Kills too high, artillery too powerfull...

[KNac007]

I have the feeling that kills (even more if these are really "kills" and not general casualties) are to high.

If one examines the loses incured by units heavily enganged, their attrition is too high compared to RL engangagements, even when heavy too. I know this is to vague w/o empirical data to be agreed, but I will dig-in some info about the airborne operations in MG and during D-Day to compare them with game loses and will post later.

Apart of the too high losses a more deeper Casualtie Model would be good, separating:
* KIA/MIA1/WIA1: killed by enemy or friendly fire; missed cause body disapeired (arty barrage rip off bodies) or captured, lost in-deep enemy teritory; wounded with no possible return to action ever.
* WIA2/MIA2 : heavy wounded personal, no possible recuperation in short-term and missed in the fog of war in-deep enemy territory (won't return early)
* WIA3/MIA3 : lightly wounded, lost/missed their unit in the fog of war but will reurn early.

There are more cases, dead because of illness or deasease (mispelling?), etc but these wouldn't be modelled in into the game (at least not in this one, maybe for the cold winter campaigns in Russia or actions if Africa, with Malaria and such).

KIA1/MIA1 & WIA1/MIA2 would be definitive loses during game terms.
WIA1/MIA3 would increase unit strength and morale slowly during the game.

At the end of the game casualties statics should show the first two casualties departments (WIA3/MIA3 not).

About gun/vehicles loses.:
-Tanks were usually taken out of action but a low number of them were finally "knocked out" as long as they could be taken out of the battlefield. This is were we include the concept of operational tanks available, for example if you check the operational tanks during the battle of Normandy, you will see the number of operational tanks for the germans moves around daily. On the british flank, from 6 June until the breakthrought in the american flank and eventually the collapse of the german defensive front (more than 2 months), german panzer divisions were able to mantein an high number of tanks even if operational tanks were low. That means tat real tank loses were low, while in HTTR you can lose in a few hours a full panzer company, while this is possible (just check eatern front) is not usual, and final tank loses are eventually too high. Tank loses should be divided in:
*Knocked Out
*Long Term Repair
*Middle Term Repair
*Short Term Repair
On the final game lose statics only knocked out tanks should be included. Short Term Repair (and maybe middle) loses should increase strength and morale of their former unitsnslowly (just like in personal units).
-Armoured Personal Carriers or Armoured Vehicles (recon or support) should follow the same pattern as tanks, but I must recognize that final knock outs in this department they were more usual (because of lower armour).
-Soft vehicles (traktors and trucks), for simplicity shake, should only be disregarded as knock outs.
-Same for guns.

Maybe this all seems just an useless demand, but, apart of the always nice feature of having more statics (even if it's just for analization of your performance), this makes the possibility of just getting back some strength (after all light wounds were the more numerous of casualties) and eventually morale for your units.

[KNac007]

Artillery too powerfull issue is poossible linked with the above statements of too high loses. I know that artillery caused most of the war casualties and that it was the queen of war, but maybe this is too much and attrition too fast.

There are several possibilities (or a mixture of them) for this:
- Kill values against soft units too high
- Artillery flexibility.

*The first point is clear.
*The second point means, well, that, artillery units are too flexible. Why? Making available all artillery for instant call is something that just nowadays armies can do due to technological advancements.
I know maybe some pourposes won't like much people, but are neccessary for realism issues.

---Units on-call must be certaintly attached to a HQ, and only available to support that unit or their subHQs. That would represent that only the units which had attached an artillery would have a FO (or various) with direct link with that arty unit. If you want an arty unit to be on call for various units, you would attach it to various units (that would need an addition to game engine).

Ie. I have 3 regiments under a div HQ, I want an arty bn to support 2 regiments, I pick both regiments and the arty bn, and then click on the (future) attach order (maybe this could be added not only for arty but for all units, replacing current attachment system), then it will be on-call for both regiments, priority code should enhanced (maybe using current one is enough), by action-aggro-size in that order; for example if one of the regiments is attacking and other in defense, the priority for on-call would be given to the attacking regiment (priority for action should be: assault (attack & probe), secure cross, deny cross, defnd, reorg, rest) if both regiments are doing same action, priority would be given by aggro level, if both have same aggro, then by size/strength or equally shared. As long as this cannot be included an other temporal system (or a combination of both in the future) should be assumed, like attaching it to the supHQ, in the above example that would mean attaching that arty bn to the divHQ, the problem would be that then it would be supporting all 3 regiments, additional code should be added anyway, making the avility of an attached arty unit to a HQ to support subHQs even if their are in their own. Ie. I give the divHQ a defend order, and then one of the regiments an attack order, the arty unit should be able to support the attacking regiment even if it's on attacking on his own (because his prior HQ was the div HQ). This all would represent oportunity fire too. Delays (even if very few) are neccessary, no insta-call, when higher in CoC is the arty longer delays should eb incured (not the same a mortar pn than a divisional arty bn)

What if we attach an unitto the higher in-map HQ? Then we would be gaming the system. To avoid this arty units can only be attached to units the same size of it's organic HQ or lower in the CoC. We couldn't attach a divisional arty bn to a corps HQ.

Apart of this, AI shouldn't relocate arty units when you attach them if they have been previously located by the human as long as their are not thread by enemy, and are in range of the units their are supportign and the spotted enemy units confronting them. Adapted ROF for on-call units should be that of their supHQ or it would be even better in a changing ROF code added to the game.

--- Units would be no longer generally available on-call for all units when given a defend or other action other than rest. They would be just defending their perimeter or performing the action given by the player (denyc ross for example, but offensive actions should not be allowed for arty units other that if they are attached). You would have to give bombard orders. But not as it's now.
Bombard would be representing fire missions, you should plan them in advance (so a delay would be implied), note that most arty deliveries falled in empty ground, and most times they were planned ahead. The addition of important features like H:Hour and addition of some paramters should be available. You should be able to group various units under one and make the AI plan it, you would have to state the genral bombard area & shape (radial, square), and the H:hour and end hour. But the hability to micromanage (for a group of arty units, or for individual units) should be available: advancement rate, ROF, size&shape of the bombard area for each unit, the hability to place various bombard in form of waypoints and edit each waypoint (this could be added to other units and actions too, like movment), making possible a complex fireplan. Ie. I select an arty bn and place two bombard action in form of waypoint (like you do now with movement), and edit each one, the first one being:
h-hour:12:00; end-hour:13:00; rof:slow; shape:radial; area:50m (that would be the radious)
the second one, would be: h-hour:13:00; end-hour:13:15; rof:rapid; shape:square; area: front-100m,side-20m;

When the first end hour then it moves to the second one waypoint and performs action. This could be done for a group and then the AI would plan each individual fireplan.
This combined with the possibility of H:Hour for other unitsd and actions would make possible to use both in combination like it was IRL.

About AI performance: it should rout and make retreat of enemy units bombarded fast, but maybe attrition reduced (off course this would be conditional to the ROF, size & number of bombard units, etc).

Remember delays are important to reduce arty flexibility. And more use of fireplans reallistically. Which units would be able to be grouped and if this would take into account national doctrines is something I left open for debate,.

[Arjuna]

KNac007,

Good posts.

First up - Kills. A better term would be casualties as these represent KIAs, MIAs, WIAs plus non-battle casualties. Providing greater breakdown stats would be possible but a bit of work. I'll add it to the wish list. As to what you perceivve as "excessive" or high kill rates, please remember that gamers who are not seeing their colleagues die each day and who themselves are not suffering battle fatigue are more prone to drive their forces on an on, round the clock and hence the probability of higher casualties is increased.

Next - Arty. To a degree your comments about too much flexibility I agree with. What is really needed is code which would handle the placement of arty units "in support" but not under command. This would then make it possible to simulate the use of firebases and better restrict the flexibility. This has been on our wish list for some time and we would very much like to get to it soon.

[KNac007]

Thanks for the fast reply.

Ok, if "kills" mean all type of "casualties" then the figures are more like real ones (higher anyway). I agree a lot depends on how you use them (forcing them too much) but even when you are very conservative an small engangement can end with lots of casualties.

The returning of light wounds (for battles running for several days/weeks it's even more neccessary). For example, I'm doing the airdrop over Contentin near Utah Beach and it would be nice if I could state early strength very low -due to MIA3- (at the end of D-Day the 101st had only assembled 2500 men of a total of more than 6000 combat troops) and a recovery rate in the scenario maker, that would be the best solution to represent the problems in assembling units. That way by the end of D+1 probably the companeis would be up to strength. But indeed I had to adopt an other solution: make understrength companeis representing groups and several of these coming along the day as reinforcements, also the scenario can only run for 1 day. However I'm running offtopic here.

Arty. I don't understand quite well "the placement of arty units "in support" but not under command" phrase meaning. However it's nice to see that you agree to a level about too much flexibility. If one observes for example "Desert Storm" were the alliance modern armies had at their dispossition powerfull artyllery and fire control teams able to locate in real time iraqui arty units and deliver a salvo of MLRS rockets totally massacrating the enemy units one can see what powerfull and flexible arty can do. Maybe not comparable but we are getting somewhat that effect in the game.

[Matt Erickson]

80% percent of casualties in ww2 (ground combat) were casued by artillery.Something to think about.

[Mr.Frag]

80% percent of casualties in ww2 (ground combat) were casued by artillery.Something to think about.

This series are the only games I have ever played that actually gives Arty it's proper dues.

[Tzar007]

Arty is powerful in HTTR and can pretty much cause havoc among less than average quality troops. I don't think it is too powerful thoug, I believe it is close to reality. The only think less realistic might be indeed what Knac is talking about, i.e. too much flexibility in using arty to support basically any unit anywhere.

[KNac007]

Tzar007 said it. I know most casualties in WWII were caused by artillery (thought artillery is a very general concept, would assault guns account in these statics, tanks or other SP guns? aerial artillery? mortars and such that's for sure), followed by MG (mounted in tanks included too probably). As I said I mean probably the arty powerfullness is not due because its kill values are too high but due to their flexibility.

If you check artillery action during WWII you will see that most of it's usage at higher levels (divisional or above) was in the form of FirePlans planned ahead and not on direct call from units, just becaus the possibility of supporting this was very much restricted. The most flexible artillery was that of western allies. Soviets used a much more rigid system with fireplans going up to Front (Army Group) level for days with on-call availabity being low (even organic mortar units were grouped for colective fireplans). German artillery was a mixture of both systems. But when you haved an artillery unit under on-call respoinses times are far too fast. Arty requiered preparation, target registration, positioning etc that took hours in many times to be able to fire at a given position.

Arty is not too powerfull because it has higher kill values than it should probably, but because is far too flexible for WWII era.

For a trial just try to use your artillery in a more self-restriction manner: use bombard more than on-call, and make it ahead in time, not in a insta-manner, bombarding wide fronts ahead of your advacing units even if you don't know if enemy units are still there. If you have units on-call make it so tjat they are only attached to one HQ and only in support of that HQ. Etc etc etc.

You will see how arty effectiviness (maybe that's a more proper word than powerfullness) is reduded quite a bit.

[Arjuna]

One has to be careful here. The British were able to mass on call arty from all field guns upwards in a given army area to fire at one target within a very short time. This was referred to as calling in a "William". The William code word meant that temporarily the designated objective had priority of call on all arty within the Army area. All guns would train on the target location and fire for five minutes or so. The end effect was a massive concentration of fire on the target area. It was used primarily to break up enemy at their FUPs. It was devastatingly effective. One case I recall reading about had fire for effect rounds on target from around 400 guns within ten minutes of the request. The "stonk" virtually destroyed a German Inf Bn forming up for an assault. That is how good the British Artillery arm was. Other arms of the British Army may have lagged technically behind, but their Arty was first class.

The American Arty was also very good. On Elsenborne Ridge, the northern shoulder of the Bulge, dozens of arty Bns were massed and brought to bear at short notice on the German forces trying to break through. The incredible weight of shell from these guns saved the day for the Americans. Again it was mostly on call fire missions, massed and delivered at short notice.

Make no mistake about it, in WW2, artillery was the queen of the battlefield. It might not have had the glamour and dash of armour, nor the sharp end grit of infantry but it won the war on land. Sure armoured vehicles and the change in tactics they ushered in made for manouvre warfare but even so 80% of all battle casualties were caused by artillery and mortar fire.

As I said before we'll review the flexibility of arty but I don't want to "unrealistically" restrict it.

BTW in WW2 there were a number of "command states" that arty could be in. If an arty unit was assigned to be "Under Command" of an HQ, then that HQ could move it and order it to fire at its complete discretion. It could even assign it to subordinate forces. If the arty unit was placed "In Direct Support" then the unit still remained under command for movement to its current HQ but gave priority to any requests for fire from the assigned HQ. Under certain circumstances ( eg when a William was called ) it may loose priority temporarily. If assigned "In Support" then the arty unit remained under command for movement with its current HQ but was available to be requested to fire by the assigned HQ but with no particular priority. It was often common then to for a Division to mass its arty in one firebase, assigning each of its three field Regiments to be "In Direct Support" of a particular line Bde, but "In Support" of all the others. That way all guns could be brought to bear at a target if it warranted.

Eg. lets assume we have the 1st Fld Regt in direct support of the 1st Bde, the 2nd Fld Regt in direct support of the 2nd Bde and the 3rd Fld Regt in direct support of the 3rd Bde. If A Coy 1st Bn, 1st Bde requests fire on a say an enemy Bn FUPing then it could expect to definitely get the 1st Fld Regt and unless the 2nd and 3rd Fld Regts were currently providing fire support for their corresponding Bdes, it would most likely get these two regiments firing as well.

OK it's getting late here and even the joy of a watching my 15 year old daughter score three ripper goals to boot home a 3:2 win is starting to wear off. Good night all.[:)]

[JJKettunen]

ORIGINAL: Arjuna

One has to be careful here. The British were able to mass on call arty from all field guns upwards in a given army area to fire at one target within a very short time. This was referred to as calling in a "William". The William code word meant that temporarily the designated objective had priority of call on all arty within the Army area. All guns would train on the target location and fire for five minutes or so. The end effect was a massive concentration of fire on the target area. It was used primarily to break up enemy at their FUPs. It was devastatingly effective. One case I recall reading about had fire for effect rounds on target from around 400 guns within ten minutes of the request. The "stonk" virtually destroyed a German Inf Bn forming up for an assault. That is how good the British Artillery arm was. Other arms of the British Army may have lagged technically behind, but their Arty was first class.

The American Arty was also very good. On Elsenborne Ridge, the northern shoulder of the Bulge, dozens of arty Bns were massed and brought to bear at short notice on the German forces trying to break through. The incredible weight of shell from these guns saved the day for the Americans. Again it was mostly on call fire missions, massed and delivered at short notice.

Make no mistake about it, in WW2, artillery was the queen of the battlefield. It might not have had the glamour and dash of armour, nor the sharp end grit of infantry but it won the war on land. Sure armoured vehicles and the change in tactics they ushered in made for manouvre warfare but even so 80% of all battle casualties were caused by artillery and mortar fire.

Only American, British and Finnish (and I'm not kidding here) artillery were capable of fast response on-call TOT fire during WWII. Germans copied Finnish fire methods for mortars (I'm not kidding here either), resulting in pretty fast response times but for mortars only.

[KNac007]

"OK it's getting late here and even the joy of a watching my 15 year old daughter score three ripper goals to boot home a 3:2 win is starting to wear off. Good night all."
Hehe. Good night (evening here now).

Good examples. As I said western artillery was the most flexible of all. Probably I'm forgetting that we are on the western front and I'm extending this to eastern front (so bad eastern front is usually disregarded, as it was there were war was decided and went longer). But anyway, how usually was this used? How much time took to prepare units for this kind of concentration? Target registration was neccessay, possitioning of artillery units important? FO linking with each combat line unit took time? etc. That effects flexibility too. In the game you can get 10 arty bn as reinforcements and in matter of minutes able to fire tireless at any place all at the same time. If your artillery are perfoming such missions suddenly should be able to change their target and shot at a totally different place?

For example if I have 3 brit fld regt under XXX Corps in the middle of the island should they be able to support an attack of by the Guard Armoured div heading towards Arnhem and suddenly change their support in a matter of 5 minutes and shot at units spotted by the 82nd Airborne Div at Nijmegen, which, at all, probably don't have any contact with these artillery units. Or shoting at units spotted by the 1st Airborne Div which doubtfully can have contact and any direct link with these Flf Regt, links that could take hours, if not days to be in effect. And that if we do not account that these units are cut off, and if we do not account for physical barriers like a forest, abrut mountains or a river like the Rhine!

There are many issues with the question of artillery. As you said there are many "command states" in which artillery could be, supporting what units and with what priority, etc. But because artillery procuded 80% of casualties in war, I think we can agree that it must be as much realistic as possible. And probably a deep revision and addition in the attachment/detachment of artillery units department, priority target etc. must be done, as well.

Anyway, there would be a misperception of how much usefull and in what situations was artillery. For that one has to check out the mechanics of war and how it all went. During movile actions the importance of artillery decreased, directly connected to the tempo of the actions theirself (when more rapid, less was the importance of artillery). It is prior to the attack and during stalemates that it is more important. We have to remember that most of the time frontlines were stable and just broke when offensives took place. In the western front these were the stands at Normandy and posterior, in the West Wall. During slow advancing or smaller offensive actions artillery serves for attrition of forces, prior to a major offensive it serves for destruction of enemy defensive line and total attrition of enemy so they cannot put any resitence. After the breakthrought, when pockets have been formed, artillery is important to reduce them. So it is prior to breakthrought/offensive, and before pockets formed when more usefull artillery is, and when that many casualties are produced, softening enemy resistence in the first case, and anhilating it in the second. But during offensive/movile phase artillery is (while it stills very important) limited in use to singular (but important) actions (breaking spotted FUPs), due to the FOW, changing situation and cosntant repositioning. This all linked to the tempo off course, that's why maybe the Bulge wouldn't be the best example because it's slow tempo and restricted movement. Gentlemen, I'm getting way offtopic here [:D] but I just want to make the point that this all are issues that have to taken into account when taking examples and applying things to the game. It's true that arty could take be flexible, but it took a more or less static situation and time to be that flexible (not the case of MG), and a lot of preparations had to eb done (unlike nowadays artillery which can setup, register and fire then move and repit process sveral kilometers away or to a compelktly different unit but that all thanks to current technology, not available in WWII era, even the usage of radios was limited, most of comunication went by a line connection that ahd to eb set up, etc).

Just some points

[KNac007]

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: Arjuna

One has to be careful here. The British were able to mass on call arty from all field guns upwards in a given army area to fire at one target within a very short time. This was referred to as calling in a "William". The William code word meant that temporarily the designated objective had priority of call on all arty within the Army area. All guns would train on the target location and fire for five minutes or so. The end effect was a massive concentration of fire on the target area. It was used primarily to break up enemy at their FUPs. It was devastatingly effective. One case I recall reading about had fire for effect rounds on target from around 400 guns within ten minutes of the request. The "stonk" virtually destroyed a German Inf Bn forming up for an assault. That is how good the British Artillery arm was. Other arms of the British Army may have lagged technically behind, but their Arty was first class.

The American Arty was also very good. On Elsenborne Ridge, the northern shoulder of the Bulge, dozens of arty Bns were massed and brought to bear at short notice on the German forces trying to break through. The incredible weight of shell from these guns saved the day for the Americans. Again it was mostly on call fire missions, massed and delivered at short notice.

Make no mistake about it, in WW2, artillery was the queen of the battlefield. It might not have had the glamour and dash of armour, nor the sharp end grit of infantry but it won the war on land. Sure armoured vehicles and the change in tactics they ushered in made for manouvre warfare but even so 80% of all battle casualties were caused by artillery and mortar fire.

Only American, British and Finnish (and I'm not kidding here) artillery were capable of fast response on-call TOT fire during WWII. Germans copied Finnish fire methods for mortars (I'm not kidding here either), resulting in pretty fast response times but for mortars only.

Yes, that's why I was saying that maybe I was overextending this to eastern front.

[JJKettunen]

Sure armoured vehicles and the change in tactics they ushered in made for manouvre warfare but even so 80% of all battle casualties were caused by artillery and mortar fire.

Btw, Soviets counted casualties caused by tanks and at-guns also under the category of "artillery". That might unbalance some of the statistics...

[Mr.Frag]

You'll see an option when you issue an order to prevent the units from calling in Arty from outside it's command. Sounds like it fits the bill for what you want to see from a reduction of coordination between commands.

[Arjuna]

Actually this task option prevents any assigned artillery units from providing on call spt to units that are not assigned to the Task.

[Golf33]

ORIGINAL: KNac007

But anyway, how usually was this used? How much time took to prepare units for this kind of concentration? Target registration was neccessay, possitioning of artillery units important?

The requirements to fire accurate concentrations from multiple units are:

1. All firing units on a common survey grid, preferably theatre (precise location and orientation on the earth's surface to within, IIRC, 1 metre , and 1 mil).

2. Corrections of the moment (COM) for all firing units. COM are either current valid met data OR registration of the guns (this is real "registration", a different term from the "registration" you might sometimes see in the FireSpt tab in HTTR).

3. Calibration for muzzle velocity of all guns.

Survey was readily available by 1944 as entire Survey Regiments were established for the specific purpose of carrying survey to points located convenient to likely gun positions. When deploying, a regiment would send out a survey team to the nearest "BP" (a precisely located point on the ground, often concreted in by a survey regiment team) and carry back theatre survey to the guns. This could sometimes be complete by the time the guns were ready to fire, if there was a BP close enough.

Met also seems to have been pretty readily available from reading contemporary accounts but I haven't got hard data for that. Registration, in the technical artillery sense, is a procedure for a single gun to fire on a known (surveyed) target and from that deduce the COM to allow future missions from all calibrated guns within registration limits to strike the required grid location without adjustment. Registration limits are basically that the guns sharing registration must be located within a limited distance (IIRC about 10-20 km), on a common survey grid, and calibrated.

Calibration of guns provided a problem area in the early war years, but by 1943 had largely been resolved. A pool of guns was calibrated and then distributed to the firing units, which could then make comparative adjustments to produce calibration data for their other guns. By 1944 this procedure was routine and I believe that at least all British guns could be regarded as calibrated.

Essentially the requirements for coordinated fire from distributed units were routinely present at divisional artillery level and below, and were pretty easy to establish for corps level and below as well. They would be satisified as part of the normal process of deployment of the guns. Bear in mind that the movement of guns in HTTR is far less coordinated than occurred in practice, where the movement, deployment and survey of guns was not dealt with by manoeuvre arm HQs but planned and ordered by the artillery command at the highest level.

In late 1942 this sort of artillery activity was already becoming a regular occurrence. 8th Army artillery was centralised to a high degree, with the divisional artilleries being used as a massive 72-gun battery, and communications were established to enable Corps fire plans. "Registration was restricted to one gun per regiment, but all guns were calibrated, in the case of medium guns every third day; frequent meteorological corrections were issued; and all guns were on a common communications grid. Timings were synchronized by using the BBC radio time signal, and specification of time on target (TOT) became standard when calling for fire." FOOs now had the power to call on the firepower of the whole brigade and this was later extended to not only the whole division but also the whole corps. Survey was in this theatre the limiting factor; "lengthy survey was not possible in the mobile operations that followed El Alamein. A battery would usually advance with reconnaissance. The regimental survey officer would fix the position of one gun and fire two groups of airburst 40 degrees apart at 6,000m. The other troops would lay their directors on these bursts and deduce their own positions relative to the "pistol gun". A whole divisional artillery could be brought onto a common grid in one hour, using a survey beacon subsequently erected at a prominent position. The seventy-two-gun battery fire mission could thus become the standard method of support, which could be applied to a map reference by template in what was known as a "stonk", or even as a quick smoke screen." This is talking about late 1942, in the desert, in very mobile warfare. We are looking at late 1944, in the well-developed and mapped areas of northwest Europe, in much less mobile operations. In early 1943 the system was further expanded by the addition of air OPs (AOP), whose FOs had authorisation for regimental and divisional concentrations. Further officers were also added to the normal complement of observers, authorised to fire quick, observed divisional concentrations. (quotes are from J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004.)

FO linking with each combat line unit took time? etc. That effects flexibility too.

Yes, this is a good point and one that could be handled in greater detail for future games. British field artillery regiments deployed (in NW Europe) six FOO parties, three BCs parties, and of course the Regt Tac HQ. This means that every brigade got a Regt Tac HQ that established itself at Bde HQ and an artillery commander who travelled with the Bde commander. Every Bn got a battery commander who travelled in general with the bn commander, and every bn had two FO parties that were transferred between companies to ensure that the lead company had the support when required. FO parties could also be deployed away from the infantry, usually in static OPs to provide overwatch for an attack or when their supported bn was in reserve and therefore required no observer support. But the general effect is that any combat unit would have three observer parties attached to it while in contact, and could therefore place a call for fire within moments of contact. Those observers were connected by radio to an artillery net that reached all the way up to Corps artillery via the Regimental and Divisional artillery command posts. Those command posts could relay calls for fire and provide authorisation and allocation within a few minutes if it was required. I am not currently sure how medium and heavy artillery organised their observation parties, however.

In the game you can get 10 arty bn as reinforcements and in matter of minutes able to fire tireless at any place all at the same time. If your artillery are perfoming such missions suddenly should be able to change their target and shot at a totally different place?

First, a minor point, but the guns do not fire tirelessly. Conducting fire missions is exhausting and artillery units in HTTR will fatigue as they fire. On the larger issue, if your guns are already coordinated to deal with a single target, then haven't they clearly already satisfied the conditions to coordinate their fires for other targets? If anything, a delay would affect the first target far more than subsequent targets.

In Tunisia, any US FO could fire all the guns of the division in less than five minutes. Corps assets were not as well handled (this was 1943) and were usually parceled out to the divisions which reduced their effectiveness. This improved by the time of Anzio where VI Corps artillery was on common grid and could concentrate fire on prearranged targets anywhere with a single code word. Engagement of targets of opportunity could be done almost as easily - massing of fires of up to seven battalions after the adjustment of observed fire by one battalion or by one forward observer was made possible by the introduction of the FDC or Fire Direction Centre. If massing could be done after adjustment, it could also be done (albeit with reduced effectiveness and accuracy) without adjustment. In a good example of this, german infantry were spotted by an air OP and were engaged within twelve minutes by every gun in VI Corps. The guns engaged another four corps targets in the next 50 minutes.

For example if I have 3 brit fld regt under XXX Corps in the middle of the island should they be able to support an attack of by the Guard Armoured div heading towards Arnhem and suddenly change their support in a matter of 5 minutes and shot at units spotted by the 82nd Airborne Div at Nijmegen, which, at all, probably don't have any contact with these artillery units. Or shoting at units spotted by the 1st Airborne Div which doubtfully can have contact and any direct link with these Flf Regt, links that could take hours, if not days to be in effect. And that if we do not account that these units are cut off, and if we do not account for physical barriers like a forest, abrut mountains or a river like the Rhine!

Physical barriers are no problem for artillery. By late 1944, in mobile warfare, radio was the standard means of communication for artillery at the tactical level. In fact XXX Corps' artillery did fire for 1st Airborne Division's observers, and very effectively, breaking up a number of German attacks on Oosterbeek. The only real limit on this in Market Garden was the lack of artillery ammunition, and the inability of 1st Airborne Division to observe targets in depth since their positions were so compressed and on low ground.

Artillery for the Allies in WWII devoted great attention to establishing and maintaining communications. At Arnhem, the only radio nets which worked flawlessly and throughout were the 'gunner nets' which were from time to time used even by the infantry commanders to communicate since their own communications were frequently not working. Placing an observer in contact with another regiment is simple provided the observer either has the frequencies as part of orders (certainly common today, not sure about then) or has some kind of radio contact with the organisation controlling the guns. For instance, as long as there is a command radio link from XXX Corps to 1st Airborne Division, then the correct frequency for XXX Corps artillery can be passed over that link.

There are many issues with the question of artillery. As you said there are many "command states" in which artillery could be, supporting what units and with what priority, etc. But because artillery procuded 80% of casualties in war, I think we can agree that it must be as much realistic as possible. And probably a deep revision and addition in the attachment/detachment of artillery units department, priority target etc. must be done, as well.

Yes, quite correct. Handling of extra-divisional artillery could be customised more since it's an important issue. Artillery doesn't currently behave the way I'd like to see, where the movement of guns is controlled separately from their fires and observation assets, which can be allocated to pretty much any unit. Artillery in the game currently engages targets of opportunity and defensive fires on a timed basis, whereas artillery in war normally (then as now) engages on the basis of a number of rounds and/or a rate of fire per gun per minute. Corps artillery does concentrate a little too easily, and on targets of insufficient importance. It is not possible to specifically allocate Corps artillery fire to a manoeuvre unit without actually giving the manoeuvre unit command over the artillery - you can't simply have them provide communications and liaison and thus fires, as it was actually done. Mortars are currently also too flexible since as a general rule they would only fire for their parent battalion (although control of even mortars could be and sometimes was concentrated, especially for set-piece deliberate fireplans in support of significant attacks). There is no Time-On-Target facility in the game, this was by late 1944 a very common means of fire control for both British and US artillery. There is also no means of developing a deliberate fireplan to support an attack, indeed no fire at all except on observed targets, and no barrage lines. The DF process is abstracted and this loses the power of its implementation, where a single officer could concentrate the fire of every gun within range within moments as guns were laid on the highest-priority DF when not actually engaged on other missions. These were all common and effective, and I would love to see them in future games - though of course the wishlist is long enough already [:)].

Anyway, there would be a misperception of how much usefull and in what situations was artillery. For that one has to check out the mechanics of war and how it all went. During movile actions the importance of artillery decreased, directly connected to the tempo of the actions theirself (when more rapid, less was the importance of artillery). It is prior to the attack and during stalemates that it is more important. We have to remember that most of the time frontlines were stable and just broke when offensives took place. In the western front these were the stands at Normandy and posterior, in the West Wall. During slow advancing or smaller offensive actions artillery serves for attrition of forces, prior to a major offensive it serves for destruction of enemy defensive line and total attrition of enemy so they cannot put any resitence. After the breakthrought, when pockets have been formed, artillery is important to reduce them. So it is prior to breakthrought/offensive, and before pockets formed when more usefull artillery is, and when that many casualties are produced, softening enemy resistence in the first case, and anhilating it in the second. But during offensive/movile phase artillery is (while it stills very important) limited in use to singular (but important) actions (breaking spotted FUPs), due to the FOW, changing situation and cosntant repositioning. This all linked to the tempo off course, that's why maybe the Bulge wouldn't be the best example because it's slow tempo and restricted movement. Gentlemen, I'm getting way offtopic here [:D] but I just want to make the point that this all are issues that have to taken into account when taking examples and applying things to the game. It's true that arty could take be flexible, but it took a more or less static situation and time to be that flexible (not the case of MG), and a lot of preparations had to eb done (unlike nowadays artillery which can setup, register and fire then move and repit process sveral kilometers away or to a compelktly different unit but that all thanks to current technology, not available in WWII era, even the usage of radios was limited, most of comunication went by a line connection that ahd to eb set up, etc).

Just some points

I disagree with most of this. To take the last point first, how can you claim that communications were limited when every British FO travelled in a Bren Carrier with at least two radios, as well as line, or in a tank with a similar and if anything more powerful radio net? When US Army Divisional Artillery came with 10 spotter aircraft on its TO&E from 1942?

Artillery is of vital importance in all phases of war. It enables mobility of friendly forces, by suppressing ('neutralising') enemy direct and indirect firepower that will prevent mobility. It destroys the mobility of the enemy by engaging him when he seeks to manoeuvre. In fast-moving operations artillery must ideally be mechanised (pretty frequent, see for example the British armoured division where half the artillery was mechanised, or the US Army Armored Division where it was all mechanised) and FOs must be as mobile as their supported arms - Bren Carriers with infantry, FO tanks with armour - and this was routinely done by late 1944. Indeed by that time FOs were also very frequently employed in light aircraft (the "Air OP" or "AOP") although this is not modelled in HTTR as it did not occur during Market Garden. Note also that with few exceptions, the war in Northwest Europe in 1944-45 was not at all a war of movement, it was characterised far more often by set-piece offensives, massive artillery support, and movement at infantry rates. When this was not the case, artillery could still be used - when British 2nd Army covered 400 km in six days after crossing the Seine, artillery was used against targets selected from air photos and fired on when FOs called on the radio. Timed fireplans were only used when communications failed. It certainly wasn't this effective at the start of the war, but by late 1944 it had been through a process of continuous and rapid improvement (though even then there were still frequent and often disastrous regressions).

Artillery in HTTR isn't perfectly modelled, but it does provide at least a glimpse of the raw power of this decisive arm. For every aspect of the game which provides greater than historical freedom for artillery, there is another which takes away from its historical effectiveness; I think we have a pretty good balance for the moment. I would certainly hate to see the flexibility and effectiveness of artillery hobbled by pretending that no lessons were learned from 1939 to 1944, especially for British/Commonwealth and US formations.

Regards & sorry for the overly long post [:)]
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[Golf33]

ORIGINAL: Keke

Btw, Soviets counted casualties caused by tanks and at-guns also under the category of "artillery". That might unbalance some of the statistics...

Well, the British operational research determined that "indirect fire and aircraft accounted for approximately 20 percent of British tank casualties in Northwest Europe, Italy, and North Africa". German mortars alone accounted for 70 percent of the casualties suffered by the British at Normandy. I'll have to check another article (it's at work and I'm at home) but I think it also specifies indirect artillery and mortars when giving a casualty percentage.

Later developments in the war also increased the killing power of artillery. General Patton said in a letter, "the new shell with the funny fuze [VT] is devastating. The other night we caught a German battalion, which was trying to get across the Sauer River, with a battalion concentration and killed by actual count 702". The VT fuze was not only lethal against troops in the open but also rendered slit trenches without adequate overhead protection far less effective, and could also sometimes penetrate the top armour of tanks. (from Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 2004).

Regards
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[KNac007]

Steve no need to disculp yourself for the long post. BTW it was very informative, many thanks for the time taken to anwer.

About last question, probably I'm not right in most of the points [:D] but you yourself said what I was trying to say (a problem of communication by my part for sure), that is: "Note also that with few exceptions, the war in Northwest Europe in 1944-45 was not at all a war of movement, it was characterised far more often by set-piece offensives, massive artillery support, and movement at infantry rates" and about "When this was not the case, artillery could still be used - when British 2nd Army covered 400 km in six days after crossing the Seine, artillery was used against targets selected from air photos and fired on when FOs called on the radio" I didn't said it was not important. In fact, I stated that while artillery is important always and in all phases it was during a certain phases were it was more effective and caused much of that attrition.

Probably I would have stated this phases:
-Stabilization of the front line (little activity or small offensives in range and size).
-Breakthrought/Breakout phase.
-Exploitation phase.

It was during the first two, specialy the secon d when artillery was more lethal to the enemy and caused more damage (either seen from the attacker or the defender point of view). But this was again relative to the scope of the attack and it's tempo. Anyway that's a minor pint.

However, you examples are mostly absed on the western allied artillery (specially British), I hope you take that in account in the future (when that long whishlist have been reduced) and model these differences, because the allied artillery may be very flexible, but I don't know how much of all that applies to the german doctrine, or other nations. And also as you said things improved a lot during the years of the war, so if earlier campings are modeleed these changed would have to be taken into account.

On your final paragraph. I'm not critique about the game engine, I'm just trying to spice thing a little bit and make some discussion happen. I'm not doubtfull of your knowledge (it's clearly you owe me in knowledge ) and you will try to obtain as much realism as possible, etc. but I'm just trying to incentive you to give it higher priority [:D] other user would like to see other thing implemented or better done, and I'm pushing for my own priorites.

However, many thanks for your posts, and if you could give some references and works about the subject of artillery during WWII (on all sides) I would love to read about it and inform myself better (as my knowledge is very general) in the future. I'm sure Handbooks of the different armies will be usefull in this issue, someone can confirm that?

P.S: as you can see maybe I'm extending unconsciently (mispelling?) something to other armies/war fronts and periods. For example the usage of radios etc. Sorry and disregard myself for that.

[Arjuna]

Great discussion KNac007 and Golf33.

One point I would take issue on is the effectiveness of artillery in mobile ops. In static conditions, sure more arty can be brought to fire but usually this is offset by the fact that the target is better prepared ( OHP etc ). In mobile ops you get less guns being bought to bear but against usually unprotected targets. Now an entrenched unit receives ( IIRC without looking up the code ) a 75% reduction in hit effect from arty. So in effect you need four times the guns to the same damage against an unprotected target. In most cases if a force is on the move you might only have access to one third of your guns at any time. And yet this means that in terms of effectiveness they are actually more effective than when the front line becomes static. Food for thought. [:)]

[Golf33]

ORIGINAL: KNac007

Steve no need to disculp yourself for the long post. BTW it was very informative, many thanks for the time taken to anwer.

Thanks!

About last question, probably I'm not right in most of the points [:D] but you yourself said what I was trying to say (a problem of communication by my part for sure), that is: "Note also that with few exceptions, the war in Northwest Europe in 1944-45 was not at all a war of movement, it was characterised far more often by set-piece offensives, massive artillery support, and movement at infantry rates" and about "When this was not the case, artillery could still be used - when British 2nd Army covered 400 km in six days after crossing the Seine, artillery was used against targets selected from air photos and fired on when FOs called on the radio" I didn't said it was not important. In fact, I stated that while artillery is important always and in all phases it was during a certain phases were it was more effective and caused much of that attrition.

That's fair enough. I must admit that my brief time in the artillery left me with a strong impression that artillery is often forgotten, especially in peacetime, when the more 'dashing' exploits of the armour and infantry make far more exciting reading. When a major war does break out, all the bitter lessons of fire superiority have to be relearned at great cost in men and material. The artillery model in HTTR, while still fairly abstracted, at least provides players with a bit of an understanding of the battle-winning power of this arm.

In some ways you are right that the importance of artillery declines a bit during periods of rapid movement, but this is mainly because rapid movement only really occurs when not in contact with strong enemy forces. As soon as that contact occurs, there will be a requirement to establish fire supremacy and that almost always means - artillery! [8D]To a limited extent armoured forces could supply their own fire superiority on the offensive but only under specific circumstances - in particular the enemy had to have very few anti-tank guns and either very limited indirect fire assets, or very limited infantry support, and not be in heavily-protected positions (i.e. not concreted in). If those criteria were not met then tanks found it very hard to establish fire superiority against anti-tank guns which were be easily concealed, had a greater rate of fire, and could acquire and engage targets more rapidly. When I get home I can post the British assessment of just how many unsuppressed '88s' it took to hold up an armoured attack. In these cases it's very important to have indirect fire superiority in order to suppress the defences, and prevent enemy indirect fire from stripping off friendly infantry. Interestingly, although concreted defences may be quite proof against artillery fire, the psychological effects of bombardment are still decisive provided the bombardment is heavy enough. In one case the Allies applied (by gun and bomb) 1.8 tons of explosive per 100 square metres of a German fortress. The defences only suffered 10.15% casualties, but surrendered without any effective resistance as they were totally shattered by the non-physical effects of the bombardment. Obviously this kind of firepower is rather the exception than the rule, it takes a long time to organise and a fair while to deliver. In other cases where the enemy was heavily concreted in, and this kind of shattering weight of fire was not available, artillery could become quite ineffective and the infantry would be left to take bunkers one by one at great human cost. I don't have the names of the forts in these examples to hand, that book is at home, but I'll look it up and post tonight.

However, you examples are mostly absed on the western allied artillery (specially British), I hope you take that in account in the future (when that long whishlist have been reduced) and model these differences, because the allied artillery may be very flexible, but I don't know how much of all that applies to the german doctrine, or other nations. And also as you said things improved a lot during the years of the war, so if earlier campings are modeleed these changed would have to be taken into account.

Quite right. Partly I am most familiar with the British model since it hasn't actually changed very much - reading about their procedures they are in fact very similar to the ones I trained in here in Australia a few years ago. Only just as I was leaving were tools like GPS and laser designation becoming more common. In fact in some respects we had taken a step backwards, although we had microwave rangefinders and other similar technical tools available for survey we had abandoned the survey regiment and eliminated dedicated survey from artillery regiments, with corresponding loss of our ability to concentrate fire from distributed units without protracted preparation. Similarly calibration equipment had improved with the availability of muzzle-velocity measuring radar, but this too was not being employed as efficiently as it could have been. I guess it takes a major war to clear away some of the cobwebs.

On your final paragraph. I'm not critique about the game engine, I'm just trying to spice thing a little bit and make some discussion happen. I'm not doubtfull of your knowledge (it's clearly you owe me in knowledge ) and you will try to obtain as much realism as possible, etc. but I'm just trying to incentive you to give it higher priority [:D] other user would like to see other thing implemented or better done, and I'm pushing for my own priorites.

I appreciate this, and I agree that there is room to expand the modelling of artillery. In particular it would be nice in some future games to allow for different artillery doctrines for different nations, since they were quite different in their capabilities. For example the US FDC enabled rapid fire response from massed batteries to calls for fire, even from infantry or armour rather than artillery observers; the British system was not quite as flexible. By contrast the Germans generally lacked in artillery (hence the large number of captured pieces in their inventory) and were largely unable to concentrate it except in very limited circumstances for a limited period of time, at least on the West front. For example, the heavy concentration of artillery present at the start of the Ardennes counteroffensive only lasted for about 2 1/2 hours; after that the few batteries which still had ammunition and transport were allocated to divisions and used piecemeal. The centralisation of firepower, as in the initial bombardment, was then never repeated on that front.

However, many thanks for your posts, and if you could give some references and works about the subject of artillery during WWII (on all sides) I would love to read about it and inform myself better (as my knowledge is very general) in the future. I'm sure Handbooks of the different armies will be usefull in this issue, someone can confirm that?

The best references I've found so far are here. The underlined words are hyperlinks that will take you to the book entry on amazon, or to the website.

J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, Naval Institute Press, 2004. This is a very handy book which details a lot of the technical grounding for artillery practice through the years, from the old direct-fire days through to modern improved munitions, rocketry and so forth. The WWII section is fairly general but gives some good examples to support the author's main points, and covers the major theatres and periods of the war, looking at what each major combatant was doing with their artillery and how well or otherwise that it worked.

G.G. Blackburn, The Guns of War, Constable Robinson, 2000. This is a gripping memoir of Blackburn's service as a Canadian FOO in Northwest Europe. He ended up spending more time on the front line than any other FOO, and his book is very detailed and goes beyond being a memoir to include the results of his postwar research and some fascinating and very useful information about the practical organisation, use, and capabilities of Commonwealth artillery in 1944-45. It's also a very good look at the stress of combat on the individual psyche, seen from a viewpoint only slightly removed from that of the infantrymen and armour crewmen who Blackburn accompanied.

An outstanding website on British artillery can be found at British Artillery in World War II. This contains useful and detailed information on almost every aspect of field artillery as practised by the British and Commonwealth forces, from basic technical gunnery principles, their organisation, communications, artillery equipment data and some great studies on the nature and effectiveness of various calibres and types of ammunition.

There's an interesting site on German artillery here at Beobachtungsabteilung. It contains an extensive list of books on various topics, mainly German artillery, which I intend to get my hands on over time (though funds are a bit short right now what with the new baby and all).

P.S: as you can see maybe I'm extending unconsciently (mispelling?) something to other armies/war fronts and periods. For example the usage of radios etc. Sorry and disregard myself for that.

I think "subconsciously" is the one you want [:)]. That's no problem, and of course in the early war period and on other fronts the things you mention were all significant problems and prevented the gunners from having their proper impact on the battle. The Germans started with the Blitzkrieg concept of rapid movement in operations, and sacrificed their artillery arm in favour of tanks and aircraft. However, as soon as the movement slowed down - and it did, thanks partly to the increasing firepower of the defences - this policy proved a poor choice. Certainly I would not like to see Soviet artillery responding to calls for fire from across the battlefield; then again, the massed Soviet artillery brigades and even divisions provided an enormous reserve of firepower that could be relocated across the battlefield, which is another kind of advantage and something that was actually copied by the Western allies from time to time, though not on the same scale.

Regards
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