A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Buckrock]

Only one destroyer need be done at a time. One port slot and one crane.

So an IJN Mutsuki class destroyer sails up to civilian run dock with a sufficiently sized crane at a Japanese port and requests (they can't demand) a berth adjacent to the crane for some undefined period. The master of the dock checks his schedule and says come back when they're not so busy.

Rubbish. Ports aren't private enterprizes. They're public facilities. The Navy would have priority - especially in such a militaristic country like Japan.

Most of the non-military major docks in Japan were owned by the big corporations. If the navy wanted exclusive use of their facilities, it would be negotiated by service contract. If a warship turned up at a dock that is not already contracted to the navy during this pre-war period, there is likely no reason short of an emergency where it would be guaranteed priority. After all, the civilian fleets that fed the nation still needed some ability to maintain their operations. If some arrogant warship commander refused to wait, then the equally arrogant corporate owners of the dock could be expected to protest to the navy. And then the navy might start to wonder about why Yamamoto is sending his warships outside the existing system.

What "specialist labor"? Welders and carpenters. They're just adding berths and storage.

Is this an APD or just a DD with a field mod?

And ships are huge. They can't hide while being worked on. It doesn't matter where it's done.

You seem unaware of the efforts the Japanese went through to avoid close ups of their warships and weaponry pre-war even in the public harbors of Japan.

[TulliusDetritus]

Thus, if USN had tried to reinforce Philippines as in Warplan Orange, those old BBs would have sat quickly in bottom in lot deeper sea...

Had it happened, the odyssey of the Prince of Wales and Repulse or something similar would have been food for thought... I get your cunning plan though.

[Aurelian]

warspite1

Two astonishing posts, one after the other. This comment is perhaps the highlight across the two. Genuinely no words.

Every item above is from Grigsby. I think we make a great team!

warspite1

If only Yamamoto had had a copy of Pacific War he would surely have seen the error of his ways.

Seriously Curtis Lemay those two posts at the top of the page are off the chart out there, even for you. I think Buckrock was right - this is a wind up right?

If Pacific War is so accurate, then why did I waste my money on WiTP and AE?

Funny thing about Pacific War. I bombarded Japan with the surviving battleships from Pearl Harbor. And got away with it. Very realistic, except it wasn't.

[Platoonist]

If Japan had been smart, they'd not have attacked USA at start.

Instead, they could have used all the resources dedicated to PH and Philippines to attack Brits and Dutch.

They should have been able to finish both Malaya and DEI quite quickly with extra troops and full Kido Butai in support.

Then they could have attacked USA (e.g. Philippines) and remember, USN was still believing into Battleships, only PH attack disillusioned that belief. Thus, if USN had tried to reinforce Philippines as in Warplan Orange, those old BBs would have sat quickly in bottom in lot deeper sea...

I'd have to agree this would have been a far better Japanese strategy. Roosevelt believed that the survival of Britain’s empire in Asia was essential to Britain’s ability to continue fighting Germany and Italy in Europe. Yet he never indicated to anyone, including Churchill, how he thought he could obtain a US declaration of war against Japan in response to a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia limited to European colonies.

Luckily for Roosevelt, the Japanese leadership and populace were strongly subscribed to the A-B-C-D encirclement conspiracy theory, in which it saw itself being strategically hemmed in by the Americans, British, Chinese and Dutch in lockstep unison. The IJN in particular insisted that the United States and Great Britain were strategically inseparable (mirroring Roosevelt’s view of Germany and Japan) and that an attack on the British and the Dutch in Southeast Asia was sure to provoke a violent U.S. response, and therefore that it was imperative to preempt the United States militarily. After all, they had imposed their oil embargoes on Japan as one bloc. Even though the US wasn't at war yet, American shipyards were repairing war-damaged British ships, helping transport British troops and cargo and the American Volunteer Air Group was training in British territory. In their eyes, Britain and American in particular, were joined at the hip.

[Sardaukar]

If Japan had been smart, they'd not have attacked USA at start.

Instead, they could have used all the resources dedicated to PH and Philippines to attack Brits and Dutch.

They should have been able to finish both Malaya and DEI quite quickly with extra troops and full Kido Butai in support.

Then they could have attacked USA (e.g. Philippines) and remember, USN was still believing into Battleships, only PH attack disillusioned that belief. Thus, if USN had tried to reinforce Philippines as in Warplan Orange, those old BBs would have sat quickly in bottom in lot deeper sea...

I'd have to agree this would have been a far better Japanese strategy. Roosevelt believed that the survival of Britain’s empire in Asia was essential to Britain’s ability to continue fighting Germany and Italy in Europe. Yet he never indicated to anyone, including Churchill, how he thought he could obtain a US declaration of war against Japan in response to a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia limited to European colonies.

Luckily for Roosevelt, the Japanese leadership and populace were strongly subscribed to the A-B-C-D encirclement conspiracy theory, in which it saw itself being strategically hemmed in by the Americans, British, Chinese and Dutch in lockstep unison. The IJN in particular insisted that the United States and Great Britain were strategically inseparable (mirroring Roosevelt’s view of Germany and Japan) and that an attack on the British and the Dutch in Southeast Asia was sure to provoke a violent U.S. response, and therefore that it was imperative to preempt the United States militarily. After all, they had imposed their oil embargoes on Japan as one bloc. Even though the US wasn't at war yet, American shipyards were repairing war-damaged British ships, helping transport British troops and cargo and the American Volunteer Air Group was training in British territory. In their eyes, Britain and American in particular, were joined at the hip.

Roosevelt would have been hard-pressed to try to declare war on Japan (even with all anti-Japanese feelings) if Japan didn't do anything aggressive towards USA. Isolationist support was high that time.

Or even Germany...but Adolf, in his wisdom, decided to declare war on USA. That was...dumb.

[Sardaukar]

To add, Japanese seriously misunderstood Western psyche that time.

But similarly, Western Powers similarly misunderstood Japanese psyche.

E.g. Japan had deep desire to be treated as equal to other powers and when it was not in e.g. Naval Treaties, resentment was high. As Shattered Sword analyses it well, since more astute Japanese (like Yamamoto) realized, that those Naval Treaties were actually beneficial to Japan, who didn't have resources to compete with industrial might of USA.

Then there was Japanese invasion of China, in which they seriously made themselves look like bad guys.

Had there not been things happening in China and had Japan just attacked Britain and Dutch, they might have gotten away with it. Especially, since anti-colonialism was popular in USA (as was evident in Asia during and after WW II) and that combined with isolationism could have just pulled them out of war with USA.

[warspite1]

If, as many appear to believe, the US refused to get involved if Japan had launched a UK/France/Dutch only policy, just what would that have meant? I suspect the Japanese would have had sufficient resource to at least invade India and hope that this would start a full scale revolt against British rule there. Had Britain effectively lost India, Burma, Malaya and Singapore (as well as control of the Indian Ocean with all that meant for Egypt, the oil fields of the middle east, Australia and New Zealand) by the middle of 1942, the aid to the USSR would have been reduced - both directly and indirectly.

I guess the greatest of the unknowns is what this meant on the Eastern Front. With their continued neutral status, what would this mean for assistance to the USSR? Maybe the Germans and Soviets would have fought toa standstill - but equally there may have been a German or Soviet winner. Either way, a discomforting thought for Europe.

I wonder how the world would view Roosevelt and the US had all that come to pass? Personally I like to think that the US would have not sat on the sidelines had the Japanese left the US alone. An attack on British and Dutch possessions would circumvent Roosevelt’s embargo on Japan, see US western allies weakened and do nothing to help China.

Roosevelt knew the US would need to fight the totalitarian nations one day - best to do that when you still have Allies to fight with.....

[Buckrock]

In the situation being discussed, getting congressional support for a US declaration of war against Japan should have been an "easier" task than it would have been against Germany. IIRC, Gallup polling in the latter half of 1941 showed a majority of the American public were supportive of measures to stop Japanese expansion even if it risked war. And in the Far East, there would likely be many more situations for unfortunate incidents involving US forces compared to the Atlantic.

Personally I think a declaration would have happened within weeks, about the time needed for it to become obvious that Singapore and the DEI were going to inevitably fall without US intervention. After that, the B-17s would quickly force Japan to the negotiating table and all could end amicably with a nice cup of tea.

[Platoonist]

I think isolationist sentiment was certainly in decline by late 1941. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June had caused the left in American politics to almost wholesale abandon their opposition to US involvement. However, in the back of Roosevelt's mind was that in August the House of Representatives had voted to extend the Selective Service Act by a mere single vote. But for that one vote, the U.S. Army would have largely fallen apart in the fall. The sinking of the destroyer Reuben James to a U-Boat torpedo with the loss of 100 lives in October also did virtually nothing to move the meter on public opinion.

However, I do think the US would have had to make a choice to come to Britain's aid at some point. Especially if it looked like a link-up in India between Japan and Germany was in the offing. Who knows? This version of events might have given the US the breathing space to fortify Guam and Wake, reinforce the Philippines, update a lot of obsolescent aircraft and then be in an even better position to throttle Japan's sea lanes.

You have to give Roosevelt credit in some respects. Unlike some later presidents, he certainly respected the Congress’s constitutional prerogative to declare war.

[warspite1]

I for one give Roosevelt credit. I believe he understood that the US would end up having to fight because he understood the danger. It is just a shame that so many of his countrymen and women could not see what the US were being faced with that late in the day. But at the end of the day FDR was a politician in a democratic country and there were limits to what he could do. I believe within those constraints, he did what he could.

[warspite1]

http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm gives good guidelines about IJN oil consumption.

warspite1

This article evidences why the Japanese would never, could never, afford to do anything that could compromise the conquest of the NEI at the earliest moment.

If Japan chose war, the oil of the NEI (and other strategic materials in Malaya) was not a nice to have, it was not something they could delay getting, while they found something more juicy to attack. The oil of the NEI was absolutely crucial. Japan had essentially no oil income and reserves that were running out. Those reserves would disappear rapidly once war was declared, but were running down even without war.

Curtis Lemay has given Yamamoto foresight and ideas he didn't have in real life. It is interesting that he has envisaged a plan to sink the carriers (without which there is no war apparently) and yet wouldn't even say how many carriers needed to be in port. But if he believes that Yamamoto was suddenly imbued with this foresight, well maybe he would have insisted on all three carriers being in port. That would be interesting wouldn't it? His enlarged Kido Butai complete with flotillas of jam-packed destroyers would have been horizontally yo-yoing back and forth in the hideous weather of the North Pacific for months waiting for Saratoga to show up.

Its just total fantasy.

[Sardaukar]

If Japan had just taken Malaya, Burma and DEI, and then sat down to try to negotiate, I wonder what US response would have been.

Or Britain's. Dutch would have been unable to negotiate at all, since they would not have much left to negotiate with.

Historically what I propose would have been quite alien to Japanese mentality and it still leaves the "tar-baby" of China.

[TulliusDetritus]

You have to give Roosevelt credit in some respects.

+1

Hard or futile to define the best president in charge but his patrician intelligence is what the US needed in the 30s and 40s. The country in shambles (1933), he immediately understood he needed to fix the *really* important front: the domestic affairs. Only when this part was secure he lead the country to war (the Japanese helped, of course). From Dust Bowl to victory in war (which he could not see). If not the best, he's clearly one of them.

[TulliusDetritus]

The positive thing for Japan if they don't attack the US but Roosevelt declares war the same, what about the historical resolve to crush the enemy?

[Orm]

You have to give Roosevelt credit in some respects.

+1

Hard or futile to define the best president in charge but his patrician intelligence is what the US needed in the 30s and 40s. The country in shambles (1933), he immediately understood he needed to fix the *really* important front: the domestic affairs. Only when this part was secure he lead the country to war (the Japanese helped, of course). From Dust Bowl to victory in war (which he could not see). If not the best, he's clearly one of them.

Hear, hear.

Although, towards the end of his presidency I think he was to tired to bear the weight of his office as good as he had previously been doing.

[warspite1]

If Japan had just taken Malaya, Burma and DEI, and then sat down to try to negotiate, I wonder what US response would have been.

warspite1

My 0.02GBP.

The US wouldn't negotiate with Japan about China/FIC. They embargoed the oil. Japan has just doubled down on the land grab AND got around the US embargo. I don't - I simply can't - believe that with everything happening in Europe and Asia, that suddenly Roosevelt would be in a mood to negotiate with Japan. What would Japan agree to that the US could give?

The Japanese - with these conquests intact - would be in even less of a mood to negotiate than they were in the summer of 1941. And with Germany seemingly set to conquer the USSR, things look suddenly a whole lot worse for the US from a global perspective.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

Two astonishing posts, one after the other. This comment is perhaps the highlight across the two. Genuinely no words.

Every item above is from Grigsby. I think we make a great team!

warspite1

If only Yamamoto had had a copy of Pacific War he would surely have seen the error of his ways.

Seriously Curtis Lemay those two posts at the top of the page are off the chart out there, even for you. I think Buckrock was right - this is a wind up right?

I stand by every word. And Grigsby is right about carriers and battleships. At the time of Pearl, carriers had a big speed advantage on BBs and 10x the bombardment range. Plus 10x the spotting range. The BB can't spot or shoot at the carrier, or even run away. Plenty of BBs sunk by carriers in the war (including the two biggest). No BB ever sank a carrier.

That's really what it's all about. It all depends upon the value of the targets. If carriers really are 10x as valuable as battleships, the plan is a no-brainer. It's a risk-reward option. The risk is low and the reward is very high.

[RangerJoe]

If Japan had just taken Malaya, Burma and DEI, and then sat down to try to negotiate, I wonder what US response would have been.

warspite1

My 0.02GBP.

The US wouldn't negotiate with Japan about China/FIC. They embargoed the oil. Japan has just doubled down on the land grab AND got around the US embargo. I don't - I simply can't - believe that with everything happening in Europe and Asia, that suddenly Roosevelt would be in a mood to negotiate with Japan. What would Japan agree to that the US could give?

The Japanese - with these conquests intact - would be in even less of a mood to negotiate than they were in the summer of 1941. And with Germany seemingly set to conquer the USSR, things look suddenly a whole lot worse for the US from a global perspective.

My understanding is this: Japan could still have procured oil but not in the amount that Japan had been purchasing. Any purchases of any embargoed goods would be on a case by case basis since the USA terminated the trade treaty. FDR wanted to keep the Japanese civilian economy going but nothing extra for the military.

[Curtis Lemay]

Fuel and oil situation would have made HI operation (anything but historical raid) quite impossible.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm gives good guidelines about IJN oil consumption.

Plus, as well-described in Shattered Sword, capturing further and further areas with scarcely anything to bring back would increase both oil/fuel consumption by TWO miles per every mile (since they'd need to go back too).

It'd also severely reduce efficiency of IJN merchant marine (that was already quite inadequate to job, huge amount of shipping pre-war was actually done by Allied or neutral ships and that tonnage was obviously lost when war started).

As already pointed out, Japanese GHQ had already calculated that supplying enough troops to capture HI was impossible.

Landing 4 battalions huge distance away with no realistic way to reinforce and resupply them is sure way to lose those 4 battalions (and subsequent forces, be it naval, air or land forces).

When Kido Butai would have to withdraw, those units Japan had landed would be destroyed piecemeal by superior numbers of US troops, since IJN would not have any means to support or re-supply them.

A reminder: The Luzon invasion is postponed. Lots of fuel released for other purposes.

[Curtis Lemay]

Most of the non-military major docks in Japan were owned by the big corporations. If the navy wanted exclusive use of their facilities, it would be negotiated by service contract. If a warship turned up at a dock that is not already contracted to the navy during this pre-war period, there is likely no reason short of an emergency where it would be guaranteed priority. After all, the civilian fleets that fed the nation still needed some ability to maintain their operations. If some arrogant warship commander refused to wait, then the equally arrogant corporate owners of the dock could be expected to protest to the navy. And then the navy might start to wonder about why Yamamoto is sending his warships outside the existing system.

This is not "pre-war". Japan is at war with China. The military rules. And the port capacity of Japan alone (nevermind its overseas holdings) is huge relative to its shipyard capacity. Don't claim that every port in Japan was permanently full up for months prior to the war.

What "specialist labor"? Welders and carpenters. They're just adding berths and storage.

Is this an APD or just a DD with a field mod?

It's adding berths and storage.

And ships are huge. They can't hide while being worked on. It doesn't matter where it's done.

You seem unaware of the efforts the Japanese went through to avoid close ups of their warships and weaponry pre-war even in the public harbors of Japan.

They're still huge and can't be hidden. You don't need a close up to know what's being worked on.