REVIEW OF STRATEGIC COMMAND: WORLD AT WAR

[STEVEBARNES659]

A while ago I posted a review of Strategic Command which upset some people. I apologise for the brusque tone of that article but I wish to reiterate two fundamental points about simulating WW2 at the operational/strategic level.

COMBAT FIREPOWER AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
Armies have two separate components of capability. The first is the total of raw firepower (and mobility) they can generate based on the physical characteristics of their weapons and vehicles. The second, much much more important, component (their combat capability or effectiveness) reflects the extent to which they can exploit the firepower and combat potential of their men and equipment. This depends on the extent to which armies have mastered a range of critical skills, in particular doctrine, leadership, training, staff efficiency, battlefield communications and artillery fire control proficiency. These are qualitative, but not intangible, factors.

Think about it. If the opposing armies in WW2 had been of roughly equal capability (as opposed to raw firepower) there would have been a repeat of WW! - a stalemate. There is simply no way that, in 1940, Nazi Germany would have been able to crush the combined armies of France, the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium, with equal numbers of men and more tanks and artillery, in ten days (the campaign was effectively over when panzer units reached the English Channel on 20 May). Moreover, it would have been simply impossible for Axis forces to advance some 1,000km to the gates of Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov in 24 weeks against (initially) 228 plus more than 400 Soviet reinforcement divisional equivalents, and the biggest tank force in the world. Ditto for Operation Compass in which a small corps utterly destroyed an army of some 150,000 men in a campaign that lasted barely 9 weeks.

Let’s look at the battle of France. On 10 May 1940 some 3,200,000 German troops attacked a total of some 3,000,000 Allies (French, UK, Belgian, Dutch). Each German infantry division had 50% more firepower than the Allies (French, Belgian and Dutch). The Germans had about 2,438 tanks against about 3,500 Allied. However, about 660 French tanks were completely useless, so its 2,384 against 2,840. The Germans have an advantage of 1.07 in men and 0.86 in tanks plus a 1.5 infantry division firepower advantage which gives an overall force advantage of 3.43. The Germans suffered a total of 156,500 casualties, the Allies some 2,132,700. That’s an advantage to the Germans of 13.63 to 1. The Germans lost about 750 tanks and the Allies most of theirs so the tank casualty ratio is about 2.67:1 to the Germans. The overall casualty ratio is 16.3 to the Germans. Dividing this by the force ratio we get a force/loss ratio of 4.76. Then add in terrain and force posture factors: 1.2 for each which gives a total environmental modifier of 2.4. When that is added we get a campaign combat effectiveness ratio for the Germans of 7.16.

So throughout the battle of France the Germans were at least 7 times as effective as the Allies, man for man and tank for tank. That’s an average for the Allies as a whole. The BEF performed well in what was one of the complete debacles of the war and should have a less embarrassing CER, but it formed only a tiny part of the Allied army.

Now let’s look at Barbarossa. Using the same process we get the following:

GERMANY USSR RATIO
Manpower ratio (initial): 3,875,000 2,932,160
Reinforcements: 500,000 [2] 1,300,000
Manpower ratio (final): 4,375,685 4,232,160 1.03 [1]
Infantry division firepower ratio: 6,406 4,100 1.56
Tank ratio: 3,080 [3] 13,336 [4] 0.23
FORCE RATIO: 2.83
Casualties (personnel): 1,131,788 4,056,000 3.58
Tanks lost: 1,500 14,000
Tank casualty ratio: 9.33
Overall loss ratio: 12.92
FORCE/LOSS RATIO: 4.57
Environmental modifiers: 3.4 [5]
FINAL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS RATIO (CER): 7.97

Notes.
1. Between 22 June and the Soviet counter-offensive on 5 December 1941 the Soviets mobilised more than 2,600,000 men in more than 400 new divisional-equivalent units. This ratio factors in 50% of those reinforcements, as they were introduced progressively over 6 months.
2. Jentz, Panzer Truppen, vol 1, pp. 190-193.
3. An estimate.
4. Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 2015, p. 367.
5. Includes 1.1 for weather, which overwhelmingly benefited the defenders.

Throughout Operation Barbarossa the Germans were 8 times as effective as the Soviets, man for man and tank for tank. This helps to explain how they continued to advance for more than 5 months against endless Soviets reinforcements and a massive tank force. To reiterate, we must look to qualitative factors (eg doctrine, leadership, training, staff efficiency, battlefield communications and artillery fire control proficiency) to explain the massive inequalities in combat effectiveness.

MOVEMENT RATES
When simulating history it is nice if historical achievements can be replicated in the game. After attacking on 22 June 1941 the Germans encircled Smolensk on 17 July. That’s about 670km in a straight line, but they probably travelled at least 35% further for reasons of tactical necessity and the fog of war, etc (as do ships). That’s almost 1,100km in 26 days, or an average of 41km (near enough to 1 hex) per day at the game scale. In this early stage the weather wasn’t a factor.

General Heinz Guderian states that on 1 October 1941 the spearhead of the 24th Pz Corps covered 85 miles (136km) in one day, presumably in good weather and on hard ground (Panzer Leader, p. 230). Taking Barbarossa as a whole, Guderian’s Pz Group 2 advanced from the Polish border NE past Smolensk, from Smolensk Sth to Lokhvista, and from Lokhvista NE to Tula. That’s more than 1,700km in straight lines, or about 2,300km combat km, in 166 days, fighting most days. However, that period included 34 days when heavy rains transformed the “roads” to impassable bogs (Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 210, 233) and no significant advance could be achieved. So it is 2,300km in 132 days which gives an average of 17.4km per day or 244km per fortnight, or near enough to 5 hexes per fortnight at the game scale, fighting most days.

[ElvisJJonesRambo]

Okay, so the Germans had a nice early run, no doubt. Germans had cool uniforms, squad training, motivation, halftracks, trucks, tanks, air, paratroops, etc. Attacking sleeping farmers, from Poland, Low Countries, France, Barby. Buntas gained alot ground, but forgot their snowshoes.

Iron Mike Tyson ran thru a telephone book of bums. Serious punching power. History was cheated, never faced Butterbean or Tommy "The Duke" Morrison. Then pow, James "Buster" Douglas played Guns of Navarone in 10th round. Then prison, Evander Holyfield, and Lennox Lewis. 1 man != 1 different man

Far as applying this to a game, I'd love to see an Audie Murphy script, Patton slaps a coward & "Nuts" Bastogne. Great morale boast.

To Hell and Back,
-Legend