The Movie Troy

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

It should also be remembered that feigning retreat to draw in the enemy, and then attacking again, was a favoured tactic of the Greeks.

Note the Spartans did this very thing at Thermopylae against the Persian host. . .

I beg to differ[:-]

The entire heart of archaic greek battle ethics was the close quarter clash that enabled the battle to be finished quickly. Making ruses and feigning flight only became a big thing in the 4th century (and really big in hellenistic times)

I simply can't see what it is you are arguing against.

Yes, you are correct in what you stated.

However, since the Spartans did feign retreat and then rallied to attack the Persians, this clearly shows this is something for which they trained to perform.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: mavraam



Hannibal was able to close the gate and destroy 8 Roman Legions. It looks from the diagrams that you showed that many Persians were able to flee to their ships in this case.

A brilliant commander such as Hannibal could have adopted and modified the tactics used by the Greeks.

Einstein, before he came up with his own brilliant theories, had earned a PH.D, and so had studied all the ideas of those who went before him.

It seems reasonable that Hannibal would have wanted to know how the Greeks beat a much larger force of Persians at Marathon. He could then have seen where he could improve upon their tactics. . .

Possibly, but it remains conjecture,and a thin one at that.

Well, that may be true.

But surely to suggest that Hannibal or Alexander, or for any general not to have studied and examined the battles and commanders of the past, is to be walking blind.

Einstein was a genius, yes. But first he needed to assimilate all the info about science of the past. He simply did not wake up one day, and presto! discovered the Theory of Relativity. . .

Hannibal was a smart guy, no doubt. But since the Carthaginans sailed the Mediterranean world, Carthage would have had access to many of the written works of the ancient Greeks, etc, etc. . .

His father would have taught him, etc, etc. . .

People, no matter how brilliant they become, are products of what they learn. . .

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


I did not say it was an intentional ruse. I said it appeared to be of a purposeful design. Even if not intentional, the Greek generals were quick to capitalize on the situation and were flexible enough to to know exactly where to strike the enemy.

Certainly.

[What do you think the Athenian generals were debating? A good general would not only debate about whether to do battle, but also about what tactics to use.]

I would like to point out that studies of the written sources seems to indicate that the depth of the phalanx was up to the individual Lochaiaoi to determine the depth of which his Lochos would fight (W.K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek military practices part 1. Berkeley 1974 Page 140-142). Again, nothing in the sources (Herodotus) supports the notion that the outflanking ,maneuever was deliberate and intentional.

[Clearly, having the centre left weak was part of the OoB - it was purposely done. Herodotus did not include everything about the Battle of Marathon in his account. For example, he left out the fact that Themistocles was in command of the "weak centre"]

http://campus.northpark.edu/history/Cla ... athon.html [/quote]

Certainly, but I tend to believe that the reason was because the subunit commanders (Lochaioi) in the centre chose to do so, and not because of any intentional ruse on the greek side decided at the top level. If this was the case, it would have been stated in later historical sources as another example of greek military superiority and cunning.As it is, the absence of any notions pertaining to this speaks for iself.

I believe the details of Themistocles partcipation can be found in the aptly named biography by Plutarch[;)]

This is not true.

I quote Creasy:

"Aristides and Themistocles (who were in charge of the weak centre) re-newed the fight with their reorganized troops, and the full force of the Greeks were brought into close action with the Persian and Sacian divisions of the enemy (Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, p.24)."

I gave you Herodotus account above. Herodotus is a primary source. Creasy ain´t. What does Creasy bring forward to support this notion?

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



During the Greek/Persian Wars, Herodotus mentions that Xerxes crossed the Hellespont with 3 million men.

Scholars today acknowledge that that was a gross exaggeration. They estimate it was closer to 250,000 - 300,000 men.

So, he was also prone to faulty reporting [;)]

Also, those graphics do depict how the battle was fought according to Herodotus. . .

Exaggerations of numbers are common in antique history, and it was not unique to Herodotus[;)]

And since Herodutus wrote the Histories many years after the events, scholars have found many other things wrong as well. He was Greek and was prone to bias towards Greece.

He is not infallible, and should not be looked at as the "Holy Grail" of information.

Certainly not, but in this case he is THE best primary source.

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

It should also be remembered that feigning retreat to draw in the enemy, and then attacking again, was a favoured tactic of the Greeks.

Note the Spartans did this very thing at Thermopylae against the Persian host. . .

I beg to differ[:-]

The entire heart of archaic greek battle ethics was the close quarter clash that enabled the battle to be finished quickly. Making ruses and feigning flight only became a big thing in the 4th century (and really big in hellenistic times)

I simply can't see what it is you are arguing against.

Yes, you are correct in what you stated.

However, since the Spartans did feign retreat and then rallied to attack the Persians, this clearly shows this is something for which they trained to perform.

Yep, but the Spartans were the cream of greek military prowess with regard to maneuver, so I don´t find it odd that THEY could pull something like this off.

Besides, I argue because I like to. Discussions about obscure subjects are fun[8D]

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



A brilliant commander such as Hannibal could have adopted and modified the tactics used by the Greeks.

Einstein, before he came up with his own brilliant theories, had earned a PH.D, and so had studied all the ideas of those who went before him.

It seems reasonable that Hannibal would have wanted to know how the Greeks beat a much larger force of Persians at Marathon. He could then have seen where he could improve upon their tactics. . .

Possibly, but it remains conjecture,and a thin one at that.

Well, that may be true.

But surely to suggest that Hannibal or Alexander, or for any general not to have studied and examined the battles and commanders of the past, is to be walking blind.

Einstein was a genius, yes. But first he needed to assimilate all the info about science of the past. He simply did not wake up one day, and presto! discovered the Theory of Relativity. . .

Hannibal was a smart guy, no doubt. But since the Carthaginans sailed the Mediterranean world, Carthage would have had access to many of the written works of the ancient Greeks, etc, etc. . .

His father would have taught him, etc, etc. . .

People, no matter how brilliant they become, are products of what they learn. . .

Of course.

[Belisarius]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


I did not say it was an intentional ruse. I said it appeared to be of a purposeful design. Even if not intentional, the Greek generals were quick to capitalize on the situation and were flexible enough to to know exactly where to strike the enemy.

Certainly.

[What do you think the Athenian generals were debating? A good general would not only debate about whether to do battle, but also about what tactics to use.]

I would like to point out that studies of the written sources seems to indicate that the depth of the phalanx was up to the individual Lochaiaoi to determine the depth of which his Lochos would fight (W.K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek military practices part 1. Berkeley 1974 Page 140-142). Again, nothing in the sources (Herodotus) supports the notion that the outflanking ,maneuever was deliberate and intentional.

Excuse me for meddling; but since the General was appointed day by day on a rotary schedule and in turn the position of General was mainly as a "drill inspector", i.e. to organize the battle formation, wouldn't this ultimately have been the decision of Miltiades'? Or possibly together with Kallimachos, even if it wasn't his "day" to decide.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


I did not say it was an intentional ruse. I said it appeared to be of a purposeful design. Even if not intentional, the Greek generals were quick to capitalize on the situation and were flexible enough to to know exactly where to strike the enemy.

Certainly.

[What do you think the Athenian generals were debating? A good general would not only debate about whether to do battle, but also about what tactics to use.]

I would like to point out that studies of the written sources seems to indicate that the depth of the phalanx was up to the individual Lochaiaoi to determine the depth of which his Lochos would fight (W.K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek military practices part 1. Berkeley 1974 Page 140-142). Again, nothing in the sources (Herodotus) supports the notion that the outflanking ,maneuever was deliberate and intentional.

[Clearly, having the centre left weak was part of the OoB - it was purposely done. Herodotus did not include everything about the Battle of Marathon in his account. For example, he left out the fact that Themistocles was in command of the "weak centre"]

http://campus.northpark.edu/history/Cla ... athon.html

Certainly, but I tend to believe that the reason was because the subunit commanders (Lochaioi) in the centre chose to do so, and not because of any intentional ruse on the greek side decided at the top level. If this was the case, it would have been stated in later historical sources as another example of greek military superiority and cunning.As it is, the absence of any notions pertaining to this speaks for iself.

I believe the details of Themistocles partcipation can be found in the aptly named biography by Plutarch[;)]

This is not true.

I quote Creasy:

"Aristides and Themistocles (who were in charge of the weak centre) re-newed the fight with their reorganized troops, and the full force of the Greeks were brought into close action with the Persian and Sacian divisions of the enemy (Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, p.24)."

I gave you Herodotus account above. Herodotus is a primary source. Creasy ain´t. What does Creasy bring forward to support this notion?
[/quote]


1) Well, I find it hard to believe that thinning the centre lines would not have been made at the highest command levels. You are making conjecture here by leaving it to the subunit commanders. In such an important battle, this would not have been left to the subunit commanders.

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


I did not say it was an intentional ruse. I said it appeared to be of a purposeful design. Even if not intentional, the Greek generals were quick to capitalize on the situation and were flexible enough to to know exactly where to strike the enemy.

Certainly.

[What do you think the Athenian generals were debating? A good general would not only debate about whether to do battle, but also about what tactics to use.]

I would like to point out that studies of the written sources seems to indicate that the depth of the phalanx was up to the individual Lochaiaoi to determine the depth of which his Lochos would fight (W.K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek military practices part 1. Berkeley 1974 Page 140-142). Again, nothing in the sources (Herodotus) supports the notion that the outflanking ,maneuever was deliberate and intentional.

Excuse me for meddling; but since the General was appointed day by day on a rotary schedule and in turn the position of General was mainly as a "drill inspector", i.e. to organize the battle formation, wouldn't this ultimately have been the decision of Miltiades'? Or possibly together with Kallimachos, even if it wasn't his "day" to decide.

The position of "Strategoi" carried no such power. It was his obligation to decide when and where to engage, not superwise the formation of the different sub units (who were from other cities than Athens)

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen



Exaggerations of numbers are common in antique history, and it was not unique to Herodotus[;)]

And since Herodutus wrote the Histories many years after the events, scholars have found many other things wrong as well. He was Greek and was prone to bias towards Greece.

He is not infallible, and should not be looked at as the "Holy Grail" of information.

Certainly not, but in this case he is THE best primary source.

Well, Herodotus did not witness any of these events. It's all second hand information. He condenses a lot of info and leaves out a lot of info.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH HERODOTUS:

All scholars agree that Herodotos' account contains "not a few patent contradictions." Bury regrets that at the time of Marathon there was not "a contemporary historian lice Thukydides to ask searching questions and record the truth." (44)

Macan declares that the story of the Athenian advance against the Persians is "probably genuine," as long as we assume that it was a march at double speed and not a race, but "the rest is distortion, exaggeration, inconsequence, glorification." (45)

Most scholars are only somewhat less critical than Macan. A group that is more radical than Macan claims that actually it was the Persians who went to the attack; their argument is that, since Herodotos does not mention the participation of the Persian cavalry in the battle, it can be inferred that the Persians had decided to attack the Athenians on the hills.

Several other explanations for the failure of the Persian cavalry to participate in the battle have been offered. Grote suggested that the Athenians caught the Persian horsemen by surprise so that they did not have time to get on their mounts. Among the recent writers, H. G. L. Hammond claims that the cavalry was pasturing further north and did not arrive in time for the beginning of the battle. By the time it arrived, it could not be deployed because the armies were fighting at close quarters. (46)

Some scholars claim that the Persian cavalry had not yet arrived from Eretria, even though Herodotos states that the Persians had landed at Marathon a few days after the capture of Eretria and that the battle took place on the eleventh day after the landing. In order to explain why the cavalry was still at Eretria, Munro adds the further suggestion that the Persians had landed at the same time at Karystos, Eretria, and Marathon with the result that their forces were scattered in three separate actions. (47)

I have already mentioned the opinion that Herodotos is completely wrong when he states that the expeditionary forces sent to Greece included horsemen. At the opposite extreme there are the critics, such as Johannes Kromayer (48) and Hans Delbrueck, (49) who claim that Herodotos is in error when he assumes that the Persian cavalry did not participate in the battle. (50)

Among the minority of scholars who do not assume that the Persians were wanton in their military actions and that Herodotos is fanciful in his report, there prevails the opinion that the cavalry was absent from the battle because it had been embarked, since the Persians were planning to withdraw from Marathon and to land at the Phaleron, the outer harbor of Athens. (51)

The withdrawal of the Persian cavalry is mentioned in the dictionary of Suidas where he explains the meaning of the idiom xwris ippeis "without cavalry, the cavalry is off": "As Datis who had landed in Attica was retiring, the Ionians by climbing on trees signalled to the Athenians the cavalry is off." "As Miltiades learned in this way of their withdrawal, he engaged battle and won. Hence, this expression is used proverbially to refer to those who are breaking their military formation." According to this text the Ionians who were serving in the Persian fleet betrayed their Persian commander by informing their fellow Greeks; the withdrawal must have taken place at night because otherwise the Athenians encamped above Marathon would have seen by themselves what was taking place.

We may disregard the opinion of those, such as Schachermeyr, who question the account of Herodotos by claiming that the Persians never planned to land at the Phaleron after the withdrawal from Marathon (fantaisies had said Hauvette of this [52]).

An opposite position is taken by Anton E. Raubitschek who claims not only that the Persians planned to land at the Phaleron, but actually landed and were defeated there in a battle with the Athenians; (53) neither Herodotos nor any other Greek source hints at the occurrence of this repetition of the battle of Marathon.

Among the other more recent writers on the subject, A. W. Gomme was willing to accept Herodotos' account as having some value. Gomme gave an explanation of what happened at Marathon that to my mind is convincing and in agreement with the texts; but, since to assume that Herodotos said something sensible is a serious offense for modern scholarship, before presenting his views Gomme engaged in elaborate expiatory rites. He began his article thus:
Everyone knows that Herodotos' narrative of Marathon will not do. Many improvements have been suggested: some good, some bad. . . . My theme is rather this: if we reject Herodotos, are we justified at all in correcting, or adding to, his narrative, or ought we just to sit back, and say nothing, because correction is arbitrary? (54)

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/arti ... _wars4.php

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
1) Well, I find it hard to believe that thinning the centre lines would not have been made at the highest command levels. You are making conjecture here by leaving it to the subunit commanders. In such an important battle, this would not have been left to the subunit commanders.

Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Well, Herodotus did not witness any of these events. It's all second hand information. He condenses a lot of info and leaves out a lot of info.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH HERODOTUS:

All scholars agree that Herodotos' account contains "not a few patent contradictions." Bury regrets that at the time of Marathon there was not "a contemporary historian lice Thukydides to ask searching questions and record the truth." (44)

Macan declares that the story of the Athenian advance against the Persians is "probably genuine," as long as we assume that it was a march at double speed and not a race, but "the rest is distortion, exaggeration, inconsequence, glorification." (45)

Most scholars are only somewhat less critical than Macan. A group that is more radical than Macan claims that actually it was the Persians who went to the attack; their argument is that, since Herodotos does not mention the participation of the Persian cavalry in the battle, it can be inferred that the Persians had decided to attack the Athenians on the hills.

Several other explanations for the failure of the Persian cavalry to participate in the battle have been offered. Grote suggested that the Athenians caught the Persian horsemen by surprise so that they did not have time to get on their mounts. Among the recent writers, H. G. L. Hammond claims that the cavalry was pasturing further north and did not arrive in time for the beginning of the battle. By the time it arrived, it could not be deployed because the armies were fighting at close quarters. (46)

Some scholars claim that the Persian cavalry had not yet arrived from Eretria, even though Herodotos states that the Persians had landed at Marathon a few days after the capture of Eretria and that the battle took place on the eleventh day after the landing. In order to explain why the cavalry was still at Eretria, Munro adds the further suggestion that the Persians had landed at the same time at Karystos, Eretria, and Marathon with the result that their forces were scattered in three separate actions. (47)

I have already mentioned the opinion that Herodotos is completely wrong when he states that the expeditionary forces sent to Greece included horsemen. At the opposite extreme there are the critics, such as Johannes Kromayer (48) and Hans Delbrueck, (49) who claim that Herodotos is in error when he assumes that the Persian cavalry did not participate in the battle. (50)

Among the minority of scholars who do not assume that the Persians were wanton in their military actions and that Herodotos is fanciful in his report, there prevails the opinion that the cavalry was absent from the battle because it had been embarked, since the Persians were planning to withdraw from Marathon and to land at the Phaleron, the outer harbor of Athens. (51)

The withdrawal of the Persian cavalry is mentioned in the dictionary of Suidas where he explains the meaning of the idiom xwris ippeis "without cavalry, the cavalry is off": "As Datis who had landed in Attica was retiring, the Ionians by climbing on trees signalled to the Athenians the cavalry is off." "As Miltiades learned in this way of their withdrawal, he engaged battle and won. Hence, this expression is used proverbially to refer to those who are breaking their military formation." According to this text the Ionians who were serving in the Persian fleet betrayed their Persian commander by informing their fellow Greeks; the withdrawal must have taken place at night because otherwise the Athenians encamped above Marathon would have seen by themselves what was taking place.

We may disregard the opinion of those, such as Schachermeyr, who question the account of Herodotos by claiming that the Persians never planned to land at the Phaleron after the withdrawal from Marathon (fantaisies had said Hauvette of this [52]).

An opposite position is taken by Anton E. Raubitschek who claims not only that the Persians planned to land at the Phaleron, but actually landed and were defeated there in a battle with the Athenians; (53) neither Herodotos nor any other Greek source hints at the occurrence of this repetition of the battle of Marathon.

Among the other more recent writers on the subject, A. W. Gomme was willing to accept Herodotos' account as having some value. Gomme gave an explanation of what happened at Marathon that to my mind is convincing and in agreement with the texts; but, since to assume that Herodotos said something sensible is a serious offense for modern scholarship, before presenting his views Gomme engaged in elaborate expiatory rites. He began his article thus:
Everyone knows that Herodotos' narrative of Marathon will not do. Many improvements have been suggested: some good, some bad. . . . My theme is rather this: if we reject Herodotos, are we justified at all in correcting, or adding to, his narrative, or ought we just to sit back, and say nothing, because correction is arbitrary? (54)

http://www.iranchamber.com/history/arti ... _wars4.php

Sure, but he is still the best primary source nonetheless.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

The battle formation was decided before the battle began - ie the middle ranks were thinned out. This would have bene decided by the overall commanders before the battle began. . .

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

You're joking, right? [:-]

He has all the footnotes and sources, but the publisher, because of the exacting nature of the scholarship, didn't need to put them in the book. In fact all his work is based on primary sources.

Creasy, to any scholars in the know, is THE authoritative source. I would accept his exacting scholarship over Herodotus any day. For 150 years Creasy's book has stood the test of time against the close eye of scrutiny.

Congressman Ike Skelton states that of the top 50 books worth reading, Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World; From Marathon to Waterloo, is THE most important book on the list. Skelton mailed copies of the list to hundreds of people, including chiefs of all the military branches, war college officials, various military officers, and every member of the U.S. House. In the first week alone, his office mailed out over 600 copies of the 50-book National Security List.

http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/2003/ ... pert.shtml

Herodotus, on the other hand, is full of errors and omissions.

[Rune Iversen]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

The battle formation was decided before the battle began - ie the middle ranks were thinned out. This would have bene decided by the overall commanders before the battle began. . .

Well, it would have been decided by the commanders of the different contingents before the battle, so in a sense, yes

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

You're joking, right? [:-]

He has all the footnotes and sources, but the publisher, because of the exacting nature of the scholarship, didn't need to put them in the book. In fact all his work is based on primary sources.

Creasy, to any scholars in the know, is THE authoritative source. I would accept his exacting scholarship over Herodotus any day. For 150 years Creasy's book has stood the test of time against the close eye of scrutiny.

Congressman Ike Skelton states that of the top 50 books worth reading, Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World; From Marathon to Waterloo, is THE most important book on the list. Skelton mailed copies of the list to hundreds of people, including chiefs of all the military branches, war college officials, various military officers, and every member of the U.S. House. In the first week alone, his office mailed out over 600 copies of the 50-book National Security List.

http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/2003/ ... pert.shtml

Herodotus, on the other hand, is full of errors and omissions.

You can´t possibly claim that a secondary source take presedence over a primary one. Creasy is a secondary source, Herodotus is primary. End of story.

[dinsdale]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
It is interesting that the Battle of Cannae is still studied in military academies today. I wonder how our modern age could use the same tactics used back in Hannibal's time?

Double envelopment by a smaller force is so unique that there are lessons for today. Just as Tzun Szu's principles are still relevant, so are the exploits of Hannibal, Caesar and other military genius.

As for "modern" war, couldn't some of Rommel's maneuvers be deemed similar to Hannibal? I can't remember the specifics or battle names off the top of my head but didn't he ignore the British centre and envelop both flanks at the start of his last great offensive?

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

ORIGINAL: Rune Iversen

Oh but it would. As I mentioned above the Strategus would have had no commanding power over the individual subunits from different cities (except perhaps for his own, and even then this is not certain). His obligation was solely to decide when and where to engage (which in itself proved ahuge problem in this type of coalition, even if it was just Athens and her allies), and exhort his men to fight bravely.

The battle formation was decided before the battle began - ie the middle ranks were thinned out. This would have bene decided by the overall commanders before the battle began. . .

Well, it would have been decided by the commanders of the different contingents before the battle, so in a sense, yes

2) Sir Edward S. Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World is considered the most famous work of military history of the 19th Century. His book is considered the authoritative account of each battle, and has stood the test of 150 years since it was first published. To quote Creasy, is like quoting an encyclopedia. Because of the very exact scholarship of the book, the publisher (for ease of reading) has left out the footnotes.

In other words: No footnotes, no sources=No value.

19th Century notions of historicistic scholarship has long since gone the way of the Dodo. I wouldn´t attach any particular value to it.

You're joking, right? [:-]

He has all the footnotes and sources, but the publisher, because of the exacting nature of the scholarship, didn't need to put them in the book. In fact all his work is based on primary sources.

Creasy, to any scholars in the know, is THE authoritative source. I would accept his exacting scholarship over Herodotus any day. For 150 years Creasy's book has stood the test of time against the close eye of scrutiny.

Congressman Ike Skelton states that of the top 50 books worth reading, Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World; From Marathon to Waterloo, is THE most important book on the list. Skelton mailed copies of the list to hundreds of people, including chiefs of all the military branches, war college officials, various military officers, and every member of the U.S. House. In the first week alone, his office mailed out over 600 copies of the 50-book National Security List.

http://www.eagleforum.org/educate/2003/ ... pert.shtml

Herodotus, on the other hand, is full of errors and omissions.

You can´t possibly claim that a secondary source take presedence over a primary one. Creasy is a secondary source, Herodotus is primary. End of story.

Well, I won't labour the point.

Suffice it to say, that scholars, both in antiquity and today, have found numerous errors in Herodotus. He is a good general reference of what happened. But the events he writes about must be examined in light of other knowledge on the subject.

Like you, I actually enjoy reading ancient sources - heheh.

Creasy uses nothing but primary sources, and after 150 years, his book has withstood all scrutiny. There is a reason why a book published in 1859 is still published and read today. . .

Cheers!

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: dinsdale

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
It is interesting that the Battle of Cannae is still studied in military academies today. I wonder how our modern age could use the same tactics used back in Hannibal's time?

Double envelopment by a smaller force is so unique that there are lessons for today. Just as Tzun Szu's principles are still relevant, so are the exploits of Hannibal, Caesar and other military genius.

As for "modern" war, couldn't some of Rommel's maneuvers be deemed similar to Hannibal? I can't remember the specifics or battle names off the top of my head but didn't he ignore the British centre and envelop both flanks at the start of his last great offensive?

Good observations [:)]

I have read a lot about Rommel, and although he adapted his tactics to the situation, many of his maneuvers have a hint of Hannibal in them.

Incidently, when the first Gulf War (1991) took place, General Schwarzkopf had a copy of Rommel's biography on his nightstand. It's interesting that the"Hail Mary" military maneuver the Allies put into practice was very similar to many of Rommel's tactics.

Cheers!

[dinsdale]

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Incidently, when the first Gulf War (1991) took place, General Schwarzkopf had a copy of Rommel's biography on his nightstand. It's interesting that the"Hail Mary" military maneuver the Allies put into practice was very similar to many of Rommel's tactics.

Cheers!

The book is Panzer Battles by Von Mellenthin. It's one of the most engaging books I've read and I'd recommend it!

I agree the Hail Mary was an interesting and thoroughly successful maneuver, the feat of moving that many troops to one wing of the theatre while the enemy believed an attack was to be directed from the coast has been ignored because it was too successful: the ground campaign looked too simple to be worthy of greatness, which is a shame.

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: dinsdale

ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Incidently, when the first Gulf War (1991) took place, General Schwarzkopf had a copy of Rommel's biography on his nightstand. It's interesting that the"Hail Mary" military maneuver the Allies put into practice was very similar to many of Rommel's tactics.

Cheers!

The book is Panzer Battles by Von Mellenthin. It's one of the most engaging books I've read and I'd recommend it!

I agree the Hail Mary was an interesting and thoroughly successful maneuver, the feat of moving that many troops to one wing of the theatre while the enemy believed an attack was to be directed from the coast has been ignored because it was too successful: the ground campaign looked too simple to be worthy of greatness, which is a shame.

Thanks for the tip about the book [:)]

I agree about the "Hail Mary". When I initially learned that the Allies seemed to be opting for an amphibious operation I started to worry.

However, once I learned that Rommel was being read, I knew the ground campaign would go well. The deception and military maneuver through the desert were performed flawlessly.

[Von Rom]

Hmmm, what a coincidence.

I see that Spartan is getting an expansion pack called "Gates of Troy"

The Advertising:

It includes 17 new heroes ranging from Achilles and Hektor in the Trojan Wars to Leonidas & Demophilus in the pass of Thermopylae. Play as Achilles with his Myrmidon warriors, or maybe you prefer Odysseus or Hektor? Control vast armies of Trojans and Greeks and lay siege to the most powerful city of its time – Troy!

Take command of Leonidas and his 300 Spartans against the mighty Persian horde. The pass of Thermopylae has been re-created on a one for one scale with 300 Spartans, 700 Thespian allies under Demophilus & 400 unreliable Thebans who really didn’t want to be there – and can you blame them! This small force stands against the might of the Persian army with wave upon wave of increasingly powerful troops hitting your lines until the mighty Immortals arrive. Xerxes launches attack after attack from his inexhaustible horde and your objective is just to hold the pass long enough for Greece to muster her forces.

The expansion pack includes 6 new historically accurate campaigns :

The Trojan Wars
The pass of Thermopylae
Greek Colonization
Pre-Historic Greece
The Ionian Revolt
Grand Campaign with Rome & Persia

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