Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged?????

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: Fallschirmjager

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

One extra very important thing to clearly understand:

When assaulting Atolls, you must be super prepped and have ever bonus under the sun in your favour.

The landing automatically kicks off a shock attack by your troops which will produce horrid losses if you did not:

(a) Pack your ships so troops come off really fast (50% troops/supplies is a good mix here)
(b) Get there at night so you have 2 phases worth of unload time before the shock attack kicks off
(c) Bring enough troops so that you completely overwhelm the defenders
(d) Bombard the hell out of the place for weeks (airfield/port attack over time)
(e) Maximize disruption of troops by killing off support/supply (airfield/port attacks over time)
(f) Multiple Ground attacks the turn of the attack to disrupt large troop formations *before* they pummel you.

All in all, failure is not an option as you *will* loose all your troops if it goes bad. Japanese troops do *not* surrender.

Japanese troops hardly ever engaged the enemy on the beach. How will you lose all your troops when the landing goes unoppossed?

"Rommel believed in those favorite shibboleths of his oriental ally, to 'anihillate the enemy at the beachhead,' 'hurl him into the sea,'.... -"The Two Ocean Navy" pg.395, Morison.

[;)]

[rhohltjr]

ORIGINAL: showboat1

I usually spend all of Dec. 41, Jan 42, and Feb 42 in a full scale retreat to try and save anything and everything I can. ...

So do I. In PacWar. I try to use Evacuation missions to pull troops out of harms way.
I already know this (WitP) evac process is political points related.

Can anyone(testers?) give any clue about any other details regarding evac missions?
For instance where/how does, this combination of political points, evac transports and troops
to be evacuated come together? Please elaborate. Evac transports just conjured up out of thin air by using those magic political points? Do you pre assign the transports to Evac like the routine convoy system at San Fran or Osaka?
[&:]

[Mr.Frag]

Ships carry troops. Planes carry troops.

There is no other way to move.

Changing the HQ to a non-restricted one so you are permitted to movedoes not replace the ship/air requirements.

Nothing comes from thin air. You either have a ship were the unit is or they don't leave. [:(]

[jcjordan]

Well my strategy from PACWAR was to stall the IJA & IJN as much as possible early on in China & India making a good long stand at Rangoon if possible. Then as the 14th Army comes in drive out the IJA through Malaya & then in to China. On the Dutch front, try to set a line at Timor so that I might still get air raids to Balikipapan using it as a spring board to retake Java & Borneo thereby constricting Oil from IJN. In Solomans, New Guinea & Australia, hold & keep open through Nouema using it as a springboard to retake Phillippines & Saipan. As far as the Central Pac, make what stand I can at Wake & Midway using it as a springboard to take the Marshall Islands & into Iwo Jima then into Japan itself.

[byron13]

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag
There are 30 *major* units that come in to the Pacific area from the US/Oz/NZ. (many many others).

Given this and what I understand (or think I understand) about reflagging split units), does it make any sense to break down a division on the Philippines and try to evacuate a small portion of it that can be rebuilt to full division-sized strength once the other portions of the division inevitably surrender/die? If this works, it would give you one or two more divisions later in the war. And what the heck: they're going to die anyway, and your cargo ships are evacuating the area anyway. (Or are all units in a fixed command so they cannot be transferred to another command at any time regardless of PPs?)

Of course, this is gamey . . .

[mogami]

Hi, Stick as many prongs as you can support into the Japanese. The more prongs the lighter the defense any one will face. The fewer prongs the more defense the Japanese can move in the path. There are at least 6 "Prongs" possible. And most of them have "Forks"


"If you come to a fork in the road,.... take it."

[Mr.Frag]

Of course, this is gamey . . .

Expensive, 5-6 days worth of hording points and the troops there are not anything to write home about compared to one of the 30 monsters like the 3rd USMC Division.

That same cost with buy most of your air units out of the area.

[byron13]

It's really that expensive to get what I guess would be a regiment out, eh?

Hmmm. Okay. Thanks for your thoughts.

[mogami]

Hi, The problem is that to get a portion of a unit out of a HQ you have to pay for the entire unit. If I wanted to get the Marine Regt out Of PI and rebuild it later I would need to buy the entire unit and then load what I could onto a ship. (or move transport planes into area and begin flying it out)

Several points. The Aussie units in Malaya are not in a restricted HQ. You can save the unit (or portions of it) without spending PP. The Dutch have no units worth going through the trouble for.

[ColFrost]

I do hope that someone, anyone, has some grasp that it was unexceptable for the Allied forces to wait for 1943 for an offensive maneuver.

I know the game won't allow for this, but if the Allies had engaged in a sitzkreig and waited until all their carriers had Corsairs and Hellcats before beginning offensive action, not even the memory of Pearl Harbor would have prevented a negotiated settlement.

This is of course my opinion, and I'll play people who think differently.

Personally, it'll make for a boring game.

[Radzy]

ORIGINAL: Fallschirmjager

Japanese troops hardly ever engaged the enemy on the beach. How will you lose all your troops when the landing goes unoppossed?

Well it is hard not to react to landing enemy troops when you are on atol.[:)].

Also it seems to be related with game rule of shock attack after landing. When you shock attack with few troops with high disruption they have to be destroyed.

[2Stepper]

I have to agree ColFrost... (by the by, While I live in Omaha, I'm from Minnesota too) [8D]

As to your point, I've always thought you had to at least "duke it out" with the IJN/IJA in smaller scale operations to at least keep things moving. I understand the process that can lead to "wasting" units in this game just as much as it was the case in the war.

However I hardly consider the holding, almost "tug of war" actions for Henderson field to be "wasting" troops. Once the IJA/IJN was finally booted off the island it gave the US a great staging base to start harassing Rabaul and eventually get the move north going.

Just my thoughts... but either way this'll all be REAL interesting once the game gets rolling.

[Hoplosternum]

I don't know whether the US would have negociated a peace after a Sitz at Pearl for the first year and half of the War. But I do know that it does not sound like an appealing game. I want to refight Guadalcanal, Midway and Coral Sea. Even if they occur in different places and times. The less than heroic fall of Singapore and the Marianas Turkey Shoot hold far less interest. Especially if there has been little fighting when the sides were evenly matched. Victories at Leyte will be all the sweeter if you once knew fear....

I shall certainly try and attack as the Allies long before the Hellcats and Essexes arrive. If that dooms me so be it. Waiting for the Essexes is a strategy that barely befits a timid school girl which I shall be sure to mention to any Allied opponent who's navy skulks around the US West Coast until he has overwhelming force [;)]

[gunboat]

Disclaimer: I do not have UV, so I will be completely new to the system.

It would seem to me that the number of prongs that work best depends on how the firebombing of japan is handled. If that is accurately modeled, then one prong to get the b29s in range, then p-51s in range, then a forward base to invade (if necesary/before abombs). This combined with subs cutting off japan's home islands should be enough I would think. (and just let the bypassed bases starve) Would this plan be viable?

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: ColFrost

I do hope that someone, anyone, has some grasp that it was unexceptable for the Allied forces to wait for 1943 for an offensive maneuver.

I know the game won't allow for this, but if the Allies had engaged in a sitzkreig and waited until all their carriers had Corsairs and Hellcats before beginning offensive action, not even the memory of Pearl Harbor would have prevented a negotiated settlement.

As long as you realize that the arguments for early Allied offensives are pure garbage,
and that it was not only considered "acceptable" to wait for 1943, but it was the Joint
Chiefs express plan and strategy to do so. That's what "Germany First" meant. What
got things going in the Pacific much earlier than Planned (or than the Allies were actually
ready for) was the unexpected triumph at Midway. This gave Ernie King (who was look-
ing for a campaign where his Navy could be the "big dog") and Doug MacArthur (who was
looking for a chance to re-shine his reputation) both a chance to push for "limited
offensive actions" in their areas. And both grew into gruelling, bloody, dragged-out
six month campaigns run on a "shoestring" with much higher losses than necessary.

It looks like the game's "victory points" are going to force much the same kind of
nonsense on the Allied Player (Midway or no Midway), so you should be pleased. But
please don't try to cloak it in any robes of "Historical Necessity". Original US strategic
planning would have had the war with Japan going into 1946 if necessary..., and no
one was worried about the Japanese "winning" in the interim.

[Mr.Frag]

Agreed Mike, frankly as long as Japan was not showing up off the Coast of the USA, who cares what they were doing?

The USA knew that there was never any real threat. China could not be subdued (Japan had been trying to years and failed). The Brits could take care of themselves in India. Oz, well, they are all criminals anyways... [:D]

The early battles where the USN really didn't come out looking too bright were a result in their lack of understanding that the art of war had changed. Once they got spanked, they regrouped and reeducated themselves for fighting a modern war that came out fighting and really never lost a battle from that point on.

The majority of the fighting that was remotely close happened before the USN had fully grasped how warfare had changed. By the close of '43, the USN had learned how to fight and use the new tools of the trade and Japan was just a matter of stepping stones.

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: ColFrost

I do hope that someone, anyone, has some grasp that it was unexceptable for the Allied forces to wait for 1943 for an offensive maneuver.

I know the game won't allow for this, but if the Allies had engaged in a sitzkreig and waited until all their carriers had Corsairs and Hellcats before beginning offensive action, not even the memory of Pearl Harbor would have prevented a negotiated settlement.

As long as you realize that the arguments for early Allied offensives are pure garbage,
and that it was not only considered "acceptable" to wait for 1943, but it was the Joint
Chiefs express plan and strategy to do so. That's what "Germany First" meant. What
got things going in the Pacific much earlier than Planned (or than the Allies were actually
ready for) was the unexpected triumph at Midway. This gave Ernie King (who was look-
ing for a campaign where his Navy could be the "big dog") and Doug MacArthur (who was
looking for a chance to re-shine his reputation) both a chance to push for "limited
offensive actions" in their areas. And both grew into gruelling, bloody, dragged-out
six month campaigns run on a "shoestring" with much higher losses than necessary.

It looks like the game's "victory points" are going to force much the same kind of
nonsense on the Allied Player (Midway or no Midway), so you should be pleased. But
please don't try to cloak it in any robes of "Historical Necessity". Original US strategic
planning would have had the war with Japan going into 1946 if necessary..., and no
one was worried about the Japanese "winning" in the interim.

Why would the US have risked almost the entire carrier forces afloat if they did not think they could win at Midway?

And why even attempt to thwart the Japanese at Coral Sea if the JCS could wait to take offensive until '43? The fact is they couldn't wait and events bore that out.

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".

The fact that the Japanese were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal forced the US to take action or have lines of communication with Australia threatened. Which is what the Victory Points kind of approximate, they force you to take some action as the Allied player and not hide in a shell.

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.

It'll be up to the Allied player on how to respond to the IJN player.

And it's just a disingenous stab at someone to say that political considerations in the early part of the Pacific War were bunk.

[tsimmonds]

The fact is that, following the undoing of two decades of British promises to the Dominions that they would defend Australia and New Zealand at Singapore, a power vacuum existed in the western Pacific. The reality was that Britain could not live up to her promises, so America would have to do so instead. From March 42 on, FDR and the JCS realized that the eastern approaches to Australia would have to be defended. This led directly to the deployment of the Americal division to Noumea, to 12 squadrons of bombers immediately being earmarked for OZ, and to the committment of carriers to the defense of Port Moresby. During the first 6 months of 1942, the Army rushed troops not to the ETO but rather to the Southwest Pacific and Australia, the place on the planet where they were needed the most. As an added political bonus, maintaining the supply line to Australia kept MacArthur at its far end rather than in Washington, where he might have played politics himself by exposing the bankrupt pre-war strategy of building up the Philippines....

[mdiehl]

The USA built French Frigate Shoals into a Naval air station with a airstrip longer then the Island was before they began. (They enlarged the island)

I just LOVE the American way of fighting WW2. [:D]

[dwesolick]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The USA built French Frigate Shoals into a Naval air station with a airstrip longer then the Island was before they began. (They enlarged the island)

I just LOVE the American way of fighting WW2. [:D]

I love this quote: "The American Army doesn't solve its problems. It overwhelms them."