A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Aurelian]

warspite1

No, again you choose to miss the point. Of course one can explore hypotheticals. But they need to be realistic. You have Yamamoto doing things with the destroyer fleet, with the carrier raid and with the attack on the Southern Area that simply make no sense in terms of:

- Japan's strategic position
- Japan's resources vs their navy requirements
- the army vs the navy and their lack of co-operation
- what Yamamoto knew (or thought he knew)

As I've said, I deduce what Yamamoto thought from his ACTIONS. His actions heavily favored carriers. If one has concluded that carriers are far more valuable than battleships the plan is a no brainer.

warspite1

But Yamamoto didn't think that the raid should be cancelled or postponed if only BB's could be attacked so..... and his ACTIONS at Midway and elsewhere showed he hadn't shaken off the notion that the BB would deliver victory in the decisive battle.

And to say it again, Yamamoto was quite willing to lose carriers in exchange for battleships. So what can we deduce from that?

[warspite1]

Boy are you risk averse!

warspite1

You don't understand Japan's position. How many Bettys and precious aircrew do you think Japan would be happy to throw away on the basis an island thousands of miles away is perhaps possibly taken maybe? What would need to happen for your Maui invasion to work is that a million stars need to align. And you think the Japanese would run the risk. That is not me being risk averse.

It is a low risk, high reward option. Two battalions and two air groups vs. a years delay in US response.

warspite1

There is high risk and there is total and utter nonsense. What you are proposing threatens the conquest of the NEI, it threatens the loss of too much in the east thanks to the vaguries of poor weather, poor timing, bad luck. How you can say its low risk is simply beyond me. But then maybe I haven't factored in the Code of Bushido.....

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

So I ask again, all Japanese were Kamakaze yes? All Kamakaze pilots flew their mission yes?

All Japanese followed the Bushido code, from which Kamakazes result. You want to ridiculusly exaggerate every factor in the plan. A stint at sea isn't a great hardship - especially for Samuri.

warspite1

A stint at sea?? I beg you. Look at a map, look at the weather, look at the timescale, look at the conditions and what you are asking the troops to do and still be combat ready at the end of it. Read about the British troops on their way to the Falklands in a situation wholly more favourable to those you envisage for the Japanese. Sorry, you don't understand what you expect the Japanese troops to do and you simply use a get out of jail "code of Bushido" nonsense to try and explain it.

Yes. A stint at sea. If things got too drawn out, they could return to port.

[Curtis Lemay]

As I've said, I deduce what Yamamoto thought from his ACTIONS. His actions heavily favored carriers. If one has concluded that carriers are far more valuable than battleships the plan is a no brainer.

warspite1

But Yamamoto didn't think that the raid should be cancelled or postponed if only BB's could be attacked so..... and his ACTIONS at Midway and elsewhere showed he hadn't shaken off the notion that the BB would deliver victory in the decisive battle.

And to say it again, Yamamoto was quite willing to lose carriers in exchange for battleships. So what can we deduce from that?

I guess you must have read his memoirs.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

You don't understand Japan's position. How many Bettys and precious aircrew do you think Japan would be happy to throw away on the basis an island thousands of miles away is perhaps possibly taken maybe? What would need to happen for your Maui invasion to work is that a million stars need to align. And you think the Japanese would run the risk. That is not me being risk averse.

It is a low risk, high reward option. Two battalions and two air groups vs. a years delay in US response.

warspite1

There is high risk and there is total and utter nonsense. What you are proposing threatens the conquest of the NEI, it threatens the loss of too much in the east thanks to the vaguries of poor weather, poor timing, bad luck. How you can say its low risk is simply beyond me. But then maybe I haven't factored in the Code of Bushido.....

It only delays Luzon - which had nothing to do with the rest of the initial expansion. You are really, really risk averse!!

[warspite1]

All Japanese followed the Bushido code, from which Kamakazes result. You want to ridiculusly exaggerate every factor in the plan. A stint at sea isn't a great hardship - especially for Samuri.

warspite1

A stint at sea?? I beg you. Look at a map, look at the weather, look at the timescale, look at the conditions and what you are asking the troops to do and still be combat ready at the end of it. Read about the British troops on their way to the Falklands in a situation wholly more favourable to those you envisage for the Japanese. Sorry, you don't understand what you expect the Japanese troops to do and you simply use a get out of jail "code of Bushido" nonsense to try and explain it.

Yes. A stint at sea. If things got too drawn out, they could return to port.

warspite1

....and the war would be delayed.... and Japan's strategic position would continue to deteriorate. And all that oil would have been expended for nothing..... But hang on, they wouldn't to return to port - code of Bushido and all that, right?

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

A stint at sea?? I beg you. Look at a map, look at the weather, look at the timescale, look at the conditions and what you are asking the troops to do and still be combat ready at the end of it. Read about the British troops on their way to the Falklands in a situation wholly more favourable to those you envisage for the Japanese. Sorry, you don't understand what you expect the Japanese troops to do and you simply use a get out of jail "code of Bushido" nonsense to try and explain it.

Yes. A stint at sea. If things got too drawn out, they could return to port.

warspite1

....and the war would be delayed.... and Japan's strategic position would continue to deteriorate. And all that oil would have been expended for nothing..... But hang on, they wouldn't to return to port - code of Bushido and all that, right?

They would return to port. A little extra oil in exchange for carriers. Sounds like a good deal to me! Remember: Luzon is postponed. Lots of stuff available for repurposing.

[warspite1]

It is a low risk, high reward option. Two battalions and two air groups vs. a years delay in US response.

warspite1

There is high risk and there is total and utter nonsense. What you are proposing threatens the conquest of the NEI, it threatens the loss of too much in the east thanks to the vaguries of poor weather, poor timing, bad luck. How you can say its low risk is simply beyond me. But then maybe I haven't factored in the Code of Bushido.....

It only delays Luzon - which had nothing to do with the rest of the initial expansion. You are really, really risk averse!!

warspite1

Nope. You can keep saying the same thing over and over again but it doesn't make any difference. Your 'plan' simply delayed the start of the war while making the chance of the Allies detecting what was happening more likely. You have also taken away units required in the Southern Area.

I have explained to you (but really shouldn't need to) why Japan could do NOTHING to risk the conquest of the NEI. But I guess your argument is simple; Who needs oil when your ships and aircraft can run on the Code of Bushido.

[warspite1]

Yes. A stint at sea. If things got too drawn out, they could return to port.

warspite1

....and the war would be delayed.... and Japan's strategic position would continue to deteriorate. And all that oil would have been expended for nothing..... But hang on, they wouldn't to return to port - code of Bushido and all that, right?

They would return to port. A little extra oil in exchange for carriers. Sounds like a good deal to me! Remember: Luzon is postponed. Lots of stuff available for repurposing.

warspite1

No again. A lot of extra oil in exchange for still no certain date on which Japan go to war and obtain the oil they need to stop the outflow of their dwindling reserves. It sounds like a good deal to you because you are playing a war game and you don't have an industrialised country to run; a country that is fast running out of oil.....

[Platoonist]

But I guess your argument is simple; Who needs oil when your ships and aircraft can run on the Code of Bushido.

Bushido...now available in the wide-mouth slam-can.

Bushido can.jpg (174.61 KiB) Viewed 1203 times

[Curtis Lemay]

As far as Bettys go, an American fighter pilot's dream. Unescorted flying cigar lighters. Why unescorted? Because the fighters, if any, would follow Bushido and all go tearing off to seek glory. It was not in their doctrine or training to be defensive, which playing escort is.

The fighters didn't have to escort the bombers. They just had to engage the US fighters. And did they ever!

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

There is high risk and there is total and utter nonsense. What you are proposing threatens the conquest of the NEI, it threatens the loss of too much in the east thanks to the vaguries of poor weather, poor timing, bad luck. How you can say its low risk is simply beyond me. But then maybe I haven't factored in the Code of Bushido.....

It only delays Luzon - which had nothing to do with the rest of the initial expansion. You are really, really risk averse!!

warspite1

Nope. You can keep saying the same thing over and over again but it doesn't make any difference. Your 'plan' simply delayed the start of the war while making the chance of the Allies detecting what was happening more likely. You have also taken away units required in the Southern Area.

I have explained to you (but really shouldn't need to) why Japan could do NOTHING to risk the conquest of the NEI. But I guess your argument is simple; Who needs oil when your ships and aircraft can run on the Code of Bushido.

Again, delaying Luzon does nothing to the rest of the expansion. You can keep saying the same thing over and over again, but it doesn't make any difference.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

....and the war would be delayed.... and Japan's strategic position would continue to deteriorate. And all that oil would have been expended for nothing..... But hang on, they wouldn't to return to port - code of Bushido and all that, right?

They would return to port. A little extra oil in exchange for carriers. Sounds like a good deal to me! Remember: Luzon is postponed. Lots of stuff available for repurposing.

warspite1

No again. A lot of extra oil in exchange for still no certain date on which Japan go to war and obtain the oil they need to stop the outflow of their dwindling reserves. It sounds like a good deal to you because you are playing a war game and you don't have an industrialised country to run; a country that is fast running out of oil.....

Again, Luzon is postponed - along with the oil that that operation would have required.

[RangerJoe]

It doesn't have to be timed perfectly. Just within the time frame of the first strike.

warspite1

It does have to be timed perfectly. Too late and the Bettys walk into an alert enemy over Oahu. Too early and the Betty's alert the defenders of Oahu to the incoming carrier strike.

Too early for the landing on Maui and the Bettys land on an airfield in US hands.

Yes, this ridiculously complex 'plan' needed precision. But you don't bother with detail.

They have these things called radios!!! That's how they coordinate.

The Kido Butai is maintaining radio silence, the radios on the A6M2 did not work well if at all. No coordination possible.

[warspite1]

It only delays Luzon - which had nothing to do with the rest of the initial expansion. You are really, really risk averse!!

warspite1

Nope. You can keep saying the same thing over and over again but it doesn't make any difference. Your 'plan' simply delayed the start of the war while making the chance of the Allies detecting what was happening more likely. You have also taken away units required in the Southern Area.

I have explained to you (but really shouldn't need to) why Japan could do NOTHING to risk the conquest of the NEI. But I guess your argument is simple; Who needs oil when your ships and aircraft can run on the Code of Bushido.

Again, delaying Luzon does nothing to the rest of the expansion. You can keep saying the same thing over and over again, but it doesn't make any difference.

warspite1

It does. That is not an opinion - it is a fact. The PI was needed as a stepping stone to the NEI. The US units on the PI needed to be subjugated or they would be used to interfere with the Japanese attempts to conquer the NEI. Why can’t you understand such a simple concept?

[warspite1]

They would return to port. A little extra oil in exchange for carriers. Sounds like a good deal to me! Remember: Luzon is postponed. Lots of stuff available for repurposing.

warspite1

No again. A lot of extra oil in exchange for still no certain date on which Japan go to war and obtain the oil they need to stop the outflow of their dwindling reserves. It sounds like a good deal to you because you are playing a war game and you don't have an industrialised country to run; a country that is fast running out of oil.....

Again, Luzon is postponed - along with the oil that that operation would have required.

warspite1

Which is a strange answer given you haven’t in any way addressed the point. You seem to believe (numbers used made up to make the point) that if one cancels a mission that would have used 100 tons, you can then launch an operation that uses 200 tons and the extra 100 tons don’t count. It’s weird logic......

[Aurelian]

The IJA was *not* going to postpone invading Luzon. Why did they invade the Phillipines?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippin ... ion_forces

To prevent the use of the Philippines as an advance base of operations by American forces
To acquire staging areas and supply bases to enhance operations against the Dutch East Indies and Guam
To secure the lines of communication between occupied areas in the south and the Japanese Home Islands
To limit the Allied intervention when they attempt to launch an offensive campaign in Australia and the Solomon Islands via dispatching all the forces stationed in the country and other neighboring nations.

They would not send units for what would be a sideshow that would do *nothing* to further the goal of taking the SRA.

So, you're stuck with SNLF. There is just no way they will stand against the two divisions on Oahu. Especially given Japanese logistical realities. Even the vaunted Tokyo Express failed in its mission. http://www.combinedfleet.com/Dai1Yusokan.htm

[Platoonist]

This plan also conveniently ignores that the fact that the Japanese were operating on a shoestring due to their manpower commitments in China, and had to do double-duty with some of their divisions. The 48th Division slated to invade Luzon was scheduled to turn over garrison duties to the 65th Mixed Brigade in January and then proceed south to invade Java in March 1942. Kind of a difficult schedule to meet when you've been sent 4,000 miles across the Pacific to Hawaii instead.

[Buckrock]

Even if we could accept that Yamamoto would think of this, even if we accept that priority would be given in preference to carriers and battleships, when would he have actually had to have had this brain wave? How long would each conversion take?

I think taking the 3 turrets and 2 torpedo bays out could be done in a week. The rest of the work doesn't require even dock space. So...12 weeks for 12 destroyers. All using just one port berth anywhere in the entire Japanese empire.

Please tell me "the rest of the work" does not then involve the destroyer crews trying their hand at slapping on some deckhouses which would be expected to accommodate up to 200 soldiers for their journey through the North Pacific on a low freeboard destroyer. If you want to start a proper shooting war between the IJN and the IJA, that would be one way to kick it off.

[warspite1]

This plan also conveniently ignores that the fact that the Japanese were operating on a shoestring due to their manpower commitments in China, and had to do double-duty with some of their divisions. The 48th Division slated to invade Luzon was scheduled to turn over garrison duties to the 65th Mixed Brigade in January and then proceed south to invade Java in March 1942. Kind of a difficult schedule to meet when you've been sent 4,000 miles across the Pacific to Hawaii instead.

warspite1

This is, I suspect, why Curtis Lemay refuses to provide detail. Detail means a) having to make some effort and to do some research and, more importantly, b) having to provide evidence for any OOB suggested in a “what if” AND what that amendment to an historical OOB would have done elsewhere in real life.