Best Generals of WW1

[Telsor1]

ORIGINAL: Raverdave

Well if the French had been doing it for so long how come they had nothing to show for it?

They actually took quite a bit of ground in late '17 and early '18..including most of the battleground at Chemin des Dames if memory serves. ( that was where the French army 'broke' in a big failed attack in 1916 ).

I would submit that most of the histories concentrate on the British/Empire contribution to the war, so this receives less coverage. not to mention that smaller actions are less dramatic/newsworthy than the big pushes and so these french efforts aren't well known.

I would also suggest that you have a look at the battle for Hargicourt September 1918, as another example of Monash's abilities along with Monash's leadership of the 3rd Div AIF in March, April, May & June. Inaddition the battle of Amiens, the battle of Chuignes and Bray and the battles for Peronne and Mont St Quetin.

I agree..by *1918* the western allies had some decent tactics. What do you suggest Haig should have done differently in 1916?

As for Haig, I would submit that in Monash he saw a leader to whom he could "use" to bolster his flagging reputation. I know that may sound like a big call, but in Monash he found a general who knew how to win.

Isn't that what a good commander should do? Utilise his subordinates effectively?

If Monash was any less a general that those around him than how do you account for such a extraordinary rise from Divison commander to Corps commander, even Knighted in the field by King George V.

I am NOT saying Monash wasn't a good commander. My argument has largely been aimed at your descriptions of Haig as a total incompetant by trying to say that for the possibilities available across the entire war, neither he nor anyone could do that much better.

All these great successes you're attributing to Monash were in 1918...When tactics/technology had had time to evolve and develop...Nothing he did was revolutionary and while he might have been at the leading edge, it was of a much broader movement.

As a successful commander, it's no surprise he was promoted, although I would submit that being promoted one level is hardly 'extraordinary'.

[Kevinugly]

I can't really comment on Monash (web sites and this forum is the limit of my knowledge), but it would seem that le Hamel is probably not the best choice to demonstrate Monash's 'innovations'. Apart from Telsor's points, as I've shown above it wasn't the first use of large numbers of tanks either. I've tried to find a website that deals with Monash and/or his battles in some detail but I've had no joy so if anyone can direct me somewhere I'd be grateful[:)].

Regarding Haig, it should be borne in mind the political pressure he was often under and the poor quality of troops and munitions that he was forced to deal with. Plus, the 'Welsh Goat' (or David Lloyd-George as he's also known) made a largely successful bid post-war to distance himself from the responsibility for the high British and Empire casualties suffered on the Western Front and place it squarely on Haig alone.

[Raverdave]

Ah found it.........45 tanks were used in the battle of Hamel.

[Raverdave]

I would submit that most of the histories concentrate on the British/Empire contribution to the war, so this receives less coverage. not to mention that smaller actions are less dramatic/newsworthy than the big pushes and so these french efforts aren't well known.

And I must say also my knowledge is on the thin side here.

I agree..by *1918* the western allies had some decent tactics. What do you suggest Haig should have done differently in 1916?

Well I certainly would not have kept pushing the massed infantry over-the-top tactics.

All these great successes you're attributing to Monash were in 1918...When tactics/technology had had time to evolve and develop...Nothing he did was revolutionary and while he might have been at the leading edge, it was of a much broader movement.

Well then you are going to have to excuse me for being just a dumb aussie and educate me as to who where and when others did the same with the same or greater level of success.

[*Lava*]

Hi!

Here's is an interesting take on leadership in WWI from an allied (especially Haig's) point of view.

I tend to agree with the article. "Leadership" had a tendancy of taking a back seat to machine guns and trenches. The article gives, in a generally broad way, the relationships of leadership combined with initially obsolete concepts of war and a general innovative approach which finally bore fruit in 1918.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwone/ ... s_01.shtml

Ray (alias Lava)

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: Raverdave

I agree..by *1918* the western allies had some decent tactics. What do you suggest Haig should have done differently in 1916?

Well I certainly would not have kept pushing the massed infantry over-the-top tactics.

But the only alternative was to NOT attack and this was politically unacceptable.

Much is made of the German offensive of 1918 and how this broke the stalemate. Yet in four months they incurred over one million casualties, twice as many as suffered by the British at the Somme and without achieving the decisive breakthrough. One could argue that it was only the desperate nature of the German strategic position that allowed the offensive to continue for as long as it did.

@ Lava

Thanks for the link, it's a nice and relatively balanced precis of the nature of command on the Western Front.

[*Lava*]

Hi!

Something that I think people don't appreciate, which had a bearing on just about every topic you want to discuss concerning the Western Front (including leadership), was how "terrain" effected operations.

By "terrain" I do not refer to hills or rivers. I refer to the "man-made" terrain that was thrown up during trench warfare. Imagine the problem you are facing. On either side exists a vast system of trenches, bomb craters and obstacles. Between lies "no-man's" land. Now, try to take your army, advance from a system of trenches, through no-man's land and then through another complex of trenches. Time to break out right? Well, imagine funneling reinforcements over that terrain to the new front. Imagine trying to relocate Headquarters facilities or medical facilities or ammunition stockpiles. Imagine the logistical nightmare of trying to transverse all this "man-made terrain," while your primary means of transportation is the horse.

The obstacle of this "man-made terrain" is very rarely, if ever, mentioned (let alone analyzed) on the effects of an offensive. In my opinion, it is probably one of the most important aspects of the war, and the reason "offenses" very rarely achieved more than a few kilometers.

Ray (alias Lava)

[Kevinugly]

Interesting point Ray, this was particularly true of 3rd Ypres (or 'Passchendale' as it's more commonly known) when the dreadful Autumn whether reduced the terrain to a series of mud holes that swallowed men, animals, guns and vehicles. This was Haig's lowpoint really where the offensive should have been called off. In more reasonable conditions the 'no-mans land' terrain worked both ways though - it allowed small-scale attacks to have a certain element of surprise. Once the ground had been gained though the army logistics corps were usually able to render it transversable pretty quickly - assuming the enemy didn't counter-attack and take it straight back.

What is overlooked, terrain-wise, is that when the trench lines were established the Germans, particularly in the British sector, managed to seize much of the higher land. This not only gave them the advantage of looking down on the British positions but it also meant that by and large they could dig deeper and drier than could the British. The only downside of this was that it was easier for the British to dig mines under the German positions and if you've ever seen the film of soldiers at the bottom of the hole at Messines you can imagine just how devastating those mines could be.

[Telsor1]

ORIGINAL: Lava

Hi!

Something that I think people don't appreciate, which had a bearing on just about every topic you want to discuss concerning the Western Front (including leadership), was how "terrain" effected operations.

By "terrain" I do not refer to hills or rivers. I refer to the "man-made" terrain that was thrown up during trench warfare. Imagine the problem you are facing. On either side exists a vast system of trenches, bomb craters and obstacles. Between lies "no-man's" land. Now, try to take your army, advance from a system of trenches, through no-man's land and then through another complex of trenches. Time to break out right? Well, imagine funneling reinforcements over that terrain to the new front. Imagine trying to relocate Headquarters facilities or medical facilities or ammunition stockpiles. Imagine the logistical nightmare of trying to transverse all this "man-made terrain," while your primary means of transportation is the horse.

The obstacle of this "man-made terrain" is very rarely, if ever, mentioned (let alone analyzed) on the effects of an offensive. In my opinion, it is probably one of the most important aspects of the war, and the reason "offenses" very rarely achieved more than a few kilometers.

Ray (alias Lava)

Agreed.

To add a further twist to this, after their breakthrough in 1918, one of the things that 'stopped' the German adance was they reached the somme battlefield, and their advance slowed markedly.

[IronDuke_slith]

Nice thread.

Haig's reputation is quite fascinating as there is something of a move to rehabilitate him these days. It starts by (as Kev has pointed out) showing how the combat advantages had all switched to the defenders, and ends with the successes of the hundred days. I know little about Monash, but if his actions were centred in 1918, I too doubt he did anything new.

Looking back to 1917, in April the battle of Arras demonstrated that the British Army (led by Haig) were developing new tactics to cope with the realities they had rather brutally discovered on the Somme. More sophisticated creeping barrages, more effective use of machine guns on the offensive, early (although limited) use of tanks. (On this point we should remember that Haig the "Butcher" was happy to use them, and push for more of them. He saw the possibilities as much as anyone. The idea he was a technophobe just doesn't hold. )

The success of 1918 was built on the solid work of 1917, developing the artillery tactics and offensive doctrine to win battles. Objectives became more limited, and plans more realistic. As others have pointed out, this didn't necessarily reduce daily casualties, which were heavier at Arras than the Somme. However, gains were measured at worst in hundreds of thousands of yards and at best in miles. Not something that could be claimed before. I think Haig's contribution to WWI was in overseeing the development of the bite and hold offensive, which essentially recognised the changed nature of the battlefield, recognised that the easier access to the battlefields of the enemy's reserves meant knowing how to hold ground taken was as important as knowing how to take it, if you were going to be successful.

As others have argued, I don't think anyone would necessarily have done any better. Even the battle plan for the Somme is internally coherent. Massed and sustained barrage to destroy enemy defences and barbed wire, followed by a measured advance (the infamous walking lines across no man's land) to ensure the attacking units stayed in touch, and did not expose their flanks by advancing at different speeds. Although in places it went horribly wrong, I don't think the logic that wrote the plan was all that flawed based on what they knew at the time.

For example, Units advancing slowly were easy targets, but why worry when the defenders had suffered the barrage that was planned and then unleashed. That the barrage failed to do it's job was not something anyone might reasonably have anticipated. What they did know was that once the units set off, they had precious little control over the units, and an unco-ordinated advance would cause a number of problems. Since a slow advance is easier to co-ordinate than a quick one, the walking lines of Tommies across no man's land are suddenly easier to understand. It went horribly wrong, but German casualties on the Somme were equally horrendous, and since defensive advantages meant this was a war of attrition above all else, then the battle becomes easier to comprehend.

Haig was not Britain's greatest ever General, he probably wouldn't make the top 20, but I think it's wrong to dismiss him. Circumstances meant 1914-18 was different than anything that went before, and different to what came after. I can't overly blame A General faced with no precedents to guide him, and whose existing experience and national doctrine and tactics had no relation to what was about to happen. Was any General on the Western front successful before 1918?

Regards,
IronDuke

[OberJager]

Major-General A. W. Currie

Vimy Ridge

"Despite British failures at Arras, the Canadians had broken through the most formidable portion of the German line. The capture of Vimy Ridge was a great tactical success. The Canadians had seized ground of great military importance, and inflicted heavy casualties on the German Army."

Was done through careful planning, and buildup and inovation of tactics, something most other generals of the time completely disregarded....

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: OberJager

Major-General A. W. Currie

Vimy Ridge

"Despite British failures at Arras, the Canadians had broken through the most formidable portion of the German line. The capture of Vimy Ridge was a great tactical success. The Canadians had seized ground of great military importance, and inflicted heavy casualties on the German Army."

Was done through careful planning, and buildup and inovation of tactics, something most other generals of the time completely disregarded....

British failures at Arras is a little harsh. On the first day as the Canadians took Vimy, the British XVII Corp of the Third Army achieved the longest single advance since trench warfare began, a whopping 3.5 miles. I think the first day at Arras was a good day for a number of units. The peculiarities of the WWI battlefield meant they couldn't be exploited, but it was a big day in the evolution of the bite and hold and showed how even well defended trenches could be overcome.

I'm also unsure who would have formulated the Canadian assault. The Canadians formed a Canadian Corp, I think, which was part of the BEF's First Army. This isn't an attempt to reduce the Canadian contribution, merely point out that the planning of the Arras offensive was planned across a number of Corp and Armies (all of who'm answered to Haig) and who adopted many similiar tactics with regards the length of artillery preparation etc. The Germans also seem to have made some bad mistakes at Vimy, although that doesn't hide the achievement of the Canadians who performed admirably, and captured a crucial piece of ground.

Regards,
IronDuke

[SirRodneyOfGout]

Asking for a favourite WWI general is a little like asking what is your favourite vegetable. I'd really rather discuss my favourite beverage, or even breakfast cereal, for that matter.

Being a canuck I'm going to have to second the vote for Currie. IronDuke's comments are well founded, but I still question Haig's abilities.

To follow the logic of "The success of 1918 was built on the solid work of 1917" further - The Somme planning was based on what had been learned in 1915. But that it took the British from 1915 to 1918, with all the associated costs, to develop a successsful offensive demonstrates a weakness in command. The Germans were quicker to develop tactics to overcome the difficulties of trench warfare; they simply didn't unleash them on a large scale on the Western front until 1918.

IMO, Haig was kept on as the British commander because he was seen as being the government's choice. To blame him was to blame themselves. His removal would have signalled the weakness, and possible downfall, of Loyd George's coalition. I don't think this would have been politically acceptable - the downfall of the government could have had greater consequences than a simple change of politicians. And after the Dardanelles it was unlikely that any truly innovative - perhaps I should say radical - approach would have been forwarded by staff or accepted by the government. The stakes were simply too high.

Also, the battles of 1916 and 1917 were failures of offensives, and despite the tragic cost did not significantly alter the situation on the ground. The german offensives in 1918 might have provided better reason for removing him, had they succeeded, but they didn't, and the situation at that point was changing with the anticipated arrival of the Americans.

Haig's record can be rationalised, but it can hardly be resurrected other than by apologists. However, it is very easy from a gaming perspective to think "I'll just click and remove this idiot from command". In the real world there are consequences. Wars do not occur in a social / political vacum.

BTW, are commanders modelled in the game, as in ACW? I don't think so, but if anyone knows otherwise...

[*Lava*]

Hi!

In the pre-beta commanders were not a part of the game. But as I understand, Frank wanted to have personalities, so we will just have to wait and see.

Ray (alias Lava)

[SirRodneyOfGout]

Oh, so I might be able to "click and remove the idiot" ? [:)] ACW did have costs for doing so, if I remember correctly.

Thanks Ray.

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: SirRodneyOfGout


To follow the logic of "The success of 1918 was built on the solid work of 1917" further - The Somme planning was based on what had been learned in 1915. But that it took the British from 1915 to 1918, with all the associated costs, to develop a successsful offensive demonstrates a weakness in command. The Germans were quicker to develop tactics to overcome the difficulties of trench warfare; they simply didn't unleash them on a large scale on the Western front until 1918.

IMO, Haig was kept on as the British commander because he was seen as being the government's choice.

Haig's record can be rationalised, but it can hardly be resurrected other than by apologists.

I disagree with the first part I've quoted because the technology simply wasn't there until late 1917 for a successful offensive to be developed. Tanks were neither reliable nor available in sufficient quantities, artillery wasn't accurate enough or mobile enough, munitions weren't high enough quality, aircraft weren't good enough. The German offensives of 1918 was horrendously expensive in terms of manpower and ran out of steam when it out-ran its artillery. Blaming the failure of the offensives on Haig and the other commanders is wrong imho.

I'd agree with the second part though, Lloyd-George would have loved to have had Haig replaced (whether another commander would have performed better is open to question) but politically it would have been very difficult.

Regarding the third part......... Haigs critics often use hindsight to pour scorn on his record but if analysed from a contemporary perspective his record stands up rather well.

Regarding the game, if commanders could be changed it might pique my interest somewhat more[:)].

[Telsor1]

ORIGINAL: SirRodneyOfGout

To follow the logic of "The success of 1918 was built on the solid work of 1917" further - The Somme planning was based on what had been learned in 1915. But that it took the British from 1915 to 1918, with all the associated costs, to develop a successsful offensive demonstrates a weakness in command. The Germans were quicker to develop tactics to overcome the difficulties of trench warfare; they simply didn't unleash them on a large scale on the Western front until 1918.

War in the east wasn't like war in the west.

The Russians didn't have the same density of machine guns and artillery and perhaps more importantly, the logistic support to let those they had fire regularly. In addition, the scarcity of rail lines meant rapid reinforcement just wasn't going to happen.

So, leaving that out, where were the Germans 'great successes' that came so far before the Brits? Their big offensive in the west was just a couple of months ahead...next to nothing, especially when you consider that the eventual British tactics ( basic combined arms ) were more complex than those used by the Germans and the Brits didn't have a big army to 'experiment' with for sometime after the Germans.

[Adnan Meshuggi]

Well, the best general of ww1 ? Does such man exist ?
In 1914 they had no knowlegde about leading such war. Moltke the younger failed to win the war early... as it was not a trench war.
From the strategical point of view, the western allies should have sit out this war. Time was on their side.

The eastern war is often underestimated.
FIrst, the russians had a lot men, their army had the largest artillery (some say also the best). The austrians had only a really weak army and got kicked heavily in 1914 and 1915.

The germans, with their failed plan of defeating france quickly were really pissed off. the fought a two front war, in the east they needed more and more men. (the defeat 1914 in the west was a direct connection of sending 7 divisions more in the east. Germany just had not enough men.

The brits had the cheapest part. They put in some one men, draw in the "less important" empire troops.

The french, defending their home soil, fought bad leaded but brave. Later on, with leaders like Petain (yeah, the infamous Vichy comander) they saved france.

The british generals never learned a thing about the soldiers they leaded. Other nations (like the germans or french) did.

Oh, don´t forget the silly italians... very costly... and in the end they got nothing.

For the generals, the best british ? nada
the best french ? Petain
the best russian ? Brusilov
the best italian ? ha ha ha
the best german ? Ludendorf (forget Hindenburg, this was just a label)

The 1918-offensive of the german army was a mistake, instead of attacking in the west, they should have knocked out the italians (this was very easy in late1817/early1918) so they would have had only ONE frontline, all the ressources of the ukraine.

Some here underestimate the blockade of the british navy... germany lost around 1 million civililans by starving to death through it (and later on leaded to many mistakes by hitler ("Lebensraum im Osten" was based on the fear of starving again)) the soldiers were sick as they came to the front, the workers got small rations and had to work harder. In 1918, the germans could have produced a lot more weapons, but they lacked the "manpower" to do so. (Another huge mistake by hitler, he did not force the around-the-clock-working like the brits did from september 1939, he feared uprising at home)

The allied counteroffensives in 1918 were "easy", cause Ludendorff, knowing about the situation at home streched the offensives to thin... and payed.

The revolutionary tactics in ww1 ?
More artillery, tanks (even if they never had a great influence cause their tactical use was really bad) and planes, also the stormtroops

For the last, the ground support rule of planes, the germans were the one who developted it, also the stormtroops. The "more art", well both sides did it, the massive strike-theory was also german. But often the inferior side (in men) develop the "better" tactical methods.

Just to ignore the french is not fair, they did more and better as the rest of the entente-forces... the french army of 1914-1918 was something different as in 1940. The brits, well they lost the elite of their youth(some people really say the huge losses at the somme leaded to a downsize of the insula-gen-pool at last about the good-looking brits this could be true (no, just kidding))

The americans had only the good purpose to be there, have plenty of food and supply and do pressure on the germans


It is very interesting that ww1 made the men who were later the generals of ww2....

WW1 is really interesting, cause it was totally different as ww2. The chance of winning the war existed for the germans, in 1914 and in 1918. The trouble between french and brits in 1918 were really large and with a little luck it had come different. Can´t say if the world had been better, but surely hitler had not come to power, the communism had end early (in 1920) and we all would not know the connection between holocaust and jews. But this is just a personell pov.

[Telsor1]

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi
From the strategical point of view, the western allies should have sit out this war. Time was on their side.

Overall, probably yes, but Germany was catching up with Britain as an industrial power which was a concern...also, if Germany took Russian territory, that would have accelerated.

Had everyone just written the Serbs off as a bunch of nutters, either with Austria leaving them alone (unlikely) or letting the Austrians beat them up, then history could have been very different.

The eastern war is often underestimated.
FIrst, the russians had a lot men, their army had the largest artillery (some say also the best). The austrians had only a really weak army and got kicked heavily in 1914 and 1915.

The problem with Russian artillery is they didn't have enough of it, nor the industry to supply it or the logistic network ( rail mostly ) to get it to the front.

The Austrian army was very variable..they had some excellent troops, and some absolute dross.

The germans, with their failed plan of defeating france quickly were really pissed off. the fought a two front war, in the east they needed more and more men. (the defeat 1914 in the west was a direct connection of sending 7 divisions more in the east. Germany just had not enough men.

In many ways, the Germans were the 'victims' of their success in the east.

That said, they also suffered from 'turning left' too early and too readily in the west.

The brits had the cheapest part. They put in some one men, draw in the "less important" empire troops.

As a proportion of available manpower, all nations suffered to a similar degree...ie, too much.

Oh, don´t forget the silly italians... very costly... and in the end they got nothing.

Oh yeah, gotta love the Italians...Cadorna was probably the worst butcher of the lot...not least to the degree he executed his own men.

the best german ? Ludendorf (forget Hindenburg, this was just a label)

What did he do right? Tannenberg was von Prittwitz's plan, the big 1915('16?) offensive in the east he opposed..

The 1918-offensive of the german army was a mistake, instead of attacking in the west, they should have knocked out the italians (this was very easy in late1817/early1918) so they would have had only ONE frontline, all the ressources of the ukraine.

Beating Italy wouldn't win the war, winning in France would. I suspect the German commanders knew the risks, but felt that they had to get in before the Americans arrived in sufficient strength to swing it their way. Germany ( along with France and the British Emprie ) was out of men. Excluding kids becoming old enough to fight and wounded returning to the lines, none of these countries had any replacements. Every man lost couldn't be replaced..the Americans could, and effectively, replaced the British/French losses, so they needed the quick victory.

The allied counteroffensives in 1918 were "easy", cause Ludendorff, knowing about the situation at home streched the offensives to thin... and payed.

They were also 'easy' because the German army knew it had lost after it's own failed offensives so lost the will to fight. Similarly, the Brits morale broke when the Germans attacked, which helped the German attack look better than it was.

The revolutionary tactics in ww1 ?
More artillery, tanks (even if they never had a great influence cause their tactical use was really bad) and planes, also the stormtroops

not so much more artillery as better use of it....rather than long bombardments, short, sharp strikes. Avoiding sighting the guns (and warning the defenders) in favor of reliance on statistical estimates. Creeping barrages. Regularly moving the guns forward.

But often the inferior side (in men) develop the "better" tactical methods.

Only when it's a 'fair fight'..if one side has both, the war ends relatively quickly.

Just to ignore the french is not fair, they did more and better as the rest of the entente-forces... the french army of 1914-1918 was something different as in 1940.

Agreed.

The brits, well they lost the elite of their youth(some people really say the huge losses at the somme leaded to a downsize of the insula-gen-pool at last about the good-looking brits this could be true (no, just kidding))

Jokes aside, this isn't far from the truth ( for all sides ). The socialogical effects post war must have been huge. The demographics alone suggest enourmous turmoil...millions died, and propotionally these fell hardest on the young ( those in the army at the time ), the fittest and the rural population ( urban population were more likely to be exempt due to war factories ). What is worse is that many units were drawn from geographical areas...At the Somme, the male population of several small towns was virtually wiped out.

As an example. At the outbreak of the war, in Australia, huge numbers rushed to the colours..the country only had so many rifles, let alone artillery and other support elements, so they got to 'cherry pick' the best of those who volunteered. They were so 'good' that when the ANZAC corp arrived in Egypt for training, the smallest Australian soldier was bigger/taller than the average European Soldier. Very few of them were to end the war alive and unharmed. So genetically and in every other way, yes, the best of a generation were ravaged.

[Kevinugly]

ORIGINAL: Adnan Meshuggi



The british generals never learned a thing about the soldiers they leaded. Other nations (like the germans or french) did.

This is a joke right? Ever heard of the Nivelle offensive and the subsequent mutiny? French troops lived in atrocious conditions (compared to the rest of the front), were poorly fed and rarely had leave. Their generals cared for their troops[8|]. That British generals never learned anything about their troops is a myth!