A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Aurelian]

Hawaii.

Bettys can't reach it from their closest base in the Marshalls.

So what island are a couple of battalions going to land. One that has a sufficently large and undamaged airfield chock full of fuel and repair parts?

Are they supposed to fly past the point of no return in the hope they'll find a fully functional airbase?

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[RangerJoe]

Are they supposed to fly past the point of no return in the hope they'll find a fully functional airbase?

Flight 19 . . .

[Torplexed]

But they have to be based on Oahu. Thus can be bombed. Its a two way street. Again, the Japanese can fly in replacement fighters. The US can't.

Good luck on the night interception of those B-17s with no radar. Good luck on keeping a bomber wing on Maui sufficiently stockpiled with aerial bombs and avgas using rat transportation.* That's one looonng Tokyo Express. Who knows? When Japan's fuel reserves run low maybe you can keep the effort going with wooden luggers, junks and sampans.

*The Japanese nickname for the nocturnal destroyer runs of personnel into Guadalcanal.

[Buckrock]

1. When do the destroyers head for Maui?

The destroyers have a range of 1400 miles at full speed. They only need 400 to sail in and out of the detection zone. That leaves them 1000 miles of slack.

2. Where do they halt pending the final run-in to the island? How far from Maui?

They want to start the run 200 miles out.

3. What time does the run-in to Maui start?

Dusk of course.

6. What time do the destroyers reach Maui?

Probably about 5 hours after departing. Around 11:00pm. Note that night is a bit longer than day on December 7, 1941, in Hawaian waters.

Even assuming 200 miles is statute miles, covering that distance in 5 hours would equate to an average speed of approximately 35 knots. It's not going to happen the night of Dec 6/7th and it's even less likely in the week that followed when both Japanese and US records showed the weather worsened. You're welcome to check the weather records after that.

The "Pearl Harbor Papers" has an extract From the XO's war diary of the (large) destroyer Akigumo describing the sea conditions experienced by the KB DD's on the final 20-25 knot night approach to the launch position:-
"Strong swells". "The bow of the ship was covered with splashes from waves raised by the strong east wind of 14 m-15 m (29 kts-30 kts)".

I've mentioned before what the likely top speed was of the Mutsuki class by 1941 but even if we pretend they were capable of something like their original "design speed" and that 2+ weeks in the North Pacific hadn't taken its toll, you will still have reality intervening as the ships attempt to find a sustainable speed in the heavy sea conditions during this stage of the season and also one that all the ships can hold in order to keep the formation together through the night. And then there is the conditions for the passengers and the impact on the cargo loads to consider.

If this was ever attempted in reality under those conditions, I'm betting the formation speed would not have been much above 25 knots while crossing the open seas.

[Buckrock]

12. What time do the surviving Bettys run out of fuel and start crashing into the sea/land if the airfield isn't taken?

The Bettys have 400 miles of slack in their range. They can stay up for a while.

The Bettys would have no slack in their range in this scenario. In fact they probably couldn't even make a direct flight from Eniwetok to Maui because of the influence of the Trade Winds at that time of year. Then throw in climb to altitude, then how far off course they could be after a 15 hour open-water flight, then having to locate their target amongst the existing Oahu chaos and set up for their formation bomb run, then head for Maui, locate the airfield, wait for confirmation it's in friendly hands and then finally begin their attempts at approaching and landing one at a time at an unfamiliar airfield.

We get it. It's a wind-up. You can stop now.

[warspite1]

There is an important part to this 'plan' that I hadn’t picked up on until yesterday.

As has been said, the Japanese quite understandably set great store by the need for secrecy and avoiding detection. Attacking Pearl with surprise and attacking Pearl against an alert defender were going to be two very different things for the aircraft and pilots of the 1st Air Fleet – and with two very different outcomes.

But as also has been said, this 'plan' simply ignores that requirement – but I hadn’t fully put together what Curtis Lemay appears to be proposing.

Given what has been said about the need for secrecy and surprise, we are to believe that the lightly armed, and highly vulnerable, destroyer conversions make their way from the flying-off point to the holding point off Maui. And let’s be clear here. The destroyers sail in Hawaiian waters the night before the attack on Pearl. Maui is southeast of Oahu and so the destroyers will need to sail past Oahu (and other islands). Presumably the wider the berth around the island, the longer the journey takes. But of course no word on timing has been given (and Buckrock's comments make doubtful whether this could even be done) just the usual mantra that the Japanese have plenty of time, plenty of slack etc etc etc.

But let's say the weather is kind and the boilers are extracting the maximum. These destroyers assemble (depending on the weather, some may have got lost/left behind (see Norwegian Campaign) then head for Maui at dusk. I hadn’t picked up on the 'plan' proposing the destroyers head to Maui and were going to come ashore the night before the attack on Pearl. So the chances of detection are increasing by the second, and have been since the destroyers left the KB.

Curtis Lemay protests that he’s been providing detail. Well what is detail to Curtis Lemay and what makes for a coherent plan are clearly two different things. Maui is a large island, it had (as I understand it) just one airfield capable of operating Bettys. The Japanese need to be fully in position to capture this airfield without being detected. They have to approach Maui, unload 1,600-2,000 men and head inland – all in complete secrecy.

The Japanese also need to capture a port to allow for the ground crew, fuel, engines, ammunition etc. But where do the Japanese need to land to do all this? Where is the airfield in relation to the landing point? Where is the airfield in relation to the port? Do they need more than one landing zone (increasing further the chance of detection)? The Japanese come with no transport. They need to move, in darkness on foot.

Apparently pathfinders will tell them where to land so that negates the need for any of these absolutely vital details to be shared with the group…… or in other words, Curtis Lemay has absolutely no idea whether such an operation is even feasible EVEN IF they at no point gave away their arrival…. And of course, in planning typical of the Japanese in WWII, he gives no thought to any defenders the Japanese may encounter. They are all partying like its 1999 apparently.

Meanwhile the KB are sitting at the flying-off point hoping that they won’t get noticed until it’s time to launch their attack, that the destroyers have successfully sailed around and through the HI without being spotted, the troops have landed, unseen, on Maui and have moved stealthily to their targets without anyone being any the wiser….

Anything else? Oh yes, the precious Bettys and aircrew (about 25% of total Betty strength) have been previously ordered on their 10-15 hour flight. The pilots know that they are on a suicide mission if just about any part of this ‘plan’ fails – detection, stronger defence of the airfield than expected, weather conditions, mechanical issues etc. but that is not a problem as all Japanese are Kamikaze at heart apparently….

And even if they make it to the airfield, they are defenceless, immobile, useless chunks of metal unless the follow up destroyers can escape whatever patrols of submarines and ships the US put to sea (remember the US become fully aware of the Maui landing the moment the Japanese open up – if not found before).

I’ll ignore Midway, Wake and the KB as clearly I’m not going to get any comment remotely coherent on these operations and how they are dealt with (even though Curtis Lemay has the advantage the Japanese didn’t and know two carriers and four other ships will be needed at Wake where the Japanese are about to lose two destroyers)….

This debate is not about Curtis Lemay proving the Japanese wouldn’t be detected before the raid, or that the invasion would be successful. It’s not about me proving they would be detected and that the raid would be unsuccessful. None of which either of us can do. This debate is about whether Curtis Lemay has put together a feasible plan that has sufficient chance of success to allow the decision makers to have given it the green light in 1941.

Well if we:
- Get the military comfortable with the idea that the start of the war with the US, Britain and the Netherlands (and all the operations against territories and islands that need to be co-ordinated) can be flexible depending on whether 1,2 or 3?!?! Carriers are at home
- Ignore Japanese Navy/Army lack of co-operation
- Give Yamamoto powers of foresight he never had about the relative merits of carriers vs battleships
- Give Japanese decision makers the foresight to see, months before the war, that they would need to convert destroyers to troop carriers and that this work is more important than the carrier and battleship programs then under way and that they really don’t need more than 10% of their destroyer force which can be easily sacrificed for this operation.
- Give the decision makers the absolute confidence that delaying The PI conquest won’t affect the capture of the NEI and the oil that is so badly needed.

then, and only then do we even get the Japanese into a position where they have to make a decision about the merits of this ‘plan’. For most people who have any understanding of the war, the above obstacles would not have been overcome.

But even if they were, who on earth would sign up to a plan that a) relies on massive amounts of luck considering all the things that go wrong in war, and b) actually puts the attack on Pearl at great risk of either disaster or has to be called off, and c) even if all stars perfectly align, the Japanese have absolutely no chance of following up with supplies.

One final element that smacks against the funny bone is this. Regardless of what hindsight tells us, and regardless of the stupidity of Japan seeking war with the US, the real life Japanese action against Pearl kind of makes sense from their point of view once they decided that war was their only option.

Why? Well sinking large elements of the Pacific Fleet would give Japan a clear run at the vital oil rich NEI (without which this is all pointless anyway). BUT, in coming up with this ‘plan’ Curtis Lemay has actually said that if its detected and the plan fails it doesn’t really matter that much as all the US would be gaining is a few old BB compared to historical. Which kind of begs the question why, if it’s ultimately no big deal, the Japanese are throwing so much resource into this and are prepared to delay the NEI invasion, delay taking the PI, losing more than 10% of their destroyers, two battalions of infantry and 40+ precious Bettys and their crew…. Words and figures differ Curtis Lemay, words and figures differ…..

By the way, I shall shortly be presenting my ‘plan’ for the British 1st Army’s capture of Berlin in September 1939. The RN sail up the Baltic unseen, the army unload, also unseen, in a place located by pathfinders. They get aerial assistance by Hurricanes (that can’t reach but maybe the British will also capture an island or two along the way so they can stage) and Wellingtons which land on an airfield north of Berlin. I don’t need to account for the troops used other than to say the British realised the need for this operation in 1938 and got together the force required. The ships used will be those that were to be used for the cancelled reinforcement of France….

All the Germans are in Poland or on the Siegfried line so there is no one defending Berlin!! And remember, rule 37(b) of a wargame says that the capture of a nation’s capital brings an end to the war. Simples. Low Risk and High Reward – I think I’ve made my case perfectly. Stay tuned…..

[Platoonist]

It's occurred to me that we're making a logical mistake:

The Luzon invasion had great stockpiles of supplies and fuel pre-positioned on Taiwan. This shortened their supply lines.

But that is an illusion. In fact every bean, bullet, and gallon had to come from Japan. The cost of prepositioning it has to be dunned to the Luzon operation. If it hadn't been prepositioned, Japan would be that much richer in the fuel used to get it there.

Tokyo to Manila is 1867 miles.
Compare this to Tokyo to Midway = 2548 miles (36.5% further)
Tokyo to Maui = 3960 miles (112.1% further)

Considering that the force directed at Midway and Maui is much smaller than what was directed at Luzon - and the battle duration will be much shorter as well - its doubtful that the Midway and Maui operations will consume any more fuel than the Luzon operation did.

The pre-positioning of supplies, troops, aerial bombs and everything else needed on Formosa for the Luzon invasion was likely done with cargo ships which are far more economical on burning bunker fuel than destroyers. 100 tons of fuel oil and a single decent-sized (12,000 ton deadweight) freighter will deliver a battalion of troops, and the bulk of their supplies, as well. In fact, in terms of tonnage delivered for a given amount of oil burned, a cargo ship is in the neighborhood of 30 times as efficient as a destroyer. You're saving nothing with your APD invasion. You're going into the hole, especially with all the loitering around the North Pacific waiting for carriers to show.

By the way, the majority of the troops, equipment and supplies used in the Luzon operation came from China next door...not Japan, so they'd didn't have that far to go. The 48th Division had been involved in combat operations in Guangdong Province before being transferred to Taipei.

[Curtis Lemay]

But they have to be based on Oahu. Thus can be bombed. Its a two way street. Again, the Japanese can fly in replacement fighters. The US can't.

Good luck on the night interception of those B-17s with no radar. Good luck on keeping a bomber wing on Maui sufficiently stockpiled with aerial bombs and avgas using rat transportation.* That's one looonng Tokyo Express. Who knows? When Japan's fuel reserves run low maybe you can keep the effort going with wooden luggers, junks and sampans.

*The Japanese nickname for the nocturnal destroyer runs of personnel into Guadalcanal.

What "night" interception? There is no GPS in this era. B-17's could barely hit major cities at night. The planes would be dispersed from the runway anyway. And the Japs can get airborne at the crack of dawn, coming down in small groups to refuel and rearm - then back up.

Once US air and naval have been supressed normal cargo deliveries would be the method of resupply.

And the US forces at this time in no way compared to the US forces by the time of Guadalcanal. They needed weeks if not months to get to mid-war condition. Not so for the Japanese, who were at their peak.

And the Japanese are the ones who know exactly what is happening. They've had months to plan for all contingencies. The US have just been sneak-attacked. They will take days just to figure out what's up on Maui.

[Curtis Lemay]

Even assuming 200 miles is statute miles, covering that distance in 5 hours would equate to an average speed of approximately 35 knots. It's not going to happen the night of Dec 6/7th and it's even less likely in the week that followed when both Japanese and US records showed the weather worsened. You're welcome to check the weather records after that.

The "Pearl Harbor Papers" has an extract From the XO's war diary of the (large) destroyer Akigumo describing the sea conditions experienced by the KB DD's on the final 20-25 knot night approach to the launch position:-
"Strong swells". "The bow of the ship was covered with splashes from waves raised by the strong east wind of 14 m-15 m (29 kts-30 kts)".

I've mentioned before what the likely top speed was of the Mutsuki class by 1941 but even if we pretend they were capable of something like their original "design speed" and that 2+ weeks in the North Pacific hadn't taken its toll, you will still have reality intervening as the ships attempt to find a sustainable speed in the heavy sea conditions during this stage of the season and also one that all the ships can hold in order to keep the formation together through the night. And then there is the conditions for the passengers and the impact on the cargo loads to consider.

If this was ever attempted in reality under those conditions, I'm betting the formation speed would not have been much above 25 knots while crossing the open seas.

Note that this would be in Hawaiian waters, not the North Pacific. Regardless, so what if it takes longer to get there. Even if it takes 7 hours, that still leaves 5 hours before dawn. Even 3 hours of sailing out is enough to make their discovery to late for any action by Pearl before the raid begins.

[Curtis Lemay]

The Bettys have 400 miles of slack in their range. They can stay up for a while.

The Bettys would have no slack in their range in this scenario. In fact they probably couldn't even make a direct flight from Eniwetok to Maui because of the influence of the Trade Winds at that time of year. Then throw in climb to altitude, then how far off course they could be after a 15 hour open-water flight, then having to locate their target amongst the existing Oahu chaos and set up for their formation bomb run, then head for Maui, locate the airfield, wait for confirmation it's in friendly hands and then finally begin their attempts at approaching and landing one at a time at an unfamiliar airfield.

We get it. It's a wind-up. You can stop now.

I'll repeat: Range of Betty fully loaded - 3132 miles (that obviously includes climb to altitude). Range from Eniwetok to Oahu - 2715 miles. Range from Oahu to Maui - 115 miles. That's 302 miles of slack. And winds vary with altitude. They can seek out the optimum one.

[Curtis Lemay]

The pre-positioning of supplies, troops, aerial bombs and everything else needed on Formosa for the Luzon invasion was likely done with cargo ships which are far more economical on burning bunker fuel than destroyers. 100 tons of fuel oil and a single decent-sized (12,000 ton deadweight) freighter will deliver a battalion of troops, and the bulk of their supplies, as well. In fact, in terms of tonnage delivered for a given amount of oil burned, a cargo ship is in the neighborhood of 30 times as efficient as a destroyer. You're saving nothing with your APD invasion. You're going into the hole, especially with all the loitering around the North Pacific waiting for carriers to show.

The Midway operation would use cargo ships. Only the tiny Maui invasion would require APDs.

By the way, the majority of the troops, equipment and supplies used in the Luzon operation came from China next door...not Japan, so they'd didn't have that far to go. The 48th Division had been involved in combat operations in Guangdong Province before being transferred to Taipei.

Everything in China came, ultimately, from Japan.

[Curtis Lemay]

There is an important part to this 'plan' that I hadn’t picked up on until yesterday.

As has been said, the Japanese quite understandably set great store by the need for secrecy and avoiding detection. Attacking Pearl with surprise and attacking Pearl against an alert defender were going to be two very different things for the aircraft and pilots of the 1st Air Fleet – and with two very different outcomes.

Right. And the Japanese got lucky on that count. The US was placed under alert multiple times prior to the raid. They really, really needed an option to abort if the US was under alert. This plan gives them that option.

But as also has been said, this 'plan' simply ignores that requirement – but I hadn’t fully put together what Curtis Lemay appears to be proposing.

On the contrary, it gives them an abort option. The pathfinders will know if the troops on Maui are under alert and can abort the whole raid.

Given what has been said about the need for secrecy and surprise, we are to believe that the lightly armed, and highly vulnerable, destroyer conversions make their way from the flying-off point to the holding point off Maui.

At night. In Peacetime. On a weekend. About as detectable as a stealth fighter.

And let’s be clear here. The destroyers sail in Hawaiian waters the night before the attack on Pearl. Maui is southeast of Oahu and so the destroyers will need to sail past Oahu (and other islands).

Nonsense. They would be positioned for the optimum pathway to Maui - avoiding all other islands.

Presumably the wider the berth around the island, the longer the journey takes. But of course no word on timing has been given (and Buckrock's comments make doubtful whether this could even be done) just the usual mantra that the Japanese have plenty of time, plenty of slack etc etc etc.

So the chances of detection are increasing by the second, and have been since the destroyers left the KB.

Again, about as detectable as stealth fighters.

Curtis Lemay protests that he’s been providing detail. Well what is detail to Curtis Lemay and what makes for a coherent plan are clearly two different things. Maui is a large island, it had (as I understand it) just one airfield capable of operating Bettys. The Japanese need to be fully in position to capture this airfield without being detected. They have to approach Maui, unload 1,600-2,000 men and head inland – all in complete secrecy.

Aided by pathfinders (who keep close tabs on the garrison. Reminder: Maui is a big island. The garrison is tiny.

The Japanese also need to capture a port to allow for the ground crew, fuel, engines, ammunition etc. But where do the Japanese need to land to do all this? Where is the airfield in relation to the landing point? Where is the airfield in relation to the port? Do they need more than one landing zone (increasing further the chance of detection)? The Japanese come with no transport. They need to move, in darkness on foot.

Guided by the pathfinders, who've been months prepping.

Apparently pathfinders will tell them where to land so that negates the need for any of these absolutely vital details to be shared with the group…… or in other words, Curtis Lemay has absolutely no idea whether such an operation is even feasible EVEN IF they at no point gave away their arrival…. And of course, in planning typical of the Japanese in WWII, he gives no thought to any defenders the Japanese may encounter. They are all partying like its 1999 apparently.

Yes. The pathfinders have months to figure out the best site to land and how to get prepositioned for the strike. Again, if the garrison is alerted, the pathfinders alert the DDs.

Meanwhile the KB are sitting at the flying-off point hoping that they won’t get noticed until it’s time to launch their attack, that the destroyers have successfully sailed around and through the HI without being spotted, the troops have landed, unseen, on Maui and have moved stealthily to their targets without anyone being any the wiser….

This is Maui. In peacetime. On a weekend.

Anything else? Oh yes, the precious Bettys and aircrew (about 25% of total Betty strength) have been previously ordered on their 10-15 hour flight. The pilots know that they are on a suicide mission if just about any part of this ‘plan’ fails – detection, stronger defence of the airfield than expected, weather conditions, mechanical issues etc. but that is not a problem as all Japanese are Kamikaze at heart apparently….

If they're not Kamakazes they can ditch and surrender.

And even if they make it to the airfield, they are defenceless, immobile, useless chunks of metal unless the follow up destroyers can escape whatever patrols of submarines and ships the US put to sea (remember the US become fully aware of the Maui landing the moment the Japanese open up – if not found before).

Their weight added to the first strike puts the US air and naval in even worse shape. And the US are not going to figure out what is going on on Maui for a long time. There's no guarantee any signal will be able to be sent, and any that is will be by somoeone in bewilderment.

This debate is not about Curtis Lemay proving the Japanese wouldn’t be detected before the raid, or that the invasion would be successful. It’s not about me proving they would be detected and that the raid would be unsuccessful. None of which either of us can do. This debate is about whether Curtis Lemay has put together a feasible plan that has sufficient chance of success to allow the decision makers to have given it the green light in 1941.

Well if we:
- Get the military comfortable with the idea that the start of the war with the US, Britain and the Netherlands (and all the operations against territories and islands that need to be co-ordinated) can be flexible depending on whether 1,2 or 3?!?! Carriers are at home
- Ignore Japanese Navy/Army lack of co-operation
- Give Yamamoto powers of foresight he never had about the relative merits of carriers vs battleships
- Give Japanese decision makers the foresight to see, months before the war, that they would need to convert destroyers to troop carriers and that this work is more important than the carrier and battleship programs then under way and that they really don’t need more than 10% of their destroyer force which can be easily sacrificed for this operation.
- Give the decision makers the absolute confidence that delaying The PI conquest won’t affect the capture of the NEI and the oil that is so badly needed.

then, and only then do we even get the Japanese into a position where they have to make a decision about the merits of this ‘plan’. For most people who have any understanding of the war, the above obstacles would not have been overcome.

Again, all that is necessary is for Yamamoto to realize 1. That the carriers may not be in port on the date the raid is scheduled. And 2. That the raid may not have enough force to torch the port and oil stocks.

But even if they were, who on earth would sign up to a plan that a) relies on massive amounts of luck considering all the things that go wrong in war, and b) actually puts the attack on Pearl at great risk of either disaster or has to be called off, and c) even if all stars perfectly align, the Japanese have absolutely no chance of following up with supplies.

Risk. Reward. Low risk. High reward. The risk that the oblivious Americans will spot the carriers AND leap to what they were about. Vs. the Reward of sinking two US CARRIERS. The risk of two battalions of troops and two air groups. Vs. the Reward of delaying the US response TWO YEARS.

One final element that smacks against the funny bone is this. Regardless of what hindsight tells us, and regardless of the stupidity of Japan seeking war with the US, the real life Japanese action against Pearl kind of makes sense from their point of view once they decided that war was their only option.

This is off-topic, but ridiculing Japan's choice of war with the US is benefiting from perfect 20:20 hindsight. We know what Japan could not know in the Fall of 1941: That Russia was going to survive. Had Russia been KO'ed - as appeared likely to the world at that time, the Pacific War is radically altered.

Why? Well sinking large elements of the Pacific Fleet would give Japan a clear run at the vital oil rich NEI (without which this is all pointless anyway). BUT, in coming up with this ‘plan’ Curtis Lemay has actually said that if its detected and the plan fails it doesn’t really matter that much as all the US would be gaining is a few old BB compared to historical.

The truth.

Which kind of begs the question why, if it’s ultimately no big deal, the Japanese are throwing so much resource into this and are prepared to delay the NEI invasion, delay taking the PI, losing more than 10% of their destroyers, two battalions of infantry and 40+ precious Bettys and their crew…. Words and figures differ Curtis Lemay, words and figures differ…..

I'm pretty sure they expected to find a few carriers at Pearl. My idea makes that much more likely.

By the way, I shall shortly be presenting my ‘plan’ for the British 1st Army’s capture of Berlin in September 1939. The RN sail up the Baltic unseen, the army unload, also unseen, in a place located by pathfinders. They get aerial assistance by Hurricanes (that can’t reach but maybe the British will also capture an island or two along the way so they can stage) and Wellingtons which land on an airfield north of Berlin. I don’t need to account for the troops used other than to say the British realised the need for this operation in 1938 and got together the force required. The ships used will be those that were to be used for the cancelled reinforcement of France….

All the Germans are in Poland or on the Siegfried line so there is no one defending Berlin!! And remember, rule 37(b) of a wargame says that the capture of a nation’s capital brings an end to the war. Simples. Low Risk and High Reward – I think I’ve made my case perfectly. Stay tuned…..

Just for the record, some minor countries did surrender upon the fall of their capitol.

[warspite1]

By the way, I shall shortly be presenting my ‘plan’ for the British 1st Army’s capture of Berlin in September 1939. The RN sail up the Baltic unseen, the army unload, also unseen, in a place located by pathfinders. They get aerial assistance by Hurricanes (that can’t reach but maybe the British will also capture an island or two along the way so they can stage) and Wellingtons which land on an airfield north of Berlin. I don’t need to account for the troops used other than to say the British realised the need for this operation in 1938 and got together the force required. The ships used will be those that were to be used for the cancelled reinforcement of France….

All the Germans are in Poland or on the Siegfried line so there is no one defending Berlin!! And remember, rule 37(b) of a wargame says that the capture of a nation’s capital brings an end to the war. Simples. Low Risk and High Reward – I think I’ve made my case perfectly. Stay tuned…..

Just for the record, some minor countries did surrender upon the fall of their capitol.

warspite1

No you mis-understand. I know which countries surrendered after the fall of their capitals and which didn't - I told you because, if you recall, you confidently stated that ALL countries surrendered once their capital was lost in WWII .

The point was, you made a big thing about the Spanish surrendering if the capital was taken BECAUSE that is what the wargame, you based your plan on, stated. You made no allowance for the fact you were looking at a game - and the surrender rule is just as likely to be a game mechanic as much as any attempt at looking at history.

But as for the wider discussion, with each post, I have to assume you are simply engaging in a wind-up. Fair play, I fell for it again - as I did with Spain and Turkey - and you've sucked me in. So I'll leave you to your little wind-ups and your cunning Pearl Harbor plan, and I'll work on my own low risk - high reward plan for the winning of WWII by Lord Gort and his 1st British Army in September 1939.

Who'd have thought? The British Army in Berlin in September!! - just in time for tea and medals. . I just love rule 37(b)

[Curtis Lemay]

I just want to add this info on the battle for Luzon:

Japanese losses were 4,130 dead (Japanese #s - 7,000 dead US #s).
Allied losses were 25,000 killed.

That sounds like a lot of combat to me - requiring lots of supplies.

[Curtis Lemay]

No you mis-understand. I know which countries surrendered after the fall of their capitals and which didn't - I told you because, if you recall, you confidently stated that ALL countries surrendered once their capital was lost in WWII .

I'd like to see any quote from me to that effect.

The point was, you made a big thing about the Spanish surrendering if the capital was taken BECAUSE that is what the wargame, you based your plan on, stated. You made no allowance for the fact you were looking at a game - and the surrender rule is just as likely to be a game mechanic as much as any attempt at looking at history.

Making use of the experts at SPI.

[RangerJoe]

But they have to be based on Oahu. Thus can be bombed. Its a two way street. Again, the Japanese can fly in replacement fighters. The US can't.

Good luck on the night interception of those B-17s with no radar. Good luck on keeping a bomber wing on Maui sufficiently stockpiled with aerial bombs and avgas using rat transportation.* That's one looonng Tokyo Express. Who knows? When Japan's fuel reserves run low maybe you can keep the effort going with wooden luggers, junks and sampans.

*The Japanese nickname for the nocturnal destroyer runs of personnel into Guadalcanal.

What "night" interception? There is no GPS in this era. B-17's could barely hit major cities at night. The planes would be dispersed from the runway anyway. And the Japs can get airborne at the crack of dawn, coming down in small groups to refuel and rearm - then back up.

Once US air and naval have been supressed normal cargo deliveries would be the method of resupply.

And the US forces at this time in no way compared to the US forces by the time of Guadalcanal. They needed weeks if not months to get to mid-war condition. Not so for the Japanese, who were at their peak.

And the Japanese are the ones who know exactly what is happening. They've had months to plan for all contingencies. The US have just been sneak-attacked. They will take days just to figure out what's up on Maui.

Dawn doesn't crack, it sneaks up.

Yes, they will have GPS available in this fantasy, just like going to DEFCON 2 which was not started many years after this event.

Not that GPS would be needed, with the airfields visible near the ocean or the locations pinpointed by the fires in certain spots that were started by the locals.

[Torplexed]

US fighters could fly to Oahu from Hilo.

They could be delivered by aircraft ferry to Johnston Atoll southwest of Oahu and routed in that way as well. Lots of holes in this poorly cast net.

[RangerJoe]

Even assuming 200 miles is statute miles, covering that distance in 5 hours would equate to an average speed of approximately 35 knots. It's not going to happen the night of Dec 6/7th and it's even less likely in the week that followed when both Japanese and US records showed the weather worsened. You're welcome to check the weather records after that.

The "Pearl Harbor Papers" has an extract From the XO's war diary of the (large) destroyer Akigumo describing the sea conditions experienced by the KB DD's on the final 20-25 knot night approach to the launch position:-
"Strong swells". "The bow of the ship was covered with splashes from waves raised by the strong east wind of 14 m-15 m (29 kts-30 kts)".

I've mentioned before what the likely top speed was of the Mutsuki class by 1941 but even if we pretend they were capable of something like their original "design speed" and that 2+ weeks in the North Pacific hadn't taken its toll, you will still have reality intervening as the ships attempt to find a sustainable speed in the heavy sea conditions during this stage of the season and also one that all the ships can hold in order to keep the formation together through the night. And then there is the conditions for the passengers and the impact on the cargo loads to consider.

If this was ever attempted in reality under those conditions, I'm betting the formation speed would not have been much above 25 knots while crossing the open seas.

Note that this would be in Hawaiian waters, not the North Pacific. Regardless, so what if it takes longer to get there. Even if it takes 7 hours, that still leaves 5 hours before dawn. Even 3 hours of sailing out is enough to make their discovery to late for any action by Pearl before the raid begins.

That many Japanese destroyers seen that early would ensure than an alert would be sounded. For your information, the USS Enterprise group was delayed by a storm in the area which was why it did not make port on the 5th of December.

[RangerJoe]

The Bettys would have no slack in their range in this scenario. In fact they probably couldn't even make a direct flight from Eniwetok to Maui because of the influence of the Trade Winds at that time of year. Then throw in climb to altitude, then how far off course they could be after a 15 hour open-water flight, then having to locate their target amongst the existing Oahu chaos and set up for their formation bomb run, then head for Maui, locate the airfield, wait for confirmation it's in friendly hands and then finally begin their attempts at approaching and landing one at a time at an unfamiliar airfield.

We get it. It's a wind-up. You can stop now.

I'll repeat: Range of Betty fully loaded - 3132 miles (that obviously includes climb to altitude). Range from Eniwetok to Oahu - 2715 miles. Range from Oahu to Maui - 115 miles. That's 302 miles of slack. And winds vary with altitude. They can seek out the optimum one.

It appears that you are getting the combat range and the ferry range confused. Also, over water they will not know what the winds are like. Not to mention going through the storm that delayed the Enterprise group.

[RangerJoe]

The pre-positioning of supplies, troops, aerial bombs and everything else needed on Formosa for the Luzon invasion was likely done with cargo ships which are far more economical on burning bunker fuel than destroyers. 100 tons of fuel oil and a single decent-sized (12,000 ton deadweight) freighter will deliver a battalion of troops, and the bulk of their supplies, as well. In fact, in terms of tonnage delivered for a given amount of oil burned, a cargo ship is in the neighborhood of 30 times as efficient as a destroyer. You're saving nothing with your APD invasion. You're going into the hole, especially with all the loitering around the North Pacific waiting for carriers to show.

The Midway operation would use cargo ships. Only the tiny Maui invasion would require APDs.

By the way, the majority of the troops, equipment and supplies used in the Luzon operation came from China next door...not Japan, so they'd didn't have that far to go. The 48th Division had been involved in combat operations in Guangdong Province before being transferred to Taipei.

Everything in China came, ultimately, from Japan.

Obviously you did not read what happened to the Ushio. Let me put it this way, it fled from Midway after being damaged by shore batteries. Cargo ships would be so much easier to hit.

Not everything for the Luzon invasion came from Japan, Japan was importing food.