Turn 23. May/June 1943. Allied #1.
PTO Carrier & Sub Raiding Task Forces.
• Next, I moved to the Pacific, formed up and moved out my Carrier and Sub raiding task forces.
• Specifically, after looking at the situation I decided to go after IJN oil, CPs and possibly Sea Lift in the South China Sea and Singapore.
• The US used 2 of their 3 air mission during naval air, saving one for the PBY in the Philippines to strat bomb the Tarkan NEI Oil, which is barley in range.
• Japan has no fighter units in range, even if they flew CAP, to cover, which means the US has a 40% chance of knocking out 1 of 4 precious Japanese Oil points.
• The USN assembles and sends an impressive 11 ships (6 CVs, 2 BBs, 3 CAs) carrier attack force in the China Sea 4-box.
• 3 of the 7 CAGs have a (one) strat factor meaning if the USN remains, these CAGs are flipped or lost then the US can launch follow up strategic raids also against NEI oil.
• Also, the USN hopes to a chance again the 2 IJN 2 TRS Gps in Singapore, either via intercept or port strike.
• I also send in a NEI (CW controlled) and Free Free Sub Gp to 3 & 4-box, respectively.
• They didn’t have the range to reach the China Sea and will be useful in following impulses to allow the US to a land and still attempt naval combat using one of these sub Gps (CW or FF) to search.
• They will NOT be included in this impulse naval search or combat in the South China Sea.
• Even if the USN doesn’t find the threat of a port strike will most likely require the IJN to take a combine; taking some pressure off of China at least for the next impulse.
• In addition to NEI oil the 2 unescorted IJN CPs are prime targets for the USN.
• USN & CW Sub Gps are sent to raid both the China Sea & Sea of Japan with the objective of sinking/aborting as many IJN CPs as possible.
• The best, most optimistic outlook which is possible but probably below average is knocking out all IJN CPs in these three sea areas and breaking their supply to China and everywhere else outside of Japan.
• I’d like to point out that as I write this, as opposed to previous turns where I did an entire turn dump at once, I have not resolved naval combat. I write this at the completion of the allied naval moves and before such combat.
• The IJN has 2 carrier groups (3 CVs, 1 CVL), BBs (including Yamamoto & Mushai) and several CAs in Fukuoka that represent a significant firepower and threat to the USN in the Bismarck Sea if ignored.
• It’s imperative for the USN to maintain control and supply through, so the USN formed and sent out to the 4-box a 2 Carrier, 3 BB, 2 TRS Gp task force. In the 3-box they sent out battleships, TRS task force which had to go without fighter cover due to wanting to save 1 air mission for a strat of the Japanese controlled NEI oil at Tarkan.
• That’s a risk the US considers acceptable and in fact the USN wouldn’t mind an IJN sorite and a attritional engagement between their Bismarck Sea task forces and the IJN warships in port (reserve).
• The risk is an unfavorable search split and loss of sea lift with troops aboard.
• A risk that’s acceptable the US Pacific Commands and Commanders; but not necessarily to the seamen, marines and soldiers at sea in the Bismarck Sea.

- 01-AL-PTO-NM-South-China-Sea.png (1.53 MiB) Viewed 401 times

- 01-AL-PTO-NM-China-Sea-Sea-of-Japan.png (1.63 MiB) Viewed 401 times

- 01-AL-PTO-NM-Bismarck-Sea.png (977.89 KiB) Viewed 401 times