A Unit's Location and Whereabouts/Satellites

[DWReese]

In playing with this simulation it is obvious that units that don't see the enemy (or its weapons) until they are almost right in front of them are at a huge disadvantage. I have tested this many times. The OODA restricts the response, and is often when it's too late to really respond. It's almost as if the radar would be on, thus giving them some knowledge, then they have a much better chance to survive an attack rather than trying to float around and hope the the enemy never sees you. But, how real is that? I don't know.

For example, if China and the US were about to engage in battle. or continue a battle, I believe that there would be all kinds of satellites overhead and those would be able to direct/advise the units as to where the enemy is. Am I wrong? I read a few years ago that there were over 23,000 satellites circling the planet. I've even heard that it's close to 30,000 now. I don't know if those figures are true, but if they are anywhere near that number, then I would imagine that China and the US would own a bunch of them, and could position them to be overhead to monitor the enemy prior to having any shots being fired.

Would physical surveillance really be all that necessary if both sides have used their satellites to locate their enemy? Again, I don't know the answer to this question, and I'm hoping to hear from others who do have some knowledge about this. Knowing that an enemy SAG is 600 miles north of you and heading south, is probably all that you would actually need to be able to arrange an attack (or defense), if you so desired.

So, if these two enemy groups were heading toward each other from a range of about 600 miles away, would it even be beneficial to keep your radars off? You already know where the enemy ships are, so it would seem to be a little crazy to go blind when a surprise attack could have devastating results if one side is caught with their pants down.

I'd love to hear your thoughts.

[MauriceB]

Knowing something is out there is a far cry from a fire control solution.

Much, MUCH, can be said about this topic. Here's an article I found that had some interesting thoughts on Detection and Localization issues of a modern Task Force:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech ... 0a%20time.

[Nikel]

Military sats by country, data from 2023 despite the title.

No idea if it is correct.

Note that the source has a political agenda.


https://worldpopulationreview.com/count ... by-country

[thewood1]

Knowing something is out there is a far cry from a fire control solution.

Much, MUCH, can be said about this topic. Here's an article I found that had some interesting thoughts on Detection and Localization issues of a modern Task Force:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech ... 0a%20time.

One of the best articles I have seen posted on this forum. Thank you. Would be interesting to employ some of these tactics in CMO.

[DWReese]

The article was excellent. It is very comprehensive. But, it is also over 25 years old. While most of the principles are likely similar, much has changed over the last 25 years. In particular, as I previously mentioned, the number of satellites up above. I would assume that this would change many things from a tactical perspective. Again, as I said before, I don't know the answer to this. I am just throwing this out there for discussion.

I set up a simple scenario whereby a SAG was being attacked. The defending group was small, it had two HV units, and some good SAM ships.

The first attack was conducted with the SAG being completely blind. With no idea that it was being attacked before it passively picked up the existence of the attackers, the group was essentially wiped out. While the last-minute detection did occur, the SAG could not react in time because of OODA. The SAMs simply couldn't get off enough shots to keep the HV ships from being destroyed.

The second attack was done in the opposite manner---everything was lit like a Christmas Tree. The SAMs, of course, had no problem detecting the attack, and with no OODA to deal with because they had ample advanced warning, they were able to defeat the attack without a scratch.

Had we been playing with the old Harpoon rules, or the original CMANO rules, which didn't have OODA to deal with, then things would have been different for the first example. But, OODA is obviously more realistic, and we are seeking realism, so it seems as though the OODA is here to stay.

It's also obvious that actual tactics need to be employed if we are seeking realism. What is realism, and which tactics should be employed, is something that I don't know the answer?

[DWReese]

Nikel,

Thanks for the article on the number of satellites. Those numbers look more realistic to me.

That said, what I was told was that each of the satellites, especially the governmental and military ones, are performing numerous functions at the same time. One portion could be pointed here, and another pointed there, all while still performing the original observation. So, you could have as many as X-number of observations occurring at the same time, each pointed at different locales. I'm not a satellite guy, but it does seem that that would also make more sense.

I've been playing a lot of user-created scenarios (like those from the Community Pack) and many of those have satellites in them. I was never big into those, usually playing scenarios without them, when it occurred to me that units from both sides seem to have satellites sweeping over head every few minutes. The satellites constantly seem to providing updates as to the existence of forces on both sides, so I would have to assume that this is what truly happens.

For this reason, it got me thinking that it would be almost impossible to hide. It's true, you probably can't use a satellite for targeting the enemy, but it could certainly provide enough data to the units advising them that they are being watched, and that their presence is known. And, if their presence is already known, then it serves no purpose to "run blind" any longer. So, perhaps it's time to light things up.

Again, I don't the answer to this, but it's at least a topic for discussion.

[Nikel]

Sure, the governments sats will do who knows what .

Asked the Ai to generate a table, explaining GEO and NGSO advantages and disadvantages.

You may see both while playing CMO.

SatsC.png (76.27 KiB) Viewed 1022 times

GEO SBIRS sats detecting the launch of a ballistic missile. The sats apparently do not move.

GEO.gif (334.19 KiB) Viewed 1022 times

And a NGSO example in Hail Mary scenario, discovering Chinese units. However when the sat is gone the info is already outdated for the mobile units, that can change their position.

NGSO.gif (5.74 MiB) Viewed 1018 times

The good part is that they can also be destroyed

SD.png (4.61 KiB) Viewed 1015 times

[SunlitZelkova]

In playing with this simulation it is obvious that units that don't see the enemy (or its weapons) until they are almost right in front of them are at a huge disadvantage. I have tested this many times. The OODA restricts the response, and is often when it's too late to really respond. It's almost as if the radar would be on, thus giving them some knowledge, then they have a much better chance to survive an attack rather than trying to float around and hope the the enemy never sees you. But, how real is that? I don't know.

For example, if China and the US were about to engage in battle. or continue a battle, I believe that there would be all kinds of satellites overhead and those would be able to direct/advise the units as to where the enemy is. Am I wrong? I read a few years ago that there were over 23,000 satellites circling the planet. I've even heard that it's close to 30,000 now. I don't know if those figures are true, but if they are anywhere near that number, then I would imagine that China and the US would own a bunch of them, and could position them to be overhead to monitor the enemy prior to having any shots being fired.

Would physical surveillance really be all that necessary if both sides have used their satellites to locate their enemy? Again, I don't know the answer to this question, and I'm hoping to hear from others who do have some knowledge about this. Knowing that an enemy SAG is 600 miles north of you and heading south, is probably all that you would actually need to be able to arrange an attack (or defense), if you so desired.

So, if these two enemy groups were heading toward each other from a range of about 600 miles away, would it even be beneficial to keep your radars off? You already know where the enemy ships are, so it would seem to be a little crazy to go blind when a surprise attack could have devastating results if one side is caught with their pants down.

I'd love to hear your thoughts.

Here is an article detailing China's satellites for maritime surveillance. It was posted in 2016 but if you look at the satellite data it was updated as recently as 2021. Most sats launched since then are likely just replacements for ones that have run out of fuel over time so the info should still be relevant.

https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/0 ... ce-system/

In terms of whether it makes sense to keep radar on or off—yes and no.

Yes, but not on ships. In a real high-end surface engagement, a task force would never sail into a high threat environment without air cover. Surface combatants would have radar "on" in the form of AWACS aircraft over head/nearby, and fighters would be present to guard both the ships and AWACS aircraft. AWACS aircraft are not only more survivable, but more efficient: because they are at altitude they can detect incoming targets at much greater distances than a typical surface-based radar.

No, on ships. This is because even if satellites are able to determine the general location of a task force, *at least in CMO* they generally have a hard time getting an accurate fix on ships. However, *at least in CMO* any surface unit that turns radars on can generally be located with pinpoint accuracy provided there are multiple ELINT satellites to help triangulate the signals. ELINT aircraft and ELINT stations onshore also play into this.

[Fido81]

I used to work on satellites for a living (as a civilian, but some were for defense industry customers), so I've got a few thoughts.

C:MO abstracts away a lot of the communications lag, including in space assets. From first hand experience - satellites can get better image resolution at lower altitudes, but at lower altitudes they see less of the world at a time. In order for a satellite to provide useful data to a defense customer (to say nothing of them using it operationally) the satellite has to be commanded to watch an area while in contact with the ground, then it has to wait to pass over the area, then maybe it sees something interesting, then it waits until it can talk to a ground station directly or through a relay satellite, and then it downlinks the data to the ground. That is not always an instantaneous process in real life, which probably impacts the extent to which a spacecraft should be used to cue attacks.

It sounds like the situation in the US has improved over time; apparently the National Reconnaissance Office
used most of the time on TDRSS (a satellite constellation originally designed to provide real-time comms with major NASA programs like the Space Shuttle) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tracking_ ... plications.

This also doesn't appear to have just been a US issue. I've seen sources claim that Soviet Naval Aviation was not excited about committing to a regiment-sized attack solely on the basis of a satellite cue. Here's one - https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/v ... nwc-review.

One last point that I haven't seen come up in the conversation yet is the issue of the duty cycle. Satellites have an extremely limited power budget, which means that many satellites cannot run their payload sensors continuously. Synthetic Aperture Radar spacecraft, which can take pictures through weather and at night, are notoriously power-hungry. Capella Space, a startup which was recently bought by IonQ, claims to be able to collect data for about 10 min/orbit (which lasts about 90 minutes), and says this is 5x what the competition can do https://www.capellaspace.com/technology.

A larger military satellite might not be power-constrained quite this tightly, but I have to imagine that other prospective imaging targets would be competing for time. Just because there's two SAGs approaching each other doesn't necessarily mean that's the tactical situation that higher headquarters is going to feel is the most important to support with satellite data.

My view is that if I think that the enemy know where I am, I should radiate from at least some of my ships and also use my OECM.

[Dimitris]

One last point that I haven't seen come up in the conversation yet is the issue of the duty cycle. Satellites have an extremely limited power budget, which means that many satellites cannot run their payload sensors continuously. Synthetic Aperture Radar spacecraft, which can take pictures through weather and at night, are notoriously power-hungry. Capella Space, a startup which was recently bought by IonQ, claims to be able to collect data for about 10 min/orbit (which lasts about 90 minutes), and says this is 5x what the competition can do https://www.capellaspace.com/technology.

That would be really "fun" to model in CMO. Possibly already feasible through scripting.

[DWReese]

My point, sort of, was if the Gerald R. Ford (for example) sailed anywhere close to the South China Sea, then the Chinese would make sure that whatever satellite (or other surveillance assets) that they had would be used to constantly provide an update as to its general location. If the Chinese wanted to launch an attack on the Ford, then all of their weapons pretty much only need to be fired in the general direction of the group because the Chinese missiles all have active seekers which would make any necessary last minute changes. (Perhaps I'm wrong in my assumption.) But, if this is true, what would be gained by keeping the Ford's (or any ship) radars off if the enemy already knows where you are located?

Furthermore, if a smaller SAG (as I mentioned before) is venturing out into an area where they have no legitimate land-based aircraft to support them and provide air cover, then the group is basically sailing blind. If this group were to be attacked with no advanced warning provided by radar, the entire group could be wiped out, just as it was in my CMO scenario. The OODA limitation severely restricts the response, and given that the attack is revealed so late (because of the lack of active radar), there is very little defense offered. On the flip side, if the group was sailing with its radars active, then the ships get the advanced knowledge of what is attacking them from the furthest distance possible, and they are able to defend themselves. Again, using the same assets in my earlier CMO example, but with their radars active, the SAG was able to destroy all of the incoming missiles without sustaining any damage.

The results provided a stark contrast. This is why I posed the question. I do realize that each situation is different, but using CMO to provide some realistic context to the situation, it would appear to be a topic worth discussing as far as tactics are concerned.

[SunlitZelkova]

The exact location might end up being too ambiguous to get a fire control solution if the carrier and its escorts are sailing silently. Turning radars on would greatly help the enemy resolve that issue.

In a very high threat environment, if land or carried-based air cover isn't available, the SAG probably won't be sailing into that area at all. Doing so is basically asking for a repeat of the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse.

The main reason you see ships doing FONOPS and things like that without air cover is because none of the great powers actually believe war will break out at the drop of a hat. The Soviets and Chinese always expected a decently long period of political crisis prior to a conflict starting and I'd imagine the US and friends felt the same way too. Instantaneous readiness had/has more to do with deterrence (a political action) rather than actual tactical necessity.

[DWReese]

Instantaneous readiness had/has more to do with deterrence (a political action) rather than actual tactical necessity.

But, the topic of this thread has been geared all around tactical necessity.

The things that you outlined are fine. In fact, I agree with all of them. That is the way that it SHOULD BE. But, working for the government on several levels, I can tell you first hand there are things that should be, and those are great for textbook learning, and then there are things in real life, and those often turn out quite differently than was expected.

The CMO game/simulation, depending on how it is used, provides glimpses into what might happen if presented with a certain set of circumstances. For example, many scenarios start at H-Hour, of the absolute first shots of the war. Lots of preparation is involved, and both sides are likely aware of what might happen. These scenarios can be large or small in nature.

Other scenarios might also be the first shots of a war, but the attack was that of a sneak attack variety, such as a Pearl Harbor type of event.

The smaller ones, of course, don't represent the whole war. They are representing snippets of what is happening at this location, at that particular moment. After the fighting has started, we are no longer dealing with deterrence. It's now a fighting conflict. Diplomacy may enter into things further on down the road, but for this particular moment, the units that you have on your screen are all that you have, and you have been provided with an objective that needs to be accomplished.

If you have read a bunch of military books, attended seminars, and discussed previous military action, then you know that rarely (if ever) does anything go as planned. It's entirely possible that no planes ae available, and that a SAG is cut off, and must fend for itself. It's possible that this SAG needs to transit from Point A to the Safety of Point B, and it needs to get there as soon as possible. It's possible that they have been ordered to operate at Flank speed, regardless of the possibility of enemy subs. And, it's possible, given the number of satellites, that a SAG's whereabouts and composition are are known. It's these type of circumstances that a SAG might have to operate in.

Turn on your radar, and the enemy knows where you are; turn off your radar, and you might not be around very long to discuss the question why it was a bad idea to operate without them.

Every situation is different, so there is no absolute and generic answer that will cover all situations.

[Zanthra]

There is also the question of how effective various jamming techniques are against SAR satellites, especially if combined with good weather prediction and sailing under cloud cover (to avoid EO/IR tracking). Satellites especially have a huge power disadvantage vs surface based jammers. While getting a general location of the jammer may be possible, getting a location high enough quality for a weapon may be more difficult. The wide angle of the SAR may allow a jammer to be quite distant from the target it is trying to conceal.

[thewood1]

"location high enough quality for a weapon"

This is the key point a lot of people miss. While 30 knots doesn't sound very fast, it creates a fairly big ambiguity zone that limits the types of weapons and how they are deployed. AI and advanced data operations can accelerate some of the links in the kill chain. But it still takes time to get to the point where even the most sophisticated RV sensors can be pointed to a usable area to lock on. Typically, the satellite will generate a possible spot where another platform can get a good enough reading to launch a missile.

And those weapons have a limited ability to maneuver once launched. And there are still a limited number of them in a state to launch in the time frame needed. Most of the anti-carrier missiles are going to be most useful in a first strike or as an ongoing deterrent. Their role in an area denial defense against a multi-carrier attack is to be one more quiver in the arrow. I would think they might be used more effectively against land-based air units.

This is being played out in a small scale with the Houthis in the last year. Hundreds of drones and missile being launched to get a very limited number of hits. And the defending DDGs are also very limited. The Houthis are getting pretty solid intel on location and have a very small AO for the missiles. In a small fish bowl, its showing that as hard as it is to defend against BMs and ASBMs, its even harder to hit something with precision. The Houthis are, at this point, launching a volume of attacks and just hoping.

The Chinese are probably a little pissed that the Houthis are providing real-world training and intel for the USN. It removes some of the deterrent factor of ASBMs. And the Houthis with people sitting on shore and flying observation drones are getting more precise and timely intel against very slow and large targets than Chinese satellites can give.

[DWReese]

I guess the point that I am trying to make is:

Let's say that 1941 is fast-forwarded to 2025. Tensions between Japan and the US have escalated, and everyone knows that war is a possibility. Ships, planes, satellites would obviously stumble upon and observe the six Japanese aircraft carriers and their escorts heading toward Hawaii. There would be no way that they wouldn't be spotted a some point along the way. After they were, and considering the circumstances, I would think that many satellites would be reprogrammed at aimed at this group of ships. I doubt that a sneak attack of any kind would be possible.

From the Japanese perspective, what benefit would they gain by leaving their radars off? If the enemy (which isn't an enemy as of yet) already knows where you are, there is nothing to be gained by keeping your radar off because that is only blinding yourself.

Let's move to the attack at Midway. Hostilities have already begun. Again, it would be impossible for Japan to sneak up on the island, and it would be impossible for both sides to NOT know exactly where the other side is. In essence, the Battle of Midway would not happen. The US would not have to send a squadron of reconnaissance planes on a do-or-die mission to locate the enemy.

Again, just as before, what benefit would be derived from leaving any of the radars off as both enemies know where the other is.

Even if clouds, etc., are present, the enemy still has some kind of general idea as to where your forces are located, and that your certainly be enough to launch to conduct an aerial attack. So, the tactics used are a little cloudy, at least as far as I am concerned.

If hostilities have already started, then to run blind might be as bad as committing suicide. The enemy likely knows where you are, and you may be under a hail of weapons, waiting for OODA to kick in before you can start defending yourself.

As an example, in present times, the South China Sea is not that large, and I would venture to guess that every potential enemy ship's position is almost immediately known by the other side at all times. So, again, does the benefit of POTENTIALLY being somewhat less precise about revealing your own position outweigh the problem of being totally blind to an attack that could be coming your way and having to wait or a last second OODA response?

That sort of sums up my question.

[SunlitZelkova]

I guess the point that I am trying to make is:

Let's say that 1941 is fast-forwarded to 2025. Tensions between Japan and the US have escalated, and everyone knows that war is a possibility. Ships, planes, satellites would obviously stumble upon and observe the six Japanese aircraft carriers and their escorts heading toward Hawaii. There would be no way that they wouldn't be spotted a some point along the way. After they were, and considering the circumstances, I would think that many satellites would be reprogrammed at aimed at this group of ships. I doubt that a sneak attack of any kind would be possible.

From the Japanese perspective, what benefit would they gain by leaving their radars off? If the enemy (which isn't an enemy as of yet) already knows where you are, there is nothing to be gained by keeping your radar off because that is only blinding yourself.

Let's move to the attack at Midway. Hostilities have already begun. Again, it would be impossible for Japan to sneak up on the island, and it would be impossible for both sides to NOT know exactly where the other side is. In essence, the Battle of Midway would not happen. The US would not have to send a squadron of reconnaissance planes on a do-or-die mission to locate the enemy.

Again, just as before, what benefit would be derived from leaving any of the radars off as both enemies know where the other is.

Even if clouds, etc., are present, the enemy still has some kind of general idea as to where your forces are located, and that your certainly be enough to launch to conduct an aerial attack. So, the tactics used are a little cloudy, at least as far as I am concerned.

If hostilities have already started, then to run blind might be as bad as committing suicide. The enemy likely knows where you are, and you may be under a hail of weapons, waiting for OODA to kick in before you can start defending yourself.

As an example, in present times, the South China Sea is not that large, and I would venture to guess that every potential enemy ship's position is almost immediately known by the other side at all times. So, again, does the benefit of POTENTIALLY being somewhat less precise about revealing your own position outweigh the problem of being totally blind to an attack that could be coming your way and having to wait or a last second OODA response?

That sort of sums up my question.

Your location potentially being less precise = potentially no attack at all.

Turning on radars means there certainly will be an attack. It eliminates that ambiguity that Zanthra talks about. And given the salvo sizes that surface vessels, submarines, aircraft, and for some, ballistic missiles can deliver, there is a potential the attack will simply overwhelm the defender. So a commander choosing to be more aware is basically trading potentially not being attacked at all for potentially being defeated.

Yes, turning radars on does have the potential for defeating the attack, but then an attack is coming no matter what. Note that a naval group will often be tasked with doing something else—it won't be out there just to defend itself. It will need to be unbothered to complete whatever tasks it has been given. So remaining hidden is generally deemed ideal, even if it means sacrificing awareness.

Of course, commanders are human and that might not always be the case in the real world. But the benefits of running silent are real.

Ironically, thewood1's example of the Houthis is one of the few situations where "running loud" makes sense. Because the USN was tasked with protecting shipping, it would make sense to turn on their radars to attract hostile anti-shipping fire, drawing it away from civilians.

I'm not sure such tactics would be very relevant in a conflict with China though. Whereas the USN was basically trying to deny the Houthis "access" to the Red Sea, protecting civilian shipping in the same way the PLA would try to protect a Taiwan invasion force, in a conflict with China the roles will be reversed. They won't just be there to defend an area—they will have to sink PLA vessels.

The challenges the Houthis seemed to face are no guarantee of survival. The PLA is certainly better trained, better equipped, and better coordinated. They will be able to generate larger salvoes than the Houthis did. Staying hidden gives the attacker (by this I mean the USN) more time to locate targets and get its weapons away. "Running loud" would be an invitation for the neutralization, if not destruction of the attacker.

[DWReese]

I'm not disagreeing with you. In fact, I have always thought the same way that you do. That said, I'm now just questioning the tactic.

While SSMs likely won't be launched at targets due to the fact that they require more precise targeting, missiles launched from aircraft (ASMs) can generally be fired in the direction of their targets as they are often equipped with terminal active radar which is able to handle the final directions for the missiles.

In the beginning I ran a scenario whereby the same attack was conducted against the same foe. The only difference was whether the target was operating its radar or not. The ones with the radars active were consistently able to detect, and defeat the incoming missiles as they had ample time to detect and defat them. The scenario whereby the group was blind essentially had the incoming missiles at their doorstep before they knew what was going on. Furthermore, the OODA so restricted their response that they were all destroyed before they could get off just a handful of shots. This is what got me thinking about this topic.

I've played hundreds of scenarios in just the last month alone, each time testing this theory by playing it both ways. It appears, at least to me, that radars active seems to work the best. I'd invite others to test it out for themselves, using whatever scenario that they like. I'd love to hear the responses.

Thanks for responding, and Merry Christmas to all.

[thewood1]

You are missing the most obvious radar approach. I'm surprised it hasn't come up. Its not on or off. There are many different radar/EMCON strategies. The most obvious is air or surface picketing off-axis and away from the main fleet. This is especially useful with land-based air surveillance nearby. But can still be accomplished with carrier and helo-based AEW. You keep your HVT quiet and out of the way while a SAG and AEW go out looking for trouble. I have used this numerous times in SCS scenarios where I want to bait SSM fire to clear the path into the AO.

Even something as simple as intermittent radar from a rotating set of escorts can be enough to draw out enemy SSMs and AShCMs.

[thewood1]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eURsuxZnRKo

Around 20:00 mark is the relevant part. Also note the heavy use of CMO in this episode.

edit...As I pointed out earlier, the ASBM's main strength is a first strike and the deterrence. Even firing a full complement of DF-21/26/YF-21, its a tough nut to crack a forewarned and ready CV group. And multiple groups with supporting forces should be able to weather it. But that initial strike is the literal killer.