Make oil relevant and strategic planning mandatory

[zyankali89]

I am currently playing my first grand campaign as Axis. It is the end of May '42 and I am within the last preparation steps for my summer offensive. My fuel reserves are dangerously running low. Gauging from the metrics with current consumption I should run out of fuel in 4-6 months. That is why I chose to aim for Maikop and other Caucasian oil fields to secure the ability to wage (mobile) war in the future.

Now I just read on the forum that there are no adverse effect of low fuel reserves since there is a hardcoded, guaranteed reserve that makes it impossible to run out, even if you continue to use more fuel than you produce.

If that is really the case, there is no point in implementing production cycles, resources and factories in the first place in this game. Why did the devs go such a long way researching all the different factory and resource locations, production mechanisms etc. if there is no strategic meaning of it whatsoever?

Don't get me wrong: This is a fantastic game, one of my favorites of all time. But I think the devs wasted a huge opportunity here. On the one hand, historic accuracy and immersion are what makes this game so much fun. But on the other hand the prerequisites of war, the strategic objectives of warfare itself are neglected. Oil played a dominant role in the war. Some even say, Barbarossa itself was a war for oil. I do not feel this at all in the game.

Long story short: Dear developers, please abolish the invisible minimum fuel reserve, thereby increase the importance of oil (and possibly other resources) and hence make strategic planning mandatory. Thank you!

[Denniss]

With insufficient fuel reserves you'll suffer in aircraft Pilot training, this will be the first to cut short. There is no fuel created out of thin air.

[zyankali89]

Thank you for the reply! What you are saying contradicts other players' reports in this forum who say there are almost no consequences and as a player you do not have to pay attention to fuel reserves at all.

I am glad to hear that apparently there are adverse consequences, though. What other effects do oil/fuel shortages have? Do frontline troops' fuel supply and mobility (MP) diminish? Does it inhibit production? Do the maths add up, so do you have to cut short and save the delta between production and consumption of fuel?

[Stamb]

in my first GC fuel drops to ~250k and then stays at the same level, why it does not drop to 0 since i did not produce more fuel than before?

1.png (1.42 MiB) Viewed 1380 times

2.png (1.4 MiB) Viewed 1380 times

3.png (1.4 MiB) Viewed 1380 times

4.png (1.39 MiB) Viewed 1380 times

there was 0 consequences for a units on the map
planes were able to fly
mobile units were able to get 50 MPs

[M60A3TTS]

Taken from a US Army 1955 study entitled The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940-1942)

Underlined parts I include to emphasize some points.

The Oil of the Caucasus

German Efforts at Production

Late in September 1942 German counterintelligence personnel were still planning a coup de main in order to spare certain important installations in the Baku area from complete Soviet destruction. German agents were to infiltrate behind the Russian lines, contact reliable persons employed at the respective installations, and prepare so-called fake demolitions. The latter would be easily repaired once the Germans had seized the respective area.

By early November the unfavorable course of events forced German counterintelligence to switch from fake demolition attempts to real acts of sabotage. The most successful sabotage act was perpetrated at Grozny, where parachute agents blew up a large Russian ammunition dump, causing great damage and heavy casualties. The Oil Brigade Caucasus was meanwhile continuing its efforts against heavy odds. In a memorandum dated 29 October Oil Brigade Headquarters complained about the situation at Ilskaya, a town southwest of Krasnodar. There, the German outpost line went straight
through the oil fields. Inspecting officers from Oil Brigade Headquarters had requested the responsible tactical commander to advance his defensive positions by 900 yards. This request had gone to the chief of staff of Seventeenth Army, who expressed his concern over any such action since German forces faced greatly superior Russian
units in that sector. From the German point of view this refusal was all the more regrettable because the Russians had apparently left their drills intact and production could have started sooner there than elsewhere.

The Ilskaya wells produced no oil while under German control. Neither did most of the other wells at Maikop or elsewhere in the Caucasus. Reviewing the German effort to exploit the Caucasus oil resources in his economic survey of 1942, General Thomas stated that the staff of Oil Brigade Caucasus had taken the continuance of the German advance into the Caucasus for granted. Expecting that they would be able to exploit the rich Grozny oil fields, the Oil Brigade
personnel had failed to concentrate their efforts on the Maikop and other fields, which had been in German hands for several months.

The technical difficulties encountered by the Germans because of Russian demolition of oil wells and transportation facilities were far greater than anticipated. After inspecting the Maikop area the technical experts reported that it would be more effective to use the drilling equipment and personnel of the Oil Brigade in Romania or near Vienna than in the Caucasus.

This suggestion was not accepted. Instead, the Oil Brigade operated at Maikop and elsewhere under precarious circumstances, and the Armavir-Maikop railroad was not reconditioned until too late. When the brigade finally struck oil, its commander was ordered to evacuate and blow up the laboriously reconstructed installations; the small quantities of oil produced could not be taken along due to the lack of transport facilities.

Russian Supplies

In reviewing the Russian oil supply, General Thomas expressed the opinion that blocking the Volga at Stalingrad would not by itself suffice to reduce the Soviet Union's POL supplies to such a degree that it would impair the Russian conduct of operations in 1943. This could be achieved only if all supplies from Baku were cut off completely by the spring of 1943. In this case Russian stocks would be exhausted by the summer of 1943. The Soviet armed forces and civilian economy would be severely handicapped without oil from the Caucasus. Since approximately 70 percent of the total high-octane gasoline consumed in the Soviet Union was produced from Baku oil, the seizure of the Baku wells and not the occupation of the lower Volga from Stalingrad to Astrakhan would lead to extensive paralysis of the Russian Air Force.

This report, like so many others by which General Thomas tried to warn the men who were responsible for Germany's military planning, served only one practical purpose: to make its author even more unpopular in National Socialist circles.

[Stamb]

I was also watching some video and it was told that Germans got much less than they planned from the Caucasus.
So in the game it would be reasonable to add some penalties for the Axis at certain point (when they started to have issues with a fuel IRL) like reducing max MPs that mobile units can have, as an example, IMHO.

[Wiedrock]

Just created a "Quick question" to this, now finding this new Thread,....

Let's say the assumtion is correct and Fuel can be created out of Food.

I know there is a percentage based gain of stuff needed depending on successfull leader-rolls. This percentages may differ between different "kinds" of Divisions (mot./mech, Pz., Inf ....). Then there are Bonuses to those percentages for AssaultHQs (if i remember correctly). Then there are somewhat manipulated ammunition values for Soviet Artillery Units....and more more more.
I don't know the exact numbers for all of those (and atm I am not willing to read the manual), but may there be a difference in those percentages of gaining fuel comparing soviet/german units and it's just not that obvious since Germans have better leader-skills?!

If someone could clarify this topic, I'd appreciate it.

[Denniss]

I have 1945 saves from AI tests were almost all of the limited fuel production is eaten by civil consumption (factory upkeep) and TBs, almost nothing is available for onmap combat units. Most of these units have limited to no fuel with massively reduced moving points.

[jasonbroomer]

in my first GC fuel drops to ~250k and then stays at the same level, why it does not drop to 0 since i did not produce more fuel than before?

1.png

2.png

3.png

4.png

there was 0 consequences for a units on the map
planes were able to fly
mobile units were able to get 50 MPs

Is this 250k just representing the week's production? i.e. you are living hand to mouth.

The question is, what are the consequences of this?

[Stamb]

It is not week production, it is pool.

Production in the tittle is because it is the Production section in the sidebar, I believe.

For the units on the map there were no consequences.

[jasonbroomer]

It is not week production, it is pool.

Production in the tittle is because it is the Production section in the sidebar, I believe.

For the units on the map there were no consequences.

Surely it is a production pool like any other eg manpower or tank production?

You see the active and transit (ie the most recent week's production) in the pool total

[Stamb]

It is not week production, it is pool.

Production in the tittle is because it is the Production section in the sidebar, I believe.

For the units on the map there were no consequences.

Surely it is a production pool like any other eg manpower or tank production?

You see the active and transit (ie the most recent week's production) in the pool total

Manpower pool is under same section and that is why it also has Production: Manpower pool.
So if it says Fuel Stores + pool (1st screenshot) I think it is stores and pool (not sure what is the difference between them)
But graph clearly shows when magic kicks in

[Denniss]

pool is the global virtual pool, stores is what's onmap in locations. I don't think that includes what's in units/airbases.

[Denniss]

BTW for an update far in the future I'm working on a slight revision of soviet oil, reducing it to ~300 points.
Then there is the problem of properly modelling the soviet sabotage/evacuation of oil/fuel factories and special equipment once/if the Axis advance into the Caucasus. This is currently done with a date-based factory size reduction but I'm trying to find something better.
Either something dynamic based on Axis troops reaching specific locations (ingame events, needs altering all scenarios) or a general production efficiency reduction from 1943 on (removing the date-based factory reductions in both cases)

[Stamb]

Also here is great AAR in 1945:
https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/view ... 2&t=376240

and we can see MPs:






does not look like there are any problems

[Jango32]

I fully expect that playing VtB for a few turns against the AI with OKH set to supply priority 4 (so the entire Wehrmacht and W-SS is set to priority 4) will show that MPs are not a problem.

[Nikel]

A lot of relevant data in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: Oil Division, final report.

Unfortunately some of the pages lost in the scanning process.


https://books.google.com/books?id=hPMsA ... navlinks_s

[Mehring]

Related to this is the movement of motor vehicles and towed heavy equpment without fuel, albeit at a reduced rate. While motorised units might under report their fuel supply and scavenge where possible, it would eventually become exhausted and immobilise entire units. In such circumstances there should really be a game option to separate manpower from heavy equipment enabling the former to abandon the latter to gain movement, as happened countless times in the conflict.

[Denniss]

Axis heavily rationed fuel for civil usages from mid 1944 on, something that never happens in the game. Thus civil usage bleeds the Axis armies dry

[zyankali89]

Thank you all for the discussion. I know that Germany never was able to really capitalize on the Maikop oil fields. However, I stand by my argument that strategic decisions should matter in this game. Oil should be a huge part of that. Maybe this could also better be reflected in victory points since destruction of oil fields would prevent short-term effects of capturing Maikop, Grozny etc.