Regarding B29's:
If they can bomb industrial areas why can't they bomb port areas? Let's fix the problem instead of hobbling B29's.
The better answer is to make a more dramatic difference in hits scored by level bombers depending on their altitude. That would address both the port & airfield side of the problem, and the ships-in-port side of the problem. It would also preserve player choice in tactics by not specifically limiting the B29. And, it would address the same issues with B17's, B24's , etc. when they are used to bomb ports & airfields.
1) Look at how many hits are gotten by LB's at 6,000 ft.
2) Adjust the hits at 6,000 ft. to be realistic. I'm sure everybody will agree on what realistic is. [:D]
3) Change the altitude modifier making a greater reduction per higher altitude than there is today. I'm sure everybody will agree on the amount of reduction too. [:D][:D]
If city type attacks are already well balanced you might have to make adjustments to keep them well balanced (if this scheme would affect them - maybe they use different code?).
The same goes for TF attacks, both docked and at sea - are they already well balanced or do they need adjusting?
Reagarding torpedo attacks on ships in port:
Limit torpedo loadouts for port attacks to single engine TB's only. Also, increase the effect of flak on Torpedo loaded TB's making port attacks. That will make it less likely they obtain a hit and make the proposition more risky for the attacking planes (barrage balloons, etc. as mentioned by Ron).
Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
The problem is with the numbers game. If you send 12 bombers over the target, they have a fairly good chance of getting a good hit. If you send 2000, the first couple have a good chance, the rest can't even see the target anymore.
Really no way to deal with this except force controls to cap raid sizes. Not likely to happen this late in the dev phase.
Really no way to deal with this except force controls to cap raid sizes. Not likely to happen this late in the dev phase.
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Hey Apollo.. care to rerun test with same leaders but with 55-60 experience groups to see if experience matters or if its just a numbers game ?
Thanks,
Xargun
Thanks,
Xargun
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Hi all,
I will do it on Sunday if I manage to find enough time...
Leo "Apollo11"
ORIGINAL: Xargun
Hey Apollo.. care to rerun test with same leaders but with 55-60 experience groups to see if experience matters or if its just a numbers game ?
Thanks,
Xargun
I will do it on Sunday if I manage to find enough time...
Leo "Apollo11"
Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!
A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
I will do it on Sunday if I manage to find enough time...
Leo "Apollo11"
If you don't send me the files and I'll run some tests..
Xargun
sireric_69@yahoo.com
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
I'm not sure of when it occurred but I believe the Luftwaffe pulled off a very devastating raid on the shipping in Naples harbor in late 1943. Sorry no statistics but I do seem to recall some kind of incident like this. Also I'm pretty sure it was high level bombing at night.
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#dotjf
under the section THE AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS, there is some useful information on bombing accuracy
might be helpful at this stage of the discussion
cheers
Paul
under the section THE AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS, there is some useful information on bombing accuracy
might be helpful at this stage of the discussion
cheers
Paul
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Thanks Jojm, very interesting indeed. I've bolded some portions:
THE AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS
Basic United States strategy contemplated that the final decision in the Japanese war would be obtained by an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The long-range bombing offensive from the Marianas was initiated in November 1944, with that in mind as the primary objective. As in Europe prior to D-day, the principal measure of success set for strategic air action was the extent
to which it would weaken enemy capability and will to resist our amphibious forces at the time of landings. This led, originally, to somewhat greater emphasis on the selection of targets such as aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, and finished military goods, destruction of which could be expected to weaken the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces to resist at the Kyushu beachheads in November 1945, than on the disruption of the more basic elements of Japan's social, economic, and political fabric. Certain of the United States commanders and the representatives of the Survey who were called back from their investigations in Germany in early June 1945 for consultation stated their belief that, by the coordinated impact of blockade and direct air attack, Japan could be forced to surrender without invasion. The controlling opinion, however, was that any estimate of the effects of bombing on the Japanese social fabric and on the political decisions of those in control of Japan was bound to be so uncertain that target selection could safely be made only on the assumption that ground force invasion would be necessary to force capitulation.
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the twin objectives of surrender without invasion and reduction of Japan's capacity and will to resist an invasion, should the first not succeed, called for basically the same type of attack. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion, was the basic economic and social fabric of the country. Disruption of her railroad and transportation system by daylight attacks, coupled with destruction of her cities by night and bad weather attacks, would have applied maximum pressure in support of either aim. This point of view was finally adopted. Although urban area attacks were initiated in force in March 1945, the railroad attack was just getting under way when the war ended.
The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was 656,400. Of this, 160,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home islands of Japan. Navy aircraft accounted for 6,800 tons, Army aircraft other than B-29s for 7,000 tons, and the B-29s for 147,000 tons. By contrast, the total bomb tonnage in the European theater was 2,700,000 tons of which 1,360,000 tons were dropped within Germany's own borders.
Approximately 800 tons of bombs were dropped by China-based B-29s on Japanese home island targets from June 1944 to January 1945. These raids were of insufficient weight and accuracy to produce significant results.
By the end of November 1944, 4 months after seizure of the islands, the first of the long-range bomber bases in the Marianas became operational. The number of planes originally available was small and opposition was significant. Losses on combat missions averaged 3.6 percent. The tonnage dropped prior to 9 March 1945 aggregated only 7,180 tons although increasing month by month. The planes bombed from approximately 30,000 feet and the percentage of bombs dropped which hit the target areas averaged less than 10 percent. Nevertheless, the effects of even the relatively small tonnage hitting the selected targets were substantial. During this period, attacks were directed almost exclusively against aircraft, primarily aircraft engine, targets. The principal aircraft engine plants were hit sufficiently heavily and persistently to convince the Japanese that these plants would inevitably be totally destroyed. The Japanese were thereby forced into a wholesale and hasty dispersal program. The continuing pressure of immediate military requirements for more and more planes during the campaigns in the Pacific had prevented any earlier moves to disperse. When dispersal could no longer be avoided, the necessary underground tunnels, dispersed buildings, and accessory facilities such as roads, railroad spurs and power connections were not ready. As a result the decline in aircraft engine production, which shortages in special steels requiring cobalt, nickel and chrome had initiated in mid-1944, became precipitous.
On 9 March 1945, a basic revision in the method of B-29 attack was instituted. It was decided to bomb the four principal Japanese cities at night from altitudes averaging 7,000 feet. Japanese weakness in night fighters and antiaircraft made this program feasible. Incendiaries were used instead of high-explosive bombs and the lower altitude permitted a substantial increase in bomb load per plane. One thousand six hundred and sixty-seven tons of bombs were dropped on Tokyo in the first attack. The chosen areas were saturated. Fifteen square miles of Tokyo's most densely populated
area were burned to the ground. The weight and intensity of this attack caught the Japanese by surprise. No subsequent urban area attack was equally destructive. Two days later, an attack of similar magnitude on Nagoya destroyed 2 square miles. In a period of 10 days starting 9 March, a total of 1,595 sorties delivered 9,373 tons of bombs against Tokyo, Nagoya, Osake, and Kobe destroying 31 square miles of those cities at a cost of 22 airplanes. The generally destructive effect of incendiary attacks against Japanese cities had been demonstrated.
Thereafter, urban area attacks alternated with visual and radar attacks against selected industrial or military targets. In April, an extensive program of sowing minefields in channels and harbors at night was added. In the aggregate, 104,000 tons of bombs were directed at 66 urban areas; 14,150 tons were directed at aircraft factories; 10,600 tons at oil refineries; 4,708 at arsenals; 3,500 tons at miscellaneous industrial targets; 8,115 tons at air fields and sea-plane bases in support of the Okinawa operation; and 12,034 mines were sown.
Bombing altitudes after 9 March 1945 were lower, in both day and night attacks. Japanese opposition was not effective even at the lower altitudes, and the percentage of losses to enemy action declined as the number of attacking planes increased. Bomb loads increased and operating losses declined in part due to less strain on engines at lower altitudes. Bombing accuracy increased substantially, and averaged 35 to 40 percent within 1,000 feet of the aiming point in daylight attacks from 20,000 feet or lower.
Monthly tonnage dropped increased from 13,800 tons in March to 42,700 tons in July, and, with the activation of the Eighth Air Force on Okinawa, would have continued to increase thereafter to a planned figure of 115,000 tons per month, had the war not come to an end.
Three-quarters of the 6,740 tons of bombs dropped by carrier planes on the Japanese home islands were directed against airfields, warships, and miscellaneous military targets, and one-quarter against merchant shipping and other economic targets. Most of the warships sunk in home ports had already been immobilized for lack of fuel. The accuracy of low-level carrier plane attack was high, being at least 50 percent hits within 250 feet of the aiming point. The attack against the Hakodate-Aomori rail ferries in July 1945 sank or damaged all twelve of the ferries, 17 steel ships, and 149 smaller ships.
THE AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS
Basic United States strategy contemplated that the final decision in the Japanese war would be obtained by an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The long-range bombing offensive from the Marianas was initiated in November 1944, with that in mind as the primary objective. As in Europe prior to D-day, the principal measure of success set for strategic air action was the extent
to which it would weaken enemy capability and will to resist our amphibious forces at the time of landings. This led, originally, to somewhat greater emphasis on the selection of targets such as aircraft factories, arsenals, electronics plants, oil refineries, and finished military goods, destruction of which could be expected to weaken the capabilities of the Japanese armed forces to resist at the Kyushu beachheads in November 1945, than on the disruption of the more basic elements of Japan's social, economic, and political fabric. Certain of the United States commanders and the representatives of the Survey who were called back from their investigations in Germany in early June 1945 for consultation stated their belief that, by the coordinated impact of blockade and direct air attack, Japan could be forced to surrender without invasion. The controlling opinion, however, was that any estimate of the effects of bombing on the Japanese social fabric and on the political decisions of those in control of Japan was bound to be so uncertain that target selection could safely be made only on the assumption that ground force invasion would be necessary to force capitulation.
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the twin objectives of surrender without invasion and reduction of Japan's capacity and will to resist an invasion, should the first not succeed, called for basically the same type of attack. Japan had been critically wounded by military defeats, destruction of the bulk of her merchant fleet, and almost complete blockade. The proper target, after an initial attack on aircraft engine plants, either to bring overwhelming pressure on her to surrender, or to reduce her capability of resisting invasion, was the basic economic and social fabric of the country. Disruption of her railroad and transportation system by daylight attacks, coupled with destruction of her cities by night and bad weather attacks, would have applied maximum pressure in support of either aim. This point of view was finally adopted. Although urban area attacks were initiated in force in March 1945, the railroad attack was just getting under way when the war ended.
The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was 656,400. Of this, 160,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home islands of Japan. Navy aircraft accounted for 6,800 tons, Army aircraft other than B-29s for 7,000 tons, and the B-29s for 147,000 tons. By contrast, the total bomb tonnage in the European theater was 2,700,000 tons of which 1,360,000 tons were dropped within Germany's own borders.
Approximately 800 tons of bombs were dropped by China-based B-29s on Japanese home island targets from June 1944 to January 1945. These raids were of insufficient weight and accuracy to produce significant results.
By the end of November 1944, 4 months after seizure of the islands, the first of the long-range bomber bases in the Marianas became operational. The number of planes originally available was small and opposition was significant. Losses on combat missions averaged 3.6 percent. The tonnage dropped prior to 9 March 1945 aggregated only 7,180 tons although increasing month by month. The planes bombed from approximately 30,000 feet and the percentage of bombs dropped which hit the target areas averaged less than 10 percent. Nevertheless, the effects of even the relatively small tonnage hitting the selected targets were substantial. During this period, attacks were directed almost exclusively against aircraft, primarily aircraft engine, targets. The principal aircraft engine plants were hit sufficiently heavily and persistently to convince the Japanese that these plants would inevitably be totally destroyed. The Japanese were thereby forced into a wholesale and hasty dispersal program. The continuing pressure of immediate military requirements for more and more planes during the campaigns in the Pacific had prevented any earlier moves to disperse. When dispersal could no longer be avoided, the necessary underground tunnels, dispersed buildings, and accessory facilities such as roads, railroad spurs and power connections were not ready. As a result the decline in aircraft engine production, which shortages in special steels requiring cobalt, nickel and chrome had initiated in mid-1944, became precipitous.
On 9 March 1945, a basic revision in the method of B-29 attack was instituted. It was decided to bomb the four principal Japanese cities at night from altitudes averaging 7,000 feet. Japanese weakness in night fighters and antiaircraft made this program feasible. Incendiaries were used instead of high-explosive bombs and the lower altitude permitted a substantial increase in bomb load per plane. One thousand six hundred and sixty-seven tons of bombs were dropped on Tokyo in the first attack. The chosen areas were saturated. Fifteen square miles of Tokyo's most densely populated
area were burned to the ground. The weight and intensity of this attack caught the Japanese by surprise. No subsequent urban area attack was equally destructive. Two days later, an attack of similar magnitude on Nagoya destroyed 2 square miles. In a period of 10 days starting 9 March, a total of 1,595 sorties delivered 9,373 tons of bombs against Tokyo, Nagoya, Osake, and Kobe destroying 31 square miles of those cities at a cost of 22 airplanes. The generally destructive effect of incendiary attacks against Japanese cities had been demonstrated.
Thereafter, urban area attacks alternated with visual and radar attacks against selected industrial or military targets. In April, an extensive program of sowing minefields in channels and harbors at night was added. In the aggregate, 104,000 tons of bombs were directed at 66 urban areas; 14,150 tons were directed at aircraft factories; 10,600 tons at oil refineries; 4,708 at arsenals; 3,500 tons at miscellaneous industrial targets; 8,115 tons at air fields and sea-plane bases in support of the Okinawa operation; and 12,034 mines were sown.
Bombing altitudes after 9 March 1945 were lower, in both day and night attacks. Japanese opposition was not effective even at the lower altitudes, and the percentage of losses to enemy action declined as the number of attacking planes increased. Bomb loads increased and operating losses declined in part due to less strain on engines at lower altitudes. Bombing accuracy increased substantially, and averaged 35 to 40 percent within 1,000 feet of the aiming point in daylight attacks from 20,000 feet or lower.
Monthly tonnage dropped increased from 13,800 tons in March to 42,700 tons in July, and, with the activation of the Eighth Air Force on Okinawa, would have continued to increase thereafter to a planned figure of 115,000 tons per month, had the war not come to an end.
Three-quarters of the 6,740 tons of bombs dropped by carrier planes on the Japanese home islands were directed against airfields, warships, and miscellaneous military targets, and one-quarter against merchant shipping and other economic targets. Most of the warships sunk in home ports had already been immobilized for lack of fuel. The accuracy of low-level carrier plane attack was high, being at least 50 percent hits within 250 feet of the aiming point. The attack against the Hakodate-Aomori rail ferries in July 1945 sank or damaged all twelve of the ferries, 17 steel ships, and 149 smaller ships.
Intel Monkey: https://sites.google.com/view/staffmonkeys/home
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
I'm not sure of when it occurred but I believe the Luftwaffe pulled off a very devastating raid on the shipping in Naples harbor in late 1943. Sorry no statistics but I do seem to recall some kind of incident like this. Also I'm pretty sure it was high level bombing at night.
Almost everything under the sun has happened once. But if it was effective, why didn't it happen all the time? There had to be some factor that prevented this from being repeated night after night, like it would be in WitP....
Fear the kitten!
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Cap Mandrake
- Posts: 20737
- Joined: Fri Nov 15, 2002 8:37 am
- Location: Southern California
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
If you ask me.....and nobody did....B-29's were not used in this role because the Japanese had enough sense to avoid large concentrations of ships at the stage in the war when the US could mass 90 bomber B-29 raids. Not to mention the fact that the B-29's were extremely valuable ($). Quite possibly, one B-29 was worth more than the 40 year old rusitng,(insert name) Maru. The B-29 buildout and development actually cost more than the Manhattan project [:)]
A 90 bomber B-29 raid attacking a relatively small target would spread out for many miles. The attack would last forever...4 bombers..pause 4 bombers..pause etc etc etc. If there were a capable AA defence, they would pour it in on the tail of the column if they came in on the same heading at the same airspeed and same altititude...especially at 10,000 ft.
I'm not sure B-29's ever attacked at 10,000 ft. in daylight???
I'm guessing a B-29 on a short range low altitude mission of this type might carry 200 bombs (mix of 250 and 500 HE's) x 90 bombers= 18000 bombs
using the first example that is 55/18,000 = 0.3% [X(]...and I assume that includes near misses
A 90 bomber B-29 raid attacking a relatively small target would spread out for many miles. The attack would last forever...4 bombers..pause 4 bombers..pause etc etc etc. If there were a capable AA defence, they would pour it in on the tail of the column if they came in on the same heading at the same airspeed and same altititude...especially at 10,000 ft.
I'm not sure B-29's ever attacked at 10,000 ft. in daylight???
I'm guessing a B-29 on a short range low altitude mission of this type might carry 200 bombs (mix of 250 and 500 HE's) x 90 bombers= 18000 bombs
using the first example that is 55/18,000 = 0.3% [X(]...and I assume that includes near misses
-
Wilhammer
- Posts: 401
- Joined: Fri May 24, 2002 4:00 pm
- Location: Out in the Sticks of Rockingham County, North Caro
- Contact:
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Missing from the game is any restrictions based on doctrine and politics.
The B-29 was not used tactically as an anti-shipping weapon for two reasons:
1. It was the Navy's job, and the Navy was opposed to anti Shipping mission of the USAAF.
2. Stategic Bombing (this would include mining of ports) was the reason for the Heavy Bomber Cult. They would not divert precious B-29s to anti-Shipping strike.
In the game, we can use the equipment for whatever we wish.
-----------------
A similar effect occurs for Japan. The IJA and IJN were not in agreement much of the time, but the player is not bothered by this.
The IJA has lots of armor units, and I have decided the best use is to pull them all together and mass them in China and Burma/India. The shock/pursue dynamic would make Rommel proud in this game.
My Japanese Army practices a blitzkrieg style of warfare - massed armor and dive bombers with my best infantry divisions and concentrated artillery.
This method was not practiced by the real IJA.
The B-29 was not used tactically as an anti-shipping weapon for two reasons:
1. It was the Navy's job, and the Navy was opposed to anti Shipping mission of the USAAF.
2. Stategic Bombing (this would include mining of ports) was the reason for the Heavy Bomber Cult. They would not divert precious B-29s to anti-Shipping strike.
In the game, we can use the equipment for whatever we wish.
-----------------
A similar effect occurs for Japan. The IJA and IJN were not in agreement much of the time, but the player is not bothered by this.
The IJA has lots of armor units, and I have decided the best use is to pull them all together and mass them in China and Burma/India. The shock/pursue dynamic would make Rommel proud in this game.
My Japanese Army practices a blitzkrieg style of warfare - massed armor and dive bombers with my best infantry divisions and concentrated artillery.
This method was not practiced by the real IJA.
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Regarding B29's:
Agree!
Agree!
Solution:
Limit the alt to 15,000-20,000ft. min for B-29's reguardless of mission.
If they can bomb industrial areas why can't they bomb port areas? Let's fix the problem instead of hobbling B29's.
Agree!
I'm not sure B-29's ever attacked at 10,000 ft. in daylight
Agree!
Solution:
Limit the alt to 15,000-20,000ft. min for B-29's reguardless of mission.
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Ron Saueracker
- Posts: 10967
- Joined: Mon Jan 28, 2002 10:00 am
- Location: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
ORIGINAL: spence
I'm not sure of when it occurred but I believe the Luftwaffe pulled off a very devastating raid on the shipping in Naples harbor in late 1943. Sorry no statistics but I do seem to recall some kind of incident like this. Also I'm pretty sure it was high level bombing at night.
That was Bari and was accomplished by JU88s. And, surprise surprise, no torps were used to guarantee all planes had a target.
Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
ORIGINAL: pad152
Regarding B29's:If they can bomb industrial areas why can't they bomb port areas? Let's fix the problem instead of hobbling B29's.
Agree!
I'm not sure B-29's ever attacked at 10,000 ft. in daylight
Agree!
Solution:
Limit the alt to 15,000-20,000ft. min for B-29's reguardless of mission.
The B-29s were used to firebomb at night at 7000 feet
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake
The B-29 buildout and development actually cost more than the Manhattan project [:)]
Holy Cow!
Intel Monkey: https://sites.google.com/view/staffmonkeys/home
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
The port raid I was thinking of was the Luftwaffe's raid on Bari in December 43.
A low level raid by 105 Ju-88s at dusk resulted in the sinking of 17 merchant ships and the damaging of 8 more. The ships were very tightly packed in a relatively small harbor with every slip occupied. The Germans achieved total surprise coming in below the Allied radar horizon and finding the harbor brightly lit (in order to speed unloading operations). Apparently the explosion of one ship laden with ammunition severely damaged a number of nearby ships as well. Also the sinking of one American Liberty Ship resulted in the release of 100 tons of mustard gas.
A low level raid by 105 Ju-88s at dusk resulted in the sinking of 17 merchant ships and the damaging of 8 more. The ships were very tightly packed in a relatively small harbor with every slip occupied. The Germans achieved total surprise coming in below the Allied radar horizon and finding the harbor brightly lit (in order to speed unloading operations). Apparently the explosion of one ship laden with ammunition severely damaged a number of nearby ships as well. Also the sinking of one American Liberty Ship resulted in the release of 100 tons of mustard gas.
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
ORIGINAL: Jorm
The B-29s were used to firebomb at night at 7000 feet
Yep, it's in that link Jorm provided.
Intel Monkey: https://sites.google.com/view/staffmonkeys/home
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
ORIGINAL: Jorm
ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker
Not related to this thread but here goes. During development, it was decided to allow twin engine bombers and larger aircraft to torpedo ships in port (disbanded). I asked for this decision to be reversed because I know of not one single occurence of this happening during the war in any theatre (not talking roadsteads here,but ports). Nobody else could point one out after I challenged them to point out a single historical precedent.
3rd December 1940, 2x SM79's torpedoed HMS Glasgow while at anchor in Suda bay, ie in port
September 1940 6x beauforts of 22 Sqn made night torp attacks against shipping in Cherbourg harbour
FO K. Cambell of 22 Sqn (Beauforts) won a VC (Postumous) for putting a torp into Gneisenau while Docked
Excellent! I found out about the Gneisenau after my first comments on this
about six months ago, but that was it. Were the Glasgow and merchants in other examples actually IN the tight confines of the harbor as opposed to middle of a bay, exposed onthe outside of a nest etc.?
That was pretty quick but Idoubt if many other examples areout there. In WITP, you can get this result during a 12 hour phase. Seems too common an occurance to me by a wide margin.
Thanks for the replay. What areyour thoughts on this Jorm?
HI Ron
ill have to wait till tomorrow to get a book from work that covers RAF torpedo bomber squadron operations.
However, i have read it and from memory it points out that chance of surviving as a beaufort torp bomber pilot was somenthing lik 13 or 17 % for a tour or duty and 3 % for a 2nd tour of duty.
I know the Wellington torp bombers and Torbeaus from Malta had ample oprtunity to attack itialian shipping in harbnour, but didnt, they always waited until the ships were in convoy on their way to Nth Africa. there must have been a reason forthis wait given the high priority givento cutting Nth aftican convoys by the RAF.
So , while i cant say for sure, from what ive read the strikes on ships in port by multi engine torp bombers at least from the RAF and Regina aeronautica <sp?> were very limted.
I doubt it will ever happen but my thoughts would be to allow torp strtikes on a 'reconed' port but with very heavy moral/fatigue penalties and perhaps increase the effectiveness of AA units in in a port hex <shrug>
it all gets pretty complex to have a program that is sophisticated enough to model 'every' possible aircraft operation.
cheers
Paul
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Jim D Burns
- Posts: 3991
- Joined: Mon Feb 25, 2002 6:00 pm
- Location: Salida, CA.
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
Personally I think the problem with the model isn’t the chance to hit a ship, rather it’s the fact every single plane in the raid has its own chance to hit a ship. The reason heavy bombers weren’t used for surgical bombing is because they bombed as a formation. So if the lead ship hit the target, the rest were going to miss because they released their bombs together as a group and only the lead ship was aiming.
If a port is full of ships then perhaps a few more ships might get hit if they were anchored close to the target ship, but the cost (dollars spent on bombs fuel etc.) of the raid was far too high to justify the use of heavies in a surgical strike role during WWII. The game should probably force heavies to bomb as groups of 6 planes, and if a ship gets hit once by a group that’s it, the rest of the bombs are considered to miss. This would be far more realistic I think and you wouldn’t have to nerf the heavies or prevent the port attacks all together. I also think the supply cost for heavy bombing raids needs to be tripled or more, these were very expensive operations and simply bombing merchants in ports was deemed non-cost effective.
Jim
If a port is full of ships then perhaps a few more ships might get hit if they were anchored close to the target ship, but the cost (dollars spent on bombs fuel etc.) of the raid was far too high to justify the use of heavies in a surgical strike role during WWII. The game should probably force heavies to bomb as groups of 6 planes, and if a ship gets hit once by a group that’s it, the rest of the bombs are considered to miss. This would be far more realistic I think and you wouldn’t have to nerf the heavies or prevent the port attacks all together. I also think the supply cost for heavy bombing raids needs to be tripled or more, these were very expensive operations and simply bombing merchants in ports was deemed non-cost effective.
Jim
RE: Comprehensive Port bombing testing (98 B-29's vs. 50 ships in day and night)...
I saw on a show about the Aleutians compaign recently that the B24's bombed singly, and at low level to get under the cloud cover. They went in one after another. They showed interviews with pilots on this.
I agree that there's a way things were usually done, but there were plenty of exceptions, some that apparently happened frequently enough for us to be concerned about.
I think we have enough info to agree:
1) "No torps for multi-engine bombers on port raids" is the right way to go.
2) Single engine TB's with torpedos on port attacks have to be put at extra risk somehow:
---a) increased AA effect?
---b) increased ops losses?
---c) increased chance of abort without launching weapon?
---d) other suggestions?
As far as heavies go, formations, altitude, night bombing, targets all should remain flexible for the player. The key is to get the bombing accuracy to be correct for the mix of target/altitude/day-night, and perhaps the risk of ops losses in addition to more AA exposure when considering very low altutude.
IMO.
I agree that there's a way things were usually done, but there were plenty of exceptions, some that apparently happened frequently enough for us to be concerned about.
I think we have enough info to agree:
1) "No torps for multi-engine bombers on port raids" is the right way to go.
2) Single engine TB's with torpedos on port attacks have to be put at extra risk somehow:
---a) increased AA effect?
---b) increased ops losses?
---c) increased chance of abort without launching weapon?
---d) other suggestions?
As far as heavies go, formations, altitude, night bombing, targets all should remain flexible for the player. The key is to get the bombing accuracy to be correct for the mix of target/altitude/day-night, and perhaps the risk of ops losses in addition to more AA exposure when considering very low altutude.
IMO.
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