Does anyone else think the USA CV pilots are over skilled for 1941?

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Jon_Hal

Leo, I'm not sure what you are getting at. Myself and several others have provided historical examples that seem to disagree with you position. You have yet to provide any proof of your position besides your opinion. Your statement is fine and good if you want to believe it, I'm not going to try to convince you anymore. I will let the historical record stand on it's own.

Jon what can I say... we disagree...


But let me ask you one question - the Japan expanded in 6 months but it took US 3 years to beat it (and to free what Japan took at the beginning).

If US was so strong at the beginning of WWII with clear superiority in everything (with such great Army, Navy, Marines, aircraft, ships, equipment, generals, soldiers) why it took so long to beat poor Japan who was so inferior even at the start of war (with poor ships, poor aircraft, poor generals, poor soldiers, poor economy)?

Why wasn't the war over by Christmas 1942?

Why didn't USN wipe out IJN immediately?

I will answer for you... because the above is not true...

Japan (and Germany) were tough and capable opponents and it took long long time to crush them for the good of mankind (and many many brave people had to die accomplishing that great and noble task)...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

The fast monocock full metal low wing fighters started to appear in air forces in 1939/1940/1941.

Sorry to be annoying, I am NOT a spelling nazi, but please... monocoque. And it doesn't mean "1 wing." It means that the exterior is also the major stress-bearing element in the design. That element of design was common in some combat biplanes in the mid-1930s. The F3F, for example, was a monocoque biplane. The difference is primarily in the "skin." A fabric covered surface is not a monocoque design. An aluminum surface generally was.

Sorry... misspell...

BTW, I do know what it means - the way aircraft is designed from inside.

For example the Spitfire had monocoque construction while Hurricane didn't...

Those designs were so radically new that all the knowledge that pilots gained from WWI and in post war years become practically obsolete.

Errr. No. Nothing terribly radical about the designs at all. If you look at the progression from biplane to monoplane it's not a "great leap forward." It's a series of incremental progressions from frame&fabric, low HP biplanes to aluminum-skinned, higher HP-engined monoplanes. Withing the general category of things 1-winged and monocoque there was a huge degree of variation in characteristics affected by things like weight and drag and of course especially by powerplant output.

I disagree 100%...

The 1939/1940/1941 fighter designs were "light years" ahead of anything biplanes (and likes) had to offer from WWI onwards... everything changed...

Thus, saying that USN had extensive deflection shooting training from 1925 onwards means practically nothing because all that training and tactics were done in aircraft that were far far inferior to new hot fighters they all received before the war started (and practically useless because everything changed in meantime when new machines arrived).

That is just pure, off the cuff, taking off the top of your head speculation and it is nonsense. It's hard to imagine what sort of training cycle you think that the USN used. People did not transition from Wright Fliers to F4Fs 48 hours before being sent into combat, so this business about the 'new fighters being radically different' in whatever you think they differed in ... is just not applicable. F4F pilots trained extensively in F4Fs at deflection shooting and were very, very good at it. And the proof is in the performance. Thach, Flatley, other famous pilots at the time attributed USN pilots' ability to hold their own to good deflection shooting. Lundstrom's analyses prove that good deflection shooting was instrumental in obtaining victories over the A6M. So, you seem to have a "theory" with no good statement of why the theory ought to make sense that is not supported by extant information about training practices nor by extant information from combat.

Now I don't know what you imagine to be radically different. Airspeeds increased, but that happened at a pretty constant rate from 1914 through 1945. The only "great leap" in airspeed occurred with the transition to the jet age.

So you say that it really doesn't matter at all that new fighters were almost brand new in service when war started (i.e. that there wasn't so much time for all pilots to train all new tactics/doctrines in their new fighters)?


BTW, the speed was much higher along with rate of climb with new fighters on all sides (therefore old theories and practice had to be re-done all anew).

Thus the "great leap" wasn't only when jets were introduced (late WWII and after it) - it also happened just before WWII when new fast fighters arrived.


You can't convince me (and I did "some" actual flying) that it is same thing to enter combat at, for example, 200 mph and 400 mph. The new speeds introduced whole new sets of variables...


Also I have read fighter pilot memoirs:

- Japanese
- German
- British
- Russian
- US

All of them wrote that the transition from trainers to new fighters was big thing and that it demanded adjustment and lost of practice.

Why would Japanese pilots who used to fly Claudes and then transferred to Zeros find it difficult whilst their US counterparts who did the same transition (from old to new) would not?

I also fail to see how this could matter in combat, because high rates of closure in deflection training could be obtained using almost any aircraft. Consider an AT6 Texan pilot training at aerial gunnery. His target is a banner towed by, perhaps, a Hudson or some other aircraft. In any quartering from behind to dead astern approach, the AT6's closing rate is on the order of anything from nil to 100 mph, depending on the AT6's pilots desires. This is certainly much greater than the speed differential of any F4F on a quartering approach on an A6M in a combat where, for example, both planes may have turned once. It's certainly a much greater difference than that for which F4F pilots would have compensated when and A6M making a stern approach pass on an F4F would dive under then zoom up in front of the F4F (a favored tactic of A6M pilots as a matter of training and doctrine).

Finally, there is the fact that the deflection shooting worked. You don't have to take my word for it. Read what Thach and Flatley said about it. You don't have to take their word for it, read what Lundstrom said about it. You don't have to take his word for it, read the detailed descriptions of a2a combat and see for yourself the numerous instances of Zekes falling to F4Fs in deflection shots. You don't have to beleive those are typical, but if you read any history of the aerial war the usual conclusion is that the dcotrinal emphasis on deflection shooting gave the USN the edge. Heck, if I remember right even the "usual suspects" Japanese pilot anecdotes credit the USN pilots with being crack shots.

You don't have to believe THEIR word for it either. Ask yourself how an a/c that was less maneuverable at slow speed than the Zero, with inferior acceleration, inferior climb, and slower maximum WEP speed at all altitudes managed to shoot down more Zekes in direct confrontations than they lost? It wasn't done by pounding one's fists on the controls and shouting harsh words at the Japanese.

Please see above...

As for USN using deflection shooting I never said that USN didn't use it - but to say that all USN pilots were thus better than their counterparts because of that is exaggeration.

Don't you think that Japanese also used deflection shooting?


Leo "Apollo11"

[Captain Cruft]

Here's a tidbit from a PBEM game I'm playing, date was early Jan 1942 ...

Code: Select all

 Day Air attack on TF, near Darwin at 36,84 
 
 Japanese aircraft 
 A6M2 Zero x 36 
 G4M1 Betty x 9 
 
 Allied aircraft 
 F2A Buffalo x 11 
 F4F-3 Wildcat x 15 
 Wirraway x 3 
 
 Japanese aircraft losses 
 A6M2 Zero: 26 destroyed 
 G4M1 Betty: 7 destroyed, 4 damaged 
 
 Allied aircraft losses 
 F2A Buffalo: 2 destroyed, 1 damaged 
 F4F-3 Wildcat: 8 destroyed, 1 damaged 
 Wirraway: 5 destroyed, 1 damaged 
 

USN fighters were from the Lex and Enterprise. IJN fighters were from 3rd Daitai with a mix of high and low exp pilots.

The actual numbers were 13 Zeros down for 1 Buffalo and 5 Wildcats. The combat replay consisted almost entirely of "USN fighters bounce IJN fighters" (boom and zoom?) resulting in either a dead Zero or, less often, "Zero evades". My guess is that the dead Zeros were those with rookie pilots whilst the evading Zeros were those with the high exp pilots.

I have to say I think the game has it about right.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Well I can see where that would be the case. If they say "We are not attacking from the stern" then the only option left is deflection shooting.

You know the Japanese learned they had to attack B-17 with deflection shooting but 2x7mm does not do the damage 6x.50cal (or more) does. Getting hits with the 20mm using deflection shooting would limit an A6M2 pilot to only one or two shots. Much better for him to fill his sight with enemy aircraft close up.
[:)]Hi Mogami!!!!!!
Well,I have read your various threads for over a year,and generally I feel you are very knowledgeable about things,but here you are wrong..
Suburo Sakai made a profound case in his book "Samurai" that the B 17 was the hardest plane to knock down,and he states they eventually learned the most efficient way to do it was to make continuous "head on" passes..
(Later,the Germans followed this practice as well and the USAAF countered with their powered chin gun on the "G" model..)
Ref the arms you mentioned on the Zero,actually the common arms were 2 MG's and 2 cannon on the Zero..(The Oscar was the one with only 2 MG's)..
In nearly all other matters,(especially game knowledge,I defer to you)..
The Luftwaffe used deflection attacks against B-17 as well. Where they came over the top rolled over and passed under. The whole time they were firing at empty space that was full of B-17 when it mattered.

All fighter pilots do the "snap shot" where you quickly turn your nose and fire before going into another move and your not astern of the enemy.
If it is what you do then it is not surprising you get good at it.
It was the perfect match for Allied aircraft. It makes Japanese aircraft lose their advantage and the only cost to the Allies is higher ammo bills. (Not that deflection shooting wastes more ammo for good shots) It's just like skeet shooting only your flying and using a maginegun.

[mdiehl]

But let me ask you one question - the Japan expanded in 6 months but it took US 3 years to beat it (and to free what Japan took at the beginning).

There are four reasons.
1. When Japan started the war in the Pacific, they had a vast numerical advantage in aircraft, ships, and men.

2. They also had a superior strategic position throughout most of the war vis a vis lines of supply and communication. Basically "interior" lines of supply. If you think of the Pacific "front lines" as points on a ragged circle, Japan was rather near the center of the circle, so moving assets between bases along the perimeter of the circle was easier for the Japanese through 1943 (after which time their ship losses really began to adversely affect basic supply). In contrast the Allies, to get from A to B, had to move along the perimeter of the circle. And before the Allies could even GET to the perimiter of the circle they had to travel the equivalent of 1 diameter (to get assets from the US to any point on the circle from the US) or 3 diameters (to get assets from the UK to any point on the circle).

3. The vast bulk of the island air bases throughout the Marshalls, the Bonins, the Ryukyus, Taipei, etc had been under Japanese control since 1920, so Japanese "conquest" does not equate with the Japanese perimeter at its maximum. The Japanese started the war with much of the region already in thier pocket, and the areas that they conquered were more or less surrounded (in the case of Guam, and the PI) before the war, or like Indonesia-Borneo-Northern New Guinea-Davao depopulate or under the control of a fourth rate military power (Netherlands East Indies).

4. The Allies pretty much had to invade heavily fortified positions in places that increasingly lacked friendly land air bases and became ever more replete with enemy land air-bases. In effect, each invasion was much like the effort required of old to reduce a fortified position.

If US was so strong at the beginning of WWII with clear superiority in everything (with such great Army, Navy, Marines, aircraft, ships, equipment, generals, soldiers) why it took so long to beat poor Japan who was so inferior even at the start of war (with poor ships, poor aircraft, poor generals, poor soldiers, poor economy)?

This is known as the "straw man" argument. The question isn't one of people arguing that the US was so strong or so great at everything. The issue to hand is whether or not the USN pilots warrant high EXP values and what the basis for that may be.

The 1939/1940/1941 fighter designs were "light years" ahead of anything biplanes (and likes) had to offer from WWI onwards... everything changed...

This is known, in the Baloney Detector Kit, as "the fallacy of the excluded middle." (Arguments in the form of "If not this then the only one other possibility exists.") In this particular instance your argument seems to require that we beleive that no one, prior to 7 December 1941, had flown or trained in anything other than an 1918 vintage biplane.

So you say that it really doesn't matter at all that new fighters were almost brand new in service when war started (i.e. that there wasn't so much time for all pilots to train all new tactics/doctrines in their new fighters)?

No, I'm saying that it is just plain factually incorrect to state that all the new fighters (for ex the P40 and the F4F) were brand new conceptually from the ones that immediately preceded them (see below), and it is likewise factually incorrect to state that pilots lacked the time to train in the newest fighters, and finally that it is factually incorrect to claim that new tactics and doctrine were mandated (at least in the USN) with the introduction of the F4F.

Progression of aircraft USAAF:

1931: Boeing P-26 (1 wing monocoque radial design)
1937: Seversky P-35 (direct lineal ancestor to P-43 --> P-47)
1938: Curtis P-36 (radial engine precursor to the P-40)
1940: Bell P-39 (600 deployed prior to December 1941) -- laugh as much as you want. Below 10,000 feet it was an A6M or Ki-43 driver's worst nightmare come true. Dirty rotten shame that the USAAF castrated the thing at altitude by taking away the supercharger.

Progression of aircraft USN:
1936: Grumman F3F-1 (monocoque biplane) -- at 262 mph more than 100 mph faster than non monocoque biplanes and with a service ceiling of 33,000 feet. Definitely not a plane that Richtofen would want to have encountered in his Dreidekker and definitely NOT your garden varienty biplane trainer or WW1 biplane.

1940: Brewster F2A-2 (monocoque 1-wing) -- at 344 mph/26,500 it was *faster* than the Japanese A6M2. For a variety of reasons (including inferior landing gear, a problem that plagued Japanese late-war designs, lack of armor, and the general state of grab-assedness that characterized Brewster as a manufacturer), the plane was phased out in anticipation of the Grumman F4F. VF-2 and VF-3 had been flying F2A-2s for almost a year prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

1941: Grumman F4F-3... had replaced the F2 in all but two USMC and USN squadrons and was the only destination fighter for new units in training in 1940.

Now, these are basically "deployment dates." The specifications were typically 5 years older than the deployments, which means that for any given one of them, 5 years of innovation in doctrine and tactics, at minimum, preceded their use.

As for USN using deflection shooting I never said that USN didn't use it - but to say that all USN pilots were thus better than their counterparts because of that is exaggeration.

That startement reiterates the fallacy of the excluded middle. USN pilots were better at defection shooting because by all accounts they trained much more intensively at it. No one ever said that other nations pilots did not take deflection shots. Just that as a matter of central tendency USN pilots were better at it. They were better at it because they practiced at it and developed doctrine around it and had been emphasizing it for 20 years more or less prior to the US entry into the war.

Like most things, the more you practice, the better you are.

[spence]

The IJN surface forces inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the ABDA fleet at Java Sea and a serious and humiliating defeat on the USN at Savo Island. In both cases the odds were about the same but the results were totally one-sided in favor of the IJN. There were 4 carrier-air confrontations in 1942 between the IJN and the USN.
The odds were roughly equal or slightly (planewise anyways) in the IJNs favor in all of them (discounting LBA of both sides whose only contribution to any of the 4 battles was to keep the IJN CAP busy for a couple of hours on June 4 at Midway). The IJN air arm can't show a result comparable in result to Java Sea or Savo Island to justify being given a significant overall superiority in experience compared to the USN. Their better torpedo bomber/torpedo (at start) and more nimble fighter pretty much account for their ability to inflict (excepting Midway) slightly more damage on the USN than they suffered. The way the game works in 1942 CV battles seems pretty good to me.

[DrewMatrix]

To Spence (and to kill time and keep the discussion going [:D]): You compare surface actions and CV vs CV actions. Those are pretty different. The CV actions are "flukey" (for non-native English speakers that means you can get a huge range of different options from time to time, rather than have a predictable result). That is in part because CVs are so fragile (as opposed to CAs for example, which usually take something of a pounding to be destroyed in a gun duel) and in part because the CV battle is mainly decided by who gets in the first blow ("Who strikes effectively first" to quote Hughes). In other words, the ships being equal, 6 CAs will "always" beat 4, but 6 CVs will sometimes beat 4 CVs, but on some occasions be defeated by 4 CVs if the 4 CV side launches a big strike that finds the 6 CV guy before he launches.

Not that any of that means I don't like the level of training of US pilots in the game. I think the game gets pretty believable results.

[spence]

To Beezle - The point I hoped to make was that certain classes of IJN forces demonstrated a clear superiority over comparable forces of the USN/Allies. The Battle of the Java Sea and Savo Island pitted comparable groups of surface forces (cruisers/destroyers) against one another and both demonstrated that the Japanese had a much better grasp of how to fight that type of battle than the Allies/USN. In so far as carrier vs carrier battles (which I agree is a different ball game entirely) there is no comparable Japanese demonstration of overwhelming competence which would justify an additional advantage (higher experience levels) being included in the model of that type of fight. Most of the fights came out pretty even with the only one sided victory being an American one brought on in part by better or at least more decisive leadership on the operational level (i.e. the players of the "game").
I will also reiterate another point though - from somewhere way back when in this thread - even when the TBDs at Midway were set upon without escort by some fairly large number of Japan's finest fighter pilots in their best fighter some of the Americans managed to get their "fish" into the water in proximity to their target CVs. It was more than luck that made them go low, slow, straight and level to do that - it was training and competence and determination which is sorta all combined into experience in game terms.

[freeboy]

OK, not to be too much of an asss,
If I am the Allies my pilots are fine. could even be better.
on the other hand I hate seeing my jap fragile bombers chewed to pieces by Allied fighters

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

But let me ask you one question - the Japan expanded in 6 months but it took US 3 years to beat it (and to free what Japan took at the beginning).

There are four reasons.
1. When Japan started the war in the Pacific, they had a vast numerical advantage in aircraft, ships, and men.

But when did that advantage evaporate?

1942?

1943?

1944?

1945?

IMHO this is not good argument...

2. They also had a superior strategic position throughout most of the war vis a vis lines of supply and communication. Basically "interior" lines of supply. If you think of the Pacific "front lines" as points on a ragged circle, Japan was rather near the center of the circle, so moving assets between bases along the perimeter of the circle was easier for the Japanese through 1943 (after which time their ship losses really began to adversely affect basic supply). In contrast the Allies, to get from A to B, had to move along the perimeter of the circle. And before the Allies could even GET to the perimiter of the circle they had to travel the equivalent of 1 diameter (to get assets from the US to any point on the circle from the US) or 3 diameters (to get assets from the UK to any point on the circle).

I agree but even in late 1942 US poured so much men/equipment/supply into theater that this also is not good argument

I am sure that by late 1942 US had much more material than Japanese in theater.

3. The vast bulk of the island air bases throughout the Marshalls, the Bonins, the Ryukyus, Taipei, etc had been under Japanese control since 1920, so Japanese "conquest" does not equate with the Japanese perimeter at its maximum. The Japanese started the war with much of the region already in thier pocket, and the areas that they conquered were more or less surrounded (in the case of Guam, and the PI) before the war, or like Indonesia-Borneo-Northern New Guinea-Davao depopulate or under the control of a fourth rate military power (Netherlands East Indies).

Sure thing... but those places could have been bypassed (as many were). What Japan conquered in 1941/1942 had to be fortified new...

4. The Allies pretty much had to invade heavily fortified positions in places that increasingly lacked friendly land air bases and became ever more replete with enemy land air-bases. In effect, each invasion was much like the effort required of old to reduce a fortified position.

Please see above.

If US was so strong at the beginning of WWII with clear superiority in everything (with such great Army, Navy, Marines, aircraft, ships, equipment, generals, soldiers) why it took so long to beat poor Japan who was so inferior even at the start of war (with poor ships, poor aircraft, poor generals, poor soldiers, poor economy)?

This is known as the "straw man" argument. The question isn't one of people arguing that the US was so strong or so great at everything. The issue to hand is whether or not the USN pilots warrant high EXP values and what the basis for that may be.

I agree but it was not me who added P-40, North Africa (and other stuff) discussion into this thread...

The 1939/1940/1941 fighter designs were "light years" ahead of anything biplanes (and likes) had to offer from WWI onwards... everything changed...

This is known, in the Baloney Detector Kit, as "the fallacy of the excluded middle." (Arguments in the form of "If not this then the only one other possibility exists.") In this particular instance your argument seems to require that we beleive that no one, prior to 7 December 1941, had flown or trained in anything other than an 1918 vintage biplane.

They flew it, but they lacked time to acquaint themselves 100%.

If, for example, some middle ranking officer in USN flew biplanes 10x longer than his brand new Wildcat (or whatever else aircraft) then certain things he learned, practiced to perfection and loved to do in his biplane were almost unusable in new aircraft...

At the end war made pilots on all sides to adjust or die really quickly...

So you say that it really doesn't matter at all that new fighters were almost brand new in service when war started (i.e. that there wasn't so much time for all pilots to train all new tactics/doctrines in their new fighters)?

No, I'm saying that it is just plain factually incorrect to state that all the new fighters (for ex the P40 and the F4F) were brand new conceptually from the ones that immediately preceded them (see below), and it is likewise factually incorrect to state that pilots lacked the time to train in the newest fighters, and finally that it is factually incorrect to claim that new tactics and doctrine were mandated (at least in the USN) with the introduction of the F4F.

Progression of aircraft USAAF:

1931: Boeing P-26 (1 wing monocoque radial design)
1937: Seversky P-35 (direct lineal ancestor to P-43 --> P-47)
1938: Curtis P-36 (radial engine precursor to the P-40)
1940: Bell P-39 (600 deployed prior to December 1941) -- laugh as much as you want. Below 10,000 feet it was an A6M or Ki-43 driver's worst nightmare come true. Dirty rotten shame that the USAAF castrated the thing at altitude by taking away the supercharger.

Progression of aircraft USN:
1936: Grumman F3F-1 (monocoque biplane) -- at 262 mph more than 100 mph faster than non monocoque biplanes and with a service ceiling of 33,000 feet. Definitely not a plane that Richtofen would want to have encountered in his Dreidekker and definitely NOT your garden varienty biplane trainer or WW1 biplane.

1940: Brewster F2A-2 (monocoque 1-wing) -- at 344 mph/26,500 it was *faster* than the Japanese A6M2. For a variety of reasons (including inferior landing gear, a problem that plagued Japanese late-war designs, lack of armor, and the general state of grab-assedness that characterized Brewster as a manufacturer), the plane was phased out in anticipation of the Grumman F4F. VF-2 and VF-3 had been flying F2A-2s for almost a year prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

1941: Grumman F4F-3... had replaced the F2 in all but two USMC and USN squadrons and was the only destination fighter for new units in training in 1940.

Now, these are basically "deployment dates." The specifications were typically 5 years older than the deployments, which means that for any given one of them, 5 years of innovation in doctrine and tactics, at minimum, preceded their use.

Great list and dates (I knew this of course from my books as well) but let's concentrate on most important one:

1941: Grumman F4F-3

This is what I was writing about - the aircraft was almost brand new when war started and all the USN pilots had of modern design (if you can call it) before it was Brewster. All aircraft before were biplane...

True... not biplanes of WW1 but still biplanes...


Also saying that Brewster was faster then Zero and thus (in this category) better is, well, 100% wrong...

What is more important than maximum speed is acceleration (and rate of climb very closely connected to this).

For example the Me-262 had great MAX speed but poor acceleration and many German pilots were lost because of that...

BTW, after Midway, Admiral Nimitz himself wrote in official report that Wildcat (and not Brewster) is inferior to Zero (speed, acceleration, rate of climb) and that improvements must be done immediately (although not in a way to lower the flow of existing fighters into units).

As for USN using deflection shooting I never said that USN didn't use it - but to say that all USN pilots were thus better than their counterparts because of that is exaggeration.

That startement reiterates the fallacy of the excluded middle. USN pilots were better at defection shooting because by all accounts they trained much more intensively at it. No one ever said that other nations pilots did not take deflection shots. Just that as a matter of central tendency USN pilots were better at it. They were better at it because they practiced at it and developed doctrine around it and had been emphasizing it for 20 years more or less prior to the US entry into the war.

Like most things, the more you practice, the better you are.

Here we go again... [;)] yes they have trained it for 20 years but with aircraft that were 100% different than ones used in WWII. Entering combat with 200 mph or 400 mph is vast difference...

Anyways... perhaps the best truth about pilots overall is what "caslug" wrote:

Most pilots (all sides) were not expert at deflection shooting, that's why thousands of pilots (all sides) fly their tours but never shot down a plane, becuase they just didn't have a) shooting eye and b) hunter instincts. Of course the pilots that had those skills, became legend(foss, Yeager, campell, sakai, hartman, etc.,). Even Eric Hartman, said that strategy was to manuever the plane really close(preferably rear) before openning up.

Leo "Apollo11"

[Rainerle]

Hi,
if asked about the single most outstanding IJN CV act I'd say Hiryu taking on 3 USN CV's at Midway and contributing 99% for Yorktown's sinking.

[mdiehl]

But when did that advantage evaporate?
1942?
1943?
1944?
1945?

IMHO this is not good argument...

"IMHO this is not a good argument" is non sequitur, as it does not address the material facts or offer any specific countervailing information. I believe Monty Python did a spoof on your sort of "rebuttal" once.

In answer to your question, I'd say late 1944, after the US landings on Davao. At that point the US had sufficient airbases in range of objectives to obtain air superiority, perhaps even air supremacy, along much of Japan's lines of communications. Prior to the actual conquest of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, the Japanese had the edge in land based air facilities, but the USN had sufficient striking power that a well planned, snappily executed attack could overwhelm local aerial resistence using CV based air. Still, I think the real turning point was the conclusion of the USN Marianas campaign; anything could have happened there.

I agree but even in late 1942 US poured so much men/equipment/supply into theater that this also is not good argument

I do not understand your objection. First, by late 1942 the ONLY Japanese conquered piece of ground that the US had a foothold on was Guadalcanal, and NONE of the Japanese pre-war mandates were under US control. As to "so much men" etc, I do not agree. Numerically the Japanese had the allied outnumbered in the Solomons, New Ireland, New Britain, New Guinea area. The Japanese had more CVs, BBs, CAs, and DDs in Truk and Rabaul than the USN had from Pearl Harbor to New Caledonia until 1st quarter 1943. Even then, the Allies were just getting started on pushing on the edge of the Japanese perimiter.

I am sure that by late 1942 US had much more material than Japanese in theater.

Well, on that score you are 'surely' incorrect. And that Solomosn campaign certainly had no effect on the advantageous strategic position held by the Japanese (interior supply lines).

Sure thing... but those places could have been bypassed (as many were). What Japan conquered in 1941/1942 had to be fortified new...

? Bypassed? Leo, there's no getting to Japan without going through the Marshalls, and no bombing Japan without taking Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, and no getting to the Philippines without the Palaus. The *only* Japanese conquered islands apart from Luzon that had not been fortified by the Japanese for 20 years were Guam, Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and the vicinity of Rabaul. And the Japanese managed to fortify the shit out of Rabaul and Guam.

Please see above.

See what? You've made no comment that applies.

I agree but it was not me who added P-40, North Africa (and other stuff) discussion into this thread...

Which has what, precisely, to do with the Pacific Theater of Operations or your arguments about the relative merits of IJN vs USN pilots or your general notions about the alleged lack of time to train at deflection shooting?

They flew it, but they lacked time to acquaint themselves 100%.

Please define "sufficient time to train acquaint onself 100%."

If, for example, some middle ranking officer in USN flew biplanes 10x longer than his brand new Wildcat (or whatever else aircraft) then certain things he learned, practiced to perfection and loved to do in his biplane were almost unusable in new aircraft...

I really do not believe you have read much at all on the matter. You seem to have this notion that human cognition is equivalent to some sort of dumb automata, and that new skills or information can't be absored. If your only specimens were US presidents I might agree, but the data from USN combats clearly demonstrates otherwise. As I stipulated before, if you wanted to model the learning trajectory of US air units you'd want something like a viral model for information transmission.

At the end war made pilots on all sides to adjust or die really quickly...

At the war's beginning, Allied pilots made such adjustments with blazing speed. Most USN pilots had made some of the necessary adjustments, like being much better at deflection shooting than their opponents, before the US was in the war at all.

Great list and dates (I knew this of course from my books as well) but let's concentrate on most important one:

1941: Grumman F4F-3

This is what I was writing about - the aircraft was almost brand new when war started and all the USN pilots had of modern design (if you can call it) before it was Brewster. All aircraft before were biplane...

True... not biplanes of WW1 but still biplanes...

Well, your claim was that: 'the models prior to the F4F3 were so radically inferior that their flight profiles were incomparable, and that closing rates of speed in earlier models so inferior that despite decades of emphasis on deflection shooting, pilots who had flown F4Fs for more than a year were still no better on the whole at deflection shooting than their opponents.' That is a paraphrase of your argument. And your argument is flat out wrong on the basis of the performance characteristics of the F2A2, F3A1, and F4F3.

BTW, after Midway, Admiral Nimitz himself wrote in official report that Wildcat (and not Brewster) is inferior to Zero (speed, acceleration, rate of climb) and that improvements must be done immediately (although not in a way to lower the flow of existing fighters into units).

I never said the F4F was a better plane than the Zero at speed, acceleation and rate of climb. I said that the F4F drivers were sufficiently better at deflection shooting that they canceled out the general advantage that the Zero had. I also suggested that the 1.4:1 favorable to the USN kill ratio of F4Fs vs Zero seems to support my point of view. By teh way, the same report that you cite was based on Thach's assessment. In that report, USN superiority at deflection shooting is specifically mentioned as the reason for the success, to date, of the F4F vs the A6M. Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

Here we go again... yes they have trained it for 20 years but with aircraft that were 100% different than ones used in WWII. Entering combat with 200 mph or 400 mph is vast difference...

Well.. you seem not to understand the difference between IAS, ground speed, and speed relative to the target. Until you can come to grips with the fact that the single most important speed consideration in deflection shooting is the closing speed, you will not really be able to understand how training in an F2 moving at, say, 300 mph, vs a towed target moving at 180 mph, is quite similar to training in an F4 moving at 310 mph vs a towed target moving at 190 mph. Until you get it, you won't "get it."

Most pilots (all sides) were not expert at deflection shooting, that's why thousands of pilots (all sides) fly their tours but never shot down a plane, becuase they just didn't have a) shooting eye and b) hunter instincts. Of course the pilots that had those skills, became legend(foss, Yeager, campell, sakai, hartman, etc.,). Even Eric Hartman, said that strategy was to manuever the plane really close(preferably rear) before openning up.

Eric Hartmann's comments are specific to German doctrine. They did not train as intensively at deflection shooting as the USN pilots did. From Lundstrom's comments he makes it clear that the USN was rather unique in honing their pilots skills at this talent. Of course, in any situation it was desirable to have a low deflection shot (which means an approach from the enemy's six), but if your opposition isn't asleep, then being better at deflection shooting means that you can make killing shots that your enemy, not being trained at the skill, will be less likely to make.

But the proof is in the actual combat results in the Marshalls Strikes, the Coral Sea, Midway, and Solomons CV battles in which USN F4F pilots in a slower, less maneuverable aircraft, shot down more Zeroes than F4Fs were lost to Zeroes.

[Bradley7735]

Hi,

I think Hiryu was about 50% the cause of Yorktown sinking. The IJN sub did her in. She would have lived if either of the two weren't involved.

bc

[mdiehl]

As to the Brewster vs Zeke, the specs of the A6M2 are known. The specs of the F2A3 have, I think, been posted here before. The F2A-3 was slower than the A6M2. This was in large part owing to the addition of cockpit armor. Here are the specs for the F2A-2, which is the aircraft that VF2 and VF3 flew prior to transitioning to F4F-3s:

Powerplant: One Wright R-1820-40 Cyclone nine-cylinder single-row air cooled radial, rated at 1200 hp. Performance: Maximum speed of 285 mph at sea level, 323 mph at 16,500 feet. 344 mph at 26,500 feet. Cruising speed 157 mph. Landing speed 73 mph. Initial climb rate 2500 ft/min. Service ceiling 34,000 feet. Maximum range 1670 miles. Weights: 4576 pounds empty, 5942 pounds gross, 6890 pounds maximum takeoff. Dimensions: Wingspan 35 feet 0 inches, length 26 feet 0 inches, height 11 feet 8 inches, wing area 209 square feet. Armament: Four Browning 0.50-inch machine guns, two in the upper fuselage and two in the wings.

see: Maas, Jim, 1987. F2A Buffalo in Action. Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.

So, even if *you* ignore the fact that closing speed is the only part of speed that matters for deflection shooting, you still can't factually support your claim that there was a huge difference in speed between the F4F and F2 series that would have promoted mass confusion, hamfisted flying, or poor marksmanship, among pilots 'who had previously flown F2s and had only been flying F4s for about nine months.'

[Feinder]

I'm rather surprised at the degree of "discussion" over deflection shooting, who was good at it, and how effective it was anyways.

I will say that...

Part of the reason that most US fighters were equipped with machine-guns, instead of cannons, was their rate of fire.

1. The primary targets for US fighters were enemy fighters and 1e bombers. They (for the most part), weren't shooting at larger bombers, where the punch of a cannon was much better suited to knock down larger bombers. You don't need to cannon to knock down an enemy figher, so why mount it when a MG more aptly suits your needs (consider the following).
2. Cannons themselves, and certainly their ammunition, weighed more the MGs. That means you can put more MGs and/or ammunition on your fighters. Here you get benefit of volume of fire and duration.
3. This higher ROF/volume/duration also means that the gunnery skills of your pilots don't have to as great. I am by no means saying that US pilots had inferior gunnery skills (they in-fact had much more training with live ammunition than their Axis counterparts, simply because it was more availble). But with a higher ROF, you're bound to hit something.
4. If your targets are more or less Fighters and 1e bombers, they're more agile than a level bomber, and will more likely be maneuvering. This is where the higher ROF also helps, becuase you're essentionally just throwing up a lot lead that your target can litterally fly into. Here again, ROF/volume/duration makes a difference.

The Axis fighters were tasked with destroying an ever increasing number of heavy bombers (in both theaters). To knock down a heavy bomber, it takes more than just MGs (unless you kill the soft-squishy things that fly the thing). Hense, by 1943, most Axis fighters (of both nations), had almost abandoned MGs in favor of cannons. The plus for the cannons (and their task of downing medium/heavy bombers), is that the target isn't maneuvering, so the lower ROF and marksmanship requirements aren't as crucial.

-F-

[caslug]

I'm sure deflection shooting training was benefit to USN pilots, but it wasn't a holy grail for USN.

"USN pilots during the interwar period prided themselves on advance attack techniques and training on high-deflection shooting. No doubt such preparation helped the great tacticians like Thach, O'Hare and Flatley...Yet the average navl aviator who saw action in the S. Pacific was far from a dead-eye marksman." - Fire in the Sky

USN(and allied) airforces shot down more jap planes in PTO for combination of reasons, deflection shooting was one, but probably not the top. Radio(allows for teamwork), doctrine(finger four formation), better planes(43 onward), radar(vectoring), better protected planes, better support(more planes available), better replacements, etc., Then add this to fact that the IJN/IJAAF were almost complete opposite, you have a combination that guarantees that allied forces(USN or otherwise) will prevail.

[mdiehl]

USN(and allied) airforces shot down more jap planes in PTO for combination of reasons, deflection shooting was one, but probably not the top. Radio(allows for teamwork), doctrine(finger four formation), better planes(43 onward), radar(vectoring), better protected planes, better support(more planes available), better replacements, etc., Then add this to fact that the IJN/IJAAF were almost complete opposite, you have a combination that guarantees that allied forces(USN or otherwise) will prevail.

The subject was USN CV pilots at start. With respect to their exp ratings it is important to note NOT, as everybody knows, that US aviators shot down more jap planes throughout the war but instead that from December through August 1942, USN VF pilots flying Wildcats (F4F3 and F4F4's not F6s or F4Us) in direct, head to head dogfights with IJN A6M pilots, shot down more Zeroes than the Zeroes managed to shoot down in F4Fs, despite the fact that by all accounts the Zeke was faster, a better climber, and more maneuverable at IAS less than 300 mph.

The use of the 4 plane section was also a factor. Certainly a better formation overall than the 3-plane shotai used by the Japanese. Lundstrom, however, noted (and backed it up with Japanese fighter pilots' anecdotes) that early war Japanese aviators were sufficiently well trained as teams to maintain good cohesion with the 3-plane shotai. It was only after the head to head confrontations with USN pilots that the weaker Japanese replacement pilots made manifest the inferiority of the 3-plane section.

So, with respect to the at start EXP ratings, the real results from WW2 show that the USN plane+pilot combination, in fighters, was superior to the IJN plane+pilot combination, in fighters. Since we all seem to agree that in general the IJN plane was a better dogfighter, and the F4F was slower, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that beyond reasonable doubt the at-start USN aviators should have very high exp ratings.

[Drongo]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
By teh way, the same report that you cite was based on Thach's assessment. In that report, USN superiority at deflection shooting is specifically mentioned as the reason for the success, to date, of the F4F vs the A6M.

What assessment from Thach are you referring to? The combat reports from the CV and TF commanders don't appear to contain any mention of deflection shooting specifically being the reason for success (and Thach contributed to the Yorktown's combat report). Did he make a seperate report that was passed on to Adm Nimitz before Nimitz sent his summary reports of the battle to Adm King in late June?

The only assesment report I've see from Thach was the one he made after returning to the states in Aug '42. Part of it read:-

"In connection with the performance of the Zero fighter, any success we have had against the Zero is not due to performance of the airplane we fly but is the result of the comparatively poor marksmanship on the part of the Japanese, stupid mistakes made by a few of their pilots, and superior marksmanship and teamwork on the part of some of our pilots.

This deficiency not only prevents our fighter from properly carrying out its mission but it has had an alarming effect on the morale of the fighter pilots in the Fleet at this time and on those who are going to be sent to the Fleet."

Was that the one you were thinking of?

Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

A little bit of conjecture there, don't you think?

The full comment from the report by Nimitz to Adm King in late June read:-

"Our F4F-4 is markedly inferior to the Japanese Zero fighter in speed, maneuverability, and climb. These characteristics must be improved, but not at the cost of reducing the present overall superiority that in the Battle of Midway enabled our carrier fighter squadrons to shoot down about 3 Zero fighters for each of our own lost. However much this superiority may exist in our splendid pilots, part at least rests in the armor, armament and leak proof tanks of our planes."

There is no doubt that Nimitz considered the durability and firepower of the F4F to be part of the reason why the USN fighters did better than their Japanese opponents at Midway. It also can be seen that he considered it vital that these attributes be maintained, regardless of whatever else was done in the efforts to address the Zeros superiorities.

However, implying that his statement translates to "we are the USN, we should expect to shoot them down in droves" may not be the correct interpretation.

(From a communique by Nimitz to King one week earlier (20th June, '42) In case you're wondering, Nimitz had reviewed all the After Action reports from the CV and TF commanders by then):

"Although the Type 0 fighters are more vulnerable than ours, the primary source of any combat successes to date by navy fighting planes has been our own expert tactics opposed to faulty enemy tactics.

Overall results have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with the improvement that must be expected in enemy tactics."

Sounds a bit more like the priority was to urgently improve the F4F's capabilities not to improve the kill ratio to something more appropriate to Americans but rather to be able survive the expected improvement in Japanese fighter tactics without suffering a "serious and potentially decisive" result.

Or am I missing an additional report somewhere that would put his comments in the correct light?

[mdiehl]

Was that the one you were thinking of?

Yes.

Me:

Also, you should understand that the CinCPac thought that the actual kill ratio was three dead zeroes per wildcat shot down *and he was not satisfied.*

Any other nation would have looked at a 3:1 favorable kill ratio battle assessment and said "We're winning." The US looked at that ratio and said "We can do better yet."

Drongo:

A little bit of conjecture there, don't you think?

Yes, admittedly so. But it is correct at least insofar as comparing CinCPac with Japanese naval command. Sakai noted that many IJN field commanders for land based units were reluctant to adopt the 4-plane section even as late as (IIRC) 4thQ 1943, and were heard to make derisive remarks on the order of 'What has protective armor or a reliable radio got to do with aggressive spirit?'

The full comment from the report by Nimitz to Adm King in late June read ...

There is no doubt that Nimitz considered the durability and firepower of the F4F to be part of the reason why the USN fighters did better than their Japanese opponents at Midway. It also can be seen that he considered it vital that these attributes be maintained, regardless of whatever else was done in the efforts to address the Zeros superiorities.

Absolutely he thought that and I agree. But a pilot in a markedly inferior plane does not get opportunities to hit back very often. Bergerud is a lousy source because he relies almost exclusively on anecdotes, but one interesting one pertains to a P-38 gang-up on a very experienced Ki-43 pilot. The latter escaped by using superior maneuverability to foil the P-38 drivers' shots, but the Ki-43 driver was never in a position to hit one of the P-38s. IMO, had the USAAF trained intensively at deflection shooting, that Ki-43 pilot would not have escaped the day. Of course that's conjecture.

However, implying that his statement translates to "we are the USN, we should expect to shoot them down in droves" may not be the correct interpretation.

Non sequitur. I did not say that Nimitz statement translates to same. What I said was that a presumptive 3:1 loss ratio was displeasing to CinCPac. IMO, for reasons having to do with ethbnocentrism, pre-war expectations led to a greater degree of disappointment, given evidence to hand at the time, than makes sense. Certainly a sustained 3:1 kill ratio was wholly out of norm in comparison with losses of pilots in France in WW1, or in the Battle of Britain in WW2.

Sounds a bit more like the priority was to urgently improve the F4F's capabilities not to improve the kill ratio to something more appropriate to Americans but rather to be able survive the expected improvement in Japanese fighter tactics without suffering a "serious and potentially decisive" result.

Well, reading the priority for future work is different from reading the assessment of work to date. I agree that there was a desire to sustain good kill rates among USN pilots given the presumption that the IJN would learn from their experiences and change tactics, doctrine, or improve gunnery.

Or am I missing an additional report somewhere that would put his comments in the correct light?

No I just think we're looking at different aspects of the report.

[caslug]

Taking a global look at the game, it doesn't model the fact that Allied pilots rotated out after their 1 or 2 tours. So it will allow many pilots that started as 75 exp on 12/7/41 able to survive(with durable&armor plane) and gain exp(flying until shotdown). This will eventually lead to more allied pilots that are very experienced than historical. This allows the allied to have higher experience average of their squadrons by 1943-44. In PBEM games you might even see allied pilots with more than 40 kills(R. Bong).

Maybe in the short run, jap pilots are too exp or allied pilots are not, I'm don't have an opinion either way. BUT in the long run(1-2 yrs), the game models the allied advantages(more durable planes, better replacement, more numeroius, better planes, etc.,) pretty well. So guess if players want to bump up USN pilot exp then it'll only be fair to rotated them out after their tours. Sure, some pilots went back for 2nd tours, but most didn't. Otherwise, you'll be creating an ahistorical situation-high exp pilots that are NEVER rotated out. Only Jap/GE pilots were in this situation, because of bad leadership on by their respecitve high command.