Naval Mines

[Blitzer]

Does anyone know how or if these are modelled? Moving from the North Sea through the Dover Barrage for example should be very expensive, or prohibited.

Part of my beer-addled brain remembers reading that more warships were lost to mines than to enemy action.

[Bis]

Toss in the fact that, had the Dardinelles minefields been cleared, no Gallipoli landing would have been needed. The attempt to force the straits ended when three capital ships were lost to mines on 3/18/1915.

[Blitzer]

Hi Bis,

From what I've read, the Entente ships could have carried through the plan despite their losses. The Turkish forts were nearly out of ammunition, and the channel had been swept fairly well, but an unexpected minefield parallel to the Asiatic shore chilled the Allied commanders' feet and precipitated an unnecessary withdrawal.

You're right of course in that the whole Dardanelles operation was a debacle from beginning to end.

[wodin]

Yes the Naval forces if they had continued would have cleared the mines. As the Turks were out of ammo. However the British Admiral didnt like losing ships so was to scared to continue whereas Churchill wanted them to carry on.

In fact the Navy let down the Army during the landings aswell.

Looks like we all know our WW1 here:)

[DoomedMantis]

More like the British let down the Anzacs

[Caranorn]

There were quite a few Brits stuck at Gallipoli as well.

The problem with the naval commander during the attempt to force the straits seems to have been that he did not understand the low value of his obsolete battleships. While their crews were indeed valuable (even irreplacable), the ships themselves were at the end of their careers. Sending a dreadnaught into those straits would indeed have been a waste, but those old toothless pre-dreadnaughts were an entirely different matter.

Marc aka Caran...

ORIGINAL: DoomedMantis

More like the British let down the Anzacs

[Delphinium]

The reluctance to continue is understandable. Bouvet went down fast with great loss of life, Irresistable & Ocean were gone and 3 other bombarding ships were damaged. IF Queen Elizabeth had been lost is would have had major repercussions as that is losing one of the RN's most powerful battleships. It would have taken a gambling man to continue and the RN did not at the time (Beatty excepted) have many natural gamblers.

Personally I always like to blame the French[;)]

[Blitzer]

Greetings,

I completely agree about the high risk factor and the conservative British naval mentality (except for the captains of the minesweepers, who ironically would have been in the greatest peril). I think that with a more aggressive approach the ships could in fact have made it to Constantinople, despite their antiquated armament - the QE notwithstanding. Many of the Turkish forts had not received significant overhaul since the Middle Ages, and with a more intelligent naval fire plan most of the portable batteries and searchlights could have been smashed, driven away, or silenced by landing parties. For me, the real issue is whether the Turks, seeing an Entente fleet (of whatever size and condition) parked off their capital, would immediately have thrown in the towel. This I strongly doubt. The operation was practically feasible, but strategically idiotic.

Now back to my original question. Since we all concur that mines played an important role in the war, does anyone know how or if they affect the game?

[wodin]

Sir Ian Hamilton was a good man but just stuck in the British way of doing things. He was to scared to tell Kitchener the full extent of what was happening during the landings, he was also very poorly prepared for the actual task. hardly any preparation was done prior to the invasion and totally inadequatley supplied in landing vessels and hospital ships aswell as many other improtant things. The terrian and total lack of what those ris=dges looked like made all their plans useless. Infact the terrian was what really put an end to any success in Gallipoli. One other thing which many dont consider in summing up. This type of war had never been fought before, the landings at Gallipoli was a massive task which far outwieghed any previous wartime operation. The high command therefore just didnt have any idea on how to fight a war like this so huge in scale were all previous tactics and strategies were useless.

It was a disaster allround at the top. Even the Aussie top brass were responsible for the tragic outcome. If the British Navy stuck to it then it may have been a differetn story. Infact this was Churchills plan all along, he wasnt convinced about a landing by the army.

[GWL_Tim]

Another problem was the complete loss of the element of surprise for the landings. Before the Navy tried to force the straits landing parties had landed and walked around virtually unmolested. The High Command in WW1 did tend (I believe) to completely forget the element of surprise - when they did use it they had some reasonable success - until inevitably pushing the attack to far (Messines, Cambria, 8th Aug 1918). Gallipoli could have worked I think if the attack had been planned in secret, the troops trained, a reliable robust commander chosen. To many ifs (oh and no Anzacs [;)] - just joking before you all write in!). It is often forgotten that the British had vast majority of the forces and casualties at Gallipoli. Much as I admire the ANZACs efforts and tenacity they were the much smaller force - correct me if I'm wrong but weren't there more French even than ANZACs at least initially - landing on the Turkish mainland as a distraction!
One thing all these ifs add up to is the chance to hopefully try them out in this game [:D]

[Blitzer]

Good points all.

Terrain was determinant from the artillery standpoint, though many of the Turkish guns, both fixed and portable, ended up buried in earth or actually sliding down embankments caused by the bombardments. As for forcing the Straights, surprise was impossible after the attempts to knock out the forts on 19 and 25 February, as GWL_Tim points out, but a heavier dose of brute naval force would probably have made up for it; at least von Sanders thought so. I'm grateful to wodin for reminding of the great novelty of this attack, and the resultant inexperience and unpreparedness of Carden and de Robeck. In a way, its method and goal can be seen as an extension of the "gunboat diplomacy" approach of several pre-war situations.

As for the peninsular landings themselves, nothing but misery and mistakes all around. [:(]