I don't think it is that simple.
France was considering sending military aid to Romania in March 1940, as well as having provided them weapon systems and training during the inter-war years.
Both Britian and France had just gone to war with Germany over their guarentees of Polish sovereignty, so it can't be said that their current guarantees with Romania, lacked teeth, had things turned out differently in France in 1940.
Additionally, Romania did not denounce their allegiences to the west until
after the fall of France and loss of Bessarabia.
The defeat of France and the expulsion of Britain from the continent in the following month totally undermined any residual value their guarantees held, and predatory neighbours began to gather against Romania.
The Fall of France on June 22 and the subsequent British retreat from the Continent rendered the assurances of assistance to Romania meaningless.
During the interwar period, Romania’s closest ally had been France. Naturally, such a relationship had a military component. Romanian officers attended French schools, and, institutionally, the Romanian army was greatly influenced by French doctrine and thinking.
Hence the guarantees given by the British and French to Romania on 13 April were exactly what the Romanian government wanted: a unilateral insurance of the two great democratic powers with regard to Romania’s independence; this was because according to the text of these guarantees, the Romanians were not obliged to help Britain and France. The consequences of the Foreign Office policy were among the most significant.
