Panther Games' Highway to the Reich revolutionizes wargaming with its pausable, continuous time game play and advanced artificial intelligence. Command like a real General, under real time pressures to achieve real objectives on a real map all within the fog of war. Issue orders to your powerful AI controlled subordinates or take total control of every unit. Fight the world's most advanced AI opponent or match wits against your friends online or over a LAN. Highway to the Reich covers all four battles from Operation Market Garden, including Arnhem, Nijmegen, Eindhoven and the 30th Corps breakout from Neerpelt.
Ever since I started to study the Arnhem part of Market Garden I have been wondering why they choose the landing grounds they did. I'm fully aware that the dropzones where chosen because of restrictions laid on them by the airforce but even then the choice can be debated.
My point of focus are the reinforcement drops on monday and tuesday. The biggest question I have is why did 4th para did not land on LZ-L, where the Poles were landed the day after. On monday LZ-L was used to drop suplies which seems a strange since they had designated SDZ-V for that purpose.
The advantages of dropping 4th Para on LZ-L and not on DZ-Y (dropping the supplies at SDZ-V):
- Closer to the bridge / next objective
- Easier to secure for the KOSB (landed on LZ-S), tasked with defending DZ-Y, then move to LZ-L and defend it untill the Poles arrive on tueseday. They now had to move away from Arnhem and secure an area that was hard to defend, very exposed and last but not least, far to big a task for a single regiment. Note: A-coy KOSB was almost completely destroyed and the rest of the companies were severely reduced.
Were they to defend LZ-L from the start untill after the poles landed on tueseday they would have been able to dig in properly and form a tight defence. Chances of keeping the LZ secure were far bigger this way.
- 4th para had to walk 8km less and could attack the so called "Lichtenbeek feature" on monday to secure the SDZ-V. Now they attacked on monday Morning, giving the Germans an extra day to dig in (they started to dig in on the 17th).
Last but not least, why was not a single company dropped on SDZ-V to secure it? I drive though it twice a day and it's practicly as big as LZ-L is. Now the SDZ was never in the hands of 1st Airborne and all supplies were lost. They took a big risk by assuming the dropzone would be secured.
Hi Madman
well the answer is easy, with hindsight, everything makes prefect sense, but at the time it didn't, you got to remember, they were not planning on having a battle there
the over all plan was to drop in, get comfy, and wait on the Armor to catch up and get on to the real show
Hi Madman
well the answer is easy, with hindsight, everything makes prefect sense, but at the time it didn't, you got to remember, they were not planning on having a battle there
the over all plan was to drop in, get comfy, and wait on the Armor to catch up and get on to the real show
HARD_Sarge
But one has to ask - at what competency level do you stop being a muppet and start being an officer!? To drop troops 60 miles behind enemy lines and not expect a fight is lunacy. The film (A Bridge Too Far) suggested that recon of the area showing panzers was ignored. I don't know if that was film-making or fact - but I'd probably go with the latter.
I think most people knew Monty was pretty used to getting his own way. It's been made clear in several books I've read (no quotes) that SHAEF had to tread on eggshells with the British and, in particluar Monty.
That said, he was an absolute dream to work with compared with the French commander Charles de Gaulle who refused (allegedly) to ask his countrymen to accept the foreign printed Francs from the AEF because they were "not sovereign". WOW! The thanks you get, eh?
I'm no authority - just spouting what I remember from books gone by.
But one has to ask - at what competency level do you stop being a muppet and start being an officer!? To drop troops 60 miles behind enemy lines and not expect a fight is lunacy. The film (A Bridge Too Far) suggested that recon of the area showing panzers was ignored. I don't know if that was film-making or fact - but I'd probably go with the latter.
Well the opinion at the time was that the German army, as a fighting force, was finished. Discipline gone, weapons lost, just a rabble streaming back to Germany as fast as they could. No-one believed that the Germans could have re-constituted their SS Panzer divisions, the factories were being bombed as was the road and rail infrastructure. And in any case, where were they going to get the manpower? We can look back now and say "Ah! yes, but ........" but at the time...........
Since intel can never be 100% (unless you're playing 'Counter-Strike' with the 'wallhack' cheat on[;)]) you just have to make assumptions. Maybe we should re-title the film/book 'An Assumption Too Far' [:)] which is most certainly true. It was the complacency that hamstrung the operation most, especially, as MadMan has pointed out, over the question of re-supply. Quite how the Germans managed to improvise such a strong defence though out of their apparent weakness never ceases to stun me. Okay the SS were at Arnhem but they weren't the only effective fighting units faced by 30 Corps and the airborne troops.
Interestingly, according to Harvey (Arnhem), 1st Abn Div never ran out of AT rounds for their PIATs and AT guns - which casts some doubt on the resupply issue; and IIRC he also claims none of the tanks destroyed by them belonged to Hohenstaufen or Frundsberg, which if true also casts doubt on the presence of the SS Pz Divs as an explanation for the defeat. Harvey basically argues that the failure was due to a poor plan, made in a hurry and without regard for the likelihood of enemy interference, and even worse execution once on the ground (for example the failure of 1st Abn Div to advance in a concentrated and urgent manner on their objectives). Mind you he doesn't make it clear exactly what he means by 'never ran out' - i.e. he could mean they had rounds in stock at some points, but they could equally have run out at others.
I'd have to read Harvey to know for sure but quoting AT rounds not running out to call into question the extent of the supply problems at Arnhem is questionable. As you say Steve, this could be down to positioning or it could be down to lack of targets (or a combination of both[;)]).
Hi Madman
well the answer is easy, with hindsight, everything makes prefect sense, but at the time it didn't, you got to remember, they were not planning on having a battle there
the over all plan was to drop in, get comfy, and wait on the Armor to catch up and get on to the real show
HARD_Sarge
This has nothing to do with hindsight or not planning on having a battle there. To me what I wrote is a very strange thing in the planning of this operation. In other words, it just does not make sense why they have done it this way.
You make some good points. I've been fascinated by Market Garden ever since I was 10 and have read numerous books on the subject. People seldom make important decisions for a single reason, so here are a few of the most important factors that influenced the decision:
1) The current situation when Market Garden was conceived - the German Army had been crushed in the Falaise pocket, the remnants were streaming in a disorganised rabble back towards Germany. The Allies, after being bogged down in vicious fighting in the Normandy bocage for the best part of two months had advanced over 300 miles in a couple of weeks (so much for the cautious Montgomery), German resistance was sporadic and un-cordinated.
RESULTS:
- Feeling of great confidence, feeling that Germany was defeated, feeling that "by the book" must be ditched in order to keep the momentum of the advance going at all costs.
- Landing zones thought to be unimportant, since opposition will be light and demoralised and disorganised. In the best case scenario the landings themselves may well cause any local opposition to flee in panic.
2) Not enough transport aircraft to take 3 and 1/3rd divisions + corps HQ in one lift. Therefore landing zones must be chosen that can be defended, and that are unlikely to be under fire (i.e. close to the objectives) on days 2 and 3. Because transport aircraft are so precious, they cannot be exposed to any significant risk of flak on day 1, since all are needed on days 2 and 3.
3) The landing zones themselves, if we forget (!) the objectives, are excellent in terms of:
a) Firmness of ground (not a trivial point in soggy Holland) and flatness of ground.
b) Screened by tree-lines and woodland.
c) Away from any troop or military installations, and therefore likely to be completely undefended.
In the event, the drop zones, and especially the glider landing zones resulted in an excellent tight drop, few casualties, and quick concentration and organisation of 1st British Airborne on the 1st day. It was only of subsequent days that it become clear the drop zones were exposed, hard to defend, and too far from their objectives.
4) History has been perhaps overkind to Roy Urquart. Examined objectively, from the comfort of a warm armchair with all the benefits of hindsight we find a commander who is:
a) Inexperienced with airborne operations and regards his troops as "highly trained infantry" once they get on the ground. He doesn't seem to have quite appreciated how static and lightly armed his men were.
b) New to the job and without close friends or colleagues within the airborne clique he can ask for advice, or influence, or favours.
c) Understandably anxious to appear confident and enthusiastic when asked to perfom a difficult task for his first (and last!) divisional command.
RESULT: Urquart is uneasy about the distance to the bridge, but goes along with the plan, despite some misgivings. This is in contrast to the highly experienced Richard Gale, commander of 6th Airborne, who confessed that he would have resigned his command rather than accept the landing zones miles from the bridge. He claimed that anything less than a battalion landed directly in the small area of fields to the South of the bridge would have been unacceptable.
As you may have gathered, I have further reservations about Roy Urquart, but those will have to wait for another post...
5) Aware of the distance to objective problem, someone (I am still unable to find out who) has devised the plan of the recon squadron with twin Vickers guns on each jeep making a swift drive to size the bridge. I've often wondered what might have happened had this force not ran into Btn Kraft's blocking line, which had only been in place about half an hour (maybe less!) when they made contact. Certainly, reports of a force at the bridge several hours before one was there would have cramped the German defenders' style somewhat, as nobody likes having even a small enemy force to the rear, sitting astride a major communications and supply route. I suspect the resistance to the rest of the battalions moving into Arnhem would have been less confident...
RESULT: Anyone with misgivings about the distance to the objective is rebuffed by the recon "coupe de main" force plan. In other words "we've got that problem solved."
6) Incredibly, Market Garden took about a week to plan. Unlike D-Day, where the planners had months to consider each problem, weigh up intelligance reports, do research, and get opinions, Market Garden was thrown together although a much smaller plan, Operation Comet did provide a lot of useful information.
RESULT: There is no time or oportunity for 2nd opinions, and a calm and rational review of the plan.
None of the above does more than mitigate what turned out to be the fatal error - not a "bridge too far" but "too far to the bridge."
Hope the above explains things - there are still more factors such as bad intel, and the para's very high opinion of themselves I've not gone into...
Regarding 3)
The dropzones for 4th Para on Tuesday were not easely defended, very remote (even more then the others) and very close to the heavely garrisoned town of Ede so imo they really did it wrong there.
But you did open my eyes on something I never thought about, that the dropzone choices were deemed unimportant, never thought of it that way.
Regarding 4)
I agree on your critisism of Roy Urquart, he was very inexperienced and did not stood his ground on the dropzone issues. Also his choice to go and look for the para regiments on day 1 because he was out of touch with them proved a disaster because he was cut off by German forces for the 2 most important days of the battle. His second in command made a bad situation worse by effectively letting each regiment / brigade fight on it's own to find a way to the bridges and not concentrating them for a strong push. On Tuesday when they tried for the first time they almost succeded (they came within 1km / 0.6mile) from the bridge but the Germans were by then far to strong.
Regarding 5)
It's amazing that they came up with this plan but it's even more amazing that nobody objected to it because a recon squad is not trained for this sort of mission.
Also they really made a piss poor performance. The recon squad landed with the first gliders (around 1:30 pm)yet they did not start their advance untill after 4 pm at that time Krafft was in place and one jeep was destroyed. These things happen but what I don't understand is why they did not search for a different route towards the bridge (they were a RECON unit for crying out loud) and subsequently their mission was abandoned.
Thus one of the most important factors for success, a makeshift coup de main, started hours too late and was not carried out because of one destroyed jeep.
Oh and a side note, the news that the jeeps had not arrived was a myth. Of couse some jeeps were lost but most made it to Arnhem.
Some points regarding this interesting discussion:
As English_roG said, in hindsight, it is always easier to criticize the actions of the commanders of this operation since we all know so well how it turned out.
I believe people are too harsh with Urquhart. I am not an expert - not yet [;)] - on the Market-Garden operation since the only book I have read so far about it is Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far, a classic that is apparently not the most accurate. Still, Ryan expands at length in section 1 of "The Plan" chapter on how much Urquhart was worried and concerned about the drop zones identified for his Red Devils. I don't think he underestimated the danger this represented for the operation, but considering also that almost NO opposition was expected (we should not forget that paramount assumption on which all of the Market operation was based on), it's hard to criticize the original rationale of these drop zones, even if we can reasonably argue with it 60 years after.
Interestingly enough, Ryan explains in a footnote about the choice of the drop zones: Colonel George S. Chatterton, commanding the Glider Pilot Regiment, recalls that he wanted a coup de main, "a force of five or six gliders to land near the bridge and take it. I saw no reason why we could not do it, but apparently nobody else saw the need for it, and I distinctly remember being called a bloody murderer and assassin for suggesting it." Indeed, since XXX Corps never reached the Arnhem bridge as planned, it would have been a useless sacrifice.
In my mind though, more than the choice of drop zones, the worse was the airlift schedule spread over so many days. It does not make much sense to me, considering all the delays that could result of weather conditions. This schedule basically prevented Urquhart from having, right from the start, the sizable forces he needed to have to accomplish his mission.
>Indeed, since XXX Corps never reached the Arnhem bridge as planned, it would have been a useless sacrifice.
To tell you the truth I strongly disagree with this statement because XXXcorps came within 5 km of the bridge (the edge of Elst from where they could see the bridge). By then (I think it was friday 22nd) the birdge was in German hands again and the priority shifted towards strengthening the Oosterbeek perimeter.
What if they did use a coupe de main (with massive hindsight).
What if 4 out of 6 gilders made it to the bridge, thus there would be around 100 men directly on the bridge from the minute the operation started. Thus the Germans could not focus entirely on stopping the advancing paratroopers towards the bridge giving them a bigger chance of reaching them. It might also be an extra motivation for the advancing para's to speed up (they were painfully slow in reaching the bridge as we all know). With more para's on the bridge and more shattered / spread out german defenders the para's could have held the bridge longer.
Also and this might be the most important determinating factor, the coupe de main would secure the bridge from the first minute and would stop the german 10th SS units that crossed the bridge and driving up to Nijmegen and help to defend the bridge there. Without the SS troops the bridge garrison would not held out long against the American paratroopers. The para's came within 500 METERS of the bridge on their first attempt to seize the bridge on the evening of september 17th but then ran into the SS troops and were forced to retreat.
You can imagine what would have happened if XXXcorps could drive over the Nijmegen bridge without delay towards Arnhem in the still undefended polders of the Island towards the bridge in Arnhem that would be in Allied hands............
But ofcourse, this is all fiction but it makes me wonder and wonder and wonder.......
And indeed, had they used a second lift on the first day the dropzones would not have mattered.
NO opposition was expected (we should not forget that paramount assumption on which all of the Market operation was based on), it's hard to criticize the original rationale of these drop zones, even if we can reasonably argue with it 60 years after.
How can you say that.
Ultra report XL9188 5 september: Heeresgruppe B orders 2. & 116. Pz and 9 & 10. SS Pz to transfer to Eindhoven to rest and refit in the Venlo-Arnhem-s'Hertogenbosch area. Followed by several other ultra reports indicating those divisions.
If you read the 1st Para Brigade Intel summary No.1 dated 13 sep 44 it also includes a clear mention of "a battle-scarred Panzer divison or two" reforming numbering 10.000 troops.
That above the 8.000 troops mentioned concentrated in Ede (important training area) and Arnhem ("will be a vital centre on his L of C") Ouch, how to solve this problem....ooh well, that data is from june or earlier so let's assume they are digging trenches somehwere else or conducting a fighting withdrawal from the Albert Canal
>Indeed, since XXX Corps never reached the Arnhem bridge as planned, it would have been a useless sacrifice.
To tell you the truth I strongly disagree with this statement because XXXcorps came within 5 km of the bridge (the edge of Elst from where they could see the bridge).
Agreed, you got a point. They came close. Had the bridge still been in British hands at that moment, XXX Corps might have pushed up harder to reach the bridge. But it is still doubtful that a force of 5 or 6 gliders, as suggested by Chatterton, could have hold on the bridge any longer than Frost men did in any case (and even if we combine Frost battalion to these 100-odd glider troops). The "useless sacrifice" I am talking about was due to the large delays that XXX Corps suffered rather than the capacity of the 1st British Airborne Div to hold on as originally planned.
Also and this might be the most important determinating factor, the coupe de main would secure the bridge from the first minute and would stop the german 10th SS units that crossed the bridge and driving up to Nijmegen and help to defend the bridge there. Without the SS troops the bridge garrison would not held out long against the American paratroopers.
Was there really any substantial SS forces that managed to cross the Arnhem bridge to Nijmegen before Frost's men captured the northern end? I might be mistaken but I think only an SS recon force of a few armored vehicles sent by Harmel earlier during the day managed to cross the bridge south during the afternoon to cross back north just after Frost had secured the northern end. These SS armored vehicles were attacked by Frost battalions as they were crossing the bridge back into Arnhem, not even knowing at the time that the northern end was already under British control.
Most of the 10th SS units which showed up at Nijmegen crossed the Rhine at a very slow pace from a crossing point east of Arnhem if I remember correctly.
That was Grabners (sorry for the spelling [;)]) 10ss recon battalion. The only mech force able to intervene at the beginning of the battle. They crossed south and then most of them came back north later on. A lot where shot up trying to force the bridge but those that didn't took up positions along the sought of the river and had a lot to do with making life hell when the big para assault along the water front was conducted. Those 20mm connon across the water where deadly once the sun came up!
If the bridge had been taken at the outset they would not have been there, but then again, if they where on the north side (and did not just head off to one of the ferries to try and cross over to head south) they could have played hell at the drop zones etc.
So we can make lots of guesses but in the end thats all they are.
