A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[warspite1]

You apparently don't know the difference between a fact and an opinion.

warspite1

Not really. The army can't approve a plan that hasn't been submitted. The army refuses to co-operate with the navy even if its sold a well thought out, sensible plan. It has received nothing. There is nothing by way of a plan. All it has is a vague idea that the conquest of the oil that Japan needs is being compromised because the navy wants to expand a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor that will mean landing army troops on Maui (if they are incredibly lucky) to gain an airfield for the navy. This is an island the Japanese can't hold or reinforce or supply. There is also a sub operation to take Midway - again using the army's assets for a navy operation. Like Maui, Midway is an island that the Japanese can't supply. Six army battalions gone for...... nothing. And the army's conquest of the PI is suddenly harder - as is taking the NEI.

Nothing for the army to approve.

Every word of this is opinion. You don't seem to know the difference.

Let's see....I must submit a formal, typed, proposal, in triplicate, detailing every detail of an operation or you can claim the army wouldn't approve. No. I am not actually carrying out a real operation. We are discussing it on a history website - that's all. In the event, of course the Japanese would provide a nice detailed report to the army. That doesn't mean that I need to do so here.

The navy wants to degrade the US's response capability. That's actually much more important than even the oil in the DEI. They have a stockpile. The oil can wait if it has too (it doesn't, of course - it won't be affected at all, but it just isn't as important as torching Pearl.)

We disagree about the doability of the Maui operation. I believe it is very doable. The US is a nation at peace and they slack off on the weekends. The Pearl Harbor raid showed how vulnerable they were at that time. The Clark Field raid showed how unprepared for war they were. And then there are the benefits of taking Maui: Pearl gets torched with all that oil!

The Midway operation - with the addition of huge ground forces and the naval assets of the raid fleet will be about as easy as it gets.

warspite1

Not really. And not sure why you are submitting anything in triplicate. All you are being asked to do is support your ‘plan’ with some detail. Without this you have no plan. No plan = nothing for the army to approve or reject. Once you have a plan, there is something for the army to do. Unless what you’ve proposed is an obvious no brainer, the army will say no. And as we know, even if the plan is fantastic, the army wil say no.....

[warspite1]

I said that it would take longer to reduce the air assets on Luzon. A 15% reduction in the number of Jap planes will do that. But that's all it is. They still get destroyed. Mindoro won't be any more difficult to take than it was historically. Perhaps easier due to getting invaded during the initial surprise phase.

warspite1

You appear to be quoting an opinion as fact. By removing the aircraft that delivered the coup-de-grace to the air units on Luzon, you are giving Mac options. With Luzon quiet, the Southern PI now becomes a possibility for counter attack.

You have given the Americans options they never had in real life thanks to the aircraft you have just removed.

It is a fact that I'm only removing 15% of the historical air assets used. The Clark Field raid used 108 Bettys and Nells, and 84 Zeros. I'm leaving 108 Bettys and Nells and 75 Zeros. So...only 9 Zeros less and the same number of bombers. Things don't sound too good for the Clark Field forces.

warspite1

These numbers make no sense.

[warspite1]

No. It is not a data point. That would be a carrier sailing into Pearl with whatever fraction of its aircraft onboard.

Still waiting for a reason why war changes the SOP.

warspite1

What exactly is the issue here? Perhaps if you can enlighten me on what has caused your confusion I can do my best to help?

Still waiting for the above.

warspite1

Okay lets see if I can help clear the fog and get to the bottom of this for you.

You have told me you don’t understand why war changes the SOP.....

Firstly, why is there a problem?

- you erroneously believed that carrier planes remained on board when a carrier was in port.
- that was perfect for your ‘plan’ because all those inconvenient carrier planes would sink along with their mother carrier during the raid.
- it was then correctly pointed out that your understanding was totally wrong.
- yet another unwanted reality check for your ‘plan’.
- and so what did you do? You find out that in real life, Enterprise kept some of her aircraft aboard.
- you raise this as proof that the carrier planes would have remained on board and thus been destroyed during the attack.
- you used this data point as a holy grail.
- one small problem though. The real life actions of Enterprise were under wartime conditions. Under your plan, Enterprise would act under SOP because in your scenario when the big E enters Pearl, the US is at peace.
- SOP would mean her aircraft would be transferred to shore prior to entering Pearl - and thus add to the US aircraft on Oahu to counter the Japanese attack and the hapless units on Maui.
- well that is not good is it? So what do you do? Although you don’t like using historical facts as part of these discussions, in this case you insist that what Enterprise did historically, is what she would have done in your scenario (conveniently forgetting that there is a difference betwen war and peacetime conditions).
- But of course you have no reason to believe that.
- sure, SOP doesn’t mean Enterprise’s AOC would follow them. But, in the absence of any reason to believe he wouldn’t, SOP is our best data point.
- I readily admit if you could come up with evidence to show Enterprise’s AOC was a maverick who regularly ignored SOP or who showed a history of tearing up the rule book, then that data point would need to be caveated.
- but of course you can’t. There is absolutely no reason for SOP not to have been followed by Enterprise
- so what do you do now? Well now you try and obfuscate by asking the frankly bizarre question of why war changes SOP.....
- well in real life, Enterprise is heading for Pearl now in a state of war.
- the USN need Enterprise back in Pearl to refuel and rearm as quickly as humanly possible so that she can get back out, get her aircraft in the air and go searching for the enemy (which she successfully did).
- under your scenario there is no reason to do anything other than follow SOP.

And so I’m sorry that this is all a bit inconvenient for your plan, but the simple fact is, this is a counter-factual scenario. Therefore we can’t say what would have happened with 100% certainty for the simple reason it didn’t happen. What we can do is use the most relevant data point to try and decide what was most likely to have happened. The data point from history is no good because Enterprise was at war when she did what she did. Therefore the best data point is SOP - which is what Enterprise would have carried out under the conditions that would have existed under your ‘plan’.

I do hope you are now clear on this.

[RangerJoe]

warspite1

You appear to be quoting an opinion as fact. By removing the aircraft that delivered the coup-de-grace to the air units on Luzon, you are giving Mac options. With Luzon quiet, the Southern PI now becomes a possibility for counter attack.

You have given the Americans options they never had in real life thanks to the aircraft you have just removed.

It is a fact that I'm only removing 15% of the historical air assets used. The Clark Field raid used 108 Bettys and Nells, and 84 Zeros. I'm leaving 108 Bettys and Nells and 75 Zeros. So...only 9 Zeros less and the same number of bombers. Things don't sound too good for the Clark Field forces.

warspite1

These numbers make no sense.

Sir, I believe that you are incorrect on the numbers part.

I mean, he has stated that he would redirect 40 of the Bettys from the Luzon operation to Hawaii and the math is this:

108 - 40 = 108.

He stated that he would send 36 Zeros as well and the math is this:

86 - 36 = 75.

You see how the math works out?

Also, only 50 tons of supplies which I presume would be metric tons and not imperial tons since Japan used the metric system at that time. The math for that is:

40 X 800 kg = 32000 kg or 32 metric tons and only 18 metric tons left for fuel, ammo, sake, spare parts, not to mention spare loin clothes or whatever else is needed. Of course, just how the 800 kg bombs are going to be brought ashore from destroyers with no intrinsic lift capability is simple because all it takes is one Japanese soldier or sailor to pick it up is simple to understand. Then drop the bomb over the side where another Japanese soldier or sailor would grab one with each hand, walk along the bottom of the ocean, carrying the bombs to shore and then to the airfield. Where he will then lift them into the bomb bays of the bomber with maybe the help of another Japanese soldier or sailor since most likely that would be lifting said 800 kg bomb over his head.

[RangerJoe]

"A few months later when the Japanese raided Ceylon, Nagumo gave specific orders to bomb the fuel tanks at the naval base at Trincomlee. The vaunted Kido Butai was able to destroy a grand total of one tank, and that required a suicide dive. It's not as easy to destroy fuel tanks as Hollywood would have you believe."

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warship ... t6047.html

[Torplexed]

Of course, just how the 800 kg bombs are going to be brought ashore from destroyers with no intrinsic lift capability is simple to understand, because all it takes is one Japanese soldier or sailor to pick it up. Then drop the bomb over the side where another Japanese soldier or sailor would grab one with each hand, walk along the bottom of the ocean, carrying the bombs to shore and then to the airfield. Where he will then lift them into the bomb bays of the bomber with maybe the help of another Japanese soldier or sailor since most likely that would be lifting said 800 kg bomb over his head.

I gotta get me some of that vaunted Code of Bushido. It sounds better than spinach or Wheaties.

[KingHart]

Sir,
If you would simply answer the questions regarding your plan, it would not be necessary for them to be repeated.

No. It evidently has to be repeated over and over and over.

No.
Evidently, you refuse to provide any details of your plan, despite being asked over and over and over again.

Betty bombers. Let's once again look at your plan for the Betty bombers:
1 - The Japanese did not have an airfield on Eniwetok in December 1941. The airfield was only started in December 0f 1942, and was first used in November 1943. Please explain how you plan to conduct long-range air operations on an atoll with no airfield. There was an airfield on Roi-Namur, and one bomber unit (Nells) and one fighter unit (Claudes) were based there on 7 December. I point this out to try to show you that names are not "chrome", but actually important details in any plan.

My plan was to expand Eniwetok prewar. But you are right about Roi-Namur!!!! Thanks for that! Distance to Oahu = 2443 miles. To Maui = 2535 miles. And no prewar expansion required! Plan just got that much more doable!

2 - The distance from Roi-Namur to Maui is 2500 miles, as I stated in my previous post. The maximum range of the Betty, unloaded and unarmed, is 3176 miles. The extended combat range of the Betty is, however, only 937 miles, with a normal combat range of 748 miles. By the way, these quoted range figures for the Bettys come from a source that you yourself said was an unmatched authority - Gary Grigsby.

Even Gary can be wrong. Unamed the Betty can do 3749 miles. Fully armed 3132 miles. Sorry, I'm not going to repeat the links.

And you can also be wrong.
Which is what you are regarding the ranges of the Betty. Let me try again:
Max range (unloaded and unarmed): 3132 miles
Combat range: 1772 miles
Source - every online source using a simple google search. The link you provided included, if you had bothered to actually read the entire link.

3 - Thus, as I said, your planes are arriving with no ammo or bomb load, having flown all night, having used at least 80% of their fuel, and having no certainty of there being anywhere for them to land. The idea is, to use your favorite term, "clueless".

2535/3749 = 67.6% of their fuel. Tons of range left.

Again wrong.
2500/3132 = 79.8% of their fuel. And they have nowhere to land.
Speaking of the Bettys, I note that in another post, you claim that your celebrated "abort" code could be sent when the Bettys are 2/3 of the way to Maui; in other words after having flown 1666 miles. 1666/3132 = 53% of fuel used. Please explain how the Bettys could make it back without running out of fuel.

US "cluelessness":
1 - An inexperienced Army lieutenant saw the radar, and believed it to show the flight of dive-bombers due in from Enterprise. A mistake, yes. But certainly not proof that the US was unprepared or "clueless".
2 - The sub was tracked, fired upon, and sunk. Not sure how that is a "clueless" response.
3 - Not sure what "ultimatum warning" you are referring to; given that the Japanese bungled the reception of the 14-point diplomatic missive that was supposed to be delivered prior to the raid, thus insuring the US public would view the raid as an unforgiveable sneak attack, it would seem to be the Japanese who were "clueless".
4 - All ships had ammo for the AAA, within 10-15 minutes of the attack Japanese planes were being targeted.
5 - Please provide any proof whatsoever that Washington could not believe the reports of the attack. Shocked, yes. Stunned into disbelief, no.
6 - The planes on Clark Field were being refueled when a delayed Japanese attack caught them on the ground. Had the attack been delivered as planned, all US planes would have been airborne. That the Japanese got lucky does not make the US "clueless".

Excuses for why they were clueless. Irrelevant.

Clueless = being confronted with facts that show your complete ignorance of the actual historical situation, and being unable to respond except by denial.

Midway invasion:
1 - As I asked before, where is the invasion force during the raid? It is 1300 miles from Pearl Harbor to Midway; where do you sync up at?
2 - What ships are being used to transport the invasion force? It is 2500 miles from Japan to Midway; how are you refueling both KB and this Midway invasion?

They synch up at Midway. The very same ships that would have taken them to Luzon can take them to Midway.

Where do you get the fuel for these ships? How do you plan to refuel the convoy? Do you have any covering force or do you expect a convoy of xAKs to sail 4500 miles from Hainan to Midway with no protection?

Maui invasion:
1 - What do you mean by "ground crew ships"? Previously, you have stated that the only naval forces involved were the historic KB force and 12 APDs. Where do the ground crews ride? Where is all the fuel and bombs for the Bettys? Where is all the fuel for all these ships coming from?

Sorry, I'm just not going to repeat this over and over.

Not asking you to repeat anything, since you have never answered the questions in the first place.

2 - As before, where is the invasion force landing on Maui? How can 2000 Japanese soldiers be landed on an island with a population of 47000 and no one notices?

2400 soldiers. They are guided by pathfinders who had months to scout and prepare. Maui is huge with a very long coastline. Its is in the middle of the night on a weekend at peacetime.

Let's see - middle of the night, on Maui, Saturday night....surely, no one is going to be partying on the beach, right?

3 - What is the timeline for the landing and for the capture of both the airfield and port?

The landing is when the APDs get there from 100 miles out at dusk - about midnight. They then have about 8 hours to get into strike position. The strike takes place when the raid begins.

You really continue to believe that a convoy of 12 Japanese APDs can sail undetected, on a Saturday evening, land a force of 2400 soldiers and their supplies (again undetected), sail 300 miles to rendezvous with KB and the mystery "ground crew ships", somehow transfer aboard the ground crews and more supplies (including 800-kg bombs), and then sail back 300 miles to Maui and unload? In 8 hours? Meanwhile, your invasion force is somehow avoiding detection while maneuvering to attack positions to seize both port facilities and the airfield. Do I have that right?

4 - Just who are these "pathfinders" you keep referring to? How many are there? How and when did they arrive on Maui? How do the various Japanese forces communicate with the "pathfinders"?

Japanese infiltrated or recruited agents. They communicate just how all pathfinders do - radios, signal lights, and, eventually, face to face.

How many? How did they get to Maui? What does Japan do if one of these "pathfinders" is caught prior to the raid? How are they avoiding detection if they are using signal lights and radio?

Communications:
1 - Japanese radios were notoriously poor, to the point that some pilots actually removed prior to taking flight. Note that Fuchida, the Pearl Harbor strike leader, did not use his radio to talk to other pilots; the famous "Tora, Tora, Tora" signal was meant for Admiral Nagumo back on the Akagi, not for the planes. He used flares to signal the attack.
2 - The problem with using radio to communicate is that the enemy can intercept the signals. This the US did far better than the Japanese. Why, then, would the Japanese use coded radio transmissions to relay word of an abort, especially when the entire Japanese war offense depends on this raid?

And we can't have any risk, can we!? What does "Tora! Tora! Tora!" tell any US intercepter?

It tells the US that Japan has combat forces in the area, thus alerting the US to your plan. Do you not understand the concept of "radio silence"?

Luzon:
1 - Please explain why you believe the Japanese would totally ignore the US forces on Luzon, and instead invade Midway and attempt a suicidal invasion of Maui? How could your plan possibly benefit Japan's war aims?

Once the air assets on Luzon are destroyed, it is neutralized. It's far in the Japanese rear. The invasion of Maui has huge payoff - well worth the tiny risk. Delaying US response by two years definitely benefits Japan's war aims.

How are you destroying the air assets on Luzon? You have transferred 48 Bettys and 34 Zeroes from the attack force to your Maui plan. And the risk is, in fact, huge - so big that what you are proposing would cause Japan to lose the war two years earlier than historically.

2 - You are using 6 battalions in your Maui and Midway invasions. That represents roughly 1/3 of the land forces assigned to attack Luzon. 2 of the battalions will be lost at Maui, and the other 4 stranded and starving on Midway. How do you plan to replace these forces?

?? Too nonsensical to even reply to.

I see.
When confronted with facts, you can do nothing but become confused and in denial.

3 - How do you plan to proceed with the invasion of Borneo without first having at least attempted to neutralize the US forces on Luzon? You are aware, that sizing the oilfields on Borneo and in the East Indies was the whole point of Japan going to war?

What can ground forces on Luzon do about anything if their air assets have been destroyed? Once their air assets have been destroyed Luzon is neutralized for quite a while.

Again, by your transfers of the available air assets from Luzon to Maui, you have substantially decreased the possibility of reducing the US air forces on Luzon. By your transfer of land forces and the delay of the invasion, you have given MacArthur valuable time to increase his defenses. This, in turn, delays the conquest of Borneo and the East Indies, which is the whole point of Japan going to war.

[warspite1]

They will have a CVL, CAs, CLs, and DDs freed up from the Luzon operation . Plus ground units freed up.

warspite1

Irrelevant to the question.

Please confirm how you know the Japanese have enough destroyers given you've denuded the force by more than 10%, you've added extra operations, and the Japanese are about to start taking losses to their destroyer force.

If its gunfire they need, they will have more than historically via the releases from Luzon. If its ASW they need, the APDs will be back with that by the time they would have been released from Luzon.

warspite1

As said previously, this is irrelevant. I am asking about destroyers not light carriers or light cruisers or heavy cruisers or fast transports.

Please confirm how you know the Japanese have enough destroyers given you've denuded the force by more than 10%, you've added extra operations, and the Japanese are about to start taking losses to their destroyer force.

[Buckrock]

Again, the only data point we have is the one in which the Enterprise sailed into Pearl with 2/3rds of it aircraft on board.

I think you mean the only data point you have.

I don't care what the "SOP" was. What matters is how tightly they followed it.

They followed it "tightly" enough that it was considered standard procedure, hence the term. It will be the normal condition expected to be encountered if you attacked PH during peacetime while one or more CVs were moored there, hence it should be what any competent Japanese planners would have assumed. Even the historical Japanese treated it as SOP for US carriers at PH. And we know that because they supplied details for their plan.

Right now we only have the one data point, and it doesn't fit your claim. It would take dozens more to establish the compliance rate.

So again you are doubting your own quora "experts" that we were all supposed to respect earlier on the topic.

Unfortunately your data point is during wartime, it has no bearing on peacetime SOP. Find me a data point in peacetime where the USN CVs weren't landing their CAGs before mooring their ship for a 24+ hour stay at PH and then we can talk compliance. And I'm using the 24+ hour stay as that is what your whole plan is built around.

Or just give us the details of your raid and I'll give you multiple referenced examples of that peacetime procedure.

And why would the "SOP" change between peacetime and wartime?

Seriously? The presence of a known hostile force operating close to Oahu that had attacked the previous day and could well be about to attack again tomorrow wouldn't warrant any reconsideration of a SOP that had been previously used because it met peacetime needs?

I'll give you a hint. The USS Enterprise intended to only enter PH and moor at dusk then complete refueling by midnight so as to be back out at sea and ready for battle against a real enemy before dawn. Hardly a peacetime situation.

Here's the link to the raid on Clark Field:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Clark_Field

Remember: This was 9 hours after Pearl. It's the only contemporary evidence of US readiness immediately post Pearl.

I know the historical details. I also know what the US aircraft had been doing all morning in anticipation of a raid that the Japanese would have attempted had weather not intervened. As I said, lay out some proper details for your PH raid plan and I'll be happy to discuss it.

It doesn't matter whatever excuse you want to make for how they got into the situation that resulted. What matters is what actually happened. It illustrates how unready for war they were at that time of the war.

Excuse? We haven't even discussed that topic yet. Give us the details of your plan and we can start.

The US has just been stunned by Pearl Harbor. That's all the Japs need to get into position on Maui.

And yet during the historical PH Raid, Maui was alerted, actively moving to defend itself and was able to receive and respond to direct orders from PH. Being stunned doesn't mean being comatose. Put forward the requested details regarding Maui and we can discuss it.

Maui will be infiltrated at night on a weekend in peacetime guided by pathfinders to all critical targets. The surprise attack will come from the interior of the island - in the rear of the island assets. They will be heavily outnumbered.

This is a low risk operation (even total failure only risks two battalions and two air groups) with a huge reward: TWO YEARS delay in US response. A no brainer.

Then give us the details so we can actually track your Japanese as they triumphantly make their way to their huge reward.

So far it's just all yell, no tell.

[warspite1]

I've said what force I'm taking from Luzon - names are irrelevant. The plan for Midway and Maui are very detailed.

warspite1

....and you still don't have anything approaching a plan.

Of course I do. And I've detailed it repeatedly. I don't include unnecessary trivia, like the water level in each canteen. Or the names of units (chrome). Just the critical factors.

warspite1

You have a selective idea about what constitutes critical factors in an amphibious landing operation. The Japanese are under massive constraints here:

- they cannot afford to be located (with all that means in terms of signals and illumination in the dead of night)
- they have to seize the airfield and the port, and defeat any resistance quickly without any transport and with only light weapons.

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

[Buckrock]

Since The Plan leaves Mac's USAFFE free to complete their full mobilization and deploy where they wish using their large numbers of inter-island transports, the Japanese would also need to use more battalions than historical (two) to ensure they hold Mindanao (Davao) and Mindoro against whatever schemes Mad Mac eventually comes up with. With 48th Div being needed for the DEI operations, I'd suggest the current version of The Plan would have already soaked up close to 100% of the historical IJA battalions originally used on Luzon.

Of course we'll just have to wait for the relevant plan details to confirm this.

I'm sure the Japanese wouldn't have done anything about those transports.

They were unable to stop Mac doing just that historically. Want to know more? Give us the details of your Philippines' plans and we can discuss it.

[Buckrock]

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

[Platoonist]

I think the Midway portion of this plan would have faced some serious obstacles. So many historical narratives focus on the what-ifs of the naval aspect of the 1942 Battle of Midway, that the flawed nature of the planned Japanese invasion of the atoll never gets much attention.

The two islands at Midway are surrounded by an exposed coral reef through which one inlet called the Brooks Channel had been blasted in the 1930s. That channel was covered by coast defense guns. There are gaps in the reef on the far western end, but the Japanese rejected using these as they lead to shallows of varying depths in the lagoon and would not have constituted a useful approach. The plan the Japanese Army conceived in 1942 was to use their daihatsu barges to land troops on the south facing reef closest to the islands instead of forcing the channel. The tidal range at Midway is quite small, with a mean range of only nine inches and a diurnal range of fifteen inches, which means that there was never a tide high enough to float the barges over the reef. After being "landed" the troops would have had to wade unto the exposed reef itself. From there the troops would have to slog through 200-300 yards of waters ranging from ankle to chest deep to reach the beach. To make matters worse, most of the Marine heavy and light machine guns were sited to cover this stretch of water.

I don’t have a source for how many landing barges were assigned to the IJN invasion fleet at Midway in 1942, but there were only a dozen transport ships and about 5000 men. So, you are going to be landed on a reef just inches above sea level and then step off into a lagoon with irregular depths from 3-15 ft deep. You’ve still got several hundred yards to the beach itself and you are wading that distance, not running. Pushing your way through waist deep water is slow and tiring. You are trying to keep your footing while gunfire is bursting around you. There is zero cover. And gods help you if you step into a hole 6 or 7 foot deep or trip and end up face down in the water carrying 70-100 lbs of equipment on your back. More troops might drown in the lagoon as opposed to being shot.

That’s not to say nobody would make it across, the Japanese weren’t known for being sensitive to losses. But I don’t see how more than 1000 of the 5000 Japanese assigned to the assault at the time make it as far as the beach, and then still have to get off that beach. I'm doubtful that there would have been enough men left to overcome the garrison.

I think at best it would have been a Japanese Tarawa. The lagoon would have flowed red with blood.

Fringing Reef.jpg (70.64 KiB) Viewed 1298 times

[sPzAbt653]

Wasn't the Midway plan for the Jap Planes to destroy all opposition so that the difficult landing would be easy?

So when the planes didn't accomplish their goal it was called off?

[warspite1]

I think the Midway portion of this plan would have faced some serious obstacles. So many historical narratives focus on the what-ifs of the naval aspect of the 1942 Battle of Midway, that the flawed nature of the planned Japanese invasion of the atoll never gets much attention.

warspite1

I think perhaps the most grating element of this thread is the total lack of reciprocity in evidence.

So we have numerous posters making reasonable requests for proper detail regarding invasions, fleet movements, timetables etc. And getting very little back because about 99% of legitimate queries can apparently be fully answered by the words; 'trivial', 'pathfinders' and 'Kamikaze/code of bushido'.

So, for example, while it is apparently totally unimportant to identify an invasion convoy and a plan for actually taking Midway - a timetable and the use of the KB etc, it is perfectly reasonable to request a compliance rate for USN carrier commanders in respect of whether they carried out SOP in terms of carrier planes landing on shore ahead of a carrier sailing in to port in times of peace......

[warspite1]

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

warspite1

In a post on 11 December, Curtis Lemay said at around noon.

[Platoonist]

Wasn't the Midway plan for the Jap Planes to destroy all opposition so that the difficult landing would be easy?

So when the planes didn't accomplish their goal it was called off?

The actual carrier air attack the Japanese made on the 4th of June 1942 didn't degrade the island's ground defenses one bit although they wiped out the ancient planes of the fighter squadron. They destroyed some barracks and oil tanks. A seaplane hangar was set also ablaze and the battalion laundry was heavily damaged, but not one heavy gun was put out of actions and total personnel losses on the ground were six KIA. At a cost of six Japanese bombers and a lot of planes shot up. Which is why the strike leader called for another attack (with awful follow-on consequences for the battle).

During the US Pacific offensive in which the carrier fleets were far vaster I can't think of an instance in which air power alone degraded an island's ground defenses enough to make the battle for the island easy. Certainly not at Tarawa, Roi-Namur, Saipan, Iwo Jima, etc. Air support helped and was vital, but couldn't destroy all ground opposition by itself.

[Aurelian]

Love how this plan takes the Japanese approach to logistics. It will work itself out.

Take Maui. Take Midway. How are they going to supply either, let alone hold it?

Their merchant marine couldn't do it. Tokyo Express style runs won't do it.

[Zovs]

I am still waiting to see a sensible outline of some kind of plausible realistic and historical plan.

[Buckrock]

And yet......

- you can’t tell us where the Japanese will land
- you therefore have no idea where the airfield and port is in relation to the landing zone
- you have no idea of the terrain to be traversed
- you have no idea of the cover that the area surrounding the invasion beach affords
- you have no idea how (assuming any of this works) ‘the magic 50 tons of whatever’ gets to the airfield

And remember, the landing is not governed by the weather, the tides or any of the usual factors. This operation has to take place to fit the carriers being at home regardless of whether this compromises the invasion.

And you believe you have covered the critical factors??

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

warspite1

In a post on 11 December, Curtis Lemay said at around noon.

Thanks. That's probably really good news for the US then but I can't say for certain unless (surprise, surprise) we get to see some proper detail on his Maui operation.

Does anyone know what is supposed to happen to KB's attack if the APDs have to abort their landing on Maui? Does KB still go ahead? We really need an index.