ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico
In my previous post, I was perhaps being a little more critical than I truly fell.ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Culiacan Mexico:
Excellent summary [:)]
And of course you make very valid points.
You are not stirrig the pot, when what you say is true.
Most of all the early German victories; most of all the fame the German armies gained; much of the reputation gained by German generals; was done against weaker, poorer, and inferior forces in Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Norway, etc, etc. . .
Cheers!
Regarding early victories, the German reserve units called up in 1939/1940 were not much better than the French reserves, but the combat and operation experience gained by these men in there victories over inferior force was invaluable. I believe this is why the German units became very capable (1940-43): a core unit of competent experienced NCOs and junior officers. They made mistakes and adapted, becoming very good in the process, unlike the upper leadership which made numerous mistakes and never seemed to change.
As for fame, I agree for the most part. The fame of the upper crust of German leaderships came from beating hapless opponents, yet when these advantages were lost… they faltered.
I was perhaps being a bit over general in my description, but I think you are essentially correct - German troops learned a great deal in their early conquests, and therefore, were far better prepared when they attacked France in 1940.
You are also correct, I think, in believing that just comparing numbers between opposing forces is not enough to define which is the better force, especially in the Battle of France in 1940.
When an old house is given a fresh coat of paint, it may look new, but it is still an old, ramshackle house. This is the state the French army was in when Germany attacked in 1940.
Because of France's "Maginot" mentality, its poor leadership, its out-moded tactics, its "defeatist/defensive" mindset, its poorly trained troops, its lack of aircraft pilots, etc, France was defeated before the Germans even attacked in 1940. It was, as you rightly state, a modern, well-trained army (Germany) pitted against a less modern, less trained army (France).
Here are just a few thoughts:
* In France, most of the Allied armies were never engaged against the Germans. While there was some fighting, essentially German armoured speaheads merely bypassed most resistence and raced for the channel to trap the Allied Armies. With the bulk of Allied forces forward in Belgium and without any operational reserves, the French were unable to contain the main German offensive pouring through the lightly-defended Ardennes region. By the evening of 15 May, the Germans had ruptured the Allied front completely. By 20 May, the German panzer corps had reached the English Channel and had successfully entrapped the Allied armies in Belgium. After the frantic withdrawal of the Allied forces through Dunkirk, the rest of the campaign was a stroll for the Germans. Although there were some initial tenacious resistance, the French defences soon collapsed. On 22 June 1940, just six weeks after the invasion, France capitulated.
* In essence, the French military degenerated into a tragic state of inertia after the Great War. In this state of inertia, the French military minds were closed to new innovations and new tactics. Technological advances, which had made possible faster planes, heavily armoured tanks and radio communication, were received with much scepticism. Other than the conversion of five infantry divisions and a cavalry division into light mechanised divisions, the French military of 1940 had virtually shown no progress since the last war.
* For France, the Great War was practically a brutal demonstration on the effectiveness of modern firepower. In that war, France lost 1.4 million soldiers. Another 4.2 million were seriously maimed. Following these terrible losses, post-war France was bent on abandoning the philosophy of offensive à outrance in favour of a more balanced emphasis on defence. The French were determined that the holocaust of 1914 to 1918 caused by excessive emphasis on the offensive should never again be repeated in future wars. Moreover, the 10-month battle at Verdun in 1916 had convinced the French that a continuous line of trenches and an immense amount of firepower could hold out against any attack. These lessons had convinced post-war France that defence was the only feasible strategy, not only to win the next war, but also to prevent the mindless slaughter of her youths.
Consequently, the terms of military service were reduced in 1921, 1923 and 1928 to two years, 19 months and one year respectively. This effectively halved France's standing army from 41 divisions in 1922 to only 20 divisions in 1928. With only a small standing army, the French army could only hope to hold back any surprise German invasion while awaiting the mobilisation of its reservists.
* France was prepared to go to war with doctrines formulated based on her WW I experience. In short, the French military in 1940 was organized, equipped and trained to fight a war similar to that of the western front in 1918. Naturally, the French doctrines, which emphasised static defence and "methodical battle", were ill-suited and too rigid for the hectic and often intense pace of mobile warfare that the Germans unleashed upon them in 1940.
* An indispensable part of the French doctrine was its step-by-step approach to battle, termed the "methodical battle". The "methodical battle" closely resembled the WW I procedures. Under this method, all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat according to strictly schedules timetables and phase lines. Under the "methodical battle", decision-making was centralised at higher level command so as to co-ordinate the actions of the numerous subordinate units. There was little need for decentralisation and lower-level officers were expected to display obedience rather than initiative and flexibility. Therefore, the French military leaders were simply too slow to respond to "Lightning" warfare.
* After siphoning off a disproportionate share from the military's coffers during the lean depression years of the 1930s, the Maginot Line turned out to be no more than an engineering feat of questionable military value in the 1940 Campaign. The trouble with the Maginot Line was that it was in the wrong place. In the 1940 Campaign, nearly HALF of the French Army was deployed in support of the Line, and they remained there only to be bypassed by the Germans attacking through the Ardennes. Therefore, the German forces never engaged HALF of the French troops that were available.
* Unfortunately, the quality of the French soldiers in 1940 was a far cry from that of their forefathers who had died willingly by the thousands in the infernos of the Great War. Poor training, inadequate battle preparation, inept leadership and complacency resulting from the "Maginot Line complex" had adversely drained the morale, cohesion and discipline of the troops.
* The key difference between the two countries was not in the quantity or the quality of their tanks, but rather, the tactical employment of these tanks. Although, France recognised the tank as one of the most important weapons indroduced since WW I, they firmly believed that the primary function of the tank was to augment the firepower of the infantry. The first two French armoured divisions were created in January 1940, while a third was only added in April 1940. Unfortunately, these hastily formed divisions suffered a lack of equipment and training. Not only were these tanks dispersed in "Penny Packets", but they also lacked radios and co-ordination.
* As with the tanks, the French failed to develop a viable doctrine for the deployment of airplanes. Little thought had been given to air co-operation with the ground forces. Probably, the most serious fault with the French air doctrine during the inter-war period was its failure to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers despite the lessons from the Polish Campaign. As at May 1940, France possessed a mere 50 dive-bombers.
* While France had a large number of aircraft, there were not enough aircrews or ground crews to man them. Thus the air force was not organized for battle. The regular air force had only half again as many units as during its peacetime nadir in 1932. As the battle opened, 119 of 210 squadrons were ready for action on the decisive northeastern front. The others were reequipping or stationed in the colonies. The 119 squadrons could bring into action only one-fourth of the aircraft available. These circumstances put the Allied air forces in a position of severe numerical inferiority vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe.
* As a consequence of the political struggles between the officer corps and the political left, between the army and the air force, and between the air force and the government, the French Air Force entered combat with an incomplete ground infrastructure, insufficient personnel to man its aircraft, and a doctrine so completely at variance with the army's doctrine that the two services were destined to fight largely independent wars.
* Finally, the French leadership was horribly demoralized. For example, in the book, "The Collapse of the Third Republic", the author notes that the top two leaders of France were convinced of the ultimate defeat of France by Germany long before it became feasible for Germany. And of course civilian leadership was completely lacking both during Hilter's move into the Rhineland, and later during the German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. In the 30's, both far left and far right forces were convinced that the Third Republic had to be taken down and were actively undermining it. Finally, there were many French (in positions of power) who welcomed the German occupation. Apparently it was widely thought that rule under a German tyranny was better than under the old Republic.
Ultimately, the French defeat in the 1940 Campaign is attributed to her ill-conceived strategy which was based on fallacious assumptions, her poorly-led military forces, and her obsolete tactical and operational-level doctrines which were inadequate for the mobile war Germany thrust upon her in 1940.
