War in Spain 1936-39 is the first in a new wargame series, using a new Land-Sea-Air engine inspired by War in the Pacific - Admiral’s Edition. Gameplay and realism are improved by TRUE AI and a detailed Logistics systems. A hyper detailed OOB reaches down to battalion and company level. A beautiful, hand drawn, 5 nautical mile per hex map massively increases player immersion.
There is the series of books in Russian «RKKA and the Spanish Civil War. 1936-1939. Collections of information materials of RKKA's Intelligence Directorate» / «РККА и Гражданская война в Испании 1936–1939 гг. Сборники информационных материалов Разведывательного управления РККА». At this moment was published 5 volumes of 8. These books also uploaded on RGVA (Russian State Military Archive) site in free access in PDF.
My suggestions:
Don’t try to read/translate the whole book (right from page 1 till the end). Each volume has somewhere in the end “List of published documents” (“Перечень публикуемых документов”). Find it and translate name of the collection. If the topic can be interesting for you then translate names of its documents. So by this way you can avoid non-interesting topics.
Volume 1 has more general reports and also has more wrong data (like errors about foreign aircraft model names which lead to other mistakes).
No. 4.4. Aviation Advisor A.I. Bergolts’ (alias Rinaldo) report to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army regarding the operations of the Republican Army’s aviation schools, identified deficiencies, and measures to rectify them
(Valencia, December 11, 1936)
Report by t. Rinaldo dated 11 December 1936 on the state of the aviation schools of the Spanish Republican Army
The state of Spain's aviation schools and considerations for their deployment. Currently, the following schools are operating in Spain:
1. The School of Pilots is located at the San Javier airfield.
2. The School of Fighter Pilots is also located at the same airfield.
3. The School of Navigators is located at the Los Alcázares airfield.
4. The School of Gunner-Bombardier is also located at the same airfield.
5. The School of Armament Technicians is located at the same airfield.
6. The School of Aviation Technicians is being established in Valencia.
1. The School of Pilots. There are 54 students at different stages of education. The school graduates an average of 3-4 pilots every week, while accepting new recruits in the same number. The number of students ranges from 40 to 55 men. The school has quite comfortable facilities and a good airfield. There are 15 training aircrafts and 7 combat aircrafts. The variety of training aircrafts is noteworthy, mainly English ones: Moth, Havilland, Hispano E–34 and Breguet.
There are 6 instructors, including the head of the school. So there are 8-9 students per instructor. Most of the instructors are old experienced pilots.
A student-pilot receives an average of 55 flight hours before graduation: 15 hours of flight training (with instructor), 20 hours of solo flying in a training aircraft, and 20 hours in Breguet.
The teaching methodology is primitive. The student gets not bad practice in taking off, landing, and turning, but the situation is worse with aerobatics. There is not enough attention paid to the accuracy of coordination during turns and the maintenance of speeds. During independent flights, the student is largely left to their own, and there is a lack of instructor supervision.
2. Fighter School. Currently, 22 students from among those who graduated from the above-mentioned primary school are studying. The school is young, has not graduated yet, and exists only for the first month. There are 10 aircraft in service with a wide variety of systems, mainly high-speed aircrafts: 3 Mileshawk, 1 Flade, 1 Caudron, 3 single-seat Focke-Wulf, 1 two-seat Koolhoven, and 2 single-seat Martinsyde aircraft.
3. The School of Navigators in Los Alcázares . There are 26 students. The course of study is 1.5 months, during which time students take a short course in practice, theory and practice of shooting and bombing, topography, theory and practice of air navigation and photography. This is the first experience of training non-military navigators in a just 1,5 months. I have not tested the students' knowledge, but the school administration says that 1,5-months course is insufficient. The school has 6 Hispano E-30 aircraft, good visual aids, ground equipment, and a shooting range. There is a significant shortage of optical sights, photo-kinematograph machine guns, and windmeters. The school has excellent facilities.
4. The School of Gunner-Bombardiers. The school is located on the same airfield as the School of Navigators. 40 cadets have been recruited, but they have not yet started classes. The program is designed for 1 month.
5. At the same school, there is a 40-person armament technician course.
6. School of Aviation Technicians. Currently being organized in Valencia with a recruitment of 150 students. Classes have not yet begun.
There is no course that trains technicians in instrumentation, radio engineering, and electrical engineering, yet there is a huge demand for such specialists.
To the Aviation Minister was suggested:
1. Combine separated small courses and schools of various specialties into corresponding unified schools as follows:: a) the school of pilots in San Javier with initial training departments with a total of 50 students; b) the school of fighter pilots with 20 students; c) the school of naval aviation with 15-20 students.
To achieve a more homogeneous composition of training aircraft in this school. The number of aircraft should be increased by purchasing abroad.
2. Reorganize the navigator school with departments: a) navigating officers with a training period of 2-3 months and with an increase in the number of students to 50 people; b) non-commissioned officer gunners and bombardiers with a training period of 1.5 months; c) gunners-radio operators, non–commissioned officers with the same training period, Both department should to have 50 training gunners; d) armament technicians — 40 men.
Due to the increase in the number of students, to replenish the school with aircrafts (up to 12) at the expense of old combat aircrafts or at the expense of those purchased abroad. In addition, it is necessary to replenish the school with teachers in the theory of shooting, bombing and navigation, adding a total of 6-8 people. Urgently purchase optical sights and photo-film machineguns abroad. Preferably the implementation of our windmeter and ruler.
3. Organize the school for aviation technicians with three departments: a) aviation technicians with 150 students, b) electrical technicians and radio operators with 25 students, c) instrument technicians with 15 students. The school should be opened as soon as possible in Valencia.
200 men who are sent to our flight schools should be selected with the following conditions: 1) loyalty to the Republic, 2) at least secondary education, 3) absolute health, 4) ages between 19 and 23.
All these proposals have been approved by the Minister, and instructions have been given for their implementation. The expedition to train pilots in the USSR will be led by Gascon, one of the best pilots who has been working as the head of aviation in the north. It is planned to send 8-10 instructors and 4-5 physics and mathematics teachers along with the students.
…. Avgust Ivanovich Bergolts – aviation advisor, in Spain from Oct 1936 till 18 Jan 1937 (alias/nickname “Rinaldo”), rank “komdiv” (divisional commander), before Spain was a commander of MVO’s VVS (Airforces of Moscow Military District) On December 1936 to USSR was sent 192 Spanish pilots for training.
No. 2.7. Report of the Chief Naval Adviser N.G. Kuznetsov (alias Lepanto) to Red Army’s Intelligence Directorate on the state and work of the Navy of the warring parties
(Not earlier than November 21, 1936)
Top secret
Report on the state of the Spanish Government Navy
I. The composition of the Spanish fleet forces
On November 21, 1936, the composition of the Spanish fleet is as follows:
1. Jaime I has completed the maintenance of the mechanisms and is ready, but the speed is 12 knots and, as the maximum for a short time, up to 16 knots.
2. The cruisers Libertad and Miguel de Cervantes have completed the maintenance of the mechanisms and are in readiness. The speed is up to 30 knots.
3. The light cruiser Méndez Núñez has completed repairs, but there have been no tests of mechanisms in sea conditions.
4. 6 destroyers have completed repairs, passed sea trials and are ready; 4 destroyers are under repair, moreover, according to the latest data, the repair of two of them will be delayed for 2-3 weeks. The remaining two will leave in the coming days, but at a reduced speed, no more than 24 knots.
5. Submarines. There are 4 submarines in service in the Mediterranean and 2 in the north, the rest are under repair. The B-5 submarine has not given any information about itself for 40 days and is considered lost. There is no information about its capture by the enemy, but such a possibility must be considered.
6. Auxiliary forces. Cartagena has two old small destroyers and one armed tugboat, which is used to guard the roadstead.
II. Bases
The only military base in the hands of the Government, Cartagena, is not suitable for stay a large number and especially large ships. Therefore, providing the fleet with a base is insufficient. For example, boiler water has to be supplied from Alicante, and only recently has it been possible to create some reserves in Cartagena itself.
The repair facilities are small, and all sorts of repairs are delayed for a long time. In the near future, it may be possible to involve the shipyards in Valencia and Barcelona in the repair process. The base's protection from the sea is quite reliable. From the air, during night raids, there is essentially no protection due to the lack of searchlights, and there is a lot of shooting during the raids, but it is all messy. They are very reluctant to limit firing in order to save ammunition, but recently large ships have been opening fire only in the immediate vicinity of aircraft.
There is almost no anti-submarine defense in the base itself. The existing two old destroyers and a tugboat are being used, the production of an anti-submarine net is coming to an end. In the case of ships stay in the outer roadstead, destroyers are allocated for patrol duty.
III. Ammunition supplies
The ammunition of the main calibers of battleship and cruisers averages from 80 to 100 rounds per gun. The ammunition of the destroyers is slightly higher. A small number of shells remain for anti-aircraft artillery. Attempts to establish production have not yielded positive results so far. Measures are being taken to purchase ammunition from British companies where the guns were purchased, but there is little hope for this.
There is one complete set of torpedoes for destroyers, and 4-5 pieces are available for cruisers instead of twelve. The Fiume-type torpedoes used in the Spanish Navy are type "21". A test of the torpedo's action on one of the destroyers gave good results, the torpedo was heading in the right direction and exploded.
IV. Personnel
Apart from the mechanical profession, there were almost no officers left after the uprising, both on ships and in ports and bases, as well as in the ministry. The remaining officers, out of fear, are engaged in fraternization, and, with the exception of very few, they are not able to establish discipline.
The absence of gunners, miners and signalmen is especially painful, and the non-commissioned officers who replace them do not guarantee correct actions in a relatively difficult situation. Our existing comrades are now mainly engaged in providing basic knowledge to artillery and torpedo weapon managers. The commanders of the ships, with the exception of two (the commander of the destroyer Lepanto and the commander of the destroyer Almirante Antequera), do not have ship control practice, and therefore, when leaving the base, we recommend using pilots and tugboats, and keeping slightly increased distances between the ships at sea, avoiding difficult maneuvers, since failure in such conditions would have a very bad effect on the morale of the entire fleet personnel.
The non-commissioned officers are not bad trained and perform their duties well; the enlisted personnel, due to their short service in Spain, are not enough prepared.
The lack of officers and the creation of committees that assumed both political and operational functions severely disrupted the organization at first, and it is only now that it is gradually being restored. A fleet headquarters was created, as well as a destroyer unit; the committees on each ship allocated chairmen who act as commissars, and the rest of the members are a kind of political workers. There is still no clear differentiation of functions.
Discipline has improved significantly recently. Recently, anarchists have significantly increased their activity on ships, although they do not meet with any support.
V. The composition of the rebel forces
On the north are the battleship España and the destroyer Velasco, the condition of which has not been reported recently. The cruisers Canarias and Almirante Cervera are located in the Mediterranean Sea, with their main bases in Cádiz and Ceuta. In addition, the enemy has a significant number of armed small vessels engaged mainly in the fight against submarines.
The cruiser Baleares is apparently in the process of being tested and, with the active participation of the Germans, may soon enter service.
VI. Operations of the Republican Fleet
After returning from the north, almost all the ships required repairs, and the part of the fleet that was in readiness ensured the movement of transports. According to its composition, it is more advisable to use the fleet in night raid operations, but the presence of a large number of Italian and German ships in all enemy bases, damage to which the government considers extremely undesirable, greatly complicates and often makes fleet operations completely impossible.
Similarly, air raids on rebel cruisers are difficult to ensure the safety of Italian and German ships if necessary, the actions of the latter are entirely aimed at protecting the rebel cruisers and making them fully aware of all the actions of the Republican fleet. Recently, there have been a number of cases of an obviously provocative order, when German ships approached the coast at close range and took measurements, launching planes there and often showed up in a darkened form near the base. The provisions on territorial waters and restricted areas are not being implemented. The silhouettes of German battleships, similar to the silhouette of the cruiser Canarias, make it very difficult to correctly determine where the cruiser Canarias was or is located and where the German battleship is.
Reconnaissance has so far been unable to be established due to the lack of aircraft for this purpose.
Tomorrow, the fleet leaves for the Barcelona area to ensure the movement of ships and to the island Menorca to assist the port of Mahón, which has strong naval and anti-aircraft artillery, and from there it will first carry out a series of operations against Mallorca, and then a number of operations are planned in the Gibraltar area. An amphibious operation is planned in Algeciras area, but due to the lack of men and weapons, training has almost stopped.
The submarines that have been operating in the Strait area so far are very inactive, and it is difficult to count on any significant success. We propose to allocate two boats with bolder and more determined commanders for an active operation.
Our existing comrades (4 men) are working – three in the fleet formations and one at the Cartagena base. It is highly desirable to receive the specialists in artillery, mine-torpedo and signals that I have already requested. It would be very useful to get torpedo boats and mines from the material part, which would allow the fleet to move away from unprotected ports. The acquisition of boats and mines by the Spaniards has so far been unsuccessful, and, apparently, will not succeed. From ammunition, it is highly desirable to manufacture remote tubes of the sample I sent and purchase up to 20 torpedoes.
Today, on November 22, at 9 a.m., the cruiser Miguel de Cervantes was attacked by a submarine near Cartagena, which, although slightly damaged, required 1-2 months of repair in the conditions of this base. According to unverified reports, there were at least two boats. It was not possible to determine whose boat it was.
In general, the appearance of German and Italian boats has been frequently noted recently. The guard destroyers tried to attack, but to no avail.
There are no anti-submarine bombs on ships, diving shells are available in small numbers, and only on cruisers. The cruiser has been brought into the base and a dock is being prepared, but there is no certainty that it will be possible to put a cruiser in it.
According to reports, an amphibious assault is being prepared for the island of Mallorca in Castellano area, to support which a large number of aircraft are concentrated there.
...... Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov (1904-1974)
In Spain - from August 1936 to 12 July 1937 (alias – Lepanto), Naval Attache, then Chief Naval Adviser and Advisor of the Inspector of the Navy.
Ranks – kapitan 2 ranga (1936), kapitan 1 ranga (1937), later up to Admiral Flota.
From 1938 he is TOF (Pacific Fleet) commander. From 1939 - narkom (People's Commissar) of VMF (Navy). Minister of the Navy (1951-53).
Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier is named after him.
PVO – AA defense
VNOS - (service) of aerial observation, warning and signal
No. 50.2. Report by PVO Advisor Ya.A. Tykin and Anti-Aircraft Gun Instructor Yu.G. Bogdashevskiy "Organization of Anti-Aircraft Artillery Defense of the Port and Fortified Area of Cartagena"
(No later than September 30, 1937)
Organization of anti-aircraft artillery defense of the port and fortified area of Cartagena
1. Assessment of the object.
1. The port of Cartagena is the main base of the Republican fleet.
2. The port of Cartagena is the main port where military materials for armament and technical equipment of the army arrive and unload.
3. Cartagena has a large naval arsenal, as well as repair docks and military shipyards (destroyers, submarines).
4. The Cartagena area has powerful coastal fortifications and 155, 210 and 380 mm caliber batteries requiring air cover.
5. A number of explosives factories are located in the Cartagena area.
6. There is an artillery park in Cartagena itself, providing ammunition for the fleet and coastal artillery.
Conclusion: Cartagena is an important strategic point of republican Spain, as well as a point of long-range naval communication.
2. Anti-aircraft defense systems and their armament <(see Appendix 5)>.
1. Cartagena has 6 anti-aircraft four-gun batteries of 105 mm caliber, mounted stationary on concrete.
2. The batteries are armed with 105 mm Vickers guns with Vickers directors (several models) and a Barr & Stroud's rangefinder.
3. In addition, there is the fleet's anti-aircraft artillery, which includes:
6 Hotchkiss 25 mm machine guns
10 Vickers 76.2 mm anti-aircraft guns
4 Vickers 47 mm anti-aircraft guns
All of these guns, except for the machine guns, fire a low-effectiveness mobile barrage, because they do not have any fire control devices.
3. Battery status on 1 March.
1. On 5 batteries out of 6, the synchronous communication of the guns with the director has been faulty for about a year.
2. On all 6 batteries, the telephoning system is malfunctioning and has not been working for about a year.
3. The lighting system for firing at night is defective on all 6 batteries.
4. There are no firing rules.
5. The command staff does not know the equipment and does not know how to use it.
6. The command staff does not apply and does not consider it necessary to apply any corrections.
7. The batteries have absolutely no observation and correction points.
8. The battery commanders do not have any means of observing the gaps.
9. On four batteries, the guns are arranged linearly at intervals of 5-6 m. The front faces the sea (opposite the city), the devices are placed very close to the guns. As a result, only one gun can be fired from the flank. You can only fire towards the city at high elevation angles. When firing from the front, the smoke from the guns interferes with firing, and the gunners lose their target.
10. The shooting was done in the most primitive way – direct fire, and the following were taken from the device: the setting of the tube, horizontal and vertical lead, without taking into account the actual and very large working time.
11. The results of the shooting could be judged by the accidental firing of a friendly aircraft by two batteries. The position of the gaps was so far from reality that the aircraft only noticed the shooting in its third course.
12. The rangefinders do not work on 2 batteries due to the lenses being glued.
Conclusion: The batteries are completely unusable. The good equipment is damaged, unused, and is a dead capital.
4. Tactical grouping.
1. The batteries, with the exception of one (Dolores), are located at separate altitudes from 300 to 500 m above sea level and have a very good all-round view.
2. Four batteries directly cover Cartagena (Dolores, Sierra Gorda, Conejo and Roldan).
3. One battery (Cabo Negrete) covers the village and Portman Bay and coastal batteries in the area (east of Cartagena).
4. One battery, Atalayon, covers the coastal batteries at Cape Tignoso (west of Cartagena).
5. There was no tactical control and even no operational communication, the batteries were part of coastal artillery units.
5. Conducted tactical measures to revive the batteries.
1. A team of electricians has been created, which has completely repaired and put into operation synchronous communications, telephony and lighting systems on all batteries. The brigade is currently divided into batteries and supervises the operation.
2. Rules of firing and correction have been made up, according to which all batteries are trained. An automatic firing method is given as the main method, and an additional method is to work with transmitting installations over the phone. In both cases, the aiming is not direct, and the working time is 0. (Based on Russian firing rules).
3. One observation and correction point has been set up in each battery. The battery commanders have been equipped with observation equipment.
4. Firing rules for "attack aircraft" have been developed and practiced.
5. A barrage fire system has been calculated.
6. A series of day and night training exercises have been conducted.
7. Three combat firings were conducted on the sleeve, one of which was rated "satisfactory" and two of which were rated "good." In all three cases, the sleeve was hit.
8. Operational communications have been separated into a separate unit. PVO HQ has been created.
9. The batteries have been removed from the coastal artillery units and placed under the command of PVO chief of Cartagena.
10. Two batteries (Concejo and Roldan) are currently undergoing work to reposition their guns at wide intervals along the corners of the trapezoids.
6. Organization of light defense (searchlights).
1. Until February, Cartagena did not have any searchlight facilities.
2. In February, Cartagena received three 150-cm Z-15-4 searchlights and two 90-cm searchlights from local resources.
3. At the end of April, six more 120-cm English coastal searchlights of the 1918 model were received.
4. At the end of March, 2 locally made "Valencia" type sound detectors were received.
5. Currently, Cartagena has 10 searchlights total.
7. Measures to revive light defense.
1. Preemptive tablets have been made for the operation of sound detectors with a searchlight.
2. Training was conducted on working with a tablet and on search and tracking techniques.
3. A number of day and night training exercises were conducted.
4. 120-cm English coastal searchlights are adapted to work on aerial targets. A rod for vertical aiming and a scale of pole angles are attached to them.
8. Command post.
1. PVO chief's command post is connected via its switchboard to all batteries and searchlights.
2. The command post is directly connected to the sound detectors.
3. The command post is connected to VNOS posts through the Cartagena central station, and to some of them through the naval central station.
4. In case of an alarm, the command post is moved to a shelter built into the slope of the mountain, where all communication facilities are switched with a switch and where there are duplicate telephones in all directions. The command post has a special room in the shelter.
9. Organization of VNOS service.
1. A network of observation posts has been established throughout the Cartagena fortified area (with a radius of up to 60 km).
2. In addition, there are also observation posts in the most important areas and outside the fortified area.
3. The posts are connected to the command post via civilian telephone lines and have the right of an emergency priority.
4. In addition, radio direction finding devices are also used as warning devices.
Conclusion: VNOS service copes with the tasks assigned to it. In all cases, the warning was timely.
10. The enemy's combat activities and means of active defense.
1. In November 1936, the enemy subjected Cartagena to a series of night bombings lasting up to 4 hours. The bombing caused significant destruction to the city, and one five-ton crane in the port was disabled from military installations.
2. At that time, there were no searchlights, and the batteries fired at random based on their hearing.
3. There were no bombings for over five months.
4. Knowing the available anti-aircraft artillery, the enemy operated on Cartagena only at night.
5. The bombing resumed at the end of May 1937, also at night.
6. The air base from which the enemy operates along the east coast of Spain is Palma on the island of Majorca.
7. On May 23, 1937, at about 2:30 a.m., the enemy raided Cartagena with 6 heavy bombers, apparently having received information about the arrival of ships with military cargo. Being met with fire from anti-aircraft batteries (260 shells were fired) and lighted by searchlights for a very short time (there were only 3 of them then), the enemy aircraft did not bomb the city and port, but dropped bombs in the vicinity on secondary targets without damage them.
8. On May 31, 1937, at about 2:30 a.m., the enemy again raided Cartagena with 3 heavy bombers, again receiving information about the arrival of the ship, but was promptly captured by searchlights and shelled with targeted fire from anti-aircraft batteries (160 shells were fired). Enemy planes dropped 4 bombs in the port area, causing no damage, they tried to repeat the approach two more times, but both times they were again caught by searchlights and, having dropped bombs outside the city, into the field and onto the road, they left. In all three cases, the planes were caught by searchlights working with sound detectors and a warning tablet.
11. General conclusion.
1. Cartagena has a fairly effective artillery and anti-aircraft defense system that is up to modern standards.
2. Although Cartagena has a sufficient number of searchlights, the lack of modern sound detectors and automatic devices for aiming a searchlight at a preemptive point affects their operation and makes it difficult to catch a target, thereby reducing the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery systems.
3. The state of active PVO systems, their sufficient number, as well as passive PVO measures, mainly along the line of 100% shelter coverage, puts Cartagena forward as an exemplary and reliably protected PVO point of Spain.
