Regarding the ASBM balance

[GeneralVikus]

I have been testing the various ASBMs against defensive systems and it seems pretty evident that, as far as Command represents it, the advantage of the conventional ASBM over the defence is overwhelming, as is the advantage of the ASBM in terms of cost efficiency vis a vis all other weapons. A couple of DF-26s, for instance, can do what 100 LRASMs cannot. As far as I can tell, none of the excuses which have sometimes been offered in past threads on these forums - for example, that defence is a 'system of systems,' seem to apply to the Command model; neither THAAD nor Aegis Ashore make any difference; nor do radar pickets; nor does the AN/SPY-6 of the Ford / DDGX Class.

The only platform I have found which does make a difference - and a massive one - is the SBX, which enables tracking of conventional ASBMs soon after launch, and midcourse interception with SM-3s. This perhaps improves the defence by a factor of ten. However, if the DF-26 (not a new weapon) really was so effective against all other defences, and if the SBX worked as well as advertised in Command, it seems likely to me that other examples would have been produced long before now for use in naval warfare; even if they were no faster than the existing version, the advantages would greatly outweigh the disadvantages, and the first one cost the same as a destroyer and weighed only 1,800 tons. From what I've read about the SBX, the more likely explanation seems to be that it doesn't work nearly as well as it was supposed to, but I'm not qualified to judge.

Another point against the DF-26 is that the PLA, rather than doubling down on conventional ASBMs, has apparently chosen to change direction with HGVs; and the US has never pursued conventional ASBMs at all.

It is difficult to dispute that if the advantage of the DF-26 is as great as Command portrays it, it is an absolute weapon in naval warfare - frigates and destroyers simply cannot sail under its umbrella unless they are never detected, and neither can large cargo ships with expensive cargoes such as tankers. If that is the case, it is probably futile for the US to hold either Taiwan or Japan by conventional means. Therefore, this issue seems to be of overwhelming importance.

So, my question is - how much confidence can we place in Command's portrayal of the DF-26 and opposing BMD, as of this year? Particularly, what is the probability, if any, that destroyers can detect incoming RVs at a greater altitude and thus engage them earlier, since that seems to be the major bottleneck? And what about the SBX - how likely is it that this platform works as advertised?

[SunlitZelkova]

The only platform I have found which does make a difference - and a massive one - is the SBX, which enables tracking of conventional ASBMs soon after launch, and midcourse interception with SM-3s. This perhaps improves the defence by a factor of ten. However, if the DF-26 (not a new weapon) really was so effective against all other defences, and if the SBX worked as well as advertised in Command, it seems likely to me that other examples would have been produced long before now for use in naval warfare; even if they were no faster than the existing version, the advantages would greatly outweigh the disadvantages, and the first one cost the same as a destroyer and weighed only 1,800 tons. From what I've read about the SBX, the more likely explanation seems to be that it doesn't work nearly as well as it was supposed to, but I'm not qualified to judge.

ASBMs existed long before the DF-21 and DF-26. The Soviets built the first one. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-27_Zyb#R-27K

The reason we didn't see them until now is because the USSR's were covered by the SALT I agreement and they would have rather had city killers, and then funding for things like the SS-10 Pioner became a higher priority.

Try adding SBIRS and STSS satellites. They should detect the missiles right after launch and allow the SM-3s to work better.

Another point against the DF-26 is that the PLA, rather than doubling down on conventional ASBMs, has apparently chosen to change direction with HGVs; and the US has never pursued conventional ASBMs at all.

HGVs are better because their flight profile allows the missile to avoid mid course interceptors like the SM-3 completely.

The US never pursued conventional ASBMs because it doesn't have an A2/AD doctrine.

So, my question is - how much confidence can we place in Command's portrayal of the DF-26 and opposing BMD, as of this year? Particularly, what is the probability, if any, that destroyers can detect incoming RVs at a greater altitude and thus engage them earlier, since that seems to be the major bottleneck? And what about the SBX - how likely is it that this platform works as advertised?

Terminal ABMs were never going to be effective against the DF-26. As far as I can tell, the only terminal ABM system that can handle targets with the reentry speeds of IRBMs and ICBMs are the Moscow ABM system and the 1970s Safeguard. Patriot and SM-6s simply aren't built to do that. So I'd say that part is pretty accurate.

Think of it this way, in the same way Moscow's defences likely would not be effective against the launch of 8-12 Trident IIs, do you think SM-6s would be effective against 8-12 DF-26s?

I would only be able to say whether there was confidence in CMO's modeling of the ABM after you add SBIRS and try one more time. I would do it myself but I don't have time at the moment.

Note that a lot of SBIRS satellites are missing from the DB, so you will have to time your scenario right to make sure the satellite is overhead when the missile launches.

As for the modeling of the DF-26, I think it is pretty accurate. We have two examples of tests of the DF-26. In one instance, China built a massive aircraft carrier shaped target on rails in the deserts of Xinjiang, and fired a DF-26 at it. The missile scored a direct hit, with the hit revealed by Western satellite imagery. The second time, a DF-26 was fired at a target in the South China Sea and successfully hit it, sinking it.

Assuming China's SAR capabilities are on par with Western companies, they should be able to easily find carriers and so forth too.

It is difficult to dispute that if the advantage of the DF-26 is as great as Command portrays it, it is an absolute weapon in naval warfare - frigates and destroyers simply cannot sail under its umbrella unless they are never detected, and neither can large cargo ships with expensive cargoes such as tankers. If that is the case, it is probably futile for the US to hold either Taiwan or Japan by conventional means. Therefore, this issue seems to be of overwhelming importance.

I think the threat of the DF-26 and upcoming hypersonic DF-27 is massive. The effectiveness with which China will be able to destroy naval assets will be on the same level of effectiveness that Soviet conventional forces would have had against NATO in Europe. The Cold Warrior in me thinks it is enough to warrant explicitly including nuclear arms as an option for defending at least Japan, if not Taiwan, but the current administration has put an emphasis on delegitimizing these weapons. Japan might also have an issue with such a doctrine, having been bombed with nuclear weapons itself.

Thus without extensive anti-satellite warfare, which would eliminate China's ability to target their ASBMs, I'm not sure how the US would ever be able to get carriers or other naval assets into the area without coming under attack.

Note that this only applies to the present day situation. The US and Japan have plans to build a hypersonic interceptor, and this will change the game once again when it becomes operational in the 2030s. We just have to hope war doesn't break out soon (or ever).

[GeneralVikus]

Note that this only applies to the present day situation. The US and Japan have plans to build a hypersonic interceptor, and this will change the game once again when it becomes operational in the 2030s. We just have to hope war doesn't break out soon (or ever).

Thank you for the detailed response!

I didn't include satellites in my testing on either side, because I have found so little information on current ASAT capabilities, and therefore I simply have no concept of how vulnerable satellites will be, and the extent to which they can be relied upon by either side. Obviously, if geosynchronous satellites are currently vulnerable, the implications for the blockade are probably overshadowed by other concerns. If anyone has an actually good source about the current state of anti - satellite warfare, I'd really love to see it.

I fear that nuclear escalation would not be favourable to the Allies, even if it was judged to be worth the risks. In Europe, the rationale is clear; the Soviets had the advantage of mass, theatre nuclear weapons directly counter mass; both by direct saturation of enemy forces, and by disruption of their logistics; therefore on balance, NATO has a comparative advantage upon nuclear escalation, so long as the exchange ratio is sufficiently favourable after a Soviet first strike. Whether or not the advantage conferred by the Soviet's opportunity to strike first outweighed NATO's comparative advantage in nuclear ground warfare at any given time is, of course, debatable; but it is clear that, under some conceivable circumstances - such as a Crisis - into - war scenario where there was sufficient time for both sides to disperse - nuclear escalation was a good solution to NATO's problem.

However, nuclear escalation does nothing to solve the problem of China's (or anyone else's) ASBMs. Nuclear weapons would do little to improve targeting of dispersed TELs. Furthermore, given that the ASBM issue is just one component of the overall blockade, we must also consider the impact of nuclear escalation on the PLA's ability to enforce a blockade. Here, nuclear escalation seems to distinctly favour the Red side, because port infrastructure can be destroyed by small numbers of warheads while producing relatively low civilian casualties, furthering Red's overall objective. Compared with blue's reliance on port infrastructure, I can think of no obvious target system which, if attacked by both sides with nuclear weapons, would produce a distinct advantage for blue.

Finally, we must also remember that the enemy gets a vote; if the US threatens nuclear escalation in response to the blockade, China's most rational choice is to pre-empt - an option which is always open to them, since they will be the attacker. In order to break the blockade, blue naval forces must survive; but the PLAN does not need to survive in order to enforce the blockade. Therefore, US naval forces in port seem like an attractive target for a Chinese surprise attack, given that they can be destroyed with a small number of warheads, while producing a relatively small number of civilian casualties. Again, this furthers Red's overall strategic objective of enforcing the blockade. As such, even if nuclear escalation can provide a solution to the blockade problem, the fact remains that in any nuclear war, a surprise attack almost always confers a large advantage; and the attacker, by definition, is the only one who gets to launch a surprise attack.

[thewood1]

There have been two fictional naval books that included ASBM combat that I know of. The Dan Lenson books by David Poyer and the Tipping Point books by John O'Brien. The books are OK from a plot and character perspective, but both have very good and credible modern naval, air, and land combat. I would highly recommend giving them a read. The Lenson books' ASBM is a little dated from an ASBM perspective with advanced SM-2s as the SAM, but still goes into quite bit of detail around the challenges. The Tipping Point books also show the challenges in a different way, but not as much detail.

Both books offer a lot more insight than any PRs and articles you'll find on the web. The short of it is, ASBMs are an unproven threat that is forcing a reaction by the USN. But they aren't a super weapon. Issues with a continuous kill chain, hyperglide sensor blindspots, unknown countermeasures, etc. are all valid issues. I think CMO's depiction of ASBM combat is as accurate as you're going to find (because there isn't anything else out there). Just look at the difficulty in SM-3s and THAADs hitting missiles. It sure looks like it represents how spotty the testing success is in real life and the real dependency is a getting a firing solution worthy of an intercept.

[GeneralVikus]

There have been two fictional naval books that included ASBM combat that I know of. The Dan Lenson books by David Poyer and the Tipping Point books by John O'Brien. The books are OK from a plot and character perspective, but both have very good and credible modern naval, air, and land combat. I would highly recommend giving them a read. The Lenson books' ASBM is a little dated from an ASBM perspective with advanced SM-2s as the SAM, but still goes into quite bit of detail around the challenges. The Tipping Point books also show the challenges in a different way, but not as much detail.

Both books offer a lot more insight than any PRs and articles you'll find on the web. The short of it is, ASBMs are an unproven threat that is forcing a reaction by the USN. But they aren't a super weapon. Issues with a continuous kill chain, hyperglide sensor blindspots, unknown countermeasures, etc. are all valid issues. I think CMO's depiction of ASBM combat is as accurate as you're going to find (because there isn't anything else out there). Just look at the difficulty in SM-3s and THAADs hitting missiles. It sure looks like it represents how spotty the testing success is in real life and the real dependency is a getting a firing solution worthy of an intercept.

Thanks very much for the recommendations. Like anyone here I'm a Clancy fan, but I've never really gotten around to reading any Clancyesque stories from other authors, so I appreciate it.

As far as I can tell, the quality of terminal interceptors is pretty much neither here nor there when it comes to surface naval warfare, correct? Even assuming the ASBM comes in at $50 million a pop, you could still trade 30 of them for a modern destroyer, in which case the ROF and tracking capacity of the destroyer, and above all the tracking range, are more relevant than the kill probability of the terminal missile itself.

[DWReese]

As for the modeling of the DF-26, I think it is pretty accurate. We have two examples of tests of the DF-26. In one instance, China built a massive aircraft carrier shaped target on rails in the deserts of Xinjiang, and fired a DF-26 at it. The missile scored a direct hit, with the hit revealed by Western satellite imagery. The second time, a DF-26 was fired at a target in the South China Sea and successfully hit it, sinking it.


I agree with everything that you said. I was aware of the test, but as I recall, the 'targets' were not moving. (Perhaps the second was being towed at 5 kts, or something.) This brings me to my point: I have tested ABMs in CMO quite a bit. The one thing that seems to be a good defensive maneuver is to change direction, and also speed away from the area as fast as possible. The AI, from what I've seen, doesn't make use of this defensive method. In the game, targets seem to just plug along at the same speed that they were at when the incoming missiles were first detected. The BEST method, in my opinion, is to turn directly TOWARD the missiles and speed toward them. If the missiles were fired from long range; if the speed of the ships is able to move the targets far enough away from where they 'should have been' when the missiles arrive, the ships have a greater chance of the missiles missing because the missiles might overshoot the target.

This movement method, when compared to the actual tests that you mentioned, may mean that the CMO version mirrors that of real life. Drastically changing the target's direction and speed really helps. I sincerely wish that CMO would, at the very least, immediately change the speed to FLANK speed to get away from the expected area of the impact of the incoming missiles. A change of direction would also be advisable, if that could be implemented. I'm sure that these AI changes would help the defense a little bit.

[GeneralVikus]

Thus without extensive anti-satellite warfare, which would eliminate China's ability to target their ASBMs, I'm not sure how the US would ever be able to get carriers or other naval assets into the area without coming under attack.

Regarding your last point - a relatively more lethal anti - satellite environment would also presumably favour the PLA, as targeting information against surface ships can alternatively be provided by aircraft, whereas, according to your description, only satellites can currently provide for an effective defence against the DF-26. Presumably, once the DF-27 is introduced and renders the DF-26 obsolete, satellites will be much less relevant to blue forces as far as the naval war goes, and therefore a lethal ASAT environment will be more favourable to blue. However, if there is no effective defence against HGVs, then a greater or lesser targeting capability for those weapons will be more or less irrelevant - all that matters is that missiles can be replaced much more rapidly than warships.

[GeneralVikus]

This movement method, when compared to the actual tests that you mentioned, may mean that the CMO version mirrors that of real life. Drastically changing the target's direction and speed really helps. I sincerely wish that CMO would, at the very least, immediately change the speed to FLANK speed to get away from the expected area of the impact of the incoming missiles. A change of direction would also be advisable, if that could be implemented. I'm sure that these AI changes would help the defense a little bit.

Thanks for the input!

[TempestII]

There have been two fictional naval books that included ASBM combat that I know of. The Dan Lenson books by David Poyer and the Tipping Point books by John O'Brien. The books are OK from a plot and character perspective, but both have very good and credible modern naval, air, and land combat. I would highly recommend giving them a read. The Lenson books' ASBM is a little dated from an ASBM perspective with advanced SM-2s as the SAM, but still goes into quite bit of detail around the challenges. The Tipping Point books also show the challenges in a different way, but not as much detail.

Both books offer a lot more insight than any PRs and articles you'll find on the web. The short of it is, ASBMs are an unproven threat that is forcing a reaction by the USN. But they aren't a super weapon. Issues with a continuous kill chain, hyperglide sensor blindspots, unknown countermeasures, etc. are all valid issues. I think CMO's depiction of ASBM combat is as accurate as you're going to find (because there isn't anything else out there). Just look at the difficulty in SM-3s and THAADs hitting missiles. It sure looks like it represents how spotty the testing success is in real life and the real dependency is a getting a firing solution worthy of an intercept.

*WARNING - POSSIBLE SPOILERS AHEAD FOR JOHN O'BRIEN'S TIPPING POINT SERIES*

I've been reading through and enjoying the Tipping Point series of books. I think my biggest issue with the John O'Brien's engagement was the 50KW direct energy weapon shooting down the ASBMs.

END OF SPOILERS

Various publications online seem to suggest it'll take at least 300KW to knock out cruise missiles, and potentially over a megawatt to stop hypersonics.

Gunzinger-laser-slides-OK-TO-REPRODUCE.jpg (100.23 KiB) Viewed 1838 times

https://www.sandboxx.us/news/lasers-won ... t)%20laser.

[thewood1]

Hyperglide vehicles are extremely sensitive to even minor damage during the near post-reentry phase. Even slight damage to sensors can lead to significant failures. So on standard cruise missiles, I agree. But for hypergliders, I bet it takes a lot less power.

[SunlitZelkova]

As for the modeling of the DF-26, I think it is pretty accurate. We have two examples of tests of the DF-26. In one instance, China built a massive aircraft carrier shaped target on rails in the deserts of Xinjiang, and fired a DF-26 at it. The missile scored a direct hit, with the hit revealed by Western satellite imagery. The second time, a DF-26 was fired at a target in the South China Sea and successfully hit it, sinking it.


I agree with everything that you said. I was aware of the test, but as I recall, the 'targets' were not moving. (Perhaps the second was being towed at 5 kts, or something.) This brings me to my point: I have tested ABMs in CMO quite a bit. The one thing that seems to be a good defensive maneuver is to change direction, and also speed away from the area as fast as possible. The AI, from what I've seen, doesn't make use of this defensive method. In the game, targets seem to just plug along at the same speed that they were at when the incoming missiles were first detected. The BEST method, in my opinion, is to turn directly TOWARD the missiles and speed toward them. If the missiles were fired from long range; if the speed of the ships is able to move the targets far enough away from where they 'should have been' when the missiles arrive, the ships have a greater chance of the missiles missing because the missiles might overshoot the target.

This movement method, when compared to the actual tests that you mentioned, may mean that the CMO version mirrors that of real life. Drastically changing the target's direction and speed really helps. I sincerely wish that CMO would, at the very least, immediately change the speed to FLANK speed to get away from the expected area of the impact of the incoming missiles. A change of direction would also be advisable, if that could be implemented. I'm sure that these AI changes would help the defense a little bit.

Yeah, even if the target in the desert was moving as many Chinese PLA watchers have claimed, it wasn't turning. And the target in the SCS probably wasn't either. So we don't have much of an idea of whether maneuvering would be helpful or not.

I didn't include satellites in my testing on either side, because I have found so little information on current ASAT capabilities, and therefore I simply have no concept of how vulnerable satellites will be, and the extent to which they can be relied upon by either side. Obviously, if geosynchronous satellites are currently vulnerable, the implications for the blockade are probably overshadowed by other concerns. If anyone has an actually good source about the current state of anti - satellite warfare, I'd really love to see it.

Geostationary satellites are not vulnerable, no GEO interceptors exist. Only ones in LEO are.

Note that China's sole direct ascent (Earth launched) ASAT weapon is based on the DF-21 missile, so it would definitely be detected by the satellite being targeted. This would break the element of surprise and allow Aegis ships to get their radars turned on prior to the launch of the DF-26s.

However, nuclear escalation does nothing to solve the problem of China's (or anyone else's) ASBMs. Nuclear weapons would do little to improve targeting of dispersed TELs. Furthermore, given that the ASBM issue is just one component of the overall blockade, we must also consider the impact of nuclear escalation on the PLA's ability to enforce a blockade. Here, nuclear escalation seems to distinctly favour the Red side, because port infrastructure can be destroyed by small numbers of warheads while producing relatively low civilian casualties, furthering Red's overall objective. Compared with blue's reliance on port infrastructure, I can think of no obvious target system which, if attacked by both sides with nuclear weapons, would produce a distinct advantage for blue.

What I was thinking in terms of a hypothetical nuclear response was attacking China's naval and air bases. I've spent a lot of time combing over these sites on Google maps and most of them are near sizable cities, and therefore there would be large civilian casualties.

The purpose of a nuclear attack would be to offset the weakness of US and Japanese conventional forces in a fight against the better positioned Chinese Navy. It would also be a cheap answer to countering China's mass number of conventional ballistic missiles.

I personally favor a nuclear response because I believe China's ballistic missile capability may be so powerful as to effectively be on par with a nuclear strike, especially considering how concentrated Japanese and American forces are into a small number of bases.

Finally, we must also remember that the enemy gets a vote; if the US threatens nuclear escalation in response to the blockade, China's most rational choice is to pre-empt - an option which is always open to them, since they will be the attacker. In order to break the blockade, blue naval forces must survive; but the PLAN does not need to survive in order to enforce the blockade. Therefore, US naval forces in port seem like an attractive target for a Chinese surprise attack, given that they can be destroyed with a small number of warheads, while producing a relatively small number of civilian casualties. Again, this furthers Red's overall strategic objective of enforcing the blockade. As such, even if nuclear escalation can provide a solution to the blockade problem, the fact remains that in any nuclear war, a surprise attack almost always confers a large advantage; and the attacker, by definition, is the only one who gets to launch a surprise attack.

The rational behind a nuclear response is not "warfighting" but deterrence. In all likelihood, an American nuclear response to a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would result in a full scale nuclear exchange between the two.

Just as West Germany would not realistically be "defended" by the use of a nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact assault- West Germany, and the US, would cease to exist- neither would Taiwan be defended- Taiwan, China, and the US will all be annihilated. Instead, the fear of mutually assured destruction should prevent either side from trying to break the status quo and keep the peace in the region, just as mutually assured destruction made a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe untenable and any NATO attempts to destabilize the Eastern Bloc futile.

[thewood1]

The interesting side effect of China forcing the US to heavily invest in ABM capabilities is that it might upset the nuclear deterrence angle. Its why ABM was always in the Soviet-US treaties. It can completely screw up the balance of power.

[thewood1]

About 2/3 of the way in is a section on ASBMs.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv2C6EZW3Oc

Nothing new, but still interesting and puts some of it in perspective.

[Denixen]

This is going to be a bit of an essay I apologize for that, but I have been thinking a lot about this before.

My 50 cents would be that regardless of how good the ASBMs are, you cannot hit what you cannot see. Using fighters from islands together with tankers and fighters from aircraft carriers, US could keep any surface radar capable planes well away from their carrier, or at least prevent a continuous tracking.

In the case that a ASBM is shot, it will only hit if the carrier is at the location it expects it to be and within its sensor range.

Say that the carrier is spotted by a satellite (which assumes they have survived this long, after the war is started satellites would quickly be destroyed by both sides, but let's say this is at the very start of the conflict) or that a lucky plane spot them using radar, the USN will be well aware that a satellite passed over them and saw them or that the radar plane spotted them and would immediate change course. As a matter of fact, I would imagine that in a dawn-of-war situation, they would always take evasive actions when they know a satellite or plane might spot them.

By the time the ASBM actually arrives to the area it was designated to go to and activates its radar, the carrier fleet will already be somewhere else where they didn't expect them and depending on how fast the kill chain is (Minutes? Hours? Days?), the ASBM will not detect the fleet if it is out of range of its radar.

This kind of evasive maneuvers by USN was the book Red Storm Rising by Tom Clancy (a must read for anyone who plays CMO and plays around with naval and air warfare), where they knew the orbit of soviet radar satellites and after they allowed it to detect them, they shot it down and then changed course, thus when the soviets tried to attack them in the location where they expected them to be hours later, they failed since the USN carrier fleet had changed course and where actually somewhere else.

If I was a USN admiral I would do the same. Let the Chinese satellite pass over. Once it is out of range or shot down, I would change course and head that direction at max speed (lets say 30-35 knots). If they fire an ASBM at the location they expect the carrier to be and it arrives an hour later (which I don't think is unreasonable, perhaps even generous) the USN fleet would be up to 40 miles away from where the ASBM is looking for them. I don't know how broad the sensor range is, but it could be enough for the carrier fleet to not be detected.

The weakness would be in a dawn-of-war situation, where the war has not yet started. Then a Chinese plane could continuously track the fleet, since US fighters would not yet chase it away or shoot it down.

Although in CMO an ASBM can be fired seconds after a fleet is detected, in IRL there is likely a delay.

• They have to ensure that the target is what they expect it to be (is it a Philippinian fishing ship, a civilian freight ship, a USN cargo ship or a carrier?)

• What is the priority of the target?

• Is it worth firing the ASBM (depends on target)?

• Do they wait for a better opportunity (perhaps lost track soon after detection)?

• The readiness of the ASBM unit needs to be high and be able to act immediately.

• Through how many chains of command does the information and decision have to go through?

• How fast can the info be acted on?

We know from the Russo-ukrainian conflict that the time to strike can sometimes be days and bombing have occurred on locations where the unit moved away from over a day ago.

How well drilled in the chinese armed forces in these combined arms operations? Unknown of course, but I am sure USN has a fairly good idea.

[Denixen]

I did some testing to get some CMO stats to support my previous argument that target info is a crucial part of the success of an ASBM strike.

The range at which a Gerald R. Ford class carrier can be detected by the two main chinese AWACS (that I am aware of) at about (give and take a few nm):
KJ-500A - 225 nm
KJ-600 - 175 nm

This is well within range of fighters like F/A-18E or F-35C, especially if armed with JATM (120 nm range in CMO).
Likely these AWACS wouldn't be allowed within hundreds of nms.

Second thing is that it takes a long time for the ASBMs to travel to target:
DF-21D - Time to target: 14 min 18 sec at 1048 nm distance (almost max range)
DF-26D - Time to target: 20 min 18 sec at 2098 nm distance(almost max range)

and due to how ballistic arcs works (they get lofted higher and travels slower at the peak of their ballistic arc), long range ASBMs like DF-26D actually take even longer for closer targets:
DF-26D Time to target: 25 min 52 sec at 1048 nm distance

Naturally, the sensors on these ballistic missiles likely take this into account, but if you on top of that have a lead of an hour before they are fired, you have a lot of time to move out of target area. Again this delay may also have been accounted for by PLA, to some degree, in design of the missiles. Or maybe not.

Furthermore, I tried to experiment with what would happen if I gave the carrier an hour lead to move away from last known location (AWACS is allowed to detect it, then I disable radar and let time run for one hour), but you cannot even launch the DF-21D or DF-26D if the target cross-range ambiguity is larger than 0 nm, which starts happening after about 26 min of no contact.

Meaning the DF-21D and DF-26D must be fired with 26 min of last contact, which is a very very tight window IRL... Not impossible but difficult.

In addition, I found it actually kinda difficult to hit a carrier with DF-21D and DF-26D, they are quite often deflected by point defence missiles (ESSM or RAM) and malfunction or spoofed by jammer and this is with the carriers radar off and no escorts to warn it. With escorts it would probably be even harder.

Even with a single carrier with radars off, I usually had to fire at least three DF-21Ds to get a hit, most are spoofed or deflected and malfunction.

This means that you wouldn't fire ASBMs at just any warship or cargo ship, you would want to have a high value target and send loads of ASBMs. If you fire ASBMs on every cargo ship on the way to Taiwan you will run out and maybe not have any ready to strike a carrier at the rare chance that you get good enough targeting data to fire at one.

I would love to know more about OPs exact setup and how ASBM defence was tested, because in my experience ASBM are not that effective.

[thewood1]

I think the plan for China is to fire dozens at one CVBG. I am pretty sure the plan is overwhelm any defense.

[Denixen]

I think the plan for China is to fire dozens at one CVBG. I am pretty sure the plan is overwhelm any defense.

Which would work the first time, but after that the USN would adapt and deny China any info on the location of their fleets. In that way it is a on-hit-wonder, it works well in the grey zone between war and peace, but once the gloves are off I don't think PLA will be able to do it again. USN would adapt similar to how USN did against the soviets in Red Storm Rising. it is so heavily dependent on good targeting info.

US would shoot down any AWACS that sniffs outside the Chinese coast and shoot down all known Chinese Reconnaissance satellites (as would probably China vis-à-vis Western Reconnaissance satellites that is within range).

I guess whether ASBM are effective is a matter of context and perspective. Give how expensive a Gerald R. Ford carrier is and the aircraft on it, losing a single one is a massive loss, which US would have to account for when deciding whether to defend Taiwan.

[thewood1]

Double post.

[thewood1]

China also has to be careful. Last I heard the DF-26 is about $15M-$20M per missile. I think they have about 150 of them. My last playthrough it took over 20 to land one on an escorted CVN. Thats $300M for a CVN. Still not a completely even trade, but if its an older Nimitz CVN, now you might be talking the same scale.

The ASBMs are more a deterrent threat to deny CVNs easy access to SCS. Once they are either shot off or proven to be less than effective, thats a sunk cost at the scale of multiple CVNs for China. Of course a lost carrier includes millions of $ of aircraft and a cost in morale.

[GeneralVikus]

I did some testing to get some CMO stats to support my previous argument that target info is a crucial part of the success of an ASBM strike.

Avoiding detection by aircraft is of course possible, but it is not so easy that naval assets can expect to never be detected while escorting or otherwise supporting slow convoys for months on end. Swarms of drones or other low -value aircraft, backed up by large fighter sweeps, are probably a bigger problem for a carrier than a lone AEW aircraft, because they can simply overwhelm the CAP by weight of numbers. The most likely egress route for any air raid is probably the gap between Kyushu and Taiwan, since only a couple of bases on Okinawa need to be suppressed to open that corridor.

The inflation adjusted cost of the Pershing II is about $20 million, and the new Sentinel ICBM costs $120 million, so let's conservatively assume than a DF-26 costs no more than $50 million. That means you can afford to trade 28 of them for a modern Burke class destroyer, which costs $1,400 million, or about 4-5 for a Very Large Crude Carrier carrying 320,000 DWT of oil (the ship costs about $120 million, and 320,000 tons of oil costs about $100 million.) For a $10,000 million CV, you can trade 200 missiles. In fact, all else being equal you can actually trade more; because tankers and warships are long - lead items which take years to build no matter how much money you pour into them, whereas missiles can be mass produced and therefore replaced much more quickly. If we go with a $25 million cost estimate, you can trade 56 missiles for a destroyer, 8 - 10 for a tanker, or 400 for a carrier.

Naturally, missile manufacturing facilities are highly concentrated and therefore highly vulnerable to attack by even conventional weapons, and therein lies a key US advantage - US production facilities are much harder to attack with conventional weapons. On the other hand, the shipyards of Japan and Korea are equally vulnerable. Either way, I think China will likely have to rely on missiles available at the outset of a conflict; but I see no reason why there couldn't be many more missiles than there appear to be, because ASBMs (unlike nuclear armed missiles) do not need to all be held in readiness to fire - there is no problem with storing large numbers of reloads in bunkers, so long as the war remains conventional, and there is a great advantage to be had in deceiving the enemy as to the quantity of missiles, since defending against conventional ASBMs requires filling VLS tubes with SM-3s, which are useless against all other threats.

Clearly, while large tankers and container ships carrying valuable military cargoes are profitable targets for ASBMs, other cargo ships are not. However, all major surface combatants are profitable targets; and if you strip away the escorts, the cargo ships can obviously be sunk by all other means. This is what I mean when I say that ASBMs can be used to enforce a blockade.

My DF-26D test setup was as follows:



No satellites were used on either side, the target was always the ship in the back, which was auto - detected. The SAMs are Aegis Ashore and THAAD batteries, which provided the ships with warning, but did not help to defeat the missiles. I believe China now has geostationary detection satellites with both radar and optical sensors; so if the satellites which the US relies upon for missile defence are safe from attack, then China is equally secure in its ability to detect surface targets and track them until impact, and does not need to rely upon aircraft to target its ASBMs.

Hence, the problem is that if the allies can defend their warships, those warships cannot hide; whereas if the warships can hide, then defence is impossible, and therefore destruction is only a matter of time.

I am sceptical of the 'delay before firing' argument. Clearly reducing reaction time is not easy, but it is doable; for instance, aircraft and missiles on alert against a theatre ballistic missile attack in Europe, or US strategic bombers on alert for a submarine attack, had to launch on six minutes' notice, if I recall correctly - this was forty years ago, and involved crews running to their aircraft, starting them up, taxiing and taking off. I do not see why responding to a detection and classification of a naval target should be so much harder than responding to detection and classification of an inbound missile, especially if modern AI is involved.