The errors of the Barbarossa operation

[terminator]

First mistake: underestimate your opponent

This is a common misjudgement in military history, and it is based on two main elements: the failure of intelligence (knowing what the enemy’s strengths are, its weaknesses, where its units are placed, etc.) and an ideological posture where it is assumed that the enemy is morally, racially or ideologically inferior.

The Germans made this mistake in preparing Barbarossa. It is true that the Red Army at the time did not impress much, and most Western observers shared the conviction that it would collapse in the face of the Wehrmacht. His poor performance during the Winter War against small Finland in 1939-1940 had convinced Wehrmacht planners that the Soviet armed forces, despite their plethora of equipment, were not capable of resisting a brutal invasion, Not to mention the deleterious effects of the Stalinist purges that had beheaded the high command in 1937-1938.

Second mistake: betting on a political collapse of the opponent

In 1941, the Germans were thus convinced that the Soviet regime would collapse with the first defeats and the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht in Soviet territory. The Stalinist regime was perceived as strongly weakened, very unpopular, relying only on the terror imposed by the person of Stalin. Vermoulu, it would take a few strokes for it to collapse. But the regime, thanks to the resilience of the Soviets, kept their patriotism alive and, of course, Stalin’s ruthless policy towards his own soldiers and citizens.

Third error: multiple objectives, insufficient means

This aspect stems from the first two observations, having underestimated the political and military strength of his adversary. The German General Staff had defined as the objective for Barbarossa three main axes of progression, one to the north with Arkhangelsk as its objective, on the White Sea, a second one in the centre, with Gorki (east of Moscow) in sight, and finally one to the south, Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea, as a target.

For these three axes, the Wehrmacht, divided into three groups of armies, did not have enough equipment or manpower despite the masses implemented (more than 3 million German soldiers, not counting the allies). The number of Soviet divisions was underestimated (the Germans counted on 200 divisions where there were actually 500, still a bankruptcy of intelligence). The dispersion of effort, which goes against the doxa of the strategy, is the consequence, as well as the lack of clearly established priority.

Fourth mistake: underestimating the logistical challenge

The Wehrmacht has greatly underestimated Barbarossa’s logistical challenge: huge distances to travel, fuel requirements, ammunition, gigantic spare parts and food, poor infrastructure, errors of evaluation on the railway network (the gauge of the rails was different between the Reich and the USSR), or impact of the climate (heat in summer, autumn rains, harsh winter).

In fact, the most recent studies have shown that the offensive dynamics of the Wehrmacht were exhausted, even broken, even before the arrival of winter in November 1941. She simply exhausted herself, unable to continue a sustained effort. The Soviet resistance, in spite of the catastrophes, upset the German plans which hoped the premature collapse of the opponent.

[AndySfromVA]

Very interesting analysis. I wonder if, with all the errors the Germans made, was there any way it could have prevailed as long as the Russians didn't surrender?

[warspite1]

I think a massive mistake that hasn’t been mentioned is:

Not learning from history - specifically Napoleon’s folly of turning east before Britain was beaten. A two front war gave Germany headaches she just didn’t have capacity to cope with given that Barbarossa was under resourced in the first place.

Britain in the war gave the Soviets hope. But it also gave limited,but important, material assistance in the crucial early days. With the end of the Cold War, the Russians were able to acknowledge this. The Commonwealth was an irritant that diverted resources that Germany needed in the east. And of course this problem simply exploded with the entry of the US in the war.

Just think of the number of aircraft the Germans had in Norway, Germany, France, the Mediterranean - aircraft desperately needed to fight the war that would decide Germany’s fate. Just think of the number of artillery pieces - and the manpower - that was needed to defend the Reich rather than be fighting the Red Army.

Hitler gambled he would defeat the Soviets quickly and could then turn on Britain. When that initial gamble of a quick win failed the Germans found themselves fighting enemies containing the largest Empire, the largest economy and the largest army....... whoops.

[Curtis Lemay]

A lot of perfect 20:20 hindsight on display here. Why would the Napoleonic Wars have been the example the Germans would base their plans on? Wouldn't World War I have been the more pertinent example? And in that example, the Russians fared far worse than the French had and did collapse (after penetrations no further than Riga). The Czar was forced to abdicate and the Russians eventually sued for peace. Meanwhile, in the current war, France was blitzed in 6 weeks. I doubt the Russians themselves knew they would have hung on after the rout of their frontier armies. How were the Germans supposed to jump to that? The Russians were basically given no choice but to fight on by the brutality of the German policies.

[warspite1]

I am not sure that I have said anything controversial - and certainly not 20:20. Hitler was a gambler - this was not his first roll of the dice was it? History told him it was a gamble likely to end in tears. He ignored history and placed the bet.

The obvious example is Napoleon because he leaves Britain undefeated and causing havoc in the Iberian Peninsular, where Napoleon deploys some of his best generals while he fights in the east with a force bolstered with non-French troops. And of course Napoleon wasn’t the first example of a European power getting caught out in this way. When things went wrong in the east Napoleon had no reserves and instead had to head west to fight the fires that had started to rage.

Sure, one can look at WWI too to further reinforce Germany’s problem a two front war would likely give them. The Schlieffen Plan was all about trying to avoid this. Germany gambled, the plan failed, and Germany paid the price. How many examples did he need?

I can’t see that this is 20:20. The effects that a two front war would have (if for any reason his gamble failed), would have told Hitler he was giving himself no margin for error. Many of his top brass told him so......

[Aurelian]

After the war, it was learned that Caulaincourt's *With Napoleon in Russia* was read with great interest by many German officers during their invasion of Russia. Kluge often referred to the book. Quite a few others started reading Caulaincourt's grim account of 1812.

[Curtis Lemay]

Again, the Napoleonic example is a non-industrial war more than a century earlier. WWI is an industrial war from only two decades earlier. In that example, Russia DID collapse and sue for peace without any drive to Moscow. Meanwhile, the French in WWI had held on for victory, while being rolled in only 6 weeks only a year earlier than Barbarossa. No one could have predicted what was to happen in Barbarossa without 20:20 hindsight.

[warspite1]

No one can foretell the future. It is the job of military planners to take all relevant information into account when deciding on a plan’s feasibilty. Hitler, the self proclaimed military genius didn’t do this. That was a mistake. The conditions of the Napoleanic war is irrelevant - what is relevant is that fighting a two front war is a problem, a big problem. Look at a map of France and compare to a map of the USSR west of the Urals (and that is before factoring in the weather, the roads and rail) Now look at the number of aircraft and tanks employed by the Germans in the French and Soviet campaigns. There is a problem there. The outcome was far from certain and Germany was undertaking this operation while Britain remained in the game..... big mistake.

[warspite1]

...... In that example, Russia DID collapse and sue for peace without any drive to Moscow.

warspite1

This misses the point. What would Germany have done to the French and British without the war in the East? By the time the Russians sued for peace, the Germans had lost their chance of victory in the west. Fighting on two fronts killed them.

Going back to Napoleon, the Russians traded space for time. The German generals knew that if the Soviets did the same the Wehrmacht would be in trouble - essentialy the Germans had to destroy the Soviets within (forgive me I don’t have the number to hand) miles of the start point or it would be game up - unless the Soviets gave in, and that is where Britain staying in the game was important.

[Aurelian]

...... In that example, Russia DID collapse and sue for peace without any drive to Moscow.

warspite1

This misses the point. What would Germany have done to the French and British without the war in the East? By the time the Russians sued for peace, the Germans had lost their chance of victory in the west. Fighting on two fronts killed them.

Going back to Napoleon, the Russians traded space for time. The German generals knew that if the Soviets did the same the Wehrmacht would be in trouble - essentialy the Germans had to destroy the Soviets within (forgive me I don’t have the number to hand) miles of the start point or it would be game up - unless the Soviets gave in, and that is where Britain staying in the game was important.

Lenin's gov't signed the peace treaty in March 1918. America entered the war in April 2017. Three months after Russia quit, over 667,000 Yanks were in France. Comparing Tsarist Russia with Soviet Russia... well, the former had a much lower pain threshold than the latter. And Napoleon got to Moscow, but still lost. Charles XII never got anywhere near to it. He lost as well.

I agree with you.

[Pvt_Grunt]

It sounds like a review of the Ukraine invasion. History does still repeat.

[RangerJoe]

...... In that example, Russia DID collapse and sue for peace without any drive to Moscow.

warspite1

This misses the point. What would Germany have done to the French and British without the war in the East? By the time the Russians sued for peace, the Germans had lost their chance of victory in the west. Fighting on two fronts killed them.

Going back to Napoleon, the Russians traded space for time. The German generals knew that if the Soviets did the same the Wehrmacht would be in trouble - essentialy the Germans had to destroy the Soviets within (forgive me I don’t have the number to hand) miles of the start point or it would be game up - unless the Soviets gave in, and that is where Britain staying in the game was important.

Lenin's gov't signed the peace treaty in March 1918. America entered the war in April 2017. Three months after Russia quit, over 667,000 Yanks were in France. Comparing Tsarist Russia with Soviet Russia... well, the former had a much lower pain threshold than the latter. And Napoleon got to Moscow, but still lost. Charles XII never got anywhere near to it. He lost as well.

I agree with you.

WOW! America entered the war in April 2017! This sounds much more like current events than history!

[RangerJoe]

It sounds like a review of the Ukraine invasion. History does still repeat.

It most certainly does.

[ernieschwitz]

History does not repeat: That is the view of modern history. At least it doesn't repeat to the extent that we can predict from it. I always thought that this made the subject of history quite irrelevant, but, who am I argue with modern history?

[ernieschwitz]

Or to put it more bluntly. Similarities exist, but ... we have to be careful which ones to trust.

Napoleon did not conquer Russia, Hitler did not. This is not causation, but correlation. Can we infer that attacking Russia will never succeed? That would be wrong. The mongols did a fine job of taking it.

Similarities are also available in other forms:

The Mongols trying to take Japan were thwarted by storms, and thus did not take Japan. (Will Japan always be saved by storms from invasion?) The Spanish attempt to take England, was also thwarted by a storm. Do we attribute Island conquests with failure, since there will be storms?

We can argue what the causes were, but any reference to this has been done before, and must fail, is clearly backwards viewing history, that does not actually prove anything. Did Napoleon have Tanks? Planes?... perhaps such things could have changed the outcome. He didn't have trucks to transport supplies either.

Some have a more extreme view than this. A person forgetting to tie a shoelace can cause the delay of an air mission that ends up being a success because of it. In that view, nothing is predictable.

[Curtis Lemay]

...... In that example, Russia DID collapse and sue for peace without any drive to Moscow.

warspite1

This misses the point.

No. It is exactly the point: What was the best available gauge of Russian combat ability in 1941? And the best info was their performance in WWI - NOT in the Napoleonic wars. Toss in the Winter War, of course. Nothing that says they're even on a par with the French (who were just rolled in six weeks).

What would Germany have done to the French and British without the war in the East? By the time the Russians sued for peace, the Germans had lost their chance of victory in the west. Fighting on two fronts killed them.

I would say it was the blockade that killed them. And without the unrestricted u-boat warfare, does the US even enter? They still had the spring offensives in 1918. Those turned out to be pretty good chances. Had they taken them earlier, it would have been without the benefit of Stosstruppen.

Regardless, the British aren't even on the continent in 1941. Russia isn't a second front at that point.

Going back to Napoleon, ...

Again, what planner would go that far back?

[RangerJoe]

Poland did occupy Moscow one winter. So it did happen. The Mongols were paid off by Muscovy.

[terminator]

It sounds like a review of the Ukraine invasion. History does still repeat.

Congratulations

My arguments are drawn from an article entitled "Ukrainian conflict: operation Barbarossa bis?", I removed all references to the current conflict. The Barbarossa operation, launched in 1941, is one of the most studied in the Russian military academies, because it almost caused the loss of the Soviet Union.

[Kuokkanen]

One thing I have seen/heard mentioned about Germany's invasion of Soviet Union is securing the oil in Caucasus (allegedly Hitler had deemed Moscow unimportant in comparison). Not only for continuation of the war, but also for the industry in general. Something about trade restrictions, so Germany had to become self-sufficient. Therefore much of the invasions were motivated by need/desire to secure natural resources. Had Germany committed enough (or even overkill) efforts to secure the oil in Caucasus and nickel mines in Petsamo in order to more heavily mechanize the forces while also successfully suing peace with Britain would make one heck of a what-if scenario.

[warspite1]

...... In that example, Russia DID collapse and sue for peace without any drive to Moscow.

warspite1

This misses the point.

No. It is exactly the point: What was the best available gauge of Russian combat ability in 1941?

warspite1

At no point have I even remotely suggested that Hitler should have turned to 1914 - much less 1812 - as a guage of Soviet combat ability. Why would Hitler do that? What has that comment got to do with what I’ve posted?