Suwalki Gap 2025 - ZAPAD Variation v1.0 - initial public release

[Ramosh]

Hello everyone, I am hereby publishing a scenario of the Russian Federation's attack on the Suwalki Gap. This is my first scenario for TOAW IV. I wish you enjoyable gameplay and many exciting moments.

SUWAŁKI GAP – ZAPAD 2025
(Operational Variation)

Platform: TOAW IV
Mode: Primarily designed for PBEM
Turns: 28 (6-hour turns)
Scale: Operational

Overview

This scenario explores a 2025 crisis in the Suwałki region under a Zapad-style force posture.

The core concept is simple:

Both sides have comparable maneuver mass.
Victory depends on operational decisions, not scripted inevitability.

Russia must decide between:

Securing a land corridor to Kaliningrad

Crushing Lithuanian resistance

Escalating strategically (4th Guards Tank Division / Iskander strikes)

Or maintaining a limited war posture

NATO must decide between:

Holding terrain forward

Trading space for time

Counterattacking the corridor

Or risking escalation by striking Kaliningrad / Belarus

This is not a scripted corridor rush.
It is a maneuver contest with escalation thresholds.

Design Philosophy

This scenario was designed primarily for PBEM play.

The escalation system, operational ambiguity, and axis flexibility are intended for human command decisions. An AI-compatible version is included, but the full experience emerges in player-versus-player mode.

The AI can execute a credible campaign, but it cannot fully leverage deception, delayed reserves, or escalation timing.

Key Features

• Escalation mechanics (Belarus entry, 4th Guards Tank Division, Iskander strikes)
• Multiple viable Russian operational approaches
• Lithuanian defense with irregular / territorial capability
• Limited stockpile war (logistics matter)
• Operational—not tactical—decision space
• No guaranteed outcome

Balance Notes

This is not a corridor “autowin” scenario.

If Russia overextends into Lithuania, Kaliningrad becomes vulnerable.
If NATO pushes too early into Belarus or Kaliningrad, escalation penalties apply.

Both sides can win.

Marginal and Draw outcomes are common — which is intentional.
A decisive victory requires operational coherence and risk acceptance.

Tested Variants

Zapad-style mixed regimental grouping

Reduced Russian logistics hubs

With and without 4th Guards Tank Division

AI vs AI stress tests

Human vs AI test cycles

PBEM remains the intended format.

Suggested Play

Play blind.
Avoid reading designer notes before your first game.

For NATO:
You cannot win by forward defense alone.

For Russia:
You cannot win by brute mass alone.

If there is interest, I may later release:

• A “Hardcore” version (higher Russian mass)
• A pure AI-focused simplified variant
• An escalation-heavy edition

Below are a few screenshots from the game showing various stages of operations (human FR vs NATO AI):

Early Operational Phase - Turn 7

SuwalkiGap_2025_ZAPAD_turn7.jpg (8.46 MiB) Viewed 1964 times

Russian maneuver groups advance toward Mariampol and Kalvarija while NATO attempts to delay and concentrate reserves

Endgame Situation - Turn 28

SuwalkiGap_2025_ZAPAD_turn 28.jpg (8.58 MiB) Viewed 1964 times

Heavy attrition from both sides. The corridor remains contested. Strategic escalation possible but costly.

Feedback welcome.
Best regards,
Rafal

[cathar1244]

Thank you, great scenario topic!

[FellingerXZ]

Really great scenario.

[demiller]

Excellent idea for a scenario. Thanks for putting this together.

[Ramosh]

Thanks for the positive feedback, I'm currently working on an Escalation Variation to start testing possible scenarios involving larger Russian and NATO forces.

[Ramosh]

Suwalki Gap 2025 ZAPAD Variation v2.0 is in development.

The update will include a full ground equipment review and a new UAV / loitering munition layer, including Bayraktar TB2, Gladius, Warmate, Molniya and Geran/Shahed strike options.

This should significantly change the battlefield dynamics. Rear-area security, SHORAD cover, road movement, artillery positions and logistics will matter much more than in v1.0.

More details soon.

[Ramosh]

Work on ZAPAD 2025 v2.0 is approaching completion.

What started as an equipment/OOB revision gradually turned into a much deeper rework of the scenario. The battlefield is the same, but the way the campaign develops is considerably different.

One of the largest changes is combat lethality. The original scenario used a relatively high Attrition Divider; v2.0 has been recalibrated to produce much more meaningful equipment and personnel losses during sustained combat. Units can no longer remain in continuous high-intensity fighting for several days and emerge almost intact. Operational mistakes now have consequences.

The ground OOB has also been revised to better reflect the forces actually associated with the ZAPAD exercise and the regional theater, rather than relying on a broader pool of hypothetical Russian reinforcements. The result is a more focused initial force structure, while larger formations such as elements of the 71st Guards Motor Rifle Division, 4th Guards Tank Division or 98th Guards Airborne Division remain optional escalation assets rather than automatic participants.

Belarusian forces have likewise been reorganized to better distinguish local defense, operational reserve, engineer support and escalation-dependent formations.

Special Operations Forces have also been substantially redesigned. Russian, Polish and Lithuanian SOF now have access to helicopter mobility where appropriate, allowing raids, reconnaissance and operations against vulnerable points in the enemy rear. During PO-vs-PO testing this produced some surprisingly convincing behaviour — small SOF elements were repeatedly airlifted behind the front, forcing regular formations and territorial units to divert forces to rear-area security.

UAVs have also been expanded and differentiated. TOAW does not truly model drone warfare, of course, so some of these assets are necessarily represented through artillery-type mechanics. Even so, reconnaissance UAVs, FPV systems and loitering munitions now have distinct operational roles rather than functioning as generic extra firepower.

Rear areas therefore matter much more in v2.0. Border guards, KASP, WOT, engineers, airfields, bridges and lines of communication are no longer merely background details. A small force in the right place may have an operational effect completely disproportionate to its combat strength.

Command and logistics have also been reviewed formation by formation. Formation proficiency, supply distribution and HQ support elements are being recalibrated to distinguish elite, regular, territorial and improvised formations more clearly. This becomes particularly important once formations have been fighting for several turns and begin to suffer losses, reorganization and supply problems.

Polish reinforcements are also being reconsidered. Instead of the player being able to predict that a particular heavy brigade will always appear on exactly the same turn, their commitment may be controlled by events within a limited time window. The Russian player should know that the Polish heavy reserve is coming — but not necessarily exactly when.

Initial AI-vs-AI testing has been entertaining, occasionally chaotic, but also very useful. The PO has demonstrated a remarkable enthusiasm for helicopter operations, airborne raids and deep exploitation. In one test the battle eventually turned into a major NATO counteroffensive after the initial Russian attack culminated — including fighting around Grodno and, rather unexpectedly, a NATO advance into Kaliningrad Oblast.

Those results should not be taken as balance conclusions; proper human-vs-PO tests in both directions are still required. But they strongly suggest that v2.0 has become a much more dynamic operational problem than the original release.

ZAPAD 2025 v2.0 will be released in two variants: PO and PBEM. The PO version will include some AI-specific adjustments to reinforcement timing and formation behaviour, while the PBEM version will retain the full set of player-controlled options and uncertainties.

ZAPAD 2025 v2.0 is not intended to be a larger scenario. It is intended to make the existing battlefield matter more.