antipersonnel (AP) ratings for direct and indirect fire equipment in TOAW 4

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How artillery was rated in TOAW 1

Given that TOAW is now in its fourth major iteration, one might wonder what the ratings system of TOAW 1 have to offer. What it offers is insight into the original designer’s intent regarding antipersonnel ratings for indirect fire equipment.

Norm Koger (“Norm”) emphasized the importance of rates of fire (ROF) in determining the antipersonnel effect of indirect fire weapons. There appear to have been, in the TOAW 1 equipment database, actually two systems used for quantifying antipersonnel effectiveness of indirect fire equipment, and both use a ROF factor. Of the two systems, one depended on knowing only the bore diameter of the equipment; while the other required also knowing the weight of a projectile’s bursting charge in kilograms.

It is curious that both of these systems were used because the second system actually rates the antipersonnel effect of specific projectiles, while the first system provides a generic rating for artillery pieces of a given bore diameter. The second system (a forerunner of the ratings system employed in TOAW 4) seems to have only been used for 150-mm to 170-mm artillery pieces.

Let us examine the first system. Apart from the bore diameter range of 150-mm to 170-mm, artillery pieces derived their antipersonnel rating thusly:

The bore diameter of the artillery piece or mortar, in centimeters, was raised to the power of 1.5. For pieces with a bore diameter less than 150-mm, this result was then multiplied by two thirds ( ~ 0.667 ). As an example, one may look at the 75-mm artillery pieces.

7.5 raised to the power 1.5 is 20.54.
20.54 times 0.667 is 13.7, or, rounded up, 14.

At the bore diameter of 200-mm and higher, the same system is used, except that the factor of 0.667 is replaced by 0.15.

These two factors, 0.667 and 0.15, are the “rates of fire” that Norm mentioned. Raw lethality is determined by the bore diameter, and then is modified by the ROF factor.

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The second system requires one to know the weight, in kilograms, of the bursting charge of a given projectile. This seems to have been applied to selected artillery pieces with a bore diameter ranging from 150-mm to 170-mm. In this case, the ROF is determined with the formula:

ROF = 929.03 / ( r * r * π ), where r is the radius, in centimeters, of the projectile.

929.03 is not an arbitrary constant. It is (very closely) the number of square centimeters in a square foot. A square foot was used here, apparently, as a “notional pallet” to determine how many projectiles a given artillery piece could fire. It is of note that this system imposes a logistical constraint in that larger projectiles have lower “rates” of fire. A second item of note is that 15cm pieces were apparently assigned the same antipersonnel rating as 152-mm pieces (AP rating of 35).

As an example, consider the German 17cm (field) gun. The calculated ROF is 4.09, and the weight of the bursting charge of its HE projectile (17 cm K Gr39) was 7.35 kilograms. Multiplying these numbers results in an AP rating of 30.08, or, rounded down, 30.

The exception to these rules appears to be the Soviet 180-mm gun rating, which is rated at 23. It is not clear why it is an exception, although the data used regarding the bursting charge weight may have been in error.

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Mortars and infantry guns are rated differently, probably because their range was limited compared to that of regular artillery pieces. However, mortars of a bore diameter of 107-mm or greater were rated like artillery pieces, with a ROF of 0.667.

Of particular note is that multiple rocket launcher AP ratings in TOAW 1 matched those of artillery pieces of the same bore diameter (with one exception, see below). The number of tubes for a rocket launcher played no role in determining its antipersonnel rating. The one exception is the German 15cm Nebelwerfer. It follows the first system (with a ROF of 0.667), and produces an antipersonnel rating of 39. It is unclear why it was not rated like other 15cm weapons (AP rating of 35).

This example highlights the operational focus of TOAW: Logistically, there is no difference between a single- and multiple-barrelled weapon. For whatever logistical system exists in a given battle, there is a finite number of projectiles that can be transported to the firing weapons, and, over the period of time associated with operational warfare, tactical rates of fire are not of significance. Thus, the “rate of fire” mentioned by Norm is more correctly thought of as a “unit of fire” -- a quantity of projectiles fired over time (not the typical tactical ratings given as “rounds per minute”) by a given piece of equipment.

Moreover, given the elastic scale of duration that a turn in TOAW may represent, this “quantity of projectiles fired over time” is actually a measure of how often a given piece of artillery fires in relation to other artillery pieces of different bore diameters. In TOAW 1, a 75-mm gun carries an AP rating of 14, no matter how much time duration is represented by a single turn. Obviously, then, the rating is not meant to depict a precise number of shells fired; rather, the system establishes proportional units of fire for artillery pieces of various bore diameters.

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TOAW 2: Some variation, and some arbitrary changes

Before any commentary regarding antipersonnel ratings used in TOAW 2, it is of importance to note that, as games, TOAW 1 and TOAW 2 existed in distinct parts of the wargaming universe. In other words, the antipersonnel ratings assigned in one of these two games did not impact the ratings and functioning of the other. Apart from sharing to a great extent the same code base, TOAW 1 and 2 were different games. However, one cannot ignore the influence of TOAW 2 antipersonnel ratings on later releases of TOAW: in many cases, the antipersonnel ratings of TOAW 2, multiplied by 8, are those found in the equipment database of TOAW 4.

For reasons unknown, there was a shift in antipersonnel ratings in TOAW 2. As an example of this shift, the antipersonnel rating of 75-mm artillery pieces changed from 14 (TOAW 1) to 11 (TOAW 2).

This rating (actually closer to 11.25) may be compared to the TOAW 4 equipment file rating of 90, yielding a factor of 8.18. The antipersonnel rating system for indirect fire equipment in TOAW 2 was a direct forerunner of the system used in TOAW 4, with the exception that the “times 8” factor was not yet applied.

There were, however, other changes to antipersonnel ratings that are less easily explained.

In one case, the antipersonnel ratings for selected tank guns increased dramatically. 90-mm guns, for example, had an antipersonnel rating of “6” in TOAW 1, while in TOAW 2, their antipersonnel rating was “20”.

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Some increase was to be expected. In the latter part of World War II, and continuing on into the years of the Cold War, the effectiveness of antipersonnel munitions increased. However, TOAW versions beyond TOAW 1, in rating the antipersonnel effects of some tank / antitank guns, seem to have sought out the most destructive projectiles a selected gun could fire. Problematically, the selected projectiles do not represent typical tactical situations, and thus result in distorted antipersonnel ratings (a thermobaric projectile, for example, while hugely effective in confined spaces, would not typically be employed in gun fire against troops deployed in open terrain.) Even more problematically, the focus of TOAW 2 was on post-World War II operational warfare, so the antipersonnel ratings of tank guns greater than 76-mm in bore diameter exhibit these distortions, while older tank guns do not … a data inconsistency brought forward to the equipment database of TOAW 4.

As well, the TOAW 1 convention that MRL artillery be given the same rating as artillery of the same bore diameter, was abandoned. While a German 28-cm MRL in TOAW 1 was rated for an antipersonnel effect of “22”, a Chinese 273-mm MRL in TOAW 2 was given an antipersonnel rating of “50” (an increase of over three times if these were expressed in the TOAW 4 rating scheme). Other examples of the “promotion” of antipersonnel ratings for MRL systems in TOAW 2 are evident, giving the impression that whoever rated these pieces of equipment either did not understand the system used in TOAW 1, or, decided that the immediate tactical effect of multipe tubes firing required a new assessment as far as antipersonnel ratings were concerned. Regardless, as mentioned before, so long as the two games existed separately, these discrepancies did not matter.

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This “promotion” was also evident in heavy AA gun antipersonnel ratings. The “common equipment” 90-mm AA gun, for example, had its antipersonnel rating increased by something like six times. A similar increase occurred with the German 88-mm AA gun. As well, selected 155-mm SP artillery equipment was granted a 1.5-times increase in antipersonnel effectiveness. And the reason for these changes, again, was a mistaken application of tactical rates of fire to a database meant to model operational warfare . . . that is, warfare over durations of time exceeding the tactical scale. The fact that some AA guns had a semi-automatic loading system, or that certain armored vehicles employed carousel-type autoloaders is insignificant in operational warfare, because, again, a force’s logistical systems can only move a given amount of ammunition per firing piece forward. How quickly the equipment can expend that ammuntion allowance is not of operational consequence.

The problem was this: once the two databases were brought together in TOAW: COW, TOAW III, and later, TOAW IV, these differing systems of rating antipersonnel effects were simply combined into one large equipment database and no apparent effort was made to impose a single standard of antipersonnel ratings onto the whole. The TOAW 2 MRL equipment ratings, in focusing on tactical effect, particularly conflict with the (operational warfare focused) TOAW 1 method used to rate the MRL systems of World War II.

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Back to the present: artillery antipersonnel ratings in the TOAW 4 equipment database

I haven’t checked the equipment databases of TOAW COW or TOAW 3, but at some point, a decision was made to multiply the antipersonnel ratings of guns by a factor of eight (as represented in the equipment file, not in game play). Straightforward enough, but, as mentioned previously, this was done to an integrated (TOAW 1 and 2) equipment database that had not standardized its approach to antipersonnel ratings for various classes of equipment.

There were other issues introduced as well. By and far, the most popular conflict to model with the TOAW series has been the Second World War. The integration of the TOAW 1 and 2 databases, though, introduced a subtle inconsistency. There are items of “common equipment” that are common to both World War II and subsequent eras. The TOAW 2 ratings, in some cases, represent types of projectiles that were much more effective than their World War II counterparts. One example of this regards 155-mm projectiles. Two changes were introduced during the Cold War with respect to these projectiles. The first was that the amount of bursting charge was significantly increased, and the second was that the newer projectiles were loaded with much more brisant bursting charges. (The TOAW 4 method of rating artillery antipersonnel effectiveness accounts for bursting charge brisance.) Other examples of inflated ratings can be seen in the antipersonnel ratings of the 25-Pounder gun, and any World War II direct fire gun with a bore diameter greater than 76-mm. One may debate whether such inconsistencies significantly impact World War II scenarios, but the existence of these inconsistencies is notable.

Another aspect of the artillery antipersonnel ratings is that there are vestiges of the original TOAW 1 system still extant. The 122-mm howitzer rating is an example. In the TOAW 1 system, this piece was rated as (12.2 raised to the power 1.5) and then multiplied by 0.667 . . . yielding a rating of “28”. Conversion of TOAW antipersonnel ratings to those used by TOAW 4 is obtained by multiplying the TOAW 1 rating by 5.81 . . . and doing so results in 165.14, or, rounded down, 165 -- precisely the rating found in TOAW 4. How many of these anachronistic ratings are still present in the equipment database is unknown.

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What appears to have been the preferred method of rating artillery antipersonnel effectiveness in TOAW 4 is closely related to the “notional pallet” system occasionally used in TOAW 1. The formula was modified such that the “pallet” is 100 square inches (10 x 10). This is equal to 645.16 square centimeters:

ROF (unit of fire) = 645.16 / ( r * r * π ), where r is the radius of the bore diameter expressed in centimeters.

This ROF is then multiplied by the weight of the bursting charge in kilograms and then mulitplied by 8. If the bursting charge has a brisance other than that of TNT (in TOAW, TNT uses a brisance value of “1”), the product is then multiplied by the brisance factor (this factor can be found in various internet sources, in which it is formally described as the “relative effectiveness factor”).

Testing this formula against equipment database values can be confusing for several reasons. Primary among these are the “common equipment” artillery items, for they often do not represent any specific piece of artillery or type of projectile … and so, testing them against known values of specific projectiles is an exercise of little value. Another variable is the weight of the bursting charge, because there is no way of knowing either the source used for projectile reference data or how many digits were considered significant (that is, was a weight of 3.76 kilograms reckoned as 3.76, or as 3.8). As well, brisance factors in technical literature are sometimes expressed as a range of values, rather than a single, specific value. Because the ROF value is specific, there are equipment database cases in which one can determine, more or less, the bursting charge weight that was used to generate a specific rating. Finally, as mentioned, there are the “anachronistic” ratings in the equipment database that were not determined on the basis of a ROF formula.

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But what of the ratings for direct fire equipment ? Put another way, one wonders why a “common equipment” 75-mm gun is rated as “90” for indirect fire but only as “66” for direct fire (AT guns, tanks, etc.). Without knowing the precise formula that was used to rate direct fire pieces, one way to establish their database value, within a point or two, is to determine their value as an indirect fire item of equipment and then multiply that value by 0.75 .

The 75-mm gun is a useful example of the confusion that can result from using “common equipment” in rating calculations, for 90 times 0.75 is not 66, but is 67.5 (a point or two).

The rating of “90” for 75-mm artillery pieces is on the high end. There were a few 75-mm pieces that used heavier bursting charges, but for many 75-mm pieces, the actual values in the TOAW 4 rating scheme would be “79” or less.

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In TOAW 4, the effects of the TOAW 2 method of selecting the most destructive projectiles may be seen in the antipersonnel ratings of tank and other direct fire guns with a bore diameter larger than 76-mm. This has resulted in these guns being wildly overrated. Not only is this potentially a problem for scenario design, it runs completely against the grain of Norm’s original concept for these ratings: larger bore diameters meant lesser rates of fire and therefore lessened antipersonnel effectiveness over periods of time corresponding to operational warfare. The TOAW 2 ratings ignore this concept by rewarding guns with larger bore diameters and failing to heed the guidance that, because of lesser units (“rates”) of fire, the antipersonnel effectiveness of larger guns should be bounded.

An example of this is the 85-mm direct fire gun. The TOAW 1 rating for this weapon would have, if converted, a value of “35” in TOAW 4, while the TOAW 2 rating greatly increased that, resulting in a rating of “114” in TOAW 4. Compounding this more than three-fold increase, TOAW 2’s rating scheme did not penalize direct fire guns if their bore diameter was greater than 76-mm or so. So, in TOAW 4, the 75-mm gun of the Sherman tank is rated as “66”, while the 85-mm gun (T-34 etc.) of the same era is given an impressive “114”. What drove the increase, besides not penalizing for direct fire, was the selection of the projectile, the BK-2M HEAT projectile which is thought to have been adopted in the late 1950s or early 1960s. It is also a projectile optimized for urban warfare (thermobaric effects) and likely not typically used for fragmentation effects in open country. Because of this projectile choice, every World War II scenario in TOAW 4 that uses 85-mm guns suffers from this distortion, and this gun is hardly the only one porting postwar effects into World War II scenarios.

This illustrates two problems. One is the penalty for direct fire guns is not applied in a standard manner, and the other problem is the selection of what are likely atypical projectiles, resulting in too-high antipersonnel ratings.

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The misguided use of tactical (or even cyclic) rates of fire was another error introduced into the TOAW 2 equipment database. This affected anti-aircraft guns. Of note is that these rates of fire are used in TOAW for resolution of anti-aircraft fire. But the application of the tactical or cyclic rates of fire to determination of the antipersonnel rating introduced distortions when considered over the longer periods of time represented by turns in TOAW. In effect, these rates of fire suggest the AA guns are firing at cyclic rates of fire for the entire turn, and, that they are deployed primarily as antipersonnel weapons. Both of these notions are patently absurd, yet we see antipersonnel ratings like “220” for dual 35-mm AA guns in TOAW 2 which were calculated as “586” in TOAW 4, apparently determined by multiplying the cyclic rate of fire by the weight of a single projectile (not just the bursting charge).

The other error that followed this was the use of these unrealistically high AA gun antipersonnel ratings for tanks that mounted a similar weapon. Thus, a 90-mm AA gun in TOAW 4 is rated as “150” (because of its semi-automatic loading mechanism), and this value was ported over to tanks like the M47 Patton which had essentially the same gun but no semi-automatic loading capability. When the databases were combined, the same error was made with the German 88-mm AA gun, and the too high antipersonnel rating was carried over to tanks like the Tiger I. One must also question how often, if at all, the larger AA guns used rapid fire in antipersonnel mode, for the rapid fire capability was designed to engage aircraft moving at high speed. For depiction in operational warfare, it is far better to treat them like any other gun as far as antipersonnel ratings are concerned.

The MRL antipersonnel ratings in TOAW 2 exhibit all kinds of variation for reasons unknown, with items like Chinese 273mm MRL systems showing one as having twice the antipersonnel capability as the other. This particular case may be because one of the SPMRLs has twice the number of launchers as the other, but, again, that only demonstrates the failure of these ratings to adhere to Norm’s original design guidance, in that the MRLs of TOAW 1 rated the antipersonnel effectiveness of a single rocket -- guidance well considered for modeling operational warfare. The “why” of that guidance is, again, logistics.

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Finally, one comes to the question of how to rate the antipersonnel effects of heavy artillery. As mentioned, TOAW 1 employed a calculation based on the bore diameter of the artillery piece. This system was intended to represent (over time) a lesser antipersonnel effect while (using shell weight) depicting the ability of heavy artillery to reduce entrenchments. This was a valid approach for an operational warfare model, but the depiction of heavy artillery in TOAW 4 in terms of AP ratings is a confusing mess that exhibits the products of at least two different calculation approaches. A single example will suffice to illustrate this problem. In TOAW 4, a 240-mm gun is rated as “80” while a 10 inch (254-mm) gun is rated as “170”. The 10 inch gun may have been rated on the basis of specific data, while the 240-mm gun was given what is apparently a default value of “80” for many heavy artillery pieces in the database. For the artillery pieces above a given bore diameter, a single calculation should be used so that the antipersonnel rating is generated on a standard basis.

A suggested method for determining the antipersonnel rating of heavy artillery (8-inch / 203-mm and greater) in TOAW is to use the standard (“645.16 formula”) method of rating the projectile, and then to divide that result by ( projectile diameter in millimeters / 100 ). Example antipersonnel ratings given by that method:

Equipment AP Rating

U.S. 8-inch M106 projectile for M1 howitzer 132
German 21-cm Gr 18 for Mrs 18 gun 123
U.S. 240-mm M114 projectile for M1918 howitzer 117
Soviet 240-mm rocket for BM-24 129
U.S. 10-inch Mk IV projectile for seacoast gun 134
German 28-cm rocket for Nb W 41 150
German 35.5-cm projectile for M 1 siege gun 53
U.S. 14-inch M2A1 projectile for seacoast gun 105

This, or similar systems, objectively compare the performance of actual projectiles while progressively penalizing (to reflect very low rates of fire) the antipersonnel rating as the bore size of the firing weapon increases.

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Mortars with a range less then five kilometers

Some observations can be made regarding indirect fire weapons with a range less than five kilometers. In the TOAW equipment databases, the antipersonnel ratings of these weapons are reduced presumably to model that with less firing range, there are less potential targets for the weapon to strike.

The precise formula or rule used to rate these weapons is not clear; however, the following method produces results that are very compatible with the TOAW 4 ratings for these weapons. It is taken from the TNDM, an operational warfare model created by Colonel Trevor Dupuy.

Dupuy’s model includes a method for assessing the effect of a weapon’s firing range on its overall lethality. The calculation is:

Range Factor = (square root of (r)) + 1, where r is the range of the weapon in kilometers. As an example, 2.87 is the range factor of a weapon with a 3.5 kilometer range.

In TOAW, five kilometers seems to be the distance assessed that differentiated between the realms of tactical combat and operational warfare. Thus, indirect fire systems with a range of five kilometers, or greater, suffer no penalty on the basis of range. Many mortars, however, have ranges less than five kilometers.

To calculate the penalty, one must know 3.24 is the Dupuy range factor for a five kilometer range. The range factor for a given weapon, such as the example given above as 2.87, is divided into 3.24, producing, in this example, 0.89 as a value. The full antipersonnel rating of the weapon is then multiplied by 0.89 to arrive at the penalized rating.

It is difficult to judge just how accurate this method is because the majority of the mortars in the TOAW 4 database are “common equipment” and therefore impossible to exactly rate. But the results given by this method fall well within the range of antipersonnel ratings given by the database.

Let us consider, as an example, the German 5cm GrW 38 mortar. Using the “645.16 formula”, it has a rate of fire of 32.86, and its HE shell contained 0.112 kilograms of bursting charge. At full antipersonnel rating, it calculates as 32.86 times 0.112 times 8, or, “29” when rounded down. The firing range, though, was 0.52 kilometers, well below the TOAW “5 kilometer range rule”.

The range factor is reckoned as (square root of (0.52)), + 1, with 1.72 as the result. Dividing 1.72 into 3.24 yields 0.53 as the penalty factor. To get the final antipersonnel rating, multiply the full rating of 29 by 0.53, and a rating of “15” is the result. In this case, the calculation agrees precisely with the standard equipment database of TOAW 4. Not all calculations resolve so exactly because, again, of uncertainty of which weapon was selected to represent “common equipment”. The 60-mm mortar is a good example of this, as several models of 60-mm mortars were produced beyond the original Brandt design, and, importantly, the power and range of 60-mm mortar projectiles increased significantly after World War II. The “common equipment” 60-mm mortar, then, may represent an actual mortar and an actual projectile, or the rating given may simply be a blend of several different 60-mm mortar and projectile ratings.

Finally, one may use this method of calculation to arrive at ratings for recoilless rifles, and indirect fire equipment with a range less than five kilometers (some infantry guns, for example) in the TOAW 4 equipment database.

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In conclusion, it is clear there is much complexity (and data) behind the antipersonnel ratings given in the TOAW 4 equipment database. But, it is equally clear that, over the course of almost three decades, misguided approaches and a failure to properly integrate and standardize the TOAW 1 and 2 databases have introduced numerous distortions in the antipersonnel ratings used in TOAW 4. There is much work yet to be done, and those doing the work would do well to recall the impact of logistics on calculations concerning operational warfare, which was a key driver of Norm Koger’s viewpoint.

Sample Calculations

1. US M29 81-mm mortar firing M362A1 HE projectiles. The mortar has a range of 3.99 kilometers when firing this projectile. The projectile contains 0.952 kilograms of Composition-B. Composition-B is assessed as having a relative effectiveness factor of 1.33 compared to TNT.

First calculate the range penalty. The (square root of 3.99), plus one, is 2.997 . This is divided into 3.24 (the range factor of five kilometers), resulting in 0.925 as the range penalty.

Next calculate the bursting charge, as modified by the Composition-B rating. 0.952 times 1.33 results in 1.27 .

The unit of fire is 12.52, as calculated using the “645.16 method”.

The antipersonnel rating for the equipment database file is then, 12.52 x 1.27 x 0.925 x 8, or 118. (Default TOAW 81-mm mortar rating is 45, a typical rating for World War II 81-mm mortars and their projectiles.) This rating of “118” is suited to Vietnam War scenarios or other conflicts of the 1960s.

2. Soviet 85-mm D-44 gun firing O-365K HE projectiles in indirect fire mode, thus no range penalty applies (the D-44 had a maximum range of over 15 kilometers). The projectile contains 0.78 kilograms of TNT, thus no brisance factor should be applied.

The unit of fire is 11.37, as calcuated using the “645.16 method”.

The antipersonnel rating for the equipment database file is then, 11.37 x 0.78 x 8, or 71. To represent this weapon in direct fire mode, multiply 71 by 0.75 to arrive at a rating of 53. (Default TOAW 85-mm gun rating is 114, representing the use of 1960s projectile with thermobaric effects and no application of a direct fire penalty for tank or AT-gun depiction in the equipment database.)

3. US T66 4.5-Inch multiple rocket launcher firing M16 HE rockets. The rocket has a range of 4.76 kilometers and contains 5.2 pounds (2.36 kilograms) of TNT. Following Norm’s intent in TOAW 1, we ignore the number of tubes present on the launcher and caculate for a single tube only.

The range penalty is the (square root of 4.76), plus one, or 3.182. Divide this into 3.24 to obtain 0.982 as the range penalty.

Bursting charge is 2.36, and the unit of fire (for a 114-mm projectile) is 6.32 .

The antipersonnel rating for the equipment file database is then, 6.32 x 2.36 x 8 x 0.982, or 117. (Default TOAW 4 4.5-inch MRL rating is 240, based on an unknown calculation method. The TOAW 1 rating (for a 4.5-inch rocket of unspecified model), converted to TOAW 4 equipment file standard, weighs in as 151, and was calculated on the basis of firing tube bore diameter.)

4. Swiss 35-mm GDF twin AA gun firing HE projectiles with a weight of 0.535 kilograms. In the case of light AA guns, the projectile weight, and not the bursting charge weight, is suggested to produce results that are compatible with the TOAW antipersonnel rating scheme. The antipersonnel rating is calculated for a single barrel of the weapon.

The unit of fire for a 35-mm weapon is 67.06 . This is multiplied by 0.535 to arrive at 36 as the antipersonnel rating for this weapon. Note well, for TOAW anti-aircraft (not antipersonnel) calculations, the rate of fire used is the cyclic rate for half a minute. Changes to the antipersonnel rating do not impact the AA rating of the equipment.

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Are there implications for existing TOAW 4 scenarios ?

An obvious question, but one for which the answer, IMO, is "no".

The "why" of that conclusion is that the designers of scenarios in TOAW used various design tools to craft their scenarios, including decisions made to balance, or otherwise influence gameplay.

What an understanding of how the AP ratings in TOAW 4 were made, offer a tool for designers of future, or revised-version, scenarios to better represent specific items of equipment. One need no longer be dictated to by "common equipment" definitions. While data like bursting charge weight and type are not always easily found online (particularly for modern MRL systems), these data can be found for the bulk of the direct and indirect fire equipment found in the TOAW IV database.