ASW Warfare Japan/Allied

[pad152]

ASW Warfare Japan/Allied:

Playing the Japanese for the first time, there is real difference in ASW warfare between Japan and allies.

Japanese ASW TF with six ships (MSW/PC's) with an ASW rating of 3 with leader of +60. Only one or two of the ships will attack (fire depth charges)on a sub contact. About a 1 in 4 attacks will will result in a hit.

Allied ASW TF of six ships (DD/DMS) with a leader of +55. Every single ship in allied ASW TF will attack (fire depth charges) and 9 times out of 10 will the sub contact be hit mulitple times resulting in the sub sunk.

Findings

1. Japan seems to have about a 20/30% chance of a sucessful sub attack.

2. Only one or two Japanese ships in a six ship ASW TF fire on a sub.

3. Most allied subs seem to survive one or two hits.

4. All allied ships in a six ship ASW TF fire on a sub.

5. Japanese subs because of the multiple hits all most always sink.

6. Allies have a 80/90% hit rate on Japanese subs.


Summary:

I think the Japanese ASW warfare is more realistic for both sides in 1941/1942. The allied ASW warfare seems more like mid 1944/1945. Allied ASW seems unbalanced for the early part of the war.

[KPAX]

ORIGINAL: pad152

ASW Warfare Japan/Allied:

Playing the Japanese for the first time, there is real difference in ASW warfare between Japan and allies.

Japanese ASW TF with six ships (MSW/PC's) with an ASW rating of 3 with leader of +60. Only one or two of the ships will attack (fire depth charges)on a sub contact. About a 1 in 4 attacks will will result in a hit.

Allied ASW TF of six ships (DD/DMS) with a leader of +55. Every single ship in allied ASW TF will attack (fire depth charges) and 9 times out of 10 will the sub contact be hit mulitple times resulting in the sub sunk.

Findings

1. Japan seems to have about a 20/30% chance of a sucessful sub attack.

2. Only one or two Japanese ships in a six ship ASW TF fire on a sub.

3. Most allied subs seem to survive one or two hits.

4. All allied ships in a six ship ASW TF fire on a sub.

5. Japanese subs because of the multiple hits all most always sink.

6. Allies have a 80/90% hit rate on Japanese subs.


Summary:

I think the Japanese ASW warfare is more realistic for both sides in 1941/1942. The allied ASW warfare seems more like mid 1944/1945. Allied ASW seems unbalanced for the early part of the war.

Agreed.

Got to work on the exp of the ASW ships for IJN. Run them back and forth from PI to Hong Kong and the exp will increase a lot.

[michaelm75au]

Is the better Allied ASW due to the following extract from the manual (6.1.25.3)?

"Prior to 1944, Allied crews perform ASW functions during daylight at 114% of their crew rating, and at night at 150% of their crew rating.
Prior to 1943, Japanese crews perform their ASW functions at 67% of their crew rating, while in 1943 and thereafter they perform at 80% of their crew rating. "

Crew rating is ship's approriate "experience" rating.

I am not sure that I understand the rationale behind why Allied ASW gets a 15/50% bonus and Japanese get a 33% penalty.
If the Allied bonus is because of experience in hunting Uboats in the Atlantic, not every Allied ships should get this. I would have thought this should show up as more experienced crews on particular ships.

Michael

[denisonh]

What should it be?

Is there a basis for INCREASING IJN ASW effectiveness? Want or should do not necessarily make sense in the context of historical effectiveness. It was notoriously ineffective until late 44.

As an Allied player in an ongoing PBEM, I have lost 17 subs through Mar 42, not including those damaged. Far more than historically, so I cannot concur with your assessment.

I do not disagree that Allied efffectiveness needs review and refinement.

[Taiyo]

yep, too much of an advantage! some ships ok (if experienced U-bot fights in the Atlantic) but not every one of them! I lost 3 subs trying to block Singapore in the first week since war start and the subs never scored a hit! naw, don't think so!

[pasternakski]

Come on, let's not get this started again. The subject has been beaten to death, pulverized, sauteed, fricasseed, ragouted, pureed, and masticated.

The idea in the original design was, apparently, to give the Allies an advantage due to superior equipment (that gets more superior as the war wears on) and doctrine (that also improves). The result was found to favor the Allies too much, so that, in the upcoming patch, a correction has been made.

Search the forums for it. Sorry, I don't remember where it is.

[mdiehl]

Ragouted? Ragouted? Do you marinade or not?

I take my scragged IJN submarines Gumboed.

[mdiehl]

naw, don't think so!

Entirely plausible.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: pad152

ASW Warfare Japan/Allied:

Playing the Japanese for the first time, there is real difference in ASW warfare between Japan and allies.

Japanese ASW TF with six ships (MSW/PC's) with an ASW rating of 3 with leader of +60. Only one or two of the ships will attack (fire depth charges)on a sub contact. About a 1 in 4 attacks will will result in a hit.

I think the Japanese ASW warfare is more realistic for both sides in 1941/1942. The allied ASW warfare seems more like mid 1944/1945. Allied ASW seems unbalanced for the early part of the war.

PAD I think you miss the real question. How does a Japanese MSW/PC come up with
an ASW rating of 3 to begin with? Especially before 1943? That's better than a US Fleet
DD. The Japanese were pitifully under-equipped for ASW warfare when compared to
the Allies from the war's start to it's end.

[Ron Saueracker]

I keep seeing subs (I'm stuck with Allied substandard doctrine) when in hexes with enemy TFs described as "not able to approach safely" or something like that and then get attacked consistently. If it is unsafe, should it not mean that the sub remains undetected and slunk away, discretion being the better part of valor? If not, at the very least, when being attacked after attempting to stand clear, the sub should be able to fire a defensive salvo of torps or something.

[juliet7bravo]

I don't think the ASW rating really means anything in game terms anyway, it's just telling you the ship you're looking at has 3 ASW devices mounted. Actual ASW value is an "imponderable" taking into account the various devices mounted values (range, accuracy and effect) and number, the built in modifiers downgrading IJN ASW capabilities or upgrading Allied ASW capabilities, having sonar or radar mounted, and crew experience.

[juliet7bravo]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

I keep seeing subs (I'm stuck with Allied substandard doctrine) when in hexes with enemy TFs described as "not able to approach safely" or something like that and then get attacked consistently. If it is unsafe, should it not mean that the sub remains undetected and slunk away, discretion being the better part of valor? If not, at the very least, when being attacked after attempting to stand clear, the sub should be able to fire a defensive salvo of torps or something.

Probably means it can't get a firing position on the targets it's allowed to attack due to the escorts ect. Surface sprinting to gain a favorable firing position probably isn't doctrine. Firing at attacking DD's probably isn't doctrine. In other words, it's probably all part and parcel of the substandard sub doctrine that you loathe so well.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: juliet7bravo

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

I keep seeing subs (I'm stuck with Allied substandard doctrine) when in hexes with enemy TFs described as "not able to approach safely" or something like that and then get attacked consistently. If it is unsafe, should it not mean that the sub remains undetected and slunk away, discretion being the better part of valor? If not, at the very least, when being attacked after attempting to stand clear, the sub should be able to fire a defensive salvo of torps or something.

Probably means it can't get a firing position on the targets it's allowed to attack due to the escorts ect. Surface sprinting to gain a favorable firing position probably isn't doctrine. Firing at attacking DD's probably isn't doctrine. In other words, it's probably all part and parcel of the substandard sub doctrine that you loathe so well.

[:D][:D][:D][:D][:D][:D][:D][:D][:D]
[:D]

[pad152]

Come on, let's not get this started again. The subject has been beaten to death, pulverized, sauteed, fricasseed, ragouted, pureed, and masticated.

The idea in the original design was, apparently, to give the Allies an advantage due to superior equipment (that gets more superior as the war wears on) and doctrine (that also improves). The result was found to favor the Allies too much, so that, in the upcoming patch, a correction has been made.

I think this is great, the only problem is the allied advantage starts too soon(1941/1942)! Just look at all the problems the US had with the U-boats on the east coast.

[Twotribes]

The ASW number on the task force screen is number of Depth charge launchers, if your task force lists 3, then not all your ships have launchers, thus they cant all attack a submarine, meaning some of those ships are useless in an ASW task force.

[Damien Thorn]

ORIGINAL: michaelm

Is the better Allied ASW due to the following extract from the manual (6.1.25.3)?

"Prior to 1944, Allied crews perform ASW functions during daylight at 114% of their crew rating, and at night at 150% of their crew rating.
Prior to 1943, Japanese crews perform their ASW functions at 67% of their crew rating, while in 1943 and thereafter they perform at 80% of their crew rating. "

Crew rating is ship's approriate "experience" rating.

I am not sure that I understand the rationale behind [these numbers]
Michael

The reason the crew ratings are modified the way they are (Japanese down, US up) is because the Japanese ratings start much higher but it didn't really apply to ASW so these modifiers make the numbers about equal. That is why the US gets such a huge bonus to its night number. That doesn't mean the US was so much better at night but it is because the US night exp starts so much lower.

The result was supposed to make the ASW about equal at war's start and I think the chances of a depthj charge hitting are about equal. HOWEVER, the chances of a US ships making an ASW attack seem to be about six to eight times higher than for a Japanese ship making an attack. In general, WAY too many US escorts are getting to take a shot. The number who get to make an attack should be about the same as it is now for the Japanese side. You can argue how effective such an attack should be once its taken place but it is clear that too many escorts are getting to take a shot as things are now.

[pad152]

In general, WAY too many US escorts are getting to take a shot. The number who get to make an attack should be about the same as it is now for the Japanese side. You can argue how effective such an attack should be once its taken place but it is clear that too many escorts are getting to take a shot as things are now.

I agree 100%[:)]

[mlees]

pad152,
The US did not start to convoy east coast shipping until the latter half of 1942, and even then Admiral King was extremely reluctant to release precious Fleet Destroyers for convoy work. He wanted to keep them to screen the Atlantic Battle Fleet.

Never the less, the US destroyers carried much the same ASW and surface search radar in '42 as they will have in '43. These DD's just weren't used efficiently. An argument CAN be made that the US Destroyer Force as a total average needed seasoning, but they did have observers with the Royal Navy, and those lessons could be quickly dissiminated if the will in the upper echelons was there.

The US needed time to mobilize air ASW assets, and only by the last half of '42 did the US begin to do serious patroling.

The second German "happy time" (Operation Drum Beat, et al) is entirely due to this.

[Belce]

Part of the difference is how each side saw the use of submarines in war. The Japanese saw them as spotters, something to tag crippled ships after a fight and as an other means to attack capital ships, Japanese sub doctrine means they tend to go after big targets and ignore merchant ships and minor combatants. This would also influence their ASW doctrine, what do we use subs for is what we base our approach to defending subs. It is unrealistic to expect someone to plan to use a weapon in one way and then plan to defend against that weapon in a different manner. How do we defend against this, requires first how do we think it is best used. Allied sub doctrine and ASW doctrine are based not just on current war experience, but also on WWI experience as well. Here the sub was used as a merchant raider primarily. Here the doctrine of use leads to developing a method of defense that actively seeks out subs and attempts to defend slow easily destroyed targets.

Allies use subs and defend against subs for ships with no protection travelling at 6 knots while the Japanese use subs and defend against them for well armored ships travelling at 20 to 30 knots.

Can you imagine presenting how you should use a weapon in a war and then when asked how to defend against them you ignored your entire agrument and suggested a different use of that weapon?

[mlees]

In the thirties, the USN also had a "Fleet Boat" doctrine as well. The subs were to scout for the Battle Fleet, whittle down the enemy on the approach, and finish off the stragglers/disabled. This is why the USN required greater range and large torpedo loadout, compared to the German boats for example. (Also greater reliability in the diesel propulsion plants.)

The US sub commanders, during peace time, were rigorously trained in the "proper" approach angle and (close) firing range. This was to ensure hits on faster moving, better protected targets.

After Pearl Harbor, the US Battle Fleet was hors-de-combat, and the original War Plan had to be scrapped. The Carrier Force, and the Sub Force, were the only branches of the USN immediately willing and able to commence hostilities, and new plans (to take the current state of affairs into account) were drawn up. I.E., the CV's make hit and run raids
to attrit the enemy and scout out the Japanese force dispositions (in the Marshalls), and the sub force was tasked to attack not only IJN Fleet units, but also the third (fourth?) largest merchant marine in the world.

A LOT of peace time sub commanders, falling back on their old training, would not prosecute an attack on a target unless it was the perfect (peacetime) setup. Some remained flexible (aggressive) enough to adapt to wartime conditions, but those who did not were ruthlessly pruned. Tie this in with faulty magnetic exploders, faulty contact exploders, fault torpedo depth mechanisms, it's no wonder that the USN Sub Force did not get into its stride until '43.