FYI: Alternate December 7th Start

[Rainerle]

Ha, I start a new one :

ORIGINAL: Mogami

... often because of German gaffs like adding the Norwegian merchant fleet to the Allies by invading

It was not a stupid idea to invade norway !

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Sorry Mo (and most) for putting you through that. I missed the England UBoat war thing but probably would have ignored it.

There are a couple things that activate the hunter-seeker in me. One of them is the endless list of "Gee if Axis power X [funny it's never the Italians by the way, considering that they were building better planes in 1943 than the Japanese] would have done this one OBVIOUS thing it would have WON THEM THE WAR [or bought them a negotiated peace]." Another one is: "Career military men are so knowledgeable that they sh1t gold, so some podunk civvie should not presume to question their word even absent evidence the things they claim make sense."

On the PH oil tank thing I have yet to see any of the True Believers in this matter even frame the question in a way that one might assess the feasibility. "The Pacific Fleet would have to relocate to the West Coast!" [What? ALL of it? Not even one little sub? If one sub, why not two? Why not two subs and a few tenders ... and some DDs .... and a few CAs ... and a CV ir two? See it's not a matter of all or nothing even if you completely destroy all the oil in the oil farms -- an event that as you pointed out is unlikely in the game and was in fact rather unlikely in the real event.]

I've read alot on this matter and never seen a detailed study by anyone who would really know whether or not forcing a substantial rebasing of PacFleet by bombing the oil tanks than attacking the ships directly would have been (a) feasible, (b) more expeditious than sinking the ships directly. Nimitz would not know himself, and I've never seen any attribution to Nimitz of a claim to have read a detailed study on the matter by anyone who would know. So if a person has source(s) on the matter and the author(s) attribute the claim to Nimitz but don't provide details on the report that Nimitz read on the subject, that person is probably reading the wrong d@mned book(s).

Were I FDR and faced with the problem of having NO oil -- zip -- none in PH, I would not ask anyone in the armed forces whether the problem could be solved. I'd go to the Head of Operations of Shell, Esso, and Mobile, and one of Kaiser's operations guys, put them in a room, and say "Draft me a plan for having 60% of PH's oil stocking facility rebuilt and refilled in 120 days, and the rest completed to 100% by the end of 1942." Even if they did not make the 120 day deadline, I'd bet dollars to doughnuts that they'd come real close.

I don't think many of the magic bullet guys here really have a clue about what was possible for the US to attempt logistically. We all beat around the bush, occasionally, mentioning how vastly outproduced the combined shipyards of Italy, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USSR were by US shipyards, or how Ford or GM cranked out more aircraft per week in early 1944 than most Axis manufacturers could build in a month, or how amazing it is that the US had the resources to research the bomb, mobilize the huge arsenal that it did, supply weapons and infrastructure to everyone else (the US freaking GAVE more locomotives to the USSR in 1942-1943 than the Axis powers owned during the entire war), and still live a fairly comfortable life (rationing-wise) in the civilian sector. But we still never really talk about the production and design, err, phenomena (I won't say miracles because it was just the result of smart guys being allowed to do what they COULD do) that occurred from 1941 (the gears were already turning) thorugh mid-1944.

The US started with the 3rd largest merchant marine. The 2nd largest navy. The 19th largest air arm (behind Rumania) and fewer airbase training facilities than Germany. US ground forces would have been substantially outnumbered in a hypothetical war with Poland. By 1944 the US had the production lead in every area of armaments except mechanized artillery. By 1945 the USN was larger than all the navies of all the other combatants combined. Portable harbors took the Axis wholly by surprise because the simply never imagined that anyone would try it. NEED I GO ON? [again?]

So when someone says "the logistics would have been insurmountable" my immediate reaction is a cynical laugh. Yeah, it makes me come across as arrogant. Tough cr@p.

I love you man, such a jewel in the rough. [&o]

PzKwIV vs. Shermans was equally entertaining.
[:)]

[PzB74]

ORIGINAL: Rainerle

Ha, I start a new one :

ORIGINAL: Mogami

... often because of German gaffs like adding the Norwegian merchant fleet to the Allies by invading

It was not a stupid idea to invade norway !

The thousands of norwegians who died during the war will probably disagree with you.....
From a more strategic view point, there were several negative results of invading.

Churchill considered the efforts of the 1100 ships and 30000 seafarers under the Norwegian government in exile to equal in importance an army of one million men on the battlefield in Europe.

Adding 1100 ships, including more than 300 modern tankers to the Allied arsenal was quite a backlash.

In addition, the Kriegsmarine lost so many ships, sunk and damaged, during Weserubung that any invasion of England would not have been very difficult to carry out later that year - no matter how the Battle for Britain ended.

All this will have to be 'traded' against the strategic benefits gained from having bases along the norwegian coastline, securing supply of iron ore and the opportunity to deploy troops against Russia in Finland.

[mdiehl]

Just a few facts in case anyone really WANTS to determine how feasible an attack on the oil farm would be:

1 Cimmarron Class Tanker = 146,000 bbl.
Pearl Harbor Oil Tanks = 4,500,000 bbl.
US 1942 (start of 1942 I think, given the way the #s change) oil tanker fleet: 4,260,000 tons (Harper Collins Atlas of WW2 ed John Keegan 2nd ed).

Now for the quick n dirty.
1 bbl = 42gallons petrol (common knowledge)
Specific gravity of water = 1.0 (common knowledge I hope)
Specific gravity of fuel oil varies .82-.86
(Yeah, I know specific gravity differs by temp. Sometimes you just have to assume a constant).

1 gallon water = 8.3 pounds
1 ton = 2000 pounds
1 gallon fuel oil about 7.05 pounds (from the arithmetic)
1 ton fuel about 6.8 bbl (from the arithmetic)

1 1942 US tanker fleet = about 28,560,000 bbl.

1 1942 Pearl Harbor fuel depot = 0.158 tanker fleet assuming you loaded each ship just once and sent it on to PH before returning it to other duty.

1 1942 Pearl Harbor fuel depot = 30.8 Cimmarons.

Doesn't seem to ME anyhow like the bottlneck in the problem would be an inadequacy of sea lift capacity.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: PzB

ORIGINAL: Rainerle

Ha, I start a new one :

ORIGINAL: Mogami

... often because of German gaffs like adding the Norwegian merchant fleet to the Allies by invading

It was not a stupid idea to invade norway !

The thousands of norwegians who died during the war will probably disagree with you.....
From a more strategic view point, there were several negative results of invading.

According to Paul Martin, our ersatz Prime Minister, the invasion of Norway by Canadian troops is a proud moment in our history.[8|]

[madflava13]

mdiehl,
I see what your point is, but what you are missing is that you cannot lose 4,500,000 bbl. of oil and just shrug it off. Even if you can fuel from tankers effectively, you still have to find that oil somewhere. And then ship it. And then refuel. That's the bottleneck. You can't just point to US oil production and say "Gee, we'll just ship more over". In real life that doesn't work. That oil won't be found right away, and even with every AO in the Pacific available, you're still looking at a huge delay (several months) before oil is ready to load into them...

[Mr.Frag]

A huge delay? Several months? The war goes from Dec 41 through 45. Several months is a blink of an eye. As I have always maintained, the Allies could have lost 100% of all their assets in December of '41 and it would not have made the slightest bit of difference to the war.

The USA was winding down production before the war was even over. They never actually reached anywhere near their true potential output. Yes, they were caught mapping, but no there was never any real threat to them. Don't kid yourself into thinking that they were ever in any form of danger. Had they even remotely felt threatened, the ETO would have simply been ignored until they felt more secure.

Japan was forced into the war by people too stupid to understand the realities. This very same thing caused Germany to go to war again. This is why the Allies went to such great lengths after WW II to ensure that the defeated were not once again set up into such an environment that they would once again be headed down the war path.

[Rendova]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

Yes, they were caught mapping,

Maybe they should have been US had a real problem with poor maps in in the SoPac. Made for some real navigation problems. [:D][:D]

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag
This is why the Allies went to such great lengths after WW II to ensure that the defeated were not once again set up into such an environment that they would once again be headed down the war path.

I think ensuring they did not come under Communist influence but sided with the West played more a role than any philanthropic or other idealistic reasons.

[Pascal_slith]

ORIGINAL: madflava13

mdiehl,
I see what your point is, but what you are missing is that you cannot lose 4,500,000 bbl. of oil and just shrug it off. Even if you can fuel from tankers effectively, you still have to find that oil somewhere. And then ship it. And then refuel. That's the bottleneck. You can't just point to US oil production and say "Gee, we'll just ship more over". In real life that doesn't work. That oil won't be found right away, and even with every AO in the Pacific available, you're still looking at a huge delay (several months) before oil is ready to load into them...

Well, I've been slamming mdiehl so far, so let me reverse things a little. I read in "The Pacific War Revisited" (Bischof and Dupont, ed. 1997) that along the West Coast (California mainly), the US oil companies had stockpiled 44 million barrels of oil, all used up in 1942 and 1943, so the oil was there (I'll find the reference).

However, as you say, it takes time to organize units and ship the fuel. Furthermore, the Allied shipping was Europe, and the Germans were having a field day along the East Coast with sinkings. Yes, US shipbuilding was picking up and perhaps more tankers could have been diverted to the West Coast for refilling Pearl. But until significant amounts of oil could be stocked in Pearl, the fleet there would have run dry quite quickly. Kimmel was keeping ships in harbor during the weekend to save on fuel.

The article by Daniel Blewett in "The Pacific War Revisited" is a good starting point for references to the detailed situation and limits on the activities of the US Navy during 1942.

In any case, an easy way of testing all this in WitP would be to be able to edit the fuel supply points of Pearl Harbor. Will there be an editor for WitP that will allow for base supply and fuel point editing?

[The Gnome]

I think ensuring they did not come under Communist influence but sided with the West played more a role than any philanthropic or other idealistic reasons.

I think there were a confluence of reasons of which that played a part. America was very isolationist prior to the war so not wanting to get dragged into another world war I'm sure played heavily in their minds. Hedging out the communists was also a bit of insurance for this.

[mdiehl]

I see what your point is, but what you are missing is that you cannot lose 4,500,000 bbl. of oil and just shrug it off. Even if you can fuel from tankers effectively, you still have to find that oil somewhere. And then ship it. And then refuel. That's the bottleneck. You can't just point to US oil production and say "Gee, we'll just ship more over". In real life that doesn't work.

Mad,

I'm not sure the US couldn't do exactly that. IIRC the West Coast strategic naval reserve dwarfed the PH one even in 1941. And in 1941, most of the US oil fields were still producing at max capacity. IIRC the US output was on the order of several hundred million bbl per annum.

Even assuming total destruction of the PH oil reserve, the problem seems to me not to be "can it be done?" or even "can it be done quickly?" it's "what do you divert to do it quickly?" Viewed that way, if it is really desirable on a strategic level to have the PH farms capable of supporting an 8BB gun line by, say, April 1942, the only question you need to answer is "who doesn't get the oil?" That is, of course, if you do nothing like divert some C2 shipyards to construction of T2s or T3s.

But my other point that I don't want to get lost is that the 4 million bbl at PH was intended primarily for the use of the BBs. CVs, CAs and their escorts burned much less fuel. So even if the PH fuel farms are damaged as much as 50%, there is possibly enough fuel there (again, I do not know for sure, anyone know how much fuel was required for the raids on Tarawa or Rabual in e.1942?) to support, from Pearl Harbor, the same ships that the USN historically deployed to the Pacific through, say, September 1942.

[mogami]

Hi, If the fuel farm was destroyed. And the BB undamaged. You could fuel the other ships from the BB. (The BB would have to stay home for a while but I bet there was a lot of fuel on board. The Japanese were later forced to salvage fuel from the Mutsu's wreck but it was done.

[Rendova]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, If the fuel farm was destroyed. And the BB undamaged. You could fuel the other ships from the BB. (The BB would have to stay home for a while but I bet there was a lot of fuel on board. The Japanese were later forced to salvage fuel from the Mutsu's wreck but it was done.

Good Point I blieve the BB were full or mostly full, The Arizona is actually still leaking fuel to give you an idea just how much they held.

[Mr.Frag]

In any case, an easy way of testing all this in WitP would be to be able to edit the fuel supply points of Pearl Harbor. Will there be an editor for WitP that will allow for base supply and fuel point editing?

Yep, edit to your hearts content:

[madflava13]

Mr. Frag,
I think you misunderstood me, or I wasn't clear enough...
I don't think the loss of the fuel would endanger the US in the Pacific. You are correct in all you said, but I do think that loss would delay the progress some months while the stockpile was reformed. I don't think this would be a game/war-ender by any means. I understand the length of the war... I was just saying the loss of the oil would slow down the US' progress somewhat.

Even if the fuel was drained from the BBs, at some point you hit the wall where you need to replace stocks at PH. That's where the delay comes in. Maybe all it would do is force the timetable back a month or two, but that still means Japan has an extra month or two to consolidate defenses, etc.

In the end, Japan still loses of course. Maybe it just happens in October 1945 instead...

[Mr.Frag]

I don't think the loss of the fuel would endanger the US in the Pacific. You are correct in all you said, but I do think that loss would delay the progress some months while the stockpile was reformed. I don't think this would be a game/war-ender by any means. I understand the length of the war... I was just saying the loss of the oil would slow down the US' progress somewhat.

Ha, I think your misunderstood me too. I'm simply pointing out that the USN didn't really do anything radical after PH that would have required the fuel anyways. It would have been replaced by the time they started thinking Coral Sea.

Had the BB's been unharmed and the Fuel gone instead, the USN probably would have steamed into certain death with some silly save Mac plan so in effect, it is probably a good thing that it happened the way it did or those sunken BB's would be in Manila instead with no chance of them being raised. [:D]

[Pascal_slith]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag


Ha, I think your misunderstood me too. I'm simply pointing out that the USN didn't really do anything radical after PH that would have required the fuel anyways. It would have been replaced by the time they started thinking Coral Sea.

Had the BB's been unharmed and the Fuel gone instead, the USN probably would have steamed into certain death with some silly save Mac plan so in effect, it is probably a good thing that it happened the way it did or those sunken BB's would be in Manila instead with no chance of them being raised. [:D]

Well, given what is written in the CinCPac communications in "Admiral Nimitz Command Summary" for 1942, the USN didn't do anything radical because they couldn't expend the fuel.

Thanks for the post of the edit screen. [&o]

[madflava13]

Mr. Frag,
Ok ok... I promise I'll read posts more carefully in the future...

[;)]

[Luskan]

The "throwing gas on the fire" was the hint I think we all missed in this excellent oil logistics argument.

Surely the loss of the oil wasn't really going to shit the US too much - a hassle, an irritation, sure, but nothing cataclismic. No, the reason for bombing the oil depot on pearl was to start a fire with 30.8 Cimarrons worth of oil that would spread and BURN like a wild thing if you bombed the place properly. That sized oil farm fire would have been far beyond the specialised fire fighting capabilities of 1941 (I assume) and the fire would have burned until all combustibles were consumed.

So at the very least, the pall of smoke from such a big fire would be absolutely massive (not as big as the cloud that hung over the Gulf when Saddam first lit up the oil well heads) but if the wind was blowing the wrong way, a: you'd have a damned big fire eating its way across Oahu (maybe), b: the smoke would disrupt flight ops and c: you would have to wait for the fire to finish burning and cool off for up to a week or two before you even started to think about bulldozing the place and starting again.

The loss of the oil isn't nearly as big a problem as the fire would be (i feel).