night torpedo attack

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

ORIGINAL: spence

On that side of the date line, the war started on Dec. 8th

however I figure their bombing was extraordinary in the extreme to have inflicted 50% damage on the port (IIRC) preventing fortification in the game. IRL the British did next to nothing to fortify the island of Singapore until "the enemy was at the gates". In the game the Allied Player is saddled with some seriously stupid peacetime attitudes for multiple turns.

A bit off topic because the 50% damage is a game feature, but there were some reasons Singapore was not properly fortified; at leasy from Percival's perspective (attached a link to his book on Malaya; quite a good read, and it is free)

https://thewarinmalaya.wordpress.com/

so from Perival's War on Malaya:
"The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base —not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy’s weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that. As has already been stated, the expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available."

Interesting. However, I hate it when there is an apparent error since it appears to be a sloppy work and thus may not be accurate. See if you can find any error here:

Early that morning almost a hundred Mitsubishi G3M and G4M twin-engined bombers, later code named “Nell” and “Sally” took off from bases in Indochina in search of Force Z.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

Yes, but important to mention the error was made by the foreword writer, Allen Parfitt; not by Percival

and of course, Sally, Betty or Nell were American nicknames, maybe British writers were less used to them

[RangerJoe]

Yes, but reading the first part of the book there is a reference to a potential problem with General Dobbies religion (there was none) with no comment about the religion other than that. I had to look up the religion to see what it was. Either mention the religion but since there was no problem, don't even mention it. I realize that it was a different era, but still it is annoying.

Just like a book I read about the Dolittle Raiders that mentioned a Japanese torpedo that was 2 feet long and could travel 24 miles. Irritating to me.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

It also had some condescending or colonialist thoughts like:

"It is a great pity that the Japanese commanders allowed, and sometimes even ordered, the atrocities which were committed by their officers and men, but that again may be due in some measure to lack of time, since their country emerged from its isolation, in which to absorb fully the accepted doctrines of civilization."

but those attitudes, and some other errors are inevitable when you read from primary sources

[RangerJoe]

In the Philipines, apparently Colonel Tsuji Masanobu contacted Japanese units after the Bataan surrender to kill their prisoners. Some did, most did not, some even let their prisoners go. I believe General Homma had no knowledge of this but I am not sure. He escaped after the war and was never tried for war crimes.

Still, it was a different era and a different culture.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

ORIGINAL: spence

On that side of the date line, the war started on Dec. 8th

however I figure their bombing was extraordinary in the extreme to have inflicted 50% damage on the port (IIRC) preventing fortification in the game. IRL the British did next to nothing to fortify the island of Singapore until "the enemy was at the gates". In the game the Allied Player is saddled with some seriously stupid peacetime attitudes for multiple turns.

A bit off topic because the 50% damage is a game feature, but there were some reasons Singapore was not properly fortified; at leasy from Percival's perspective (attached a link to his book on Malaya; quite a good read, and it is free)

https://thewarinmalaya.wordpress.com/

so from Perival's War on Malaya:
"The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base —not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy’s weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that. As has already been stated, the expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available."

Yeah, a lot of people forget that WWII came at the heels of the Great Depression. No one had enough money for anything in the Democratic countries. Further, Great Britain, while certainly concerned about it Far East Jewels, had just recently withstood a threat of invasion of its homeland. Finally, the cost of constructing defenses in Asia was enormous and to what end? They didn't have the forces to man them anyway. No point constructing another Maginot line unless you can actually man the defenses …

Just my opinion...

[Alfred]

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury



... A bit off topic because the 50% damage is a game feature, but there were some reasons Singapore was not properly fortified; at leasy from Percival's perspective (attached a link to his book on Malaya; quite a good read, and it is free)

https://thewarinmalaya.wordpress.com/

so from Perival's War on Malaya:
"The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base —not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy’s weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that. As has already been stated, the expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available."

The above quote doesn't come close to explaining the restrictions which were imposed upon Percival before and during the Malayan campaign.

1. Throughout the whole of Malaya, not just in Singapore itself, any defensive preparation which cost 500 pounds (includes capital and labour costs) had to be approved by the civilian Governor.

2. The Governor was under strict instructions that nothing was to be entertained if it impacted adversely upon the colony's rubber production. This meant that no local civilian labour could be diverted from rubber production and processing to military preparations. No labour employed on the rubber plantations, no labour employed to transport rubber to the docks, no stevedoring labour; none could be used for military purposes. Nor could rubber trees be cut down to provide fields of fire for artillery (the one thing which doctrinally the British army post WWI overly relied upon to hold ground), nor roads cut through the plantations.

3. As a result of 1 and 2 above, Percival was forced to use the untrained Indian soldiers to build military infrastructure. This in turn meant that necessary military training needs could not be met.

Alfred

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Alfred

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury



... A bit off topic because the 50% damage is a game feature, but there were some reasons Singapore was not properly fortified; at leasy from Percival's perspective (attached a link to his book on Malaya; quite a good read, and it is free)

https://thewarinmalaya.wordpress.com/

so from Perival's War on Malaya:
"The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base —not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy’s weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that. As has already been stated, the expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available."

The above quote doesn't come close to explaining the restrictions which were imposed upon Percival before and during the Malayan campaign.

1. Throughout the whole of Malaya, not just in Singapore itself, any defensive preparation which cost 500 pounds (includes capital and labour costs) had to be approved by the civilian Governor.

2. The Governor was under strict instructions that nothing was to be entertained if it impacted adversely upon the colony's rubber production. This meant that no local civilian labour could be diverted from rubber production and processing to military preparations. No labour employed on the rubber plantations, no labour employed to transport rubber to the docks, no stevedoring labour; none could be used for military purposes. Nor could rubber trees be cut down to provide fields of fire for artillery (the one thing which doctrinally the British army post WWI overly relied upon to hold ground), nor roads cut through the plantations.

3. As a result of 1 and 2 above, Percival was forced to use the untrained Indian soldiers to build military infrastructure. This in turn meant that necessary military training needs could not be met.

Alfred

[X(][&:]

[rustysi]

They can be very effective, particularly as initial attacks as they will drain a lot of AA supply (ships shoot blindly using up incredible amounts of ordnance.

IRL U.S. carriers did not fire at night torp attacks, so as not to give their position away.

[RangerJoe]

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

ORIGINAL: spence


however I figure their bombing was extraordinary in the extreme to have inflicted 50% damage on the port (IIRC) preventing fortification in the game. IRL the British did next to nothing to fortify the island of Singapore until "the enemy was at the gates". In the game the Allied Player is saddled with some seriously stupid peacetime attitudes for multiple turns.

A bit off topic because the 50% damage is a game feature, but there were some reasons Singapore was not properly fortified; at leasy from Percival's perspective (attached a link to his book on Malaya; quite a good read, and it is free)

https://thewarinmalaya.wordpress.com/

so from Perival's War on Malaya:
"The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base —not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy’s weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that. As has already been stated, the expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available."

Yeah, a lot of people forget that WWII came at the heels of the Great Depression. No one had enough money for anything in the Democratic countries. Further, Great Britain, while certainly concerned about it Far East Jewels, had just recently withstood a threat of invasion of its homeland. Finally, the cost of constructing defenses in Asia was enormous and to what end? They didn't have the forces to man them anyway. No point constructing another Maginot line unless you can actually man the defenses …

Just my opinion...

They did have the manpower but not enough equipment. Poor and indecisive leadership, and I will actually agree with Alfred on the poor training.

Just think if there was just one squadron of Matildas to stop the Japanese tanks.

[PaxMondo]

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: PaxMondo

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury





A bit off topic because the 50% damage is a game feature, but there were some reasons Singapore was not properly fortified; at leasy from Percival's perspective (attached a link to his book on Malaya; quite a good read, and it is free)

https://thewarinmalaya.wordpress.com/

so from Perival's War on Malaya:
"The fact that no defences had been constructed on the north and west coasts of the island in pre-war days, and only limited defences even after the war started, has been the subject of much critical comment even in the highest quarters. It has been imputed to a lack of foresight on the part of successive general officers commanding. Such criticism is most unjust. In the first place, general officers commanding had no authority to construct defences when or where they liked. The defences of Singapore were built up in accordance with a War Office plan, though of course recommendations of the local commander always received consideration. Then there was the question of the object of the defences. It was quite definitely the protection of the Naval Base —not the defence of Singapore Island. Now a very ordinary principle of warfare is that you site your defence in advance of the object to be protected; the distance in advance depends upon the range of the enemy’s weapons and increases as that range becomes greater. The Naval Base itself lies on the north shore of Singapore Island, and it would have been sheer folly to have sited the defences also on the shores of that island allowing the enemy to bomb, shell, and machine-gun the Naval Base at will. It would have been very nice no doubt to have had defences there in addition to those up-country, but finance prohibited that. As has already been stated, the expenditure on the defences in Malaya was always strictly controlled from home, and such money as was made available, apart from the defences on the south coast of the fortress, was of course spent, and quite rightly so, on defence works on the mainland. Even for these works there was never sufficient money available."

Yeah, a lot of people forget that WWII came at the heels of the Great Depression. No one had enough money for anything in the Democratic countries. Further, Great Britain, while certainly concerned about it Far East Jewels, had just recently withstood a threat of invasion of its homeland. Finally, the cost of constructing defenses in Asia was enormous and to what end? They didn't have the forces to man them anyway. No point constructing another Maginot line unless you can actually man the defenses …

Just my opinion...

They did have the manpower but not enough equipment. Poor and indecisive leadership, and I will actually agree with Alfred on the poor training.

Just think if there was just one squadron of Matildas to stop the Japanese tanks.

Yeah, I should have included equipment as well, meaning guns etc. But again, it all came down to trying to save the homeland … no easy choices there at all. Even if you bump the Singers forts up to 6 … the IJ has enough of everything to still take it. Without the ability to re-supply, no bastion can be held in WWII. Bataan falls, Singers falls, HK falls, CK falls … With hindsight, I have to agree with the GB decision to maximize production as long as they could. Tough call, but Singers could not be held. Its like my current test game with respect to Colombo; I know I can't hold it. I can't match the IJ naval and air assets, so no matter what I do it will fall eventually. All I can do is make it expensive and take it back 18 - 24 months later when I can control the sea and air lanes. Sad, Hard truth.

Just my thoughts...

[derwho]

Has anybody actually witnessed a night time torpedo bombing attack by the IJN?

I'm flying several squadrons of Nell's and Betty's at night with torpedos but they for some reason only attack with normal bombs (and never score a hit, even at ships in a harbour sitting there as static bait).

And all the normal stuff is correct: I have a HQa with torps, the base has over 20,000 supply & a Lv7 airfield - and my leaders have high air & aggression. I'm flying night time search from the same base with Mavises.

[Yaab]

Yes, here:
https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/view ... 3#p5178053

In the last seven years, I restarted the GC nineteen times as the Allies. Say 20 times x 5-6 turns until my DDs have to evac from captured HK = 100-120 turns.
This is the first time I see a night torpedo attack from IJN around HK.

[derwho]

Thanks Yaab.

I thought I was chasing a unicorn.

[Yaab]

I think your IJN air group average exp should be 70 exp. Weed out those pilots with worst experience, try adding best pilots form other groups. Or, I guess, you could divide your air group into A/B/C, and put 6-9 best pilots in wing A. Should be enough to fly a night mission with an ultra-experienced air wing A.

EDIT: Come to think of it, you probably need also Clear weather during a night (no clouds) and 90% moonlight. Pilots have to drop down low to deliver those torpedoes. Uhm, in my example weather was Heavy Rain? Go figure. Brave people, those pilots.

[Chris21wen]

I reapeat what I said in a previous post.

Port attacks, hence attacks on anchored ships rarely use torps.

To attack a TF you have to find then first which is extremely difficult to do at night. All-in-all in doesn't surprise me that you have not seen or maybe not noticed torpedo attacks at night. Even if the search ac did find it, the bomber unit also has to, it's just a lot easier. I suspect you could use 100% exp group and still not find a TF park even 2 hexes away even as much as 1:100. Hens have more teeth than night naval attacks.