Who was better: Patton or Rommel

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ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

My reading is they 'lucked out'. Rommel wasn't the 'bogey man' he'd become in the Western Desert by 1944.

Did the allies fear any specific ger commander on the western front? Or was it more a general consern about the german fighting ability? Im sure they were conserned prior to D-Day, although they believed they would pull it off.

Rommel was away from the front for 2 reasons: visit his wife and also to speak to Hitler in person. I believe it was another attempt to get approval for his idea of moving panzers closer to the coast, but maybe someone can fill me inn. He was apparently very sad for not being there when the s*** hit the fan, so to speak, and he believed the defense would have been better if he were present (of course).

Having the Panzers closer to the beach would make it possible for an early beachhead attack, but I think it was Duke who pointed out that Rommel did not appreciate the power of naval fire. I may be mistaken, but was not Rommel present at the italy landings? He had a short commission in Italy at least. However, the Italy landings showed that naval bombarbment made it next to impossible for tanks to get to the actual beach head (they never did make it in Italy), and I believe this to be especially true for Normandy. Maybe any landing were doomed to success unless the germans could participate in a naval combat (which they of course could not)? How sure was Rommel that an immediate counterattack at the beaches was going to be a success?

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

We're getting a bit offtopic here discussing details of D-day units, but the 21st Panzer was (as you already pointed out) close enough to interfere with the landings. Had the OKH and OK West only made up its mind when the first reports from 716th came in, the 21st could (theoretically) have reached the coast already in late morning, before the US troops had secured the Utah bridgehead. As it was, it lingered until well after 10 in the morning before OK West decided that this indeed was The Invasion. I wonder if OKH shared that impression even a week after... [8|]

Disregarding their composition and OOB, neither the 352nd nor 716th ID were considered ready for combat.

Agreed re the 352nd, the evidence is overwhelming. There was a smal cadre of veterans from the 321st but nothing more. I think the division was classed combat ready because the majority although new recruits were considered able, they weren't walking wounded or old men.

However, their training was inadequate and further training hampered by the (necessary) building work Rommel demanded of them. My own belief is that the 352 myth is largely a result of what happened on Omaha. As historians look at what happened, they then search for answers, and see that the 352 was not a static formation. I think the real reasons behind Omaha lie elsewhere, and don't have much to do with the 352.

The problem for the 21st based around Caen, was that it took several hours to work out what was happening. Elements could have been in action as early as 04.00 - 05.00 I think, if they were given the orders. At that time, British paratroopers were confirmed alll over the place east of the Orne. However, as the situation was assessed, the unit finally got its orders and concentrated for the attack against the paras, only for 84 Korp/7 Armee to decide the coast was suddenly more important, but this left the 21st attempting to reconcentrate around Lebisey wood moving in daylight, through the centre of a bombed and jam packed Caen. I think the sheer number of targets confused the Germans, and the knowledge the 21st was all they had prevented a swift deployment.

Regards,
Ironduke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

We're getting a bit offtopic here discussing details of D-day units, but the 21st Panzer was (as you already pointed out) close enough to interfere with the landings. Had the OKH and OK West only made up its mind when the first reports from 716th came in, the 21st could (theoretically) have reached the coast already in late morning, before the US troops had secured the Utah bridgehead. As it was, it lingered until well after 10 in the morning before OK West decided that this indeed was The Invasion. I wonder if OKH shared that impression even a week after... [8|]

Disregarding their composition and OOB, neither the 352nd nor 716th ID were considered ready for combat.

I doubt that 12SS would have been attacing any US beachead if they were released. The germans believed the US beacheads to be stuck (for a while at least), and the GB and Canadian beaches was far more pressing issues for them. This is illustrated by the fact that 915. regiment of the 352 div. was during night sent towards carentan, but was later ordered to go back towards the GB beacheads. I believe 12SS would have attacked west of Orne river while the 21Pz attacking paratroopers east of Orne, securing the brigdes.

As it turned out, the 21Pz were splitted into 2 groups, and the main groupe set out of action for most of the day as gen. Marcks ordered them towards the beaches (back to Caen, and then west of Orne). The panzers of 21pz reached Périer area (how close to the beach is that?), while a battallion of 192. pz.grenadier managed to reach Lion-sur-Mer (they joined the 21. in their attack), to relieve 736. regiment. However, that would not last for long..

The 21Pz did not do well that day. The force east of Orne was too small to manage to take the brigdes, and the main force west of Orne met much stronger forces, and Feuchtinger (commander 21.) was severly questioned by the SS officers for his performance.

As to making up minds. Imagine how difficult it was for them to do so. Most believed this to be a false manouvre, and the real attack would come at Calaise (Was it only vonRundstedt of the higher commands who immidiatelyt understood this was the real thing?). Then there were reports from all over Normandie of enemy activity as the allied Paratroopers were scattered around along with the dolls that were dropped. Then the Partisan activity breaking up communications. The the surprise of the attack in the first place as the weather was considered too bad for an invasion. If only the germans had better spies in england...

Agreed re the 12th. The advance recon element of the 12th SS arrived and watched the action on Gold Beach unfold. It was always going to secure Caen upon arrival.

I agree re the 21st. Von Luck criticised everyone after the war because he was held back from attacking the paras in the Orne bridgehead, but as events proved, the Commander of the 21st could not afford to commit his men until he knew exactly what was happening. Had he gone all out for the paras, he would never have been able to stop any of the beach landings, and when he decided the beaches were the more pressing target, it took time to concentrate his troops under allied air interdiction. There wasn't an easy or correct option for him in the circumstances.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

The paratrooper landings had a good impact on German confusion. First there were reports on major air landings and scattered firefights, then reports started coming in that the "paratroopers" were just dummies. I wonder if they considered it could be both?

Back to Rommel-related things. I question just bubbled to the surface, and I can't recall ever having read/seen anything about this: Rommel left for Germany on June 4th to celebrate his wife's birthday. This move could probably have been anticipated by any half-wit allied Intelligence Officer. Did the Allied command calculate on Rommel being out of office during those cruical days, or did they just luck out? I understand weather conditions, moon cycles and general preparations set the schedule but..

Rommel went to meet with Hitler, but left early in order to first meet up with his wife for her birthday. I don't know if the Allies were aware of this but I don't think it had any impact on their decision. Rommel went because his own weather reports indicated the next few days would not be suitable for an invasion. The lack of German recconnaisance in the Atlantic and the scarcity of U-boats now operating there meant German meteorologists were not getting the quality of data available to the Allies, and missed the window in the weather which Eisenhower was briefed about and decided to use.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: Belisarius

The paratrooper landings had a good impact on German confusion. First there were reports on major air landings and scattered firefights, then reports started coming in that the "paratroopers" were just dummies. I wonder if they considered it could be both?

Back to Rommel-related things. I question just bubbled to the surface, and I can't recall ever having read/seen anything about this: Rommel left for Germany on June 4th to celebrate his wife's birthday. This move could probably have been anticipated by any half-wit allied Intelligence Officer. Did the Allied command calculate on Rommel being out of office during those cruical days, or did they just luck out? I understand weather conditions, moon cycles and general preparations set the schedule but..

Incidentally, I believe general Marcks had his birthday this day as well

Indeed, and several Officers had ignored 7 Armee orders and left their HQs for some scheduled wargames early. It was a catalogue of problems for the Germans.

Regards,
IronDuke

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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: Belisarius
We're getting a bit offtopic here ...

I doubt that 12SS would have been ...

Agreed re the 12th. The advance recon element of the 12th SS arrived and watched the action on Gold Beach unfold. It was always going to secure Caen upon arrival.

I agree re the 21st. Von Luck criticised everyone after the war because he was held back from attacking the paras in the Orne bridgehead, but as events proved, the Commander of the 21st could not afford to commit his men until he knew exactly what was happening. Had he gone all out for the paras, he would never have been able to stop any of the beach landings, and when he decided the beaches were the more pressing target, it took time to concentrate his troops under allied air interdiction. There wasn't an easy or correct option for him in the circumstances.

Regards,
IronDuke

It was my understanding that the decision to go for the beaches was Gen Marcks, not Feuchtinger's.

Does anyone have a web site over the OOB's in Normandie?

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

My reading is they 'lucked out'. Rommel wasn't the 'bogey man' he'd become in the Western Desert by 1944.

Did the allies fear any specific ger commander on the western front? Or was it more a general consern about the german fighting ability? Im sure they were conserned prior to D-Day, although they believed they would pull it off.

Rommel was away from the front for 2 reasons: visit his wife and also to speak to Hitler in person. I believe it was another attempt to get approval for his idea of moving panzers closer to the coast, but maybe someone can fill me inn. He was apparently very sad for not being there when the s*** hit the fan, so to speak, and he believed the defense would have been better if he were present (of course).

Having the Panzers closer to the beach would make it possible for an early beachhead attack, but I think it was Duke who pointed out that Rommel did not appreciate the power of naval fire. I may be mistaken, but was not Rommel present at the italy landings? He had a short commission in Italy at least. However, the Italy landings showed that naval bombarbment made it next to impossible for tanks to get to the actual beach head (they never did make it in Italy), and I believe this to be especially true for Normandy. Maybe any landing were doomed to success unless the germans could participate in a naval combat (which they of course could not)? How sure was Rommel that an immediate counterattack at the beaches was going to be a success?

I'm not sure how much experience he had of naval gunfire, I'd guess not much. It was Allied air power he really feared after his experiences in the desert. I think what he ultimately wanted were layered defences, of the type found best found in Normandy behind Sword beach. After the beach defences, the inland defensive strongpoints (codenamed Morris and Hillman) together with minefields and resistance nests. I think ultimately, he felt that fixed defences would so tie down the attackers, that the Armoured counterattacks would be delivered into relatively small and siorganised bridgeheads.

Remember, the 12th SS arrived during the night and fought a night action against the Canadians. Had the Canadians been much closer the beach, working their way through a belt of defences several miles deep, 12th SS Armour and Pzgr would have crashed into a very precarious situation for the Allies during the evening when accurate naval gun support would have been much harder.

I think all the main Allied Commanders were wary of German tactical abilities. I think it helps explain both Montgomery's and Patton's actions. Montgomery built up overwhelming force to overcome German tactical ability, Patton manoeuvred and avoided direct confrontation to overcome it. Patton had a couple of interesting remarks about his opinion on American infantry and I think in his own way, he was trying as hard as Monty to compensate for what he saw as a German advantage.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne


I doubt that 12SS would have been ...

Agreed re the 12th. The advance recon element of the 12th SS arrived and watched the action on Gold Beach unfold. It was always going to secure Caen upon arrival.

I agree re the 21st. Von Luck criticised everyone after the war because he was held back from attacking the paras in the Orne bridgehead, but as events proved, the Commander of the 21st could not afford to commit his men until he knew exactly what was happening. Had he gone all out for the paras, he would never have been able to stop any of the beach landings, and when he decided the beaches were the more pressing target, it took time to concentrate his troops under allied air interdiction. There wasn't an easy or correct option for him in the circumstances.

Regards,
IronDuke

It was my understanding that the decision to go for the beaches was Gen Marcks, not Feuchtinger's.

Does anyone have a web site over the OOB's in Normandie?

21st Panzer was 7 Armee reserve, so Marks at 84 Korp had no control over it, although elements of the 21st were designated as the mobile reserve for 716 ID and were duly committed after the 716 requested it's help east of the Orne.

Around 06.00, 7 Armee seems to have agreed with the 21st Commanders on the ground that a counterattack could be launched against the Orne bridgeheads, but the traffic chaos in Caen meant it was closer to 10.00 before everyone was ready and concentrated. There was some brief fighting, but by 10.00AM the 352 and 716 were reporting armour breaking through the defences on what were Gold and Juno and 7 Armee decided to shift the 21st Panzer against the beaches west of the Orne. This involved another difficult move back through Caen, and it was 15.00 before the Commanders of the 21st met in Lebisey wood for the pre-attack briefing. It was about 16.00 before they got going. They launched 4 KGs, at least one of which did reach the coast at Lion Sur Mer, but was unsupported and had to fall back.

Regards,
IronDuke

[mbMike]

We forget one thing.

"Haha! Rommel, you son of a bitch!!! .............I read your book!" - Patton

[Von Rom]

ORIGINAL: mbMike

We forget one thing.

"Haha! Rommel, you son of a bitch!!! .............I read your book!" - Patton

Heheh

Those are words sweet and dear to my heart [:)]

[Makoto]

...

[freeboy]

Tanks on the coast would have been a nasty shock to the Brits... but shear weight of numbers and air power would probably have stopped the germans from annihilating the first divisions. Remember those troops in the Channel Islands at Hitlers order?... and what about in Norway? Give Rommel 100k more troops, 500 fighters, gas and a free hand with the troops displacements and how do you think things would have gone ? I remmeber the Germans discovered a nerve agent, a point of contact killed, blocked the nerve reseptors. 50 planes could have seriously screwed up the Normandy landing, with initial kills followed by very dificult landing in rubber suits. This was not mustard gas, but the precurser to somin I beleive.... again let be thankful this shit was never used... and to my knowledge, help me out ID, neither the Brits or the US had anything like this.

[fishfinder]

Montana was THE best...and his boys ALWAYS came home

[Shaun]

Hmm,

This is a question? There is any doubt on the answer - sheesh ...

Shaun

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: Sulla

Hmm,

This is a question? There is any doubt on the answer - sheesh ...

Shaun

[&:]

Given that both are over-rated I suppose there must be[8D]

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Sulla

Hmm,

This is a question? There is any doubt on the answer - sheesh ...

Shaun

[&:]

Given that both are over-rated I suppose there must be[8D]

Rekindle the fire ... [:)]

Rommel was of course being promoted as a german war hero by the Nazis. Nonetheless, he was indeed a splendid commander, but many german officers were probably as good.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: freeboy

Tanks on the coast would have been a nasty shock to the Brits... but shear weight of numbers and air power would probably have stopped the germans from annihilating the first divisions. Remember those troops in the Channel Islands at Hitlers order?... and what about in Norway? Give Rommel 100k more troops, 500 fighters, gas and a free hand with the troops displacements and how do you think things would have gone ? I remmeber the Germans discovered a nerve agent, a point of contact killed, blocked the nerve reseptors. 50 planes could have seriously screwed up the Normandy landing, with initial kills followed by very dificult landing in rubber suits. This was not mustard gas, but the precurser to somin I beleive.... again let be thankful this shit was never used... and to my knowledge, help me out ID, neither the Brits or the US had anything like this.

Using gas on the beachheads would have made the landings fail, I am sure.

As to german fighters: This is Galland's remark of the german jets (interview 1994):
"The Me-262 would most certainly not have changed the final outcome of the war, for we had already lost completely, but it would have probably delayed the end, since the Normandy invasion on June 6, 1944, would probably not have taken place, at least not successfully if the 262 had been operational. I certainly think that just 300 jets flown daily by the best fighter pilots would have had a major impact on the course of the air war. This would have, of course, prolonged the war, so perhaps Hitler's misuse of this aircraft was not such a bad thing after all. "

Im not sure of what year he talks about. But having jetfighters in 1942 would most likely have a severe inpact on the course of war... Not to mention on any landings.

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: Sulla

Hmm,

This is a question? There is any doubt on the answer - sheesh ...

Shaun

[&:]

Given that both are over-rated I suppose there must be[8D]

Rekindle the fire ... [:)]

And why not? [:)]

I suppose when assessing so-called 'great' commanders I look for those who displayed 'balance' - I don't think either Rommel or Patton displayed that. This is not to say that they were not good generals, both certainly had flair and panache, but for me that isn't enough to justify the near legendary reputation both seem to have accrued.

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly



[&:]

Given that both are over-rated I suppose there must be[8D]

Rekindle the fire ... [:)]

And why not? [:)]

I suppose when assessing so-called 'great' commanders I look for those who displayed 'balance' - I don't think either Rommel or Patton displayed that. This is not to say that they were not good generals, both certainly had flair and panache, but for me that isn't enough to justify the near legendary reputation both seem to have accrued.

Indeed, why not!

What general would you rank as a legend? Manstein, surely!? And vonPaulus for being the first FieldMarshal standing up against Hitler (by refusing to waste his and his soldiers lives) ? Cant really come up with any brits or US candidates [;)] Some Russian generals perhaps?


JT

[Kevinugly]

From WW2 I suppose it would be Manstein certainly but also William Slim, commander of the 'Forgotten' 14th Army in India and Burma. He showed himself to be an absolute master of all aspects of modern warfare, especially considering his troops were always last in line when it came down to logistical support. The more I read about the campaign in SE Asia, the more I admire his command skills and the fortitude of those soldiers who served under him. It's difficult to assess generals like Konev, Zhukov and Chuikov since Red Army doctrine tended to be profligate with the lives of soldiers. Whilst American commanders on land were a pretty poor bunch (which is why Patton stands out so much imho) their admirals were on the whole much better. Chester Nimitz seems to stand out particularly but I would say that I'm currently reading up on the Pacific Campaign so I may well change my opinions there. In the air I think Coningham stands out for the work he did forging close army-airforce co-operation but here I only really know the British perspective so there may well be others whom I haven't the necessary knowledge to pass judgement on.