A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Curtis Lemay]

I want to emphasize again what no one wants to acept: The risk of both operations are low and the reward for both is huge.

The risk of the abort option is a small chance that the oblivious US will somehow sniff out the raid. The reward is TWO CARRIERS in port and sunk = 20 battleships!

The risk of the Maui option is two battalions and two air groups. The reward is a TWO YEAR delay in US response! Probably torch a few ships as well.

Because the reward is so huge, it's worth a lot of risk. But the risk is low - small increase in detection chances and small units.

[Buckrock]

Those are operational details the Japanese can figure out.

But not operational details you can figure out and yet you're saying it definitely could have happened. Which seems to sum up the way you've tried selling your plan since page 1.

A couple of days out, or so,....

A couple of days out from where? And what would that be in distance and direction from objective(s)?

These are simply trivial details that the Japanese can figure out for themselves. Clearly, if the fleet is stationary, the APDs CAN get 12 hours ahead and about 150 miles east of them.

....the APDs top off from the capitol ships....

Why are the APDs bothering the capital ships? Where have the dozens of tankers gone?

I doubt the tankers sail that far with the fleet. If they are, they can be used instead. Good grief!

....then set sail for that point....

Sail to what point? And what would that point be in distance and direction from objective(s)?

The fleet sails to the the launch point 200 miles north of Oahu, and the APDs sail to their insertion point 100 miles north of Maui.

....while the rest of the fleet holds in place.

Holds in place? Have both the USN CVs also agreed to definitely remain in port while the Japanese sort themselves out?

They are hundreds of miles from Oahu. They will be warned if the carriers leave Pearl.

When they get far enough west and 12 hours ahead,.....

How will KB know the APDs have reached this "far enough west" point? Is someone going to use a radio? And isn't west back towards Japan?

Coded messages. (Like "Tora! Tora! Tora!"). I, of course, meant east, not west.

....the fleet resumes its sail to the launch point.

And when the bored USN CVs start leaving PH and the abort message has to be sent, how can it be ensured that everyone from KB to the Malayan invasion force will get word in time? And who in Hawaii sends the initial abort message that will hopefully lead to this mass turn around stretching the length of the Pacific? Can the initial abort message inform everyone or will it have to suffer the delays of being relayed via Tokyo?

Again no starting details. Just admit you can't show how your plan could work in real life and we can stop asking these trivial questions.

It would go through Tokyo. Why would there be any relay delay? Everyone gets the hold message at the speed of light.

Are you serious? Or have you just not read up on the actual process used by the Japanese in the lead up to the historic raid?

[Buckrock]

It would have been worse than that for the Japanese as in this scenario both the USN CVs aircraft would be operating from ashore as SOP and most if not all based at Luke Field on Ford Island, an airbase that the Japanese did minimal damage to on Dec 7th, mainly due to its huge size as well as the concentrated defensive AA available in the area. The two CVs combined would have had about 36 fighters ashore and after that it would come down to how many the Japanese could put out of immediate action. Same for the 100+ SBDs/TBDs that would also have been ashore in this scenario.

Can't train carrier pilots unless they're on carriers.

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

When the US carriers were in port their aircraft would transfer to an airfield (almost always Luke Field) in order to continue their training. The airfield would even have markers representing deck take-off points. Have you read anything like Lundstrom's "First Team" series?

[Buckrock]

I want to emphasize again what no one wants to acept: The risk of both operations are low and the reward for both is huge.

The risk of the abort option is a small chance that the oblivious US will somehow sniff out the raid. The reward is TWO CARRIERS in port and sunk = 20 battleships!

The risk of the Maui option is two battalions and two air groups. The reward is a TWO YEAR delay in US response! Probably torch a few ships as well.

Because the reward is so huge, it's worth a lot of risk. But the risk is low - small increase in detection chances and small units.

Yep, this is definitely something you might try in a wargame when you know you can just start again when it all goes wrong.

And yes it's clear you think the risk is low but how about you supply some detail to demonstrate that to the rest of us.

[RangerJoe]

It would have been worse than that for the Japanese as in this scenario both the USN CVs aircraft would be operating from ashore as SOP and most if not all based at Luke Field on Ford Island, an airbase that the Japanese did minimal damage to on Dec 7th, mainly due to its huge size as well as the concentrated defensive AA available in the area. The two CVs combined would have had about 36 fighters ashore and after that it would come down to how many the Japanese could put out of immediate action. Same for the 100+ SBDs/TBDs that would also have been ashore in this scenario.

Can't train carrier pilots unless they're on carriers.

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

When the US carriers were in port their aircraft would transfer to an airfield (almost always Luke Field) in order to continue their training. The airfield would even have markers representing deck take-off points. Have you read anything like Lundstrom's "First Team" series?

Somebody marked off the length of the deck on an airfield for B-25s to take off from. Those US Army Air Corp pilots never tried landing on a US aircraft carrier and as far as I know, they never practiced taking off from an actual aircraft carrier either. They just took off to bomb Japan.

[RangerJoe]

But not operational details you can figure out and yet you're saying it definitely could have happened. Which seems to sum up the way you've tried selling your plan since page 1.


A couple of days out from where? And what would that be in distance and direction from objective(s)?

These are simply trivial details that the Japanese can figure out for themselves. Clearly, if the fleet is stationary, the APDs CAN get 12 hours ahead and about 150 miles east of them.

Why are the APDs bothering the capital ships? Where have the dozens of tankers gone?

I doubt the tankers sail that far with the fleet. If they are, they can be used instead. Good grief!

Sail to what point? And what would that point be in distance and direction from objective(s)?

The fleet sails to the the launch point 200 miles north of Oahu, and the APDs sail to their insertion point 100 miles north of Maui.

Holds in place? Have both the USN CVs also agreed to definitely remain in port while the Japanese sort themselves out?

They are hundreds of miles from Oahu. They will be warned if the carriers leave Pearl.

How will KB know the APDs have reached this "far enough west" point? Is someone going to use a radio? And isn't west back towards Japan?

Coded messages. (Like "Tora! Tora! Tora!"). I, of course, meant east, not west.

And when the bored USN CVs start leaving PH and the abort message has to be sent, how can it be ensured that everyone from KB to the Malayan invasion force will get word in time? And who in Hawaii sends the initial abort message that will hopefully lead to this mass turn around stretching the length of the Pacific? Can the initial abort message inform everyone or will it have to suffer the delays of being relayed via Tokyo?

Again no starting details. Just admit you can't show how your plan could work in real life and we can stop asking these trivial questions.

It would go through Tokyo. Why would there be any relay delay? Everyone gets the hold message at the speed of light.

Are you serious? Or have you just not read up on the actual process used by the Japanese in the lead up to the historic raid?

Actual events in the Battle of Leyte Gulf shows how perfect this system is when messages arrived out of sequence, not to mention decoding errors . . .

[RedLancer]

Because the reward is so huge, it's worth a lot of risk. But the risk is low - small increase in detection chances and small units.

Now it all makes sense...

The problems is that there is huge confusion in this thread between the different elements of the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels of Warfare, what they mean, and the implications.

Strategically the risk vs reward pay out does seem to make it a no brainer as Curtis Lemay asserts...but:

Operationally the constraints within the Japanese organisational structures, doctrine and other tasks like the DEI or PI ops at the same time mean that addressing those conflicting demands to meet strategic intent were probably unsurmountable, however we are wargamers so let's assume the IJA and IJN etc actually agreed to go ahead...but:

Tactically the risk of success given the requirements to co-ordinate disparate elements across large distances with limited communications and tight timelines makes the plan look like suicide. If I understand the plan correctly the Bettys now seem to be flying to Hawaii with no bombload that they will meet on Maui for their missions...really? Not only will the troops need to land and win but they also need to get logistics to work. As a professional military logistician I fantasise about things like this happening which is why I play wargames to get my fix - save, fail, reload, and again, and again, oh yes!

I get the intent and risk vs reward seems great. The same thoughts were no doubt in the mind of Montgomery and Browning when they dreamt up Market Garden and we all know how that panned out.

So in case I've not been clear enough - strategically the risk is low as but tactically it's huge. That is why yesterday I didn't invest all the funds in my savings account on a possible £122M lottery payout by buying hundreds of tickets.

[RangerJoe]

Because the reward is so huge, it's worth a lot of risk. But the risk is low - small increase in detection chances and small units.

Now it all makes sense...

The problems is that there is huge confusion in this thread between the different elements of the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels of Warfare, what they mean, and the implications.

Strategically the risk vs reward pay out does seem to make it a no brainer as Curtis Lemay asserts...but:

Operationally the constraints within the Japanese organisational structures, doctrine and other tasks like the DEI or PI ops at the same time mean that addressing those conflicting demands to meet strategic intent were probably unsurmountable, however we are wargamers so let's assume the IJA and IJN etc actually agreed to go ahead...but:

Tactically the risk of success given the requirements to co-ordinate disparate elements across large distances with limited communications and tight timelines makes the plan look like suicide. If I understand the plan correctly the Bettys now seem to be flying to Hawaii with no bombload that they will meet on Maui for their missions...really? Not only will the troops need to land and win but they also need to get logistics to work. As a professional military logistician I fantasise about things like this happening which is why I play wargames to get my fix - save, fail, reload, and again, and again, oh yes!

I get the intent and risk vs reward seems great. The same thoughts were no doubt in the mind of Montgomery and Browning when they dreamt up Market Garden and we all know how that panned out.

So in case I've not been clear enough - strategically the risk is low as but tactically it's huge. That is why yesterday I didn't invest all the funds in my savings account on a possible £122M lottery payout by buying hundreds of tickets.

But according to someone in favor of this thing, I won't refer to it as a plan because it is not a plan, the professional war game designers are more experts at this stuff than the professional military experts.

[warspite1]

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

warspite1

So my previous hunch was correct. Yes, disappointing indeed. Curtis Lemay actually believes that all aircraft and aircrew would be on the carriers when sunk in port. But now he is aware, perhaps the effect of the extra, largely untouched, US aircraft on Oahu will be ackowledged - and what this means for his ‘plan’.

[RangerJoe]

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

warspite1

So my previous hunch was correct. Yes, disappointing indeed. Curtis Lemay actually believes that all aircraft and aircrew would be on the carriers when sunk in port. But now he is aware, perhaps the effect of the extra, largely untouched, US aircraft on Oahu will be ackowledged - and what this means for his ‘plan’.

What 'plan' are you referring to? I have just read, do this and do that but nothing specific about time, units, nor supplies and equipment. Nor how battalions of the Japanese Army will sneak ashore and hide with all of their equipment.

[Zovs]

...the plan...

Curtis Lemay is violating both SPI's War in the Pacific and VG Pacific War war game rules!

From SPI's WitP:

COMBAT MISSIONS
[10.1] AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
(AMPH: Engagement Value: 1)
APB (or MS) units assigned to load (embark) Friendly cargo and transport and unload (disembark) it in a hex not controlled by the Friendly Player are performing an Amphibious Assault.

Procedure
Because amphibious operations require an extraordinary amount of advance planning, AMPH Missions may be Plotted only under certain circumstances.

Both an APB unit and the cargo that are to participate in an amphibious assault must spend a certain amount of time in preparation.

Before an APB unit may be assigned to an AMPH Mission the unit must spend an amount of time in preparation, based on the number of Load Points to be disembarked in the hex in a single Game-Turn. The amount of time required varies as follows (Cycle in which planning began):

ALLIES
Cycle 13/41 to 13/43 | 1 Game-Turn per Load Point
Cycle l/44+ | 1 Game-Turn per three Load Points (round fractions up)

JAPANESE
(All Cycles)
1 or 2 Load Points to be disembarked in a given Game-Turn | 1 Game-Turn per Load Point
More than 2 Load Points to be Load disembarked in a given Game-Turn | 2 Game-Turns per Point



Plotting
On a separate index card (one each for each AMPH Mission), the Player should record:
A. The specific cargo that will be disembarked (i.e., its current hex location);
B. the specific APB units involved;
C. the hex the cargo will be disembarked in (i.e. the hex that will be amphibiously assaulted);
D. the Game-Turn in which the units will become available for the AMPH Mission.

Example of an Allied AMPH Mission Plot against the island of Kwajalein:

"APB l, carrying a U.S. 11-3 and 12 Supply Points (now at Pearl Harbor) will assault Kwajalein (E:3301). The units will have completed their required preparation-time beginning with Game-Turn 1/12/43."

[10.11] The hex the Friendly units are to be debarked in must be within the Normal or Extended Range of land-based Friendly Air Points (any type both on the Game-Turn that the Mission is originally Plotted and the Game-turn that the Mission is actually carried out.

[10.12] Ground units preparing or available for an AMPH Mission may not engage in ground combat or land movement until the Game-Turn they perform the Amphibious Assault Mission: APB units preparing or available for AMPH Missions may not embark or debark units of any kind but may perform all other missions normally.

[10.13] Units preparing or available for an AMPH Mission may be withdrawn from the procedure at any time. Once withdrawn, they may again function as normal units of their type. However, if these units are again assigned to an AMPH Mission they must begin to perform the entire preparation procedure from the beginning.

[10.14] Units may be embarked or debarked onto an APB unit up to the limit of its Load Capacity. Units may be embarked or debarked at a cost (to the naval unit) of 5 Movement Points per Load Point. Four Supply Points are considered to be the equivalent of one Load Point for this purpose. The APB unit must spend the required Movement Points in the same hex as the embarking (or debarking) unit(s). Units being carried by amphibious units are placed under that unit on the Task Force Display.

[10.15] Amphibious Assaults are resolved in the same manner as Air Assaults. That is, Cases 6.93 through 6.98 also apply to Amphibious Assaults, with the exception that the assaulting units have their Attack Strength affected as follows during the Joint Assault Segment:

Unit | Attack Strength
Marine | Normal
Mechanized | Quartered (retain fractions)
All Other Ground Units | Halved (retain fractions)

From PW:

When a combat unit disembarks into a hex occupied by an enemy ground unit, the disembarking player must initiate combat (amphibious assaults) weather he is the Operation player or not. If the Advantage player conducts the assault, he must initial combat in the ensuing Ground Combat Phase of the next Battle Cycle (he can not Deactivate his assault units until the assault is resolved).

During this combat, the unit conducting the assault has its Troop Quality halved (round up) for the combat ratio determination only, unless a friendly ground unit already occupies the assault hex, or the assault hex is being simultaneously attacked by friendly ground units from another hex. If a unit performing amphibious assault sufferers a mandatory retreat result, and does retreat, it takes double the losses specified on the Combat Results Table, embarks, and immediately Deactivates. If the assaulted hex is not occupied by enemy ground units, the assaulting unit still can move no further. Any unit performing amphibious assault cannot purse.


All the Bold above are the clear violations of the rules by Bob Cross (aka Curtis Lemay, may the real Curtis RIP).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtis_LeMay

[Buckrock]

OK, this is just disappointing to read.

warspite1

So my previous hunch was correct. Yes, disappointing indeed. Curtis Lemay actually believes that all aircraft and aircrew would be on the carriers when sunk in port. But now he is aware, perhaps the effect of the extra, largely untouched, US aircraft on Oahu will be ackowledged - and what this means for his ‘plan’.

I'm betting it'll mean absolutely nothing for his plan as it's "Sunday and the US is oblivious and the Japanese have had months to prepare". Anything that the Japanese can come up with will therefore succeed. If there are an extra hundred and fifty aircraft that the Japanese need to take out then they'll just add it to the target list and it's done. And if two battalions of Japanese troops had just landed on Maui when the mission abort was sounded then they can simply "remain in hiding" for 24 hours on a populated US island territory until the APDs return to pick them up and carry them off to safety.

It's six impossible things before breakfast time.

[warspite1]

And if two battalions of Japanese troops had just landed on Maui when the mission abort was sounded then they can simply "remain in hiding" for 24 hours on a populated US island territory until the APDs return to pick them up and carry them off to safety.

warspite1

I wondered what you meant by that and then I re-read Curtis Lemay’s response to KingHart. To be clear, it is being proposed that 2,000 men, landed on Maui in the evening of 6 December 1941, could remain in hiding there (if the raid had to be cancelled) and then picked up in secret in the evening of the 7 December 1941. No one at any point detects 12 destroyer sized vessels sailing around Maui at will. No one spots 2,000 enemy troops and their equipment just inland from a beach for 24 hours....

[warspite1]

It is difficult to keep up with all the contradictions.

Curtis Lemay told KingHart the raid could be cancelled an hour before it was due to start.

In answer to me, Curtis Lemay said:

There would be a point beyond which the raid couldn't be cancelled. Before the Betty's reached the point of no return, for example.

So that’s approx 6-7 hours before the raid. At this point the Bettys don’t have fuel to return to the Marshalls, but aren’t going to have an airfield in Maui to land on. That’s 40 precious aircraft and almost 300 even more precious aircrew in a watery grave for absolutely nothing.

[warspite1]

Curtis Lemay still hasn’t explained why the Japanese would pick two carriers as being the required number for the raid - and thus the war - to commence.

For this plan to be sold, Yamamoto would have to have a view of the carriers vs battleships debate that he never had. He would need to be some pretty zealous advocate of the supremacy of the carrier to get his superiors to agree that the war could only start if the IJN can target the US carriers - remember oil is running down.

But if Yamamoto is that bigger advocate, then why would he settle for just two of the Pacific Fleet’s carriers? Why wouldn’t he insist on all three? Or in Curtis Lemay’s thinking, why settle for 20 battleships worth of carriers when he can win 30 battleships worth?

Or is it because by settling for two, this neatly fits in with the plan and doesn’t see the KB sailing around the North Pacific well into 1942?.........

In short there is absolutely no reason for Yamamoto to think this way - because he didn’t think this way in real life. And if we are giving him powers of foresight he didn’t have, then surely he would not accept a mere two carriers....

[Platoonist]

This scheme does seem to be developing a certain cartoonish element.

Sleepless in Tokyo.jpg (379.38 KiB) Viewed 760 times

[warspite1]

I wrote:

Japan had a major problem with training sufficient carrier based aircrew to meet war losses once the war started. Losing these carrier based fighters from one of the main Japanese carriers, may potentially have put that carrier out of action for a while, no? Unless they denuded the second line carriers further.

In response to this, Curtis Lemay said this was a problem for later down the road and wouldn’t stop the Maui operation. He also said in answer to another post, that instead of one carrier’s fighters being used on Maui, it would need two.

So this is now two front line carriers of the 1st Air Fleet without fighters on 8 December 1941, and no timescale for when they can be brought back up to strength. Remember the KB has to assist with the new Midway operation, the failed Wake operation and then all the things it did between December and June - and two carriers have no fighters....

Curtis Lemay also said two more things.

One was that land based naval pilots could have been carrier trained. Again this assumes massive amounts of foresight, but also takes no account of why the Japanese carrier pilot training program was as limited in numbers as it was. How easy was it for the IJNAF to decide that all pilots must be carrier trained and then have the resources to try and put in place such a program? Surely all that is going to do is limit the number of land based pilots as the bottleneck in training starts to tell.

He also said the pilots on Maui could be swapped with land based pilots. This is a pretty big assumption. I am not seeing a lot of exposed and vulnerable Zeros, starved of fuel and ammunition (not to mention AA defence) surviving on Maui (assuming they ever got there in the first place) for long, and as for the Bettys.....

[Buckrock]

Curtis Lemay still hasn’t explained why the Japanese would pick two carriers as being the required number for the raid - and thus the war - to commence.

For this plan to be sold, Yamamoto would have to have a view of the carriers vs battleships debate that he never had. He would need to be some pretty zealous advocate of the supremacy of the carrier to get his superiors to agree that the war could only start if the IJN can target the US carriers - remember oil is running down.

But if Yamamoto is that bigger advocate, then why would he settle for just two of the Pacific Fleet’s carriers? Why wouldn’t he insist on all three? Or in Curtis Lemay’s thinking, why settle for 20 battleships worth of carriers when he can win 30 battleships worth?

The fleet orders reportedly issued just before KB sailed from Japan included the possibility that they might find up to five US aircraft carriers moored at PH. So at least we know there was an upper limit.

[Buckrock]

This scheme does seem to be developing a certain cartoonish element.

Your talents are wasted in this thread but still very much appreciated.

[Buckrock]

And if two battalions of Japanese troops had just landed on Maui when the mission abort was sounded then they can simply "remain in hiding" for 24 hours on a populated US island territory until the APDs return to pick them up and carry them off to safety.

warspite1

I wondered what you meant by that and then I re-read Curtis Lemay’s response to KingHart.

This thread is now sorely in need of an index.

To be clear, it is being proposed that 2,000 men, landed on Maui in the evening of 6 December 1941, could remain in hiding there (if the raid had to be cancelled) and then picked up in secret in the evening of the 7 December 1941. No one at any point detects 12 destroyer sized vessels sailing around Maui at will. No one spots 2,000 enemy troops and their equipment just inland from a beach for 24 hours....

And it's fairly clear the Maui in the plan is not the real Maui with its particular coastal issues but rather some generic Hawaiian Island where ninja pathfinders only encounter generic issues that can be overcome for the generic reasons I described earlier (Sunday...oblivious....months to prepare).