Allied ASW

[strawbuk]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

One "quick fix" for a lot of ASW problems in the game would be to remove the
ability of any ASW platform to attack subs when moving at "full speed". High
Speed and ASW activity are incompatible as the noise and vibration of the ship's
own power plant drown's out the effectiveness of Sonar/ASDIC and such.

Absolutely, good idea - I've seen 16 knots quoted as max in Atlantic war and it is rush noise of water over asdic kit that kills it as much as anything.

[Speedysteve]

Interesting thoughts in here guys.

Just wanted to express my opinions of ASW in WiTP. IMO Allied ASW is a bit too effective at finding and killing subs early war. Sure I know later in the war they should be real good at it but I would honestly say if a Jap sub is found 8/10 it will be hit and sunk. This is just my feel on it. I'm not sure if the latest patches have ammended ASW at all, have they? (haven't started a new game since patch came out).

I feel Jap ASW is about right. I mean it was laughable throughout most of the war IMO. I'm not an expert on Jap ASW but I think it did improve slightly over the war (mainly in terms of equipment I guess). Did Jap ASW improve at all over the war? Does Jap ASW improve in WiTP at all?

Regards,

Steven

[mdiehl]

If you could explain why you draw the line between Göbbelspropaganda (by the way, i think this is a really serius insult, just think about it) and my results ?

Not your results, AM, your claims about US ASW efforts in WW2, both Atlantic and Pacific. Your comments about the nature, extent, and effectiveness of US ASW on the Atlantic Coast and Pacific Coast are obvious "shots from the hip." If you constantly drop nonsensical claims about subjects in which you make a pretense of expertise, you're going to get challenged.

In re insults: I honestly no longer care if you're insulted. If you constantly troll for my attention (as you do by specifically naming me as a sort of SOP run-up to enlightening us with more quips from Adnan Goebbels' Manifesto), don't be surprised if I take pleasure in ridiculing you.

As regards DATA about the results that the game produces, as I said before, I think we've seen some extreme results going both ways. I can't explain them and don't fully understand what generates the results that we see in the GAME. IMO if you engage in very high risk deployments (near major, alerted US naval installations), you'll lose subs faster.

The general complaint seems to be that the Japanese ASW is about right but the Allied ASW too strong. Maybe so, but in the absence of many successful US sub encounters with Japanese subs, this might be a suitable proxy for generating early war IJN submarine loss rates (1941-42) consistent with historical rates. That's ASSUMING that the Japanese players are using the subs in ways that are consistent with historical Japanese use -- as pickets and scouts around imminent objectives, or along obvious lines of movement or communication around "important objectives." If Japanese players are attempting to replicate the Kriegsmarine's success by placing Iboats around the Pacific West Coast or Hawaii in large numbers, the Japanese players should expect to lose LOTS of subs VERY QUICKLY.

[Charles2222]

mdiehl:

I think the supposition of a pre-war "lax" mentality is wrong from the get go. ASW was one of the things that RN, the USN, USCG, RAN and RCN took quite seriously.

I have the World at War series at home, and I believe it was Lord Avon who commented that it was a latchup from the start, though I think he was talking of the pathetic job they were doing with convoying as opposed to their effectiveness against submarines, but it was on the direct subject of losses to submarines, but I'll have to check. If I'll remember I'll bring his quote to this thread soon. I recall him saying that the lessons from WWI were all there, but nobody could be bothered to learning them.

[mdiehl]

He's right but here's why (at least in re the US).

Early 1942 US merchant losses were highest along the US east coast because merchant ships were highly vulnerable there. Why were they vulnerable? Both German and US analyses of this (including accounts from German uboat officers) identify three causes, in order of priority. 1. Absence of escorts. 2. Backdrop illumination from US shore facilities. 3. Absence of convoy use.

1 and 3 are linked. The USN made the strategic decision to dedicate the most ASW capable craft to the cross-Atlantic routes because there simply were not enough ocean going ASW vessels available to cover both the coastal routes and the transatlantic routes. The US attempted to make up for this via a variety of band aid solutions that sounded nice on paper but did not work. These included the advent of the "Civil Air Patrol" and a hodgepodge 'navy' of commandeered yachts, trawlers, and non-ocean worthy craft, skippered by coasties, naval reserves, civil volunteers and so forth. There were, quite literally, US flagged "ASW" vessels that were seriously outmatched by the subs they were hunting.... yachts with two DC on a stern mounted rail, a 3" deck gun, and shotguns for the crew and so forth. These vessels could not hope under any set of circumstances to keep up with a coastal convoy. So rather than convoy coastal merchant vessels, they were sent at irregular intervals, unescorted, and solo. And they paid a huge price.

The problem wasn't that US crews did not train intensively at ASW pre-war. When a US DD sighted a sub in autumn 1941 it could (and on several occasions did) deliver devastating attacks in the best aggressive spirit. The problem was an incredible shortfall of 1st class escort vessels. Ship for ship, the US was as good as the UK, and both nations ASW training efforts were FAR superior to any Axis capability.

Of course, there were many more improvements to be made. First the US and UK had to ratchet up escort production to put enough vessels on the water to make convoying a universal strategy. Then both sides improved their capabilities -- ahead-thrown weapons, side-thrown DCs, leigh lights, meter band then centimetric band radar, better air-dropped DCs, improved sonar, better on-the-scene use of radio direction finding, better command and control etc.

But when submarines attacked escorted convoys they could, at times, be counterattacked effectively even in 1941 and 1942. Of course, absent the technological improvements, in 1942 the general advantage lay with the submarine. In the face of that, German command and control and tactics also evolved. Kriegsmarine "Wolfpacks" per se did not really come into commun use until mid-1942. Groups of subs were sent out (as in op Drumbeat), but their patrol areas were often quite dispersed.

Japan started the war lacking even the rudimentary technological capability of the Allies and they started the war with a more pervasive laxity of effort and attitude in ASW training at all levels. So of course the Allies should be better at ASW than Japan even in 1941-1942. If the Japanese player concentrates his submarines near major US facilities they should expect to lose them.

And of course there was an idiotic level of political resistence in the US House of Representatives to enforcing blackout restrictions on the US east coast. Congressmen were literally more worried about the economic effects of 'curbing the night life' on the tourist industry than they were about the economic effects of losing a merchant vessel. They learned a hard lesson at the price of the lives of sailors.

[Charles2222]

mdiehl: I'm only responding to you on the level that you seem to think pre-WWII ASW was so set in stone and effective; it wasn't. Also. Lord Avon wasn't even getting into the problems with the second Happy Time, as he was talking about how abysmal the supposed masters of ASW (UK) were. I'll see if I can dig up a few comments from Avon tonight. The volume was called "Wolfpack" for any of those that might be interested.

[mdiehl]

That's not my position. My position that Allied ASW (and to a certain extent, German submarine tactics) evolved dynamically. Allied ASW was, however, far more developed and effective even in 1939 (here we'd be talking about the UK) than, for example, Japanese or German ASW. The Japanese had NO experience with ASW and frankly a suite pf pervasive attitude problems that was a barrier to its effective use. The Germans had plenty of theory but little training largely because they weren't allowed to even build submarines and did not do so for most of the interwar period. So, for example, the idea of using a German torpedo boat in ASW exercises against a German submarine acting as a training target was right out. Of all the Axis powers, in 1941-1942 the Italians were the most rigorously and realistically trained in ASW.

As I said. In 1941 the advantage lay withe the submarine. As others, however, have pointed out, there were qualifyong circumstances (training, tactics, construction and doctrine) that made some submarines both more effective and less vulnerable than others. Other than S-boats, the US and UK subs were as good as anything built by the Germans. The larger Japanese subs had remarkable endurance, but were rather vulnerable, not rated to the same submerged depths, and slower to dive. That last one is a huge factor. When the PBY is bearing down on you, emergency dive success or failure could be determined by a 90 second dive vs a 100 second dive.

[Grotius]

Just to add some of my own results: I've put a 7-DD ASW TF in the bottleneck outside Cairns, where the AI routinely sends submarines. The TF has sunk 3 submarines in the last 10 turns, and it has damaged two others. In exchange, one of my DDs has been damaged. On the other hand, in the overall sub war, the IJN actually leads by 6 kills to 5 as of April 15, 1942, though one of its kills was apparently an aerial attack.

I'm debating whether to keep this ASW TF outside Cairns because it almost feels like an exploit. That's because I know the AI will routinely put subs in this hex. Obviously a human won't be quite so predictable.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Yeah, i know... you allways know everything... just remember the yamato-thing...

anyway, maybe you do not recognizethe difference between things that were said and things you want people to be said.

If the japanese side under "perfect" conditions can´t hit american subs (and i think even you can see that nobody would use the subs this way...) and this at the start of the war/game (okay may/june42), then this is something to speak about.

About historcal facts... just remember the black widdow performance compared to the he219 or your "knowledge" about the eto generally that yourself declared as "weak"
The american asw in 1942 in the atlantic sucked compared with the british... if you can´t accept facts, live in lalaland.... [;)]
The brits and canadians learned the asw and had the experts here... cause from 1939 to 1942 they fought against the german subs. Also, your explanaiton about the happy days of spring 42 are not wrong, but you still do not add some other points for the full failure of american asw in the atlantic...

the americans were arrogant and did not belive that they need help from the brits
the americans made the same failures about sub detection as the brits did in the beginning of the war
the americans got in the same traps the brits got in the beginning of the war...

all points cause they lacked any experience about the "modern" anti sub warfare of the ww2...

they learned it later (and esp. because the brits "helped" em to learn the lessons). But NOT in 1942...

Also, you forgot to answer the interesting question about american ueberboats, with damage in the high 60ties (some with fire onboard!) that escape from tokyo to pearl...

also, you did not answer my question about historical behaviour (refitting and sitting in the port for quite a time after a mission)....

and finally, show me that my comments about the (missing) quality of american asw in the year 1942 (compared to the british experience against german subs) is a shoot from the hip.... if you can´t stand the facts, be quite.

If you need to insult others cause you dislike their opinion, well this says enough about your character...

oh - my sub results were with historical sub use and computer control on... so the ai of the game used the japanese subs... but sure, i use version 1.10final, not the 1.20 or 1.21... so i can´t say if they changed the things so they went different.

But if my results will be repeated often (feel free to start a head to head and repeat the situation) then something IS wrong. And different to you (at last at it seems) i want to play BOTH sides. With you as the developer, we could surely only play the allied side... - how boring [8|]

don´t look for your own counterparts at the wrong position... [:'(]

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Haha, plain bs...

if you want to play about subs you should know the facts...

the VIIer Type was the "best" conventional sub in a heavy asw encounter... small, deepdiving and fast crashdiving (you know, physics...), now compare it with any allied sub. some were faster (well nearly all), but they couldn´t dive as deep, turn as quick, showed such a small signature to be detected or could stay as long in the combat zone (if you measure also with the size)... sure this was payed by nil comfort, but with the "best" sub training untill late in the war (cause the east sea (or baltic sea) was the perfect training pool) and the best trainers (different to the pilot shool system the german sub crews were trained by the "best" old aces that survived until 42)..

the american subs encountered nearly no enemy and had "high" losses (sure, many by failures of the weapons/subs) at last compared with other weapon parts.

if you are really interested, you could pm me... i will give you all detailed informations you want [:'(]

Oh, the conclusion of my mails is, that the experience level of british vets of the atlantic battle should be way higher as the americans and that the kill of an american sub should be way easier (if you attack it - cause i agree 100% - axis asw wasn´t impressive, nobody said something different) as a german sub.

Japanese subs were worser as americans, so they should be killed very easily... but also not in 2 months after the war started with "historical" usement by the computer...

[mdiehl]

HELLOO AM -- Yamato and Bismarck are still at the bottom of the sea.

If the japanese side under "perfect" conditions can´t hit american subs (and i think even you can see that nobody would use the subs this way...) and this at the start of the war/game (okay may/june42), then this is something to speak about.

I have not seen a majority of players commenting that the Japanese ASW is underrated.

About historcal facts... just remember the black widdow performance compared to the he219 or your "knowledge" about the eto generally that yourself declared as "weak"

The HE219 was a mediocre plane as was the P-61. The latter had better radar.

The american asw in 1942 in the atlantic sucked compared with the british... if you can´t accept facts, live in lalaland....

This is a contentless, factless trope and nothing more.

the americans were arrogant and did not belive that they need help from the brits
the americans made the same failures about sub detection as the brits did in the beginning of the war

All of which has nothing to do with training in re ships and equipment and everything to do with Ernie King. That said, I think the US East Coast early war losses have less to do with Admiral King's arrogance than with the dearth of 1st rate ASW assets. From some UK authors' perspective the lack of convoys on the US East Coast in e.1942 may seem like arrogance. But when you consider that every major US ASW asset in the ETO was covering the cross-Atlantic route, you have to wonder wtf anybody thinks the US could have used to escort a coastal convoy? The answer is that there was NO good solution that could have substantially reduced merchant losses in early 1942 apart from enforcing blackout rules. The failure to enforce blackout rules from the get go was not King's fault or military arrogance, it was garden variety parochial congressional stupidity.

the americans got in the same traps the brits got in the beginning of the war...

Fine. Name one. Caveat: in your response you can't name "failure to escort coastal convoys" as a "trap" into which the US fell qua British advice unless you can name assets that could escort said convoys without taking assets from the cross-Atlantic route. I don't think you understand the American situation in early 1942. It's a "zero sum game."

all points cause they lacked any experience about the "modern" anti sub warfare of the ww2...

The US had some hot load experience prior to Dec 1941 and damned near sank one of the two German subs that it attacked in the pre-war phoney-peace. The USN and USCG trained intensively and realistically at ASW -- more so than the Japanese by a long shot. Again, such training included the use of ASDIC/Sonar on "live" (USN submarines playing the opposition) targets and DC setups (but not attacks of course). Short of actually fighting in a war, USN and USCG training was as good as anyone's and better than the training in any Axis nation save, perhaps, Italy.

Also, you forgot to answer the interesting question about american ueberboats, with damage in the high 60ties (some with fire onboard!) that escape from tokyo to pearl...

I have not heard anyone else complain about the durability of US subs. They were certainly more durable than Japanese subs. How they would compare in this game with, for example, German Type IXs, is anybody's guess, since this game does not cover the Battle of the Atlantic.

and finally, show me that my comments about the (missing) quality of american asw in the year 1942 (compared to the british experience against german subs) is a shoot from the hip.... if you can´t stand the facts, be quite.

I don't mind the facts. In the case of 1942 US ASW training and equipment the facts do not support your propaganda.

[Charles2222]

mdiehl:

That's not my position.

Perhaps you'll recall saying this?:

I think the supposition of a pre-war "lax" mentality is wrong from the get go. ASW was one of the things that RN, the USN, USCG, RAN and RCN took quite seriously. It was an area in which the Allies pre-war excelled and far outdid any of the Axis players.

I was responding to that erroneous comment. I mentioned Lord Avon earlier. I was wrong that it was him, but this is what I found from the Wolfpack volume of the War at War:

From Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton: "Convoy defense is not a very glamorous affair, and between the wars, I think rather naturally, the Navy was more inclined to concentrate on more glamorous activities like great massed torpedo attacks, and that sort of thing. All the information about the lessons of WWI were available, and for those who wanted to read them the lessons were there, but I'm afraid noone bothered, and as a result our trade defense as a whole was very badly neglected."

Later the narrator Lawrence Olivier says, "There just weren't enough escort ships. Those available lacked endurance and their crews were virtually untrained."

Seems pretty lax to me.

A bit more of the volume, and a book at home I perused, mentioned that the Germans respected the ASDIC but the UK was totally unprepared for night surface attacks which is what the Germans started doing after a while. Of course I don't think the Japanese ever went very big on night surface attacking either. Given the above and how the UK flopped for quite a spell with dealing with the surface attacks, I don't see a lot of evidence that they were much good before Walker tried out his new tactics in 9/41.

I will add that since a recent post where I described my ASW experiences with the game I've had two battles since, both JA subs hitting a freighter. Now maybe it's natural for us to say the ship was unescorted, but that's where I'm going to break, as I see no reason to conclude that. Perhaps they were escorted and the escort didn't find me, but I'd suppose I'd have to leap to the other side to see what that convoy had, and I don't want to screw up my ingame reports doing that. In any event it's just astounding that '41 ASW is attacking the hevay majority of my sub sctions before they fire a shot (and of course consequently don't fire one at all). I have had some pretty decent times with the ones that got away damaged, surviving.

As far as ASW goes, I wouldn't say the UK necessarily far outdid the GE's, as they didn't even prove adequate against the few subs the GE's had early on, but even so, I'm not sure it mattered so much for the GE's since they hardly put much effort into a surface fleet. They weren't an island nation afterall (less incentive). I agree the JA ASW was worse, as bad as the UK ones were in the early years, but that's still not to say they should be as effective as they are. And if anybody in the Pacific should be ASW effective the Brits would be the strongest argument, certainly not the US (which seems to be the majority of the gripe).

Of course the other related gripe is that the US subs are far too effective. I'm not sure I've seen enough gamewise to indicate that, but I can tell you they historically were not. From what limited action I've seen in the game, the US ASW, and sometimes UK, is way too effective, as I noted that 80% of the time my JA subs, not in shallow water, get attacked by escort without firing a torpedo. Now really mdiehl, do you think ANY ASW of any nation, at ANY time, got that good? Wouldn't you say for at 'least' the first half of the war that convoys without air cover were spotting -and- attacking subs before they fired even one torpedo (not with guns, but with depth charges no less)?

[Drongo]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
I have not seen a majority of players commenting that the Japanese ASW is underrated.

I have not heard anyone else complain about the durability of US subs.

Mdiehl,
You seem to be relying heavily here on what others have said or not said about the game rather than supplying an opinion based on your own experience with it.

Have you actually played the game?

[Mike Scholl]

Drongo. Personally, my experiance (playing mostly as the US) has been that Jap
ASW is moderately good. If I hang around at a location that the AI finds annoying
it soon starts sending escorts and ASW groups. It doesn't always send enough, and
it isn't consistant, but in only one start attempt (of four) have my ASW efforts been
blessed with greater success than the AI's. If it were "head-to-head" play I'd be
engaging in more "shoot and scoot" efforts with my subs to avoid player retaliation.
Player's tend to "optimize" according to the game's realities, so their results will
probably be "ahistorically" good.

[Culiacan Mexico]

ORIGINAL: Speedy

Interesting thoughts in here guys.

Just wanted to express my opinions of ASW in WiTP. IMO Allied ASW is a bit too effective at finding and killing subs early war. Sure I know later in the war they should be real good at it but I would honestly say if a Jap sub is found 8/10 it will be hit and sunk. This is just my feel on it. I'm not sure if the latest patches have ammended ASW at all, have they? (haven't started a new game since patch came out).

I feel Jap ASW is about right. I mean it was laughable throughout most of the war IMO. I'm not an expert on Jap ASW but I think it did improve slightly over the war (mainly in terms of equipment I guess). Did Jap ASW improve at all over the war? Does Jap ASW improve in WiTP at all?

Regards,

Steven

Some better equipment later in the war and in some cases more of it. I believe the experience some improvement in tactics/capability, but I am not sure it could be called anything but ‘moderate’ improvement. If some one called that improvement marginal, I would not argue.

[Speedysteve]

Thanks for the reply CM [:)]

[Bobthehatchit]

Another thing i feel need to be taken into account when looking at subs lost to asw attacks is the amount of time subs now spend at sea compared to there actual historical deployments.

After reading Tromps info for a lot of subs on hazy grays and underway's site, i noticed that in general most subs would do one maybe to two patrols between refits which could last anything from a week to a few months, there would then be a period of crew training and working up before the sub went out for one or two more patrols.

In UV and Witp subs are generally used a lot more than this, they patrol, refuel/re-arm go straight back out again unless damaged. They will some times spend a few day in port if the sis is up then sortie again. So in general there are more subs at sea for longer being used more aggressively against asw tactics that arn't always historical.

In general the IJN and Usn did not depluy asw HK groups with ten DD's against a SS sighting like alot of players do. The Ijn mostly used PC'S PG'S SC and aircraft, the DD's were to busy carrying out other duties. It wasn't until later in the war the dedicater asw groups were deployed to the pacific by the USN and RN, generally based around a cve with dd and de's as support.

Just my two pence worth.

[mdiehl]

Seems pretty lax to me.

Then you'll have to be more specific as to who or what aspect was "lax." If your argument is that there weren't enough escort class ships and that 'expenditures for escort ship construction were lax' then fine. That's a fair remark. The DDs were on the way but there simply weren't enough of them to go around as I've agreed numerous times.

But if "laxity" is supposed to apply to the level of training and skill pre-war or, as AM suggests, throughout 1942, that'd be manifestly wrong. It is quite true to point out that the state of the art of ASW in Dec 1941 1stQ 1942 was not so compelling and that subs had the advantage. But USN/USCG escorts were quite skilled. There were some substantial organizational changes that had to be made in early 1942 to give US escort groups better CAC. Starting in February 1942 the USCG 327s (for example Campbell) and 265s (for example Modoc) were sent for month-long refits (addition of Sonar/asdic for escorts that lacked same, in the 327s, addition of DC racks to those not yet equipped with same, addition of 6x K-guns -- 3 port 3 starboard) and, importantly, a kind of "advanced ASW school" training for skippers and XOs under Royal Navy tutelage. So the assertion that UK advice and knowledge was across-the-board spurned is pretty suspect. As with most blanket generalizations, the truth is more complex and less overstated than the propaganda.

See, for example:
Walling, Michael
2005 Bloodstained Sea. McGraw Hill. ISBN: 0071424016

One thing that catches my eye is the ease with which escorts are getting torpedoed. If there's a kernel of truth to the breast gashing going on, it's that the overall intensity of submarine and anti-submarine activity seems too high. Subs make contact too easily, get off accurate shots too easily, and as a result are getting counterattacked often.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Seems pretty lax to me.

Then you'll have to be more specific as to who or what aspect was "lax." If your argument is that there weren't enough escort class ships and that 'expenditures for escort ship construction were lax' then fine. That's a fair remark. The DDs were on the way but there simply weren't enough of them to go around as I've agreed numerous times.

But if "laxity" is supposed to apply to the level of training and skill pre-war or, as AM suggests, throughout 1942, that'd be manifestly wrong. It is quite true to point out that the state of the art of ASW in Dec 1941 1stQ 1942 was not so compelling and that subs had the advantage. But USN/USCG escorts were quite skilled. There were some substantial organizational changes that had to be made in early 1942 to give US escort groups better CAC. Starting in February 1942 the USCG 327s (for example Campbell) and 265s (for example Modoc) were sent for month-long refits (addition of Sonar/asdic for escorts that lacked same, in the 327s, addition of DC racks to those not yet equipped with same, addition of 6x K-guns -- 3 port 3 starboard) and, importantly, a kind of "advanced ASW school" training for skippers and XOs under Royal Navy tutelage. So the assertion that UK advice and knowledge was across-the-board spurned is pretty suspect. As with most blanket generalizations, the truth is more complex and less overstated than the propaganda.

See, for example:
Walling, Michael
2005 Bloodstained Sea. McGraw Hill. ISBN: 0071424016

One thing that catches my eye is the ease with which escorts are getting torpedoed. If there's a kernel of truth to the breast gashing going on, it's that the overall intensity of submarine and anti-submarine activity seems too high. Subs make contact too easily, get off accurate shots too easily, and as a result are getting counterattacked often.

Let me remind you of your erroneous, or mis-stated view:

quote:

I think the supposition of a pre-war "lax" mentality is wrong from the get go. ASW was one of the things that RN, the USN, USCG, RAN and RCN took quite seriously. It was an area in which the Allies pre-war excelled and far outdid any of the Axis players.

The subject is pre-war, not 1942. Have I not provided sufficient evidence that PRE-WAR it was lax? The British, the supposed masters, were having to live with the results of that lax approach quite a while before '42 came.

I don't lump lack of ASW ships as necessarily lax, though it's certainly a symptom, but more the obvious ones of virtually untrained crews and that nobody bothered to learn the convoy lessons of WWI. You spoke of pre-war as though they were doing some 'really serious' work. but it sure didn't pay off in what was possibly the 3 most critical areas, things the military ITSELF could control (though I blame the military for only two of them), such as training crews and keeping the WWI convoy lessons in mind. The military couldn't control how much ships they were alloted.

And now a few interesting quotes form Submarines at War by Edwin P. Hoyt

page 109 somewhat into the last paragraph:

The plunger was also the first U.S. undersea boat to undergo a really arduous depth-charging and survive. In the waters off Japan she was attacked by a Japanese destroyer whose crew showed they knew a lot more about antisubmarine warafre than the Americans did at that stage of the war. The destroyer dropped twenty-four depth charges on the Plunger, one so close that it broke open the alcohol tank in the after torpedo room. The Japanese did not have American sonar but they did have their own echo-ranging system, which was accuarte to 3,000 meters. The old-fashioned hydrophones were able to obtain a bearing at 5,000 meters.

Page 184 which earlier mentioned early '43:

The Japanese had radar. It was not yet installed on ships and warships, but it was coming. They were adept at the use of radio direction finders. The submarine that came to the surface and made a long transmission to Pearl Harbor might find that it had raised a nest of hornets. The Japanese had another device not duplicated in the United States, the jikitanchiki, a magnetic detector used by Japanese aircraft. It sensed the presence of a large metal object below the surface of the sea, so that low-flying pilots could sometimes find and then track a submarine that was submerged.

However, at this stage of the war the major Japanese anti-submarine weapon was the sonar system. The Japanese sonar was technically superior and their employment of the echo-ranging techniques was excellent. Also, as the war continued, more Japanese merchant ships were armed with deck guns that were a constant threat to any submarine trying to attack on the surface.

Most important at this stage of the war was the increase in Japanese production in antisubmarine vessels. The most effective of these were the kaibokans. These vessels were small, under one thousand tons. At first the Americans thought they were only coastal freighters but they carried highly trained antisubmarine personnel, and three hundred depth charges were a standard allotment.

BTW, my grand campaign as JA is on about 12/17 now, and I remember accelerating two destroyers with the heavier depth charge loads and the first CL that had a radar set. I thought my earliest warship was coming in like 30 days at least, and unaccelerated the CL I picked was either 80 or 120 days at best, and yet I just got one, maybe not the same one, in Tokyo. Did I just miss it or are accelerations supposed to be that radical (it may had been accelerated for a week)?

[mdiehl]

Hoyt's wrong to make a sweeping conclusion about Japanese ASW being more effective or as good as American ASW based on one submarine receiving a beating. I note, for emphasis, that Plunger was not lost with all hands, as were all six IJN minisubs that attempted to penetrate PH (without getting an effective shot off at that). The first German submarine sunk by an escort was nailed by Campbell in late January 1942 in a first pass dc run. This was atypical (of all navies) for a dc run at the time. Other German submarines were destroyed by the USN/USCG during the "happy time." And this was in a period in which some of the better tech/tactical advantages (radar, cm wavelength radar, ahead-thrown weapons, on-site HFDF) had not yet been widely deployed or developed. The US shipboard radar at the time was quite as good as the Japanese set (caveat: longer wavelength than the Japanese set so more inclined to get ghost images, but much more reliable and with better trained operators), and like the Japanese and UK, not enough ships had it. As to the rest. Hey, the US had a class of 165' boats serving as ASW as well. In May 1942 one of them blew a German Uboat to bits with six dcs on its initial run. So, qua the Japanese, the US was quite good when it could find a target.

LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE IN 1942, asw assets were insufficiently numerous and the tech simply not as good as it would be for the Allies in June 1943.

The caveat that your comment applies to pre-war USN does not alter the fact that your comment is wrong, as is pretty obvious when you consider how quickly the IJN subs reconning around PH and the minisubs trying to move in were detected and driven off, when you consider that of three ASW attacks on Uboats by US ships in 1941, one sent the German boat back to port for more than a year. Not bad results for ANYONE in 1941. Although it's important statistically that the sample size is small.