? It seems like every time the Germans army was a hair breadth from victory in the east, Hitler put his nose in it and changed the direction to no doubt claim victory by his brilliance alone. Thank goodness. I just wish the Germans and Russians could have anahilated eachother so the West could have walked in and set things right all over, instead of the sad conditions present now. Oh well, just have to do I guess. =)
BTW, I'm really enjoying the great posts everyone's putting up. Lot's of stuff I've not come across getting posted.
Lynx
The tally by the end of the war was
Russia lost 5 tanks for every German tank lost and 7 men for every German soldier.
Before anyone starts with the BT justification, the Germans also fielded hoardes of antiques during that time.
The West lost 4 tanks for every German tank and the troop count I can't remember, but not as bad as the Russians. Bearing in mind that most of the German tank losses in the west were from Fighter Bombers and their crews destroying their own machines when out of fuel or breakdowns.
I've been reading a couple of posts about Blitzkrieg being so ho hum and the allied combined arms doctrine so supperior. I could only hope to achieve those results in the early years with a force like the Germans had against the then Frances reported most powerfull army in the world, not to count the rest of the armies they ground through to get to the French. The Germans had fewer tanks of which 2 out of 3 was a PZ1 or PZII, fewer troops and less mechanized mobility than the Allies of 40. Their use of horse transport increased every year throughout the war. So called Blitzkrieg stopped working when they ran out of the fuel reserves they hardly had anyways. Their failure to cut Russias fuel source by not taking Stalingrad after cracking the southern front wide open in summer 42,when it was virtually undefended. Moving the 6th army armor and 4th Panzer army's armor into the mountains of the Caucasus and letting 6th army march to Stalingrad virtually on foot instead I think sealed their doom. Ploiesti was getting bombed soon after so no more reserves and no more fuel source for Germany. I'm not sure even the store house of the west, the US, could even come close to providing the fuel the Russian army would have required. The Germans had enough trouble with supply for the tiny number of tanks they had in comparison. What would the Russians have done, made fuel from Pine trees like the Japanese did for their fighter defence? It seems like every time the Germans army was a hair breadth from victory in the east, Hitler put his nose in it and changed the direction to no doubt claim victory by his brilliance alone. Thank goodness. I just wish the Germans and Russians could have anahilated eachother so the West could have walked in and set things right all over, instead of the sad conditions present now. Oh well, just have to do I guess. =)
BTW, I'm really enjoying the great posts everyone's putting up. Lot's of stuff I've not come across getting posted.
Lynx
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Charles2222
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Tomo:
If I understand you correctly, you're saying the Germans had a good loss ratio during Kursk as well. If that's so, it makes you wonder doesn't it? Why did they call off the attack so early? We've heard all the reasons, and while that doesn't address personnel losses during Kursk, I have an idea. My thought is that the whole attack at Kursk was meant to be a statement as well as trying to take advantage of a seeming weak point. I think the combination of not outstanding success, combined with so many Panthers breaking down where they made their debut, that Hitler, not exactly the sort to call off attacks, was very disappointed with the Panthers and probably lost heart for the attack when so many broke down. If that were so, it would be quite ironic that the debut of what was probably the best tank in the field and the blows that were probably expected of them, would psychologically backfire against them.
Oh yeah, I agree, attritionally speaking, and of course those numbers are just losses but not to what. It's pretty easy though for people to believe that the USSR was losing less tanks than the Germans, late, specifically because those with larger numerical superiority tend to overwhelm the enemy with losses, so it does show quite a lot of German doggedness regardless from how they dished out the losses. It does make me curious as to what the loss ratio was in France, NAfrica and '44-'45 Western Front.and I meant to say that tank to tank became less relevant LATE in the war.
If I understand you correctly, you're saying the Germans had a good loss ratio during Kursk as well. If that's so, it makes you wonder doesn't it? Why did they call off the attack so early? We've heard all the reasons, and while that doesn't address personnel losses during Kursk, I have an idea. My thought is that the whole attack at Kursk was meant to be a statement as well as trying to take advantage of a seeming weak point. I think the combination of not outstanding success, combined with so many Panthers breaking down where they made their debut, that Hitler, not exactly the sort to call off attacks, was very disappointed with the Panthers and probably lost heart for the attack when so many broke down. If that were so, it would be quite ironic that the debut of what was probably the best tank in the field and the blows that were probably expected of them, would psychologically backfire against them.
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General Mayhem
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I don't know about rest, but I atleast don'tOriginally posted by Charles_22:
Tomo: Oh yeah, I agree, attritionally speaking, and of course those numbers are just losses but not to what. It's pretty easy though for people to believe that the USSR was losing less tanks than the Germans, late, specifically because those with larger numerical superiority tend to overwhelm the enemy with losses, so it does show quite a lot of German doggedness regardless from how they dished out the losses. It does make me curious as to what the loss ratio was in France, NAfrica and '44-'45 Western Front.
If I understand you correctly, you're saying the Germans had a good loss ratio during Kursk as well. If that's so, it makes you wonder doesn't it? Why did they call off the attack so early? We've heard all the reasons, and while that doesn't address personnel losses during Kursk, I have an idea. My thought is that the whole attack at Kursk was meant to be a statement as well as trying to take advantage of a seeming weak point. I think the combination of not outstanding success, combined with so many Panthers breaking down where they made their debut, that Hitler, not exactly the sort to call off attacks, was very disappointed with the Panthers and probably lost heart for the attack when so many broke down. If that were so, it would be quite ironic that the debut of what was probably the best tank in the field and the blows that were probably expected of them, would psychologically backfire against them.
think Germans lost more tanks towards end of
war than Russians. I don't know how matter is actually, but so I believe.
Really point I've been trying to press out that every decent army that has fought against Russians inflicted huge casualties to them. Japanese, Finns, Germans, French and English(Crimean War), Napoleon etc. Even
if Russians have won the conflit eventually.
Thus how Germans are somehow exceptional in
this group? In my opinion, no way.
If we believe this and bear in mind that Germany concentrated most of it's resources(most of Europe captured) against Soviet Union, I think German achievement in Eastern Front isn't so good as it looks quickly.
It's maybe above average, but not exceptional.
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Sex, rags and and rock'n roll!
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Sex, rags and and rock'n roll!
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I agree, Mayhem, I mean to say that the Russian performance went up a lot towards the end of the war and the 'huge' casualty thing was done. At that point they no longer had the bodies to throw away with the same magnitude they did earlier. Earlier in the war though, they took ENORMOUS casualties and ridiculous numbers of men surrendered.
Charles: Just cause the Germans had a good ratio at Kursk doesn't mean they weren't losing too many tanks for their own good. The more recent information on the operation suggests though, that the Germans didn't get their asses kicked like people thought. It was a really big, really brutal operation that was really heavy in tanks. Russia lost a LOT of tanks, but at the same time had enough to not only take those losses but have enough tanks that didn't even fight ready to kick off a gigantic offensive. The other big factor at Kursk was that the allies landed in Italy. That spooked Hitler (fair reason to be spooked mind you) and since the offensive wasn't achieving anything in the strategic sense (other than depleting tank reserves -but no one could have guessed *except Manstien*-) he pulled 1SSPzGren Div. 2nd SS PzCorps was the unit that was making the most progress, so the loss of one of three divisions stopped that fast. At Kursk the Soviets had some difficulties coordinating their tank units effectively. They took needless losses, and I think it was one of the reasons why Rotmistrov was taken off command duty and kept to higher level stuff. I'm in the process of finishing a 5 scenario series covering the 3rd SS PzGren Division during Zitadelle. The last in the series "North of the Psel" can be downloaded from Fabio Prado's site if anyone wants to check it out. They are all BIG scenarios... so if that's not your thing you are not going to like them.
Tomo
Charles: Just cause the Germans had a good ratio at Kursk doesn't mean they weren't losing too many tanks for their own good. The more recent information on the operation suggests though, that the Germans didn't get their asses kicked like people thought. It was a really big, really brutal operation that was really heavy in tanks. Russia lost a LOT of tanks, but at the same time had enough to not only take those losses but have enough tanks that didn't even fight ready to kick off a gigantic offensive. The other big factor at Kursk was that the allies landed in Italy. That spooked Hitler (fair reason to be spooked mind you) and since the offensive wasn't achieving anything in the strategic sense (other than depleting tank reserves -but no one could have guessed *except Manstien*-) he pulled 1SSPzGren Div. 2nd SS PzCorps was the unit that was making the most progress, so the loss of one of three divisions stopped that fast. At Kursk the Soviets had some difficulties coordinating their tank units effectively. They took needless losses, and I think it was one of the reasons why Rotmistrov was taken off command duty and kept to higher level stuff. I'm in the process of finishing a 5 scenario series covering the 3rd SS PzGren Division during Zitadelle. The last in the series "North of the Psel" can be downloaded from Fabio Prado's site if anyone wants to check it out. They are all BIG scenarios... so if that's not your thing you are not going to like them.
Tomo