Allied Strategy- One or Two Pronged?????

[sven6345789]

dwesolick, it is interesting that you happily accept the fact of killing civilians as a kind of retaliation (quote:"well deserved"). Calling it well deserved means even more, it means if it hadn't been done, it should have been done. Interesting point of view indeed. but i agree to you in one thing. glad the axis didn't win!! I would hate having to run around in a uniform all of the time.

but enough of that.
back to the discussion about allied counterstrategy in 1942. As mdiehl and mogami pointed out, without a CV-battle leading to similar results as midway, there is no real chance for a counterattack. harrassing, yes, counterattacking, no. we are talking about a strategic level here. there is a thing like a strategic initiative, and during the first half year or year of the war, japan has it. period. the general course and the speed of operations is dictated by the japanese player. As the aliied player, you would have to do what was done historically, like keeping the triangle around pearl clear of enemy units, keeping the supply line to Australia open, keeping Australia and maybe PM, keeping up a stable frontline along the India-Burma boundary, and somehow keep the chinese alive, at least as an army in being, forcing the japanese to devote something to china to hold it at bay. Otherwise, hit 'em were they aint is the principle. The japanese CV's are in the indian ocean? Time for a few CV-raids (like the historical ones in early 1942). After your LBA becomes stronger (P-38) and you finally start to get new CV's and later on AA and Hellcats (including well trained LCU's), that would be the time were the allied player starts to take up the initiative, now forcing the japanese player into a position of reacting. The longer the japanese player can postpone this, and the longer the japanese can slow down the inevitable advance of the allies, the greater are his chances to "win" the war by surviving into july 1946.

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Why would the US have risked almost the entire carrier forces afloat if they did not think they could win at Midway?

Immaterial to the discussion at hand. The original thrust was that the US player should not be rewarded for doing that which the JCS intended to do. Sit around and wait for a great opportunity to strike a blow. Midway was exactly such an opportunity. Unless you are going to require that the Japanese player send an understrength TF to a remote, substantially built up island with a potentially robust aircraft contingent, far from Japan's logistical bases, and also require that the Japanese player set all air units in that TF to "airfield attack," then it is inappropriate to demand action from the Allied player.

No, not really immaterial to the discussion. My point was, since it has obviously eluded you, that there were political considerations (among a myriad of other considerations that drove Allied operations in 1942. The post that this was in response to contended that there were absolutely no political (PR if you like that better) considerations before 1943. And it had absolutely not one reference to the game at this point. So when you say this.......

Every time this trivial notion comes up it is a transparent AF ploy to fabricate of whole cloth circumstances that merely generate VP for the Japanese player. Just admit that you want to handicap the Allied player and be done with all the badly informed notions about 'that which history requires.'

.....I don't know what your talking about. It's my post you're dissecting, not Madflav's.

And why even attempt to thwart the Japanese at Coral Sea if the JCS could wait to take offensive until '43? The fact is they couldn't wait and events bore that out.

Your one sentence demonstrates a failure to understand Coral Sea.It was not an offensive operation. It was purely a defensive operation. The JCS DID in fact wait until 1943 to take the offensive in New Guinea.

You have a hard time looking past your own nose here my friend. I will agree that the overall strategic considerations of the operations was the defense of PM and Australia. But the operation at it's heart was a "meeting engagement" with carrier forces. Purely defensive operations are not meeting engagements. And the Allied landings at Guadalcanal were not "defensive" and certainly took place well before 1943. Again forced upon JCS by Japanese offensive operations. My grasp of Coral Sea is no less tenuous than your own.

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".

The Rabaul raid had absolutely nothing to do with "political" reasons. It was done solely and exclusively to test Japanese defenses along the perimeter and upset Japanese operational planning. It was an excellent strategic move, and any allied player would likely pull the "raid and fade" trick a couple of times, simply to keep the Japanese player committing assets to remote areas. But if the Allied player is risk averse, I see no reason to demand that the Allied player attempt such operations. The Doolittle raid was more of the same. An effort to upset Japanese operational plans, force redeployments, new commitments and loss of face in the chain of command. It was NOT at any point conceived primarily as a pr stunt for political consumption by the American home public. Anyonw who believes otherwise does not understand what it means to attack your opponents mindshare.

Doolittle's raid was not meant to boost US public morale and was purely intended to mess with the mind of Nippon?

I think at this point in the war, Allied understanding of the Japanese mindset was incomplete at best. After all the setbacks of late '41 into the spring of '42, the US public needed a boost. And I'm sorry if your favorite revisionist autuer of the nanosecond thinks otherwise. Why would Roosevelt play it up so highly, so shortly after it's completion.

Politics have EVERYTHING to do with war, even the Rabaul raid.

Back to the game....if the Allied player wants to not risk a thing prior to '43, then I say fine that's his perogative. We'll all employ different strategies with this beast of a game. That's just one of them.

The fact that the Japanese were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal forced the US to take action or have lines of communication with Australia threatened. Which is what the Victory Points kind of approximate, they force you to take some action as the Allied player and not hide in a shell.

Why not prevent the Japanese player from hiding in a shell with his CVs and sitting around wating for a 6 on 3 CV battle. I guess we should require that Japan attempt to invade San Francisco by rewarding large numbers of VPs to the Allied player for possessing San Francisco.

What are you talking about? The overall strategic goal for the Japanese was to go over to the defensive after making thier economic gains that would enable them to be self sufficient in natural resources. They over extended themselves. Ever hear the reference "victory disease"?

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.

Right. So unless the Japanese player is required to lose 4 CVs in an ill-advised blunder, it follows that one should not require the Allied player to sacrifice resources in ill-advised blunders (which a Guadalcanal campaign would likely be unless you have substantially depleted Japan's CV force).

Again, I'm talking history here and your answering with a game context. Immaterial to the original discussion and quite shrill.

It'll be up to the Allied player on how to respond to the IJN player.

Agreed. That is why I'm coming around to Mike's POV that the VP scoring system simply be ignored. Maybe there should be an option to disable the VP count. It'd be interesting to see how strategies differe between a VP game and a non-VP game.

I pay little attention to VP's in Uncommon Valor and just fight the war the best I can. So it is refreshing that we agree somewhere.

And it's just a disingenous stab at someone to say that political considerations in the early part of the Pacific War were bunk.

Actually, it is a disingenuous stab to suggest that such claims were bunk. Political considerations were not the driving force behind any early PTO Allied raids. CVs were much too valuable to place them under undue risk solely for PR footage. That is why Hornet and Enterprise turned back from the Doolittle raid at the first sign of potential risk, and why Spruance's orders at Midway were to engage only if there was a likelihood of inflicting greater damage on the enemy. The US was in the Pacific War for the long haul, and the op-planners knew that defeating Japan was merely and solely a matter of time. Claims that the public would have demanded a negotiated peace had none of the victories of 1942 occurred are AF self-serving whole-cloth fabrications based on nothing at all.

So you are contending that the meager damage caused by a few Army bombers striking the mainland of Japan was the main thrust of the Doolittle raid and therefore worth the risk of precious carriers? Sorry, 60 years of documented works disagree with you here.

The main point of engaging in combat is to inflict greater damage on the enemy, period. Midway, notwithstanding.

Where you get your last statement is beyond me. I never mentioned in my post anything nearing what your flames contend. I suggest you have other issues afoot.

[dwesolick]

ORIGINAL: sven6345789

dwesolick, it is interesting that you happily accept the fact of killing civilians as a kind of retaliation (quote:"well deserved"). Calling it well deserved means even more, it means if it hadn't been done, it should have been done. Interesting point of view indeed. but i agree to you in one thing. glad the axis didn't win!! I would hate having to run around in a uniform all of the time.

I never said "civilians" specifically, I meant the Germans and Japanese as a whole (leaders, military, and civilians). They paid a terrible and well deserved price for plunging the world into the most bloody war in history.

[j campbell]

I stand corrected- i should have said as an "indirect" result as they (the Americans) did not actually pull the triggers.
However, they certainly knew that dire reprisals would be made in China (for right or wrong reasons) by going forward with the raid. whether you accept this or ot the simple fact remained that The doolittle raid was a political action with little military value that had far reaching repurcussions (if u were chinese) that in my mind outweighed its political value-not to mention it carried high risks as a military venture as well.


You misjudge my post- I do not condone the actions of the Japanese leadership or military actions-actually i find it horrifying. however, i always find it interesting that mass slaughter as retaliation is an acceptable means to justify an ends whereas when our enemy does it (albeit in a more personal matter-they used rifles, bayonets, swords and gunbutts) it is credited with the terror that it was.

Dwesolick-glad to see that you could add things to my post that were unstated-Rape of nanking etc .

its as if to say -you (ie the Japanese) opened the door so now anything goes-i think that is an acceptable answer-but call it what it is and not try to stand on any "moral highground".

I'll end my remarks here as i don't want to be dragged into an argument that is fruitless to argue in the first place.

as sven stated-all this detracts from the original thread.

[hithere]

thanks...i was not trying to say that you condone what the Japanese did. i was commenting on the comment [&:] that it was caused directly by the U.S. That is a mindset (mindset is prob the wrong word, hopfully you know what i mean) that is here to this day..but i won't even get started on THAT [:)]
I got alittle carried away..sorry about that..

acually I do believe that the raid was mostly political (to lift moral (SP?)) with some favorable military side affects (that the Japanese people saw U.S. bombers in their sky and forced Japanese assest to stay near the home Isles)

As for the two pronged attack...I think you have to, esp in this game...if the allies want have any chance of early offense's, because after Pearl Harbor (and with no Midway), fleet on fleet the Japanese come out ahead, but they will be forced to spread their fleet around to protect vital area's..multiple attacks will force this more...so the allies may get a 2 on 2 or maybe even a 2 on 3 advantage. for a few days at least. ofcourse the Jap's will have better machines. but that is a chance and chance is a huge part of war.

[mogami]

Hi, The Allies are going to mount more then one offensive towards Japan. There is no way for them to employ all their forces otherwise. Aifields can only hold so many aircraft. Why send 10 divisions to capture a base that can be captured by 2? The only way the Allies can bring all their force to bear is to spread it out.

They will begin with just one focus point but by 1944 they will have at least 4 and depending on player style and events up to that point could have 2 or 3 more. But there will always be operations in CBI towards Bangkok and points south.

There will always be operations in New Guinea that once complete will leave a large force unemployed unless it heads north (Palau-PI-Saipan) And of course the direct path from Pearl through Kwajalean toward Saipan. Then there are the limited ops up north if the Japanese occupy Kiska an Attu (and there is no reason for the Japanese not to do this)

The Allies also have the possible route from Darwin directly into the SRA. This threat is a major concern for the Japanese. If they do not prepare for it the Allies can cut off the supply by occuping the bases. Thus it requires a significant amount of Japanese material to guard against. Almost a quarter of Japanese strength has to be deployed against an allied avenue of approach that will likely never be used. (As long as the required quarter of Japanese strength is so employed)

The Allies will use more then one offensive. They can't help it. It's the only way to utilise their numbers. If the forward airfield of one thrust is a size 7 then only 350 aircraft can be used. Another airfield is needed. Looking for airfields in range of the Japanese will constantly require advances in different areas.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
…But the fact was that the great majority of the American Public knew that war had come on them before they were ready, and much needed to be done before the full weight of American strength could be brought down on the heads of the "evil doers"…Those that joined to "kill Japs" realized quite quickly that they didn't really know how to accomplish that goal, and needed some serious training and practice before they went into action. People building planes and ships soon realized that even when they had done their part, other folks had to train to make use of them.

Eh? The American public understanding the dynamics of modern warfare in 1942-43… not likely.

The main reason the Doolittle Raid was done was from domestic consumption, yet it risked valuable assets on an operation that could never achieve anything of significant tactical value. Politically, it was felt needed to bolster the American morale a “dramatic retribution that Roosevelt--and America--so intently desired”.

-Newspaper headlines of the raid electrified America. New York Times: "japan reports tokyo, yokohama bombed by 'enemy planes' in daylight." Columbus Evening Dispatch: "U.S. warplanes rain bombs on leading cities of Jap empire." New York Daily News: "U.S. bombs hit 4 Jap cities."-

Edward Oxford - American History Magazine in August 1997.

The American public loved it, because they didn’t ‘know’ the realities.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
The Joint Chiefs were in place to look at the "Big Picture"---and the Big Picture said…

“During the Second Washington Conference in the early summer of 1942, an acrimonious debate raged between the British and their new American allies over the future strategic course of the war against the European Axis powers. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, espoused the view that the Allies could successfully confront the European Axis only by means of an amphibious invasion of Western Europe, and that consequently no operations which might detract from this goal should be undertaken.”

Thomas E. Nutter - THE ALLIED STRATEGIC DEBATE


For many they saw a British Empire determined to avoid a return to the continent, but content to invade everywhere else: Africa, Greece, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Norway, etc. Why let millions of men set in England for an invasion of the continent the British obviously don’t want when they can be committed now in the Pacific for something useful? FDR sent Hopkins to London in April to persuade Churchill, but the peripheral strategy remained the highest priority for Britain. When Operation Torch was approved, it undermined Marshall’s beliefs and made him side with Admiral King who wanted a more aggressive policy in the Pacific.

“When none of the British or American war planners even dared to think of going on the offensive in the Pacific in 1942-43, King successfully lobbied to do just that. ‘No fighter ever won his fight by covering up -- merely fending off the other fellow's blows,’ he wrote. ‘The winner hits and keeps on hitting even though he has to be able to take some stiff blows in order to keep on hitting.’ He earned President Roosevelt’s complete confidence.

“Most naval historians agree that King was the greatest naval commander of the twentieth century. His powers of reason were first-rate, and his professionalism and understanding of the complexities of modern warfare were without parallel. Although he was too unrestrained a personality to succeed as a military diplomat, he was intelligent, dynamic, and merciless, widely respected for exacting outstanding results from his ships and his men. He was also feared and hated, but his grasp of strategy and his ability to impose his will on the enemy were major factors in the defeat of the Axis navies in World War II.”

Thomas Buell, Master of Sea Power (1979)


PS. I am not saying in the ‘Game’ certain action should or shouldn’t happen, just that there were reasons military actions were conducted before 1943.


Note: The “Germany First Policy” (RAINBOW 5) was not followed even though that is what was agreed on: major assets were committed to the Pacific well before the issue in Europe was decided, and the few assets freed up by victory in Europe were fairly insignificant to the victory against Japan. In fact, Admiral King and other who wanted a full scale offensive… got their wish.

[Mike Scholl]

Ernie King the "greatest naval commander of the twentieth century"? You have to be kidding.
King placed himself in command of the defenses of the US Eastern Seaboard during the first
several months of the war..., and steadfastly refused British aid or advice on how to cope with
the U-Boats. The result was what the U-Boat arm refered to as the "Second Happy Time".

He was opinionated, Anglo-phobic, and a self-admitted S-O-B. He was also dynamic, forceful,
and a firm defender of his Navy against all comers..., right or wrong. But realistically, only his
Mom would call him the greatest Naval Commander of the Twentieth Century.

[mdiehl]

You have a hard time looking past your own nose here my friend. I will agree that the overall strategic considerations of the operations was the defense of PM and Australia. But the operation at it's heart was a "meeting engagement" with carrier forces. Purely defensive operations are not meeting engagements.

I'll skip over your multiple, obvious ad hominems.

The existence of a meeting engagement does not obviate the importance of the basic circumstance that the US CVs were deployed in the Coral Sea. They were there as a blocking (defensive) move against an anticipated Japanese move against Port Moresby. Your use of the phrase "meeting engagement" strikes me as a gross misuse of language. In the stretegic sense (since we're talking about motivations here we are, primarily, talking about strategic decisions), one would only say it was a "meeting engagement" if both forces were attempting to seize the same objective at the same time. They weren't. Only Japan was sending troop transports in the engagement and the ONLY reason why the USN was there was to block the move. It was, therefore, by any reasonable standard, a defensive engagement not an offensive one. Moreover, there were not even any follow-up assets available on a contingency basis to exploit any lopsided Allied victory, should one occur. The Coral Sea campaign, from the US raids in February 1942 down through the CV battles, was from the Allied POV a suite of strategic defensive actions whose primary purpose was to maintain a forward base from which Allied offnsive operations could be launched in 1943 and to prevent the establishment of a Japanese forward base.

If your point is that military engagements have political fallout that was often the source of much haymaking in the press, then we agree. But there is absolutely no basis for arguing that political decisions were a driving motivating factor in the Coral Sea campaign.

And the Allied landings at Guadalcanal were not "defensive" and certainly took place well before 1943. Again forced upon JCS by Japanese offensive operations. My grasp of Coral Sea is no less tenuous than your own.

It was never part of the Allies original strategic plan to take the offensive in the SoPac in 1942. Op Watctower is often also called "Op Shoestring" because it was opportunistically cobbled together and initiated in about 8 weeks. It was the most jury-rigged operation of the Allied war effort. It was executed primarily to deny the Japanese a forward air base. Going into Watchtower, there were no plans for follow up operations in the Solomons in 1942. It was solely intended to be a one-shot invasion whose strategic purpose was defensive in nature. Moreover, it never would have happened unless the USN had been victorious at Midway.

Not to mention Doolittle or the Rabaul raid.... It was for exact moral/political reasons that you offhandedly dismiss as "garbage".

It depends. Attacking Japanese morale and, more importantly, their mindshare was the objective. I think of the Doolittle Raid as a "spoiling attack" executed on a strategic level. And it worked. Of the cases that you mention the Doolittle Raid comes the closest to being a "politically motivated" raid, but it was not primarily the US public who was expected to be the recipient of the message. Even so, in the general thrust of this discussion, don't you think it's pretty strange to assert that the Allied player should be required to take such risks when the Doolittle Raid itself demonstrates that the USN was, in 1942, pretty risk averse? After all, they DID launch those B-25s from a range that most understood would result in their running out of fuel.

Doolittle's raid was not meant to boost US public morale and was purely intended to mess with the mind of Nippon?

Primarily, yes. And it worked. Look at where the Japanese thrust was -- SE Asia and the Indian Ocean. The Doolittle Raid focused the IJNs attention back on the Central Pacific (a quiet theater after December 1941), and resulted in the restriction of a significant amount of Japanese aircraft to the defense of Japan. It also forced the IJN to react, causing them to divide their forces for their planned attempt at Port Moresby (reduced the plan from 6 CVs to 2 CVs + 1 very light CV), in order to save 4 CV for their hastily conceived, cobbled-together attempt at Midway. So, I'd say that the US op planners were pretty darned good at predicting Japanese mindset.

Why would Roosevelt play it up so highly, so shortly after it's completion.

You have mistaken effect for cause. The raid occurred. It was executed for some fairly compelling military reasons. Having executed the raid, it was then played up for far more than it was worth in terms of physical damage. Why would you expect such an event NOT to be played up, regardless of the original military purposes that set the raid in motion?

Politics have EVERYTHING to do with war, even the Rabaul raid.

I think the claim is trivial and overblown. It has to be made on a case-by-case basis if your wish to assign "political reasons" rather than "military reasons" as the primary driving force in the planning and execution of an operation or a campaign.

Back to the game....if the Allied player wants to not risk a thing prior to '43, then I say fine that's his perogative. We'll all employ different strategies with this beast of a game. That's just one of them.

I agree.

What are you talking about? The overall strategic goal for the Japanese was to go over to the defensive after making thier economic gains that would enable them to be self sufficient in natural resources. They over extended themselves. Ever hear the reference "victory disease"?

So, your argument is that the Japanese should not suffer from any game-introduced inherent pressure to sustain their offensives because it went against their original strategic plan? Yet at the same time you maintain that the Allies should suffer from game-introduced inherent pressure to take the offensive, even though it went against their strategic plan? Hey, as long as logical consistency doesn't matter, you can have your cake and eat it too.

The Japanese advance forced the hand of the Allies, who by winning (Midway), or coming to a draw with the IJN (Coral Sea), took the initiative in '42 and gained valuble experience and confidence that carried over to huge gains of '43.

The Japanese advance probably forced the Allies to take risks in the Coral Sea action. The Midway invasion did not "force" the Allies' hand in any way. It was purely a wonderously vulnerable target of opportunity for the USN. The Japanese were TAKEN at Midway, the USN planned from the outset for the result that happened, and had every reason to be confident that such a result would likely happen. Indeed, one could with better reason argue that the USN "forced the Japanese hand" into a thrust at Midway because of the Doolittle Raid. This gets back to my earlier allusion to a "strategic spoling attack" and "attacking your opponent's mind share."

Again, I'm talking history here and your answering with a game context. Immaterial to the original discussion and quite shrill.

No, you've quite clearly taken Op. Watchtower out of its historical context and, frankly, the Doolittle Raid as well. If that's "talking history" then I need no part of it. I think you have to put these actions in their contingent circumstances to understand why they happened and to assign importance to motivating factors commensurate with their real importance. Watchtower happened in order to deny the Japanese a forward air base. It was made doable in a rather hastily cobbled together way primarily because the USN had sunk 4 IJN CVs and thought that they'd sunk two more big CVs at Coral Sea.

So you are contending that the meager damage caused by a few Army bombers striking the mainland of Japan was the main thrust of the Doolittle raid and therefore worth the risk of precious carriers? Sorry, 60 years of documented works disagree with you here.

Nope. Sixty years of writing don't disagree. Most of the writings include a discussion of the strategic goals of the mission, and subsequent operations that the mission was supposed to kick off. If you are, err, narrowly focussed enough on the simple question "what did the Doolittle Raiders' bombs blow up?" then you will only conclude that the raid had no effect. You might then put the logical cart before the horse -- 'the raid had no effect, therefore it was anticipated that it would have no effect, therefore the motivating purpose of the raid was for US domestic political consumption.' But, as you ought to know:

1. The raid was aimed first and foremost at the minds of Japanese operational planners.
2. The raid was secondarily aimed at the military targets that were to be bombed.
3. The raid was supposed to result in the birth of a tactical air force in China, comprised of the raiding B-25s after they arrived in China.
4. The least important consideration was US public consumption. That is why the USN CVs fled when detected. It was far, far more important that the CVs make a clean getaway than any measure of success for the mission. In short, there was no willingness to take a real risk for the sake of political gain back home. And that, fella, cuts to the heart of yours (and others') suggestions that there ought to be some sort of inherent game mechanic that forces the Allies to take risks in 1942.

The main point of engaging in combat is to inflict greater damage on the enemy, period. Midway, notwithstanding.

That's a really odd statement. Lots of combat has objectives other than "inflicting greater damage." Why did the Axis invade Crete? For that matter, why did the UK resist? If you have a really plum strategic objective that you think will allow you to substantially enhance your overall war effort, it is often acceptable to risk greater damage to yourself than you are likely to inflict on your enemy. On another note, why "Midway notwithstanding?" Your statement is almost verbatim the orders given to Ray Spruance.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Ernie King the "greatest naval commander of the twentieth century"? You have to be kidding. King placed himself in command of the defenses of the US Eastern Seaboard during the first several months of the war..., and steadfastly refused British aid or advice on how to cope with the U-Boats. The result was what the U-Boat arm refered to as the "Second Happy Time".

He was opinionated, Anglo-phobic, and a self-admitted S-O-B. He was also dynamic, forceful, and a firm defender of his Navy against all comers..., right or wrong. But realistically, only his Mom would call him the greatest Naval Commander of the Twentieth Century.

Well actually, it was a military historian who called him that.

[dwesolick]

Interesting quote about King by one of his daughters (from Van der Vat's The Pacific Campaign: "[King] is the most even-tempered man in the Navy, he is always in a rage."[:)]

[Luskan]

Well here is my tip = the allies need to create and maintain a defence perimiter until the start of 1943. That perimiter will start weak but it MUST be continuous. Leave just one base/patch of front line under defended and the japs will take that base off you and cost you many troops and much time to root them out again.

EG - Bay of Bengal, every base here needs a big INF unit or two to dissuade invasion - same with any pacific islands within a few days sailing of the edge of the Jap sra - e.g. Suva also the entire australian coast is going to need garrisoning as well.

This way, although your perimeter is weak, you just keep adding and adding to it - most jap players will give up trying to break through it (especially fi you manage to murder any units that come near it and CONTINUE to pile in the INF) and go over to the defensive. This is where most jap players loose the iniative.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: dwesolick
Interesting quote about King by one of his daughters (from Van der Vat's The Pacific Campaign: "[King] is the most even-tempered man in the Navy, he is always in a rage."[:)]

Admiral King was... interesting. He always claimed (correctly I believe) he earned his promotions based on merit not because people liked him. Even his detractors of the day admitted he was a very smart and capable leader, and he seems to have gotten results, which might explain the wide support he received.


“Admiral King, commander in chief of United States fleet, and directly subordinate to the president, is an arbitrary, stubborn type, with not too much brains and a tendency toward bullying his juniors. But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging.”

Dwight D Eisenhower 23rd February, 1942

“One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation, a deliberately rude person, which means he's a mental bully.”

Dwight D Eisenhower 10th March, 1942:


“Admiral King claimed the Pacific as the rightful domain of the Navy; he seemed to regard the operations there as almost his own private war; he apparently felt that the only way to remove the blot on the Navy disaster at Pearl Harbor was to have the Navy command a great victory over Japan; he was adamant in his refusal to allow any major fleet to be under other command than that of naval officers although maintaining that naval officers were competent to command ground or air forces; he resented the prominent part I had in the Pacific War; he was vehement in his personal criticism of me and encouraged Navy propaganda to that end; he had the complete support of the Secretary of the Navy, Knox, the support in general principle of President Roosevelt and his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, and in many cases of General Arnold, the head of the Air Force.”

Letter from General George Marshall to Douglas MacArther (Post Teheran Conference)

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Ernie King the "greatest naval commander of the twentieth century"? You have to be kidding. King placed himself in command of the defenses of the US Eastern Seaboard during the first several months of the war..., and steadfastly refused British aid or advice on how to cope with the U-Boats. The result was what the U-Boat arm refered to as the "Second Happy Time".

He was opinionated, Anglo-phobic, and a self-admitted S-O-B. He was also dynamic, forceful, and a firm defender of his Navy against all comers..., right or wrong. But realistically, only his Mom would call him the greatest Naval Commander of the Twentieth Century.

Well actually, it was a military historian who called him that.

Sounds more like the statement of a Biographer than a Military Historian. Anyone who
wasn't trying to peddle a "kiss-up biography" wouldn't have made such a silly statement.

[barbarrossa]

Well then Mike, which naval officer of King's equivalent rank and position during WW2 would you consider superior to King in the performance of the forces under thier respective commands, regardless of nation or side?

Just curious...

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Well then Mike, which naval officer of King's equivalent rank and position during WW2 would you consider superior to King in the performance of the forces under thier respective commands, regardless of nation or side?

Just curious...

The quote was "the greatest naval COMMANDER of the 20th Century" ..., not "Who
happened to be the overall leader of the greatest collection of naval power in the
20th Century." So how about Admiral Togo? He commanded the Japanese Fleet
throughout a successful war with an enemy of superior overall strength and won
one of the most decisive victorys in Naval history. And he was actually on the
bridge sharing the risks with the rest of his men. As I pointed out before, King's only effort at "direct command" of ships was a resounding failure. King successfully
pushed the Naval View within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (with some help from FDR's
"warm spot for the Navy), but he really didn't COMMAND in the combat sense...,
that was left to Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance, Lockwood, and the like.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Sounds more like the statement of a Biographer than a Military Historian. Anyone who
wasn't trying to peddle a "kiss-up biography" wouldn't have made such a silly statement.

[:D] Perhaps... of course he may actually have believed it, because different people have different views. While I may not completely agree with Mr. Buell's assessment of Admiral King's abilities, it is hard to argue that Admiral King didn't play an important role in implementing a more aggressive operations policy in the Pacific.

There are reasons why the US didn't just sit back till 1943/44... and Admiral King was one of those.



Thomas B. Buell, a retired naval officer and a former warship commander, is author of The Warrior Generals: Combat Leadership in the Civil War (1997). His publications Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (1980); and The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (1974) both received the Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement and the Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Naval Literature. He also published Naval Leadership in Korea : The First Six Months in 2002. A 1958 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Buell also attended the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College. Following his command at sea, he taught military history at the Naval War College and the U.S. Military Academy. Buell was also a writer-in-residence in the history department at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a guest lecturer in history at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Duke University. Retired Naval Commander Thomas B. Buell died on 26 June 2002.

[ShakyJake]

[edit]- Whoops!

[Og]

Good Sirs;

I just have to laugh when I read this serious debate about the allies waiting til' 43 and their essex class carriers to counter-attack.

The reason seems to be that then they can beat the ijn without as much risk as the early coral sea battle in may.

This wait til' 43 has nothing to do with reality, it just has to do with the way people play a game.

If FDR was really on the ball he would have waited til' at least july of 45 for both the german and japanese offensives (by this reasoning). But he didn't have the game.

So why not just wait til' august of 45 since at that point you have a sure win?

This discussion shouldn't be about historic fact, but rather game mechanics. What game mechanic forces the US player to attack before he has the attomic bomb (cuz its just dumb to attack too soon right?).

Do the japanese get any chance of developing an atomic bomb in this game?

yours
very unimpressed
Og

[Mr.Frag]

This wait til' 43 has nothing to do with reality, it just has to do with the way people play a game.

Umm, I suggest you read up a bit on history.

The wait until 43 has *nothing* at all to do with the way people play the game. It has to do with the fact that the USA was completely unprepared for the war and it took them a year and a half to get up to speed where they actually had enough trained troops to start doing something apart from back pedalling.

Had Coral Sea or Midway's outcome not completely destroyed Japan's ability to make war in mid '42, it would have been more likely '44 before the Allies could have done anything.