A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[warspite1]

Plenty in the pool? Well if I read this right, as one example alone, you have three units of the 22nd Air Flotilla included in this table.

No, I'm talking about the long range army fighters or Oscars. If zeroes are diverted to the east I assume these fighters would be doing the fighting. Most of the army fighter squadrons (Nates and Oscars) were in the south vs the British.

I only give you the big picture, I won't be planning this what if lol

warspite1

Okay so you had no need to include the bomber table then.

But to be clear Curtis Lemay is talking about fighters AND bombers being sent to the PI so I assumed you were using both tables as examples of ‘spare’ units.

But regardless, if bombers that were needed for Malaya are showing in tables you’ve shown, how do we know the fighter table is not similarly affected? Perhaps we’ll find out when Curtis Lemay provides the detail of what he’s played out.

I’m not expecting you to be planning this - you don’t need to even if you wanted to - because Curtis Lemay has told us he has already done so on numerous occasions. We just need him to tell us what he’s modelled.

[TulliusDetritus]

I misread so I deleted, you were not asking for the army bombers, apologies.

edited: by the way, I did not know you could delete a post completely. That's new.

[warspite1]

I misread so I deleted, you were not asking for the army bombers, apologies.

edited: by the way, I did not know you could delete a post completely. That's new.

warspite1

No probs - no, me neither

Curtis Lemay has said he used Bettys and/or Nells (understandably considering the USN is still a threat) so we’ll see what units he confirms he used.

[Curtis Lemay]

Plenty of preparations could have been made. And it wasn't just the British that should have been alerted by this. All the Allies should have been. In modern terms we would have gone to DEFCOM 2.

Preparations were made and were continuing. What is DEFCOM 2?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DEFCON was what I meant.

This is fascinating since the DEFCON system was invented by NORAD in 1957. So years would have passed for the situation to go to DEFCON 2 in case of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Which is why I said "in modern terms". Without using the cold was terminology, they could have been just as alert. They weren't.

The details are irrelevant. If they've been at sea so long that they run out of food, they can return to port if resupply at sea isn't available. But resupply at sea is physically possible, and the Japs could have had it setup as part of the plan if they really wanted to.

The details are relevant, how would the Japanese done the resupply? How would they know how much to bring? If the ships return to port, then that fuel used was wasted plus the attack can't occur until the ships then get back on station. While the troops are on the ships, their physical fitness will deteriorate, their skill sets will not continue to be worked on, illness and injuries would occur also reducing their effectiveness, and may other problems would happen.

For sure they can return to port. Is resupply at sea humanly impossible? Of course not. If they really wanted to they could have developed the ability. But, it's not critical.

[Curtis Lemay]

So I think, given these answers, we need to step back a bit. The questions I've asked previously have not gone away, but the Pearl Harbor raid, re-imagined to ensure the carriers are at Pearl and to land troops and aircraft to some of the Hawaiian Islands, has now started to morph into something considerably larger and more complex - even without an assault on Oahu.

No. It is not larger and more complex because the PI invasion has been postponed. Idle elements from that will be repurposed.

So, before we get back to that, let's understand what this means.

1. You've mentioned taking two islands with a couple of battalions each and these are to be taken to the target by destroyer. The KB obviously needs its own destroyer defence, so I assume you've used additional destroyers units when gaming this? For four battalions, how many additional destroyers have you had to add to the KB? How many men can a destroyer comfortably carry + their equipment, initial supplies, AA weaponry etc.

https://destroyerhistory.org/de/apd/
(This was a US example. Jap would be similar.)

2. Have any other ships been added to the KB? Even if not, and given that the date for the attack is unknown and the KB may be at sea for weeks, how many tankers do Japan now need to employ to ensure the enlarged KB is kept supplie

3. You've brought the need for Midway to be taken as an essential part of this plan (not sure why you didn't mention that you needed to do this before)

Do you remember every detail of things you did years ago? What I do remember is that it was doable. Even with Grigsby's Pacific War.

and so the obvious questions are:

- What, if anything, did the US have by way of defence forces and coastal guns on Midway in December 1941?
- What forces do the Japanese commit to ensuring the island is taken? This is both troop numbers, and naval vessels.
- Where do these forces sail from?

The carrier force can strike Midway on the way back from Pearl. Land elements from PI would be used. So far as I know the defenses of Midway were no different from the defenses of Wake.

- What timescale are we talking about in terms of their arrival off Midway? I am assuming you've not put these to sea until a date for the PH attack has been confirmed? When do they arrive off Midway? I'm trying to understand how long the troops, landed on the HI, have to wait for any kind of air cover, and how big a window do the Americans have for reinforcing the islands.

As I suggested earlier, zeros could be immediately be transferred from some of the carriers before they depart. If the airfields really can't handle Bettys, some Vals and Kates could too till the airfields were expanded. (Although I question whether expansion would be necessary. Plenty of planes operated from grass airfields in WWII.)

- You still haven't confirmed which air units (fighters and bombers) you have earmarked for the two Hawaiian Islands. Can you confirm this as of course this is potentially important in terms of knock on effect on the operations against Malaya, the NEI, and keeping the aircraft on PI quiet.

The zeros and bettys from the PI operation. They would have to be replaced by older aircraft, probably making the reduction of PI air and naval elements slower. But, it would still be completed eventually. Note that the carriers would eventually become available, if nothing else worked.

[Curtis Lemay]

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

That's interesting. If the Japanese carriers and fleet depart the area what prevents those still intact USN cruisers and destroyers from sortieing every night from Pearl Harbor to bombard and harass these new Japanese airfields, interfering with any attempt to keep them supplied? PT boats as well. The army airfield at Barking Sands in Kauai is literally on the beach and would be right under the guns. Plus, I don't think it was of the size yet to accommodate two-engine bombers in 1941. You can bring in engineers to lengthen it, but that is not going to happen overnight.

I suppose you can leave some Japanese cruisers and DDs behind, but without a port in the surrounding islands on a par with Pearl Harbor in which to replenish torpedoes, ammo, fuel, and effect repairs they are going to lose in a battle of logistics. Major naval depots don't get set up overnight either and the US West Coast is a lot closer than Japan.

Ships would not dare remain in Pearl with Japs controlling the skys. They would sail for the West Coast.

[Curtis Lemay]

Especially if you are loitering around waiting for a perfect Sunday morning where word arrives that the US carriers are at Pearl.

That does conjure up a fun mental map. Especially if the Japanese were to strike out on Sunday after Sunday after Sunday.


Operation Z for Zilch.jpg

Right. That's what they would do: sail around the islands in circles like chickens with their heads cutoff. Good grief.

[TulliusDetritus]

I see some chuckles here. I'm no expert (you're not either) but I do know 1) Nimitz himself did not rule this out -maybe he thought the Japanese were mad enough to try this rofl who knows and 2) the Japanese had actually conducted many many successful amphibious assaults... battalion, regimental (Ambon, Koepang?), division (Malaya, Philippines, Java) level... unloading tons of stuff, capturing airfields and bringing planes + support here and there. Reality is reality...

You underestimate your opponent at your own peril... even if it's a what if. After all, Singapore should not have fallen. Or the whole Luzon. Reality is good at kicking people's teeth

Said this, my money would be on the Hawaiian defenders but... who knows!

I encourage you to read Nimitz' papers. It's a joy to see how a real commander actually thinks and plans.

[RangerJoe]

Plenty of preparations could have been made. And it wasn't just the British that should have been alerted by this. All the Allies should have been. In modern terms we would have gone to DEFCOM 2.

Preparations were made and were continuing. What is DEFCOM 2?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DEFCON was what I meant.

This is fascinating since the DEFCON system was invented by NORAD in 1957. So years would have passed for the situation to go to DEFCON 2 in case of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Which is why I said "in modern terms". Without using the cold was terminology, they could have been just as alert. They weren't.

The details are irrelevant. If they've been at sea so long that they run out of food, they can return to port if resupply at sea isn't available. But resupply at sea is physically possible, and the Japs could have had it setup as part of the plan if they really wanted to.

The details are relevant, how would the Japanese done the resupply? How would they know how much to bring? If the ships return to port, then that fuel used was wasted plus the attack can't occur until the ships then get back on station. While the troops are on the ships, their physical fitness will deteriorate, their skill sets will not continue to be worked on, illness and injuries would occur also reducing their effectiveness, and may other problems would happen.

For sure they can return to port. Is resupply at sea humanly impossible? Of course not. If they really wanted to they could have developed the ability. But, it's not critical.

The Cold was terminology?

According to you, since they did not develop the technology and it is not critical, you will have the soldiers running out of food and potable water at sea, many days away from a port, it whatever weather the North Pacific has in the late autumn and going into the early winter. Soon, those soldiers would be incapable of anything!

[RangerJoe]

As for the KB sticking around Curtis Lemay has previously confirmed in a previous post that the KB would not hang around:

"Initially, the troops (a few battalions, as I said) and supplies are landed via destroyers (as the Japs used frequently for small invasions). Most of the neighboring islands had ports and airfields. The carriers are long gone and are not being worn down or risked".

That's interesting. If the Japanese carriers and fleet depart the area what prevents those still intact USN cruisers and destroyers from sortieing every night from Pearl Harbor to bombard and harass these new Japanese airfields, interfering with any attempt to keep them supplied? PT boats as well. The army airfield at Barking Sands in Kauai is literally on the beach and would be right under the guns. Plus, I don't think it was of the size yet to accommodate two-engine bombers in 1941. You can bring in engineers to lengthen it, but that is not going to happen overnight.

I suppose you can leave some Japanese cruisers and DDs behind, but without a port in the surrounding islands on a par with Pearl Harbor in which to replenish torpedoes, ammo, fuel, and effect repairs they are going to lose in a battle of logistics. Major naval depots don't get set up overnight either and the US West Coast is a lot closer than Japan.

Ships would not dare remain in Pearl with Japs controlling the skys. They would sail for the West Coast.

Please explain how the Japanese would control the skies? The US Army and the US Navy still had aircraft available. The Japanese KB aircraft needed work, the KB could not stay in the area for much longer. Any Japanese land based aircraft would have to be shipped in from somewhere. Also, who would service the aircraft and where would the fuel, ammo, and spare parts come from?

[Torplexed]

Please explain how the Japanese would control the skies? The US Army and the US Navy still had aircraft available. The Japanese KB aircraft needed work, the KB could not stay in the area for much longer. Any Japanese land based aircraft would have to be shipped in from somewhere. Also, who would service the aircraft and where would the fuel, ammo, and spare parts come from?

That's my new question too. If you fly air groups off the Japanese carriers onto these airfields, who is going to be doing the maintenance, arming and fueling of these planes? Are the trained mechanics and armorers that made up the deck crew for these carriers going to be clinging to the wings? Will they be ferried ashore somehow? Of what further military use are these carriers going to be to Japan for further offensives if they sail back stripped of most of their trained mechanics, aircrew and planes? Given the highly selective and elite nature of their pilot training program it's not like Japan had a huge cadre of carrier pilots just waiting back in Yokohama for an assignment.

Combat aircraft have high logistical requirements. A single sortie consumed from a few tens to a few hundreds of gallons of high-octane aviation fuel. Sustained flight operations require extensive fuel dumps and fuel delivery systems. In addition, bunkers are needed for ammunition. You don't just want bombs and torpedoes piled in the open in the weather where any errant bomb could hit them. Aircraft require frequent maintenance. Maintenance requires stores of spare parts and skilled mechanics. Are the Americans supposed to provide them? Where are the fuel bowsers, torpedo trolleys, maintenance cranes, bomb carts and drums of aviation fuel and spare parts coming from? Are they packed on the destroyers' decks too along with the infantry, artillery and tons of spare aerial bombs and torpedoes?

Have the Japanese done any intelligence groundwork (other than the one spy in Pearl) to determine if these airfields will be suitable or if adequate port facilities are available?

When Japan launched its December 1941 attacks in Southern Asia it did so from well-developed bases. During the southern advance, the Navy’s 22nd Air Flotilla supported the attack into Malaya from three former French airfields with all-weather runways in and around Saigon. The Japanese bases on Formosa were as well equipped. Units were at full strength in aircraft and crews. Months of preparation meant plentiful quantities of fuel and spare parts were on hand. The aircraft received excellent maintenance. As Japanese forces moved south, air units occupied, repaired and exploited captured enemy bases. Real problems developed, however, when those units reached more remote territories. Getting fuel, food and materiel to those bases determined whether the aircraft flew. Whether a base had been captured or built, however, it was nearly useless if seaborne supplies could not reach it.

Somehow Japan is gonna maintain an instant aerial blitz and blockade on Oahu from improvised airfields in the Hawaiian Islands at the end of a 3,800-mile, 11-sailing days long supply line where every commodity from spare planes to sparkplugs have to be shipped in. A supply line that will have almost no air cover over most of its length and will be vulnerable to submarines and commerce raiders. All while keeping a major offensive going in the NEI. Good luck.

BTW if the Kido Butai can fly off some of its air groups off on surrounding islands to attack Oahu, there is nothing certainly preventing the air groups on the Lexington and Enterprise and eventually the Saratoga from landing their planes at Oahu to aid in its defense. At least they have ground crew and ordinance already in place.

[warspite1]

So I think, given these answers, we need to step back a bit. The questions I've asked previously have not gone away, but the Pearl Harbor raid, re-imagined to ensure the carriers are at Pearl and to land troops and aircraft to some of the Hawaiian Islands, has now started to morph into something considerably larger and more complex - even without an assault on Oahu.

No. It is not larger and more complex because the PI invasion has been postponed. Idle elements from that will be repurposed.

So, before we get back to that, let's understand what this means.

1. You've mentioned taking two islands with a couple of battalions each and these are to be taken to the target by destroyer. The KB obviously needs its own destroyer defence, so I assume you've used additional destroyers units when gaming this? For four battalions, how many additional destroyers have you had to add to the KB? How many men can a destroyer comfortably carry + their equipment, initial supplies, AA weaponry etc.

https://destroyerhistory.org/de/apd/
(This was a US example. Jap would be similar.)

2. Have any other ships been added to the KB? Even if not, and given that the date for the attack is unknown and the KB may be at sea for weeks, how many tankers do Japan now need to employ to ensure the enlarged KB is kept supplie

3. You've brought the need for Midway to be taken as an essential part of this plan (not sure why you didn't mention that you needed to do this before)

Do you remember every detail of things you did years ago? What I do remember is that it was doable. Even with Grigsby's Pacific War.

and so the obvious questions are:

- What, if anything, did the US have by way of defence forces and coastal guns on Midway in December 1941?
- What forces do the Japanese commit to ensuring the island is taken? This is both troop numbers, and naval vessels.
- Where do these forces sail from?

The carrier force can strike Midway on the way back from Pearl. Land elements from PI would be used. So far as I know the defenses of Midway were no different from the defenses of Wake.

- What timescale are we talking about in terms of their arrival off Midway? I am assuming you've not put these to sea until a date for the PH attack has been confirmed? When do they arrive off Midway? I'm trying to understand how long the troops, landed on the HI, have to wait for any kind of air cover, and how big a window do the Americans have for reinforcing the islands.

As I suggested earlier, zeros could be immediately be transferred from some of the carriers before they depart. If the airfields really can't handle Bettys, some Vals and Kates could too till the airfields were expanded. (Although I question whether expansion would be necessary. Plenty of planes operated from grass airfields in WWII.)

- You still haven't confirmed which air units (fighters and bombers) you have earmarked for the two Hawaiian Islands. Can you confirm this as of course this is potentially important in terms of knock on effect on the operations against Malaya, the NEI, and keeping the aircraft on PI quiet.

t in every sim
The zeros and bettys from the PI operation. They would have to be replaced by older aircraft, probably making the reduction of PI air and naval elements slower. But, it would still be completed eventually. Note that the carriers would eventually become available, if nothing else worked.

warspite1

So your statement that you've successfully played this scenario out in every sim you've tried rings hollow.

You offer up no detail, you offer up nothing on timetable, you offer up nothing about what defences are available on Midway or any of the HI, you don't even appear to know in any detail what Japanese units are available.

You change your version of events depending on who you are answering. So in one breath the KB aren't risked and are 'long gone' (as per real life). Then you realise your idea about flying in aircraft to PI was totally impossible, so you have the KB sailing for Midway in order to ensure its taken, but you've also just realised you have a massive hole in your air defence and so you have the KB using their aircraft on the HI.

You claim the Pearl Harbor operation hasn't got any larger or more complex - this despite the fact that you've added at least four battalions of Japanese troops, you've added a larger tanker requirement, you've added the need to protect the troops you've put ashore (assuming they get there because you have unescorted destroyers sailing right past Oahu...). You then have the need to defend, reinforce, repair, refuel and re-arm whatever aircraft you've put into the PI and won't say how that is even remotely possible (I assume you've never heard of Lake Lesjaskog).

I mean seriously, just put say 12 Zeros on the northern most of the Hawaiian islands you say will be taken. Now. How much fuel and ammunition do they land with? How do you get fuel from a Japanese destroyer to the airfield? How do you get tons of spare parts, ammunition and AA weaponry to the airfield?

Your proposed operations - Spain/Turkey/Pearl Harbor - are detail free zones. You said you've wargamed this successfully and now you admit you don't know if the airfields on the islands you've taken can even handle Bettys. What have you wargamed exactly? You now have the KB's aircraft (a precious and finite resource) taking part in numerous operations they were not doing originally - including the need to do what they did historically.

So what are the invasion forces for Midway? When do they sail in order to be at Midway at any point even approaching relevance to the wider operation? You 'suppose' the US forces are similar to Wake. Well what were they in the wargames you've played? If they were the same as Wake, you know what happened at Wake don't you? You offer absolutely no detail, no timing on a hugely complex operation you say you've successfully recreated.

What exactly are the Americans (surviving ships and submarines) on Oahu (reinforced by the surviving carrier aircraft that weren't there historically) doing while the Japanese do all this sailing and flying around the Hawaiian Islands with seeming impunity?

And all this is without looking at the effects on the operations against Malaya and the NEI or the need, that remains, to ensure the US air and naval forces in the PI can't cause problems for those operations.

It's a real shame - this could have been an interesting exploration of Japanese alternate strategies. But as with the discussion on Spain, you simply state that if something is possible in a wargame then it MUST be possbile in real life. And why? Because you say you think there is no better source of information than a wargame.

[Aurelian]

The PI operation was *not* going to be postponed. It was needed for, among other reasons, staging areas and supply bases for supporting the seizure of the SRA. And to secure the LOC between the SRA and Japan.

The Imperial Japanese Army wasn't going to divert *anything* so the Imperial Japanese Navy could seize some islands that were of no use towards the seizure of the SRA.

[Platoonist]

The Imperial Japanese Army wasn't going to divert *anything* so the Imperial Japanese Navy could seize some islands that were of no use towards the seizure of the SRA.

That's the issue with using any commercial Pacific War wargame as a tool for mapping out alternate history. Even one as complex and detailed as War in the Pacific/AE completely glosses over the huge divide between the Japanese Army and Navy and they act as a harmonious whole instead.

I'm convinced you would need an almost Kim Jong-un level of control over Imperial Japan to get the inter-service cooperation it would take to launch an operation like this. At the time, the Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy were completely separate entities that answered to no one but themselves. While the emperor was seen the supreme ruler of the universe, he was kept in a box by the military advisors in his court and never truly exerted control over the Japanese military in any appreciable way. Any invasion of Oahu or the nearby islands would have needed the support of the Army which was firmly focused on holding down China and keeping watch on the Soviet Union. It was willing to part with only the bare number of divisions necessary to secure the Southern Resource Area as vital as that was to Japan's long term survival. Basically, 10 of its 51 divisions and only 4 of its 59 brigades. The Army said no to Imperial Japanese Navy requests for troops a lot. They refused to pony up the troops needed to push on Ceylon, Fiji or Australia. They only reluctantly agreed to release Colonel Ichiki's 28th Regiment for invading Midway after the political embarrassment of the Doolittle Raid. Before that they were deeply opposed to the operation.

The serious mistrust that existed between the two services is evident from the fact that the Combined Fleet never approached the IJA to discuss an Hawaiian invasion operation. The Combined Fleet was so concerned with maintaining the secrecy of the Pearl Harbor raid that it did not want to divulge any more than the bare minimum to the Army. The Fleet's fear was based on the IJA's stronger influence over governmental decision-making. If the IJA sensed any hint that the operation might include army troops, it could force its cancellation.

[RangerJoe]

To show the enthusiastic cooperation and information sharing between the Japanese Army and Navy, the Navy never told the Army about the airfield on Guadalcanal until it was lost.

The Emperor was a figurehead but he kept the defenders of Midway from being murdered. He also went for peace at the end of the war which was actually beyond his powers.

[Buckrock]

The serious mistrust that existed between the two services is evident from the fact that the Combined Fleet never approached the IJA to discuss an Hawaiian invasion operation. The Combined Fleet was so concerned with maintaining the secrecy of the Pearl Harbor raid that it did not want to divulge any more than the bare minimum to the Army. The Fleet's fear was based on the IJA's stronger influence over governmental decision-making. If the IJA sensed any hint that the operation might include army troops, it could force its cancellation.

I don't believe this plan so far would have even survived Yamamoto's first briefing, let alone have to be hidden from the IJA.

[Aurelian]

The Imperial Japanese Army wasn't going to divert *anything* so the Imperial Japanese Navy could seize some islands that were of no use towards the seizure of the SRA.

That's the issue with using any commercial Pacific War wargame as a tool for mapping out alternate history. Even one as complex and detailed as War in the Pacific/AE completely glosses over the huge divide between the Japanese Army and Navy and they act as a harmonious whole instead.

I think, but can't be certain 50 years later, the game USN by SPI had rules that dealt with the rivalry. I remember also reading that the Allies would help one to screw the other.

[warspite1]

The PI operation was *not* going to be postponed. It was needed for, among other reasons, staging areas and supply bases for supporting the seizure of the SRA. And to secure the LOC between the SRA and Japan.

The Imperial Japanese Army wasn't going to divert *anything* so the Imperial Japanese Navy could seize some islands that were of no use towards the seizure of the SRA.

warspite1

From the way you talk, anyone would think that oil was in short supply and that Japan also needed access to natural rubber, tin, the Cinchona plant and bauxite that the NEI was rich in....

[Curtis Lemay]

So your statement that you've successfully played this scenario out in every sim you've tried rings hollow.

But true.

You offer up no detail, you offer up nothing on timetable, you offer up nothing about what defences are available on Midway or any of the HI, you don't even appear to know in any detail what Japanese units are available.

No one could successfully game it out without dealing with the details at the time. Remembering those details years later is another matter.

You change your version of events depending on who you are answering. So in one breath the KB aren't risked and are 'long gone' (as per real life). Then you realise your idea about flying in aircraft to PI was totally impossible, so you have the KB sailing for Midway in order to ensure its taken, but you've also just realised you have a massive hole in your air defence and so you have the KB using their aircraft on the HI.

They are long gone, but not all their planes. Some fly to the neighbor islands. Again, this was years ago. As I asked before: do you remember every detail from things you did years ago? I remember the important stuff - that it succeeded.

You claim the Pearl Harbor operation hasn't got any larger or more complex - this despite the fact that you've added at least four battalions of Japanese troops, you've added a larger tanker requirement, you've added the need to protect the troops you've put ashore (assuming they get there because you have unescorted destroyers sailing right past Oahu...). You then have the need to defend, reinforce, repair, refuel and re-arm whatever aircraft you've put into the PI and won't say how that is even remotely possible (I assume you've never heard of Lake Lesjaskog).

I meant that the overall (Pacific-wide) operation hasn't gotten larger. The PI invasion has been postponed. If anything the overall operation is smaller due to that postponement.

I mean seriously, just put say 12 Zeros on the northern most of the Hawaiian islands you say will be taken. Now. How much fuel and ammunition do they land with? How do you get fuel from a Japanese destroyer to the airfield? How do you get tons of spare parts, ammunition and AA weaponry to the airfield?

Again, initially by destroyer (see the link I provided). They would deliver the ground crews (from the PI operation) for the air units just after the army battalions took the islands. Once the US air and naval elements on Oahu are sufficiently degraded cargo vessels could take over. Pre-war stockpiles could have been built up on Enewetok, shortening the shipping distance.

Your proposed operations - Spain/Turkey/Pearl Harbor - are detail free zones. You said you've wargamed this successfully and now you admit you don't know if the airfields on the islands you've taken can even handle Bettys. What have you wargamed exactly? You now have the KB's aircraft (a precious and finite resource) taking part in numerous operations they were not doing originally - including the need to do what they did historically.

I provided plenty of detail for the Spain/Turkey thing - and the details that count for this as well. Names of units are chrome. The aircraft are what matter, and I've detailed where they come from: The PI operation.

So what are the invasion forces for Midway? When do they sail in order to be at Midway at any point even approaching relevance to the wider operation? You 'suppose' the US forces are similar to Wake. Well what were they in the wargames you've played? If they were the same as Wake, you know what happened at Wake don't you? You offer absolutely no detail, no timing on a hugely complex operation you say you've successfully recreated.

There are loads of ground elements available if the Luzon invasion is postponed. More than sufficient to ensure Midway falls. Their departure would be timed to arrive about when the carriers get there from Pearl. Does anyone think that couldn't be sorted out by the Japanese? That it would be humanly impossible for the carriers and the invasion units to be synchronized? And even so, what would it matter if one or the other had to wait a bit on the other?

What exactly are the Americans (surviving ships and submarines) on Oahu (reinforced by the surviving carrier aircraft that weren't there historically) doing while the Japanese do all this sailing and flying around the Hawaiian Islands with seeming impunity?

I'm assuming the US carriers will be in port and sunk - with most of their AC. Once on the neighbor islands, the transferred Jap AC will continue degrading the ships and AC on Oahu. The ships will have to flee or be sunk eventually.

And all this is without looking at the effects on the operations against Malaya and the NEI or the need, that remains, to ensure the US air and naval forces in the PI can't cause problems for those operations.

The naval and air forces in PI will still be degraded by other army and navy aircraft. Just at a lesser rate. And, eventually, the carriers will become available for that task. The PI is far behind Jap lines and without lines of communication to the US. It will eventually be neutralized.

[warspite1]

In real life, the Japanese lost the war the moment they attacked the US. Its is a shame for Japan and the Allies (in terms of deaths of civilians and troops on both sides) that your plan wasn’t adopted. The war would have likely struggled to enter 1943 had they done so.

Your plan was pretty much guaranteed to neuter the vaunted KB - the ships may not have been sunk, but the air groups would have been decimated.

The losses in destroyers and other vessels trying to supply the troops left to wither on the Hawaiian vine would have been heavy. The poor troops - those that survived from lack of food - would have been ultimately captured having achieved absolutely nothing.

In a bid to get something from the debacle, the Japanese would divert troops and aircraft from the vital tasks of capturing the NEI, Malaya/Singapore and the PI. The delay would prove costly in terms of achieving these aims.

The ships of what was ABDA, given time to organise more of a defence than they were actually allowed, are able to give the IJN a harder time, supported by increased numbers of aircraft.

With greatly reduced (or possibly no) NEI oil and other resources, and massively increased oil expenditure thanks to trying to salvage the mess in the Eastern Pacific, the Japanese simply wouldn’t have enough oil to undertake the operations against New Britain, New Guinea and Burma.

Whoops.