A Quiz for You! - Became Battleships vs Battlecruisers

[tsimmonds]

Yeah the British learned that lesson well, notice how they used the Hood against the Bismark in WWII.

To be fair, Hood was trying to close the range when she was sunk. Her weakness was recognized and Adm Holland was doing what he could to compensate. He needed a break and didn't get it.

[Tiornu]

The Admiralty had a stated preference for its battleships to fight at ranges of 12-16,000 yards. Holland began Hood's final turn as the range was closing down near 16,000 yards. I can't help thinking he had the Admiralty instructions in mind as he formulated his plans.
A major factor in formulating this 12-16,000yd doctrine was the understanding that Britain was not putting much money into rebuilding its entire battleline. A significant portion still had no armor-grade deck protection, just the thin HT plating it had in WWI. Plunging fire was acknowledged as a "wild card" that could quickly change the complexion of a fight, and since the British anticipated having numerical superiority in most cases, they weren't excited about changing any complexions.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: madmickey


Allowing Battlecruiser to be exposed to heavy plunging fire was a good idea.

No Battlecruisers were exposed to "plunging fire" at Jutland. No shells penetrated any major armor decks of the large warships during the battle.

[steveh11Matrix]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Yeah the British learned that lesson well, notice how they used the Hood against the Bismark in WWII.

To be fair, Hood was trying to close the range when she was sunk. Her weakness was recognized and Adm Holland was doing what he could to compensate. He needed a break and didn't get it.

In fact, Hood had just made her turn to open the 'A' arcs when she went up. Ludovic Kennedy reported in "Pursuit: The Sinking of the Bismark" that the Germans were astonished to see the after turrets fire after the explosion.

We'll never know for certain what happened.

Steve.

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: MengCiao

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

I've often see the "speed is armor" quote ascribed to Fisher, but I've never seen any documentation on its context. If he was referring to the use of large cruisers against the enemy's battle line, then I'd have to say the historical precedents tend to support his idea. I don't know of any disproportionate losses we can pin on him for it.
As far as I can tell, the only reason for proposing the disappearing mounts would be to indulge the appetite for newfangled whatevers.

The losses in BCs can't be pinned on Fischer (stupid freak designs like Furious, Courageous and Glorious which wasted resources could be), but on the Admirals commanding and deploying them. As cruisers got bigger and faster, so too did BCs, as the need for speed increased size and cost passed that of BBs. Because of this, many felt them a waste unless used in the battleline. Kaboom!

Excessively reactive "powder bags" for the 12-inch and 13.5-inch ammo seems to have been the immediate cause of the ships that blew up at Jutland. HMS Tiger was hit by more big shells than any RN ship at Jutland except Warspite and she didn't blow up.

If the "powder bags" had been less reactive, then BCs might have gotten less of a bad rep...Renown and Repulse did fine in surface actions and Hood might have blown up due to her own torpedoes being hit.

My understanding of why the British BCs went up, and the Armoured Cruisers for that matter, was a combination of poor armor protection, questionable usage vs heavy units, and unsafe handling room procedures. I have read that the RN advocated both upping the ammunition carried beyond the designed capacity and stowing large quantities of charge bags loosely in the hoists and handling rooms to increase the rate of fire, both which where extremely hazardous and criminally negligent practices.

[steveh11Matrix]

My understanding is that there were indeed poor procedures - excessive ready-use shells and bags, safety shortcuts etc - in the BC Fleet, because Beatty stressed ROF. I'm not so sure that this would have also been the case for the AC, I think this was simply a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. I have no idea at all whether this emphasis continued when he became the commander of the Grand Fleet. As for the situation in May 1941, I simply don't know.

This is not 'Beatty Bashing' by the way, I believe he had flaws, but so did Jellicoe.
I feel Hipper and Scheer were both better overall, but even Scheer made a serious and potentially fatal mistake at Jutland when he turned back towards the Grand Fleet.

Still, this is getting somewhat off topic...

Steve.

[rtrapasso]

Oh, you mean we're still not talking about:

a) 3 dual turrets with 20-inch guns
(b) 53,000 tons displacement
(c) 35 knots speed
(d) 10 inches belt armor

Who am I?

A hint: I would have been built, shouldn't a very serious battle take place.

F.

[:D]

Hey, half (or more) of the fun of these forums is getting off the topic into something that grabs ya. Not much in the last umpteen posts has been not been about the ship that was never built - but on subjects that really grab us - i.e. - battlecruisers, Jutland. Viva "off the topic"!!!

[Nikademus]

Poor armor protection can be cited in the case of Indefatigable i suppose. By 1916 the Invincible and the virtually identical Indefatigable class battlecruisers were quite outclassed by the latest generation of German BC's which had approached proto-fast battleship status in terms of overall protection. The Brititsh ships of those two classes were the most true "battlecruisers" as far as the original concept went and were in reality, armored cruisers armed with battleship guns. Their 1904-6 armor scheme was designed not to stop heavy shells if encountered but to localize the damage if struck. Again, the British never realized or expected to have such an issue with their ammunition.

The Lion and Tiger were IMO, adequately armored overall and actually withstood quite a good amount of punishment. No question the German BC's were better protected overall though theoretically the larger British guns should have compensated (and would have had their shells worked better) It certainly can be argued that without the issue of unstable and/or volitile cordite it is conceivable that all 3 BC's would have survived the battle. Certainly i believe this to be the case with Queen Mary and Invincible, both of which were struck high up either on their turret gunhouses or barbettes. Indefatiable might have been lost anyway as she was hit lower and progressive flooding might have eventually done her in same as with Warrior and Lutzow. The key difference was the propellent issue. German barbettes and gunhouses were also partially pierced in the battle but no catastrophes occured.

[strawbuk]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Fisher was actually very enthusiastic about the submarine. Its not well known but at the start of WWI, the navy with the largest sub fleet was......Britian [:)]

ah some vague RN balanced sanity returns. Thanks Nik. And perhaps you could continue to explain to the over-excited why all those subs were not used Donitz style ..? (hint - it is to do with geography...)

edit - I read further and Nik did explain - cheers

[Nikademus]

Already did [:D]

edit- and so you saw....lol.....time for COFFEE!

[strawbuk]

ORIGINAL: madmickey

EUBanana
I saw the same stuff from BBC, calling anything from BBC a documentary is very questionable.

ORIGINAL: madmickey

I am a Canadian and I have seen the British blame Arnhem failure on the Americans.

Dude - you need some Anti-Imperialism Counciling - another time, another place happy to discuss failings of Brit GHQ staffs in several areas, also dumb luck and whether Candaian GHQs (or indeed German or French or US ) would have done any better.

But, annoying presenters aside, dissing the BBC News and Docs? ('9 out 10 undemocratic regimes said they wouldn't ban anything else') You the ONE who actually believed Hutton???

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

ORIGINAL: MengCiao

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker



The losses in BCs can't be pinned on Fischer (stupid freak designs like Furious, Courageous and Glorious which wasted resources could be), but on the Admirals commanding and deploying them. As cruisers got bigger and faster, so too did BCs, as the need for speed increased size and cost passed that of BBs. Because of this, many felt them a waste unless used in the battleline. Kaboom!

Excessively reactive "powder bags" for the 12-inch and 13.5-inch ammo seems to have been the immediate cause of the ships that blew up at Jutland. HMS Tiger was hit by more big shells than any RN ship at Jutland except Warspite and she didn't blow up.

If the "powder bags" had been less reactive, then BCs might have gotten less of a bad rep...Renown and Repulse did fine in surface actions and Hood might have blown up due to her own torpedoes being hit.

My understanding of why the British BCs went up, and the Armoured Cruisers for that matter, was a combination of poor armor protection, questionable usage vs heavy units, and unsafe handling room procedures. I have read that the RN advocated both upping the ammunition carried beyond the designed capacity and stowing large quantities of charge bags loosely in the hoists and handling rooms to increase the rate of fire, both which where extremely hazardous and criminally negligent practices.

So sue them for winning both World Wars.

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Poor armor protection can be cited in the case of Indefatigable i suppose. By 1916 the Invincible and the virtually identical Indefatigable class battlecruisers were quite outclassed by the latest generation of German BC's which had approached proto-fast battleship status in terms of overall protection. The Brititsh ships of those two classes were the most true "battlecruisers" as far as the original concept went and were in reality, armored cruisers armed with battleship guns. Their 1904-6 armor scheme was designed not stop heavy shells if encountered but to localize the damage if struck. Again, the British never realized/expected to have such an issue with their ammunition.

The Lion and Tiger were IMO, adequately armored overall and actually withstood quite a good amount of punishment. No question the German BC's were better protected overall though theoretically the larger British guns should have compensated (and would have had their shells worked better) It certainly can be argued that without the issue of unstable and/or volitile cordite it is conceivable that all 3 BC's would have survived the battle. Certainly i believe this to be the case with Queen Mary and Invincible, both of which were struck high up either on their turret gunhouses or barbettes. Indefatiable might have been lost anyway as she was hit lower and progressive flooding might have eventually done her in same as with Warrior and Lutzow. The key difference was the propellent issue. German barbettes and gunhouses were also partially pierced in the battle but no catastrophes occured.

At both Jutland and Dogger Bank, German BCs had massive turret fires that would have blown them up if they had had RN-style propellent charges.

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: steveh11Matrix

My understanding is that there were indeed poor procedures - excessive ready-use shells and bags, safety shortcuts etc - in the BC Fleet, because Beatty stressed ROF. I'm not so sure that this would have also been the case for the AC, I think this was simply a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. I have no idea at all whether this emphasis continued when he became the commander of the Grand Fleet. As for the situation in May 1941, I simply don't know.

This is not 'Beatty Bashing' by the way, I believe he had flaws, but so did Jellicoe.
I feel Hipper and Scheer were both better overall, but even Scheer made a serious and potentially fatal mistake at Jutland when he turned back towards the Grand Fleet.

Still, this is getting somewhat off topic...

Steve.

Speaking of criminal idiocy, taking the AC anywhere in range of battleship guns definitely qualifies.

[madmickey]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Yeah the British learned that lesson well, notice how they used the Hood against the Bismark in WWII.

To be fair, Hood was trying to close the range when she was sunk. Her weakness was recognized and Adm Holland was doing what he could to compensate. He needed a break and didn't get it.

Why lead with the weaker force Hood instead of the Prince of Wales (assuming that it was a true BB with proper deck protection). The British knew where the German were, the German did not know where Hood and PW were, the British had cruisers with torpedo why not an intercept that will give the British an advantage using your cruiser as well in a feint
.

[tsimmonds]

Two BBs vs one may have seemed like a good idea at the time. Everyone reading this has far too much information available to fairly say what he himself might have done in the same situation.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: madmickey

Why lead with the weaker force Hood instead of the Prince of Wales (assuming that it was a true BB with proper deck protection). The British knew where the German were, the German did not know where Hood and PW were, the British had cruisers with torpedo why not an intercept that will give the British an advantage using your cruiser as well in a feint
.

Two theories have come about to explain it. First and formost, the Prince of Wales was a brand new ship, not fully worked up either in crew or in operability. The 2nd was tradition. It would have looked bad for Holland to "lead" from the rear. Add to that PoW's condition in #1 and it's understandable why Holland would have "led" from the front. Hood was no slouch as a unit either though her weakness to plunging fire was well known.

[MengCiao]

ORIGINAL: steveh11Matrix

My understanding is that there were indeed poor procedures - excessive ready-use shells and bags, safety shortcuts etc - in the BC Fleet, because Beatty stressed ROF. I'm not so sure that this would have also been the case for the AC, I think this was simply a case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. I have no idea at all whether this emphasis continued when he became the commander of the Grand Fleet. As for the situation in May 1941, I simply don't know.

This is not 'Beatty Bashing' by the way, I believe he had flaws, but so did Jellicoe.
I feel Hipper and Scheer were both better overall, but even Scheer made a serious and potentially fatal mistake at Jutland when he turned back towards the Grand Fleet.

Still, this is getting somewhat off topic...

Steve.

While we are off topic, I wonder why the German commanders are invaribly considered "better". Apparently they get points for surviving at all and the Brits lose points for not utterly annihilating them.

It's worth pointing out that the Germans were a country of adults, not insane children, and they could have chosen not to make the Brits angry in both world wars. In which case I guess all their commanders would be "worse" for not losing major wars.

[madmickey]

If Prince of Wales was questionable why use it, its durability was not effected by it newness. How about using Prince of Wales as flagship in first place and it still does not explain the lack of co-ordination with the cruiser or why Holland did not try and cross the Bismarck T.

[Nikademus]

Necessities of war. There were no other ships available to back up Hood and going up against a brand new BB on a 1:1 situation is not stacking the deck in your favor. PoW's unready state was highlighted by the fact that she set sail with dockyard workers still aboard!

Holland could not cross the T because he was not in position to do so when he arrived within visual range. At that point, his biggest concern was to get within the range preffered by current doctrine as well as minimizing Hood's thin deck armor to exposure.

The failure to coordinate or utilize the shaowing CA's was a flub IIRC but i'd need to brush up on the battle to offer further commentary. [;)]