Intresting discussion on Chinese DF carrier killers. Thoughts?

[TempestII]

I didn't realize the Ford's radars were blaring out loud. If I shut all jamming and radars off, the DF-26s have a very hard time finding the carrier. It looks like initial detection is ELINT from a satellite and then home on jam for the missile. Out of seven run throughs, six total misses on the carrier. If I go to flank and change heading on missile detection. The missiles all miss. I would hope that the USN could handle those tactics and countermeasures.

edit: If I shut down all SM-3s and run silent, the PLARF has a very difficult time maintaining a lock on the carrier and the group. In three runs, the Ford got damaged twice and I lost 1-2 escorts. I think this shows, at least in the CMO version of life, that having the ASBM missiles are a fleet in being only if you don't have the infrastructure to maintain a targetable lock on the carrier.

Yeah, the tests I've done with the scen I uploaded concur with you: running at 35 knots with all active sensors and jammers offline does indeed make the DF-26s miss on almost every occasion. I lost a DDG a couple of times, but never sustained any CVN damage.

What was strange is that, even when I changed the WRA to "Ignore EMCON when under attack". my ships still turned on their radars (but not OECM) to fire their SM-3s when the SBX 1 was radiating. Without that at Guam, they stayed silent.

[blu3s]

Testing DF-21 vs DF-26 with the next config:

Beta 1328.6
DB 501
CVN silent,
4 DDG's and 1 CG Radar Active, OECM Passive

Red team launch a 24 salvo missiles, 4 against each Blue ship. Lost tracking of the CSG group after the launch.
Same position as previous image.



DF-21 achieves more kills than DF-26.



DF-26 is harder to intercept than DF-21.

[thewood1]

So the net of this is the same as what we knew before. Recon and real-time intelligence are the critical factor on both sides. There is little margin for error on the DF-26 and DF-21 kill chains. Having a general location is not enough for the PLARF. One of the articles I posted stated the the USN considers that the DF-26/21 ASBMs are first strike or ambush weapons on an unprepared CVBG in the wrong place at the wrong time at the start of a war. The PLARF has 150-200 DF-26s at best and maybe a few more than that of DF-21 ASBMs. At distance, they would have to fire almost all of those to hit an aware CVBG. But as an opening salvo in a war, with a shadow on the CVBG, they could probably do it with a couple dozen DF-26s.

For the USN, they might never have enough operational SM-3s to fight off a full salvo of missiles in an opening move. But having any forewarning of a possible attack should give a CVBG in open water the ability to break any continuous surveillance enough to miss a large attack. If the ships are near shore, observable, or in dock, the USN can plan on losing 1-2 CVNs. The key is being ready strategically for the CVBG and tactically with early warning radar for missiles.

In some ways, the PLARF has won one part of the battle. They are forcing the USN to use up very valuable VLS slots and missile resources that could go to SAMs, LACMs, and AShMs. But at the same time, dedicating large numbers of DF-26s and 21s to anti-carrier attacks looks like a little bit of a forlorn hope. Those missiles might be better applied to Japan, Taiwan, Guam, or Korea.

[maverick3320]

So the net of this is the same as what we knew before. Recon and real-time intelligence are the critical factor on both sides. There is little margin for error on the DF-26 and DF-21 kill chains. Having a general location is not enough for the PLARF. One of the articles I posted stated the the USN considers that the DF-26/21 ASBMs are first strike or ambush weapons on an unprepared CVBG in the wrong place at the wrong time at the start of a war. The PLARF has 150-200 DF-26s at best and maybe a few more than that of DF-21 ASBMs. At distance, they would have to fire almost all of those to hit an aware CVBG. But as an opening salvo in a war, with a shadow on the CVBG, they could probably do it with a couple dozen DF-26s.

For the USN, they might never have enough operational SM-3s to fight off a full salvo of missiles in an opening move. But having any forewarning of a possible attack should give a CVBG in open water the ability to break any continuous surveillance enough to miss a large attack. If the ships are near shore, observable, or in dock, the USN can plan on losing 1-2 CVNs. The key is being ready strategically for the CVBG and tactically with early warning radar for missiles.

In some ways, the PLARF has won one part of the battle. They are forcing the USN to use up very valuable VLS slots and missile resources that could go to SAMs, LACMs, and AShMs. But at the same time, dedicating large numbers of DF-26s and 21s to anti-carrier attacks looks like a little bit of a forlorn hope. Those missiles might be better applied to Japan, Taiwan, Guam, or Korea.

How do the odds look for South Korea's one potential carrier?

[thewood1]

To me, it depends on a lot on what's going on around it. PLARF might not waste $10M ASBMs on it if there are a couple CVNs in the area. I would think a couple of subs might be a better package for that.

[Mickeys91]

I suspect that ABM engagements in CMO are missing something, even when the assets are in place.


AEGIS BMD - Test2.zip

I tried your Mission multiple times on the Beta v1.05.1328.7. I seem to be having issues. Majority of time the missiles will just steer off course and glide at a fixed altitude and the rest either hit the ocean without tracking or fade away (not malfunction or anything). Is anyone else having these issues? The new update said it fixed these issues but seems to have made it worse.

[Craigkn]

To me, it depends on a lot on what's going on around it. PLARF might not waste $10M ASBMs on it if there are a couple CVNs in the area. I would think a couple of subs might be a better package for that.

Subs are slow. Chinese subs are slow, and loud. In real combat, I expect a CVBG to move very rapidly in its operating area, I dont think the subs could really catch up, unless the CVN was damaged prior.

[thewood1]

1) We aren't talking about a CVN.
2) Subs aren't running around chasing ships. Subs will be in position to ambush.
3) PLAN diesel subs are well equipped to attack Japanese and Korean ships.
4) Korean CVs are very limited in what kind of power they can project. Its group could be overwhelmed but a limited number of AShMs fired from subs at distance.