Combined Historical Scenario - Land Units

[PeteG662]

Roger.

I am tracking down information on engineer units. Either Engineer battalions have too many or engineer regiments have too few engineer squads. Something is screwy in the WitP database here.

[2ndACR]

I have been trying to figure out the scale they are using for squads. For infantry, it looks like Matrix is using 12 men per squad.

But for engineers, it looks like it is either more men per squad or they are short changing them. Hard to tell. The internal engineer Batt of Japanese Divisions had 900 men in it. In 3 companies.

[PeteG662]

The standard size of squads IRL WWII was different for each nation. 12 would be about average to smoothe things across the board for comparison purposes. The things I saw last night in the database were real screwy with like a 10 squad difference between a battalion and a regiment so I know something is wrong there and will find it soon enough.

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen

Excellent work indeed. I am a little concerned with the number of available HQ and Leaders. A quick check of Scenario 15 Leaders shows only 9 empty slots. Also 5 empty Allied HQ slots. We can probably garner a few more by duplication checks, but we just don't have enough space for wholesale additions.

Thanks Don (and also Elf). The limit on HQ slots will be a major constraint. We should probably run the same drill that you are doing on aircraft -- tally up the requests for new HQs, and prioritize them against existing HQ and other requests.

Is there really a problem with leader slots? Can't we overwrite one of the innumerable COLs or LTCs if we have new leaders to add?

Alternatively, can a unit be added without a leader assigned? Or can we create one 'generic' division leader* and assign him to all 16 of the '45 ETO divisions, just to get them in the game? Although historical accuracy would suffer, I think few players would be concerned if MG Harry Twaddle was not commanding the 95th Infantry Division when it arrived in S.F. in September, 1945.

* = MG Joe Dirt

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Morale might conceivablybe lower for these units having been pulled from Europe to Pacific.

Ron,
Good point. I deliberately lowered the morale for the most veteran units (I figured the guys who had fought from Normandy to the Elbe would be more put out about being sent to the Pacific than the guys whose only duty was rounding up prisoners during the last 8 days of the war -- yes, 20th Armor Division, I'm talking about you!). Take a look at the numbers, tho -- if you think they should be adjusted further, I'm willing to be convinced.

Only after I posted the ETO-Pacific OOB did I notice that there was a separate thread for LCU OOBs (You might think an ex-cavalry scout would be good with directions . . . apparently not [X(]) I'm copying my OOB and Explanatory Notes posts onto the other thread, to make life easier for Don et. al. when they try to pull everything together.

[Philbass]

(1)I don't have any artwork myself for the LSH (L) (apart from the photo of BULOLO in my copy of Lenton), but here is a link to a site that has two photos and a painting of LARGS:
Link to LARGS photos (see bottom of that web page)

Anyway, to keep this on the Land Units TOE thread, the Gurkha parachute battalion was dropped on the coastal defences of Elephant Point (on the mouth of the estuary that leads to Rangoon) as part of Op DRACULA. The battalion itself was a composite one formed from the remains of the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade (that was gutted at Sangshak/Sheldon's Corner during the Japanese advance on Kohima in 1944), reinforced by drafts when 44th Indian Airborne Division's formation was halted at the end of 1944. I'm not sure on the strength of the composite battalion, but according to the source I have at hand,

...700 Gurkhas followed half an hour later, delivered from 38 Air Commando Dakotas, escorted by P-51s. Unfortunately the paratroopers suffered casualties later on from bombs dropped by one of the Liberators carrying out a preliminary attack on the Japanese positions; nothing daunted they went on to annihilate the garrison
Probert, Air Commodore Henry (1995)The Forgotten Air Force: The Royal Air Force in the War against Japan 1941-45 (London: Brassey's)p272

Therefore there is some justification for a British parachute capacity in the Far East of at least a battalion (Gurkha composite), or a brigade (assuming that 50th Indian Parachute Brigade isn't destroyed).Of course there is still the entire problem of how to show 44th Indian Airborne Division (when the HQ itself was formed from the 44th Indian Armoured Division, and then migrated into the 44th Indian Infantry Division by way of the 9th Indian Airborne Division - I think). Happy to work up ideas and research a TOE if requested.

Anyway, if you think the idea of a British parachute capacity is worth pursuing I can check out the Indian Army Official Histories and Gurkha regimental histories when I'm in work (we have all the Brit, American, Indian, Australian and NZ offical histories in the library).

(2) Also, I think that 3 Commando is a must for the British in 1945. It took part in fierce battles (launched with the aim of cutting off the retreat of Japanese 28th Army - so it had a role applicable in a strategic wargame) as a complete brigade. Its TOE would be very light with 3" (maybe 4.2" as well) mortars and Vickers machine guns as the heaviest kit. Again, I can research a TOE if requested.

(3) Can we show the change in TOE for the Australian Divisions in SWPA? After February 1943 (not clear on exact date yet) 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th Divisions are reorganised to Jungle division organisation. This was done to reflect the realities of war in New Guinea and the Upper Solomons and reduce the logistical burden by eliminating non-essential units from the division and concentrating them instead in a central 'pool' for allocation as needed. The main changes versus the standard British infantry division TOE (which the Australian Imperial Forces and Citizen Military Forces were initially based on) were:

• removing 2 of the field artillery regiments
• removing the divisional cavalry regiment (reconnaissance battalion)
• removing between 1/3 and 1/2 of the support troops (supply and transport, ordnance, repair, signals and mobile bath unit)

Within the infantry battalions, extraneous troops and vehicles were removed as well.
Source: Palazzo, Albert (2004),'Organising for Jungle Warfare', in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, eds., The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War. The 2003 Chief of Army's Military History Conference(Canberra, Australia: Army History Unit)

If we can do it for the Australians, then we could do it for the British in India and Burma and show the reconversion of the Indian Army for mobile warfare in central Burma in early 1945. (Op EXTENDED CAPITAL - with Andrew Brown's map, at least I can drive on Mektila)

(4) Is there any way of altering the rate of replacement squads over time? Do we have room in the devices database to play with this? By 1945, there are pretty much no British (as opposed to Indian or African) reinforcements in India, and the decision was taken to reduce the length of 'tour' for those British already out there. This has a serious impact on British planning for 1945 and 1946, and led to the disbandment of some units, and the 'Indianisation' of other brigades and divisions (details in British Official History 'War in the Far East' Volume VI - I think. No copy to hand at home).

So erhhh, I guess I'd like to sign up to help on this.

Phil Bass

[Lemurs!]

2ndACR,
I think the total squads for an engineer battalion(seperate) in the Japanese OOB is accurate.
In other words remember that 12 squads in a battalion are infantry and 27 squads or so are support.

Mike

[PeteG662]

There seems to be plenty of room in the devices database from what I saw. There are even a few devices we could eliminate if necessary as duplicate (see devices thread)

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: Philbass

(3) Can we show the change in TOE for the Australian Divisions in SWPA? After February 1943 (not clear on exact date yet) 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th Divisions are reorganised to Jungle division organisation. [Snip]

(4) Is there any way of altering the rate of replacement squads over time? [Snip]
So erhhh, I guess I'd like to sign up to help on this.

Phil,

I don't think the database is geared up to accept wholesale reorganizations of units -- you can upgrade "devices" (vehicles / weapons) but I'm not aware of a way to eliminate entire battalions and add new sub-units of a different type. Same thing with changing replacement rates. Anyone else know a way to accomplish Phil's goals?

If you do have access to AUS/US/UK official records, could I ask your help in one area? There was supposed to be a "Commonwealth Corps" formed to participate in the notional March, 1946 Allied invasion of the Tokyo Plain (Operation Coronet). According to my (single) source, it would consist of the 3rd British Division, the 6th Canadian, and the 10th Australian (to be formed from returning European veterans from other divisions). Any information you can find on the organization and equipment of the divisions, the leaders, and when they would be available for combat operations, would be appreciated.

Thanks!

[Andrew Brown]

If you do have access to AUS/US/UK official records, could I ask your help in one area? There was supposed to be a "Commonwealth Corps" formed to participate in the notional March, 1946 Allied invasion of the Tokyo Plain (Operation Coronet). According to my (single) source, it would consist of the 3rd British Division, the 6th Canadian, and the 10th Australian (to be formed from returning European veterans from other divisions). Any information you can find on the organization and equipment of the divisions, the leaders, and when they would be available for combat operations, would be appreciated.

Thanks!

Hi Blackhorse,

I don't have access to the official Aussie histories right now, perhaps I can organise a trip to the library sometime in the near future.

In the meantime, a bit of googling found this little snippet of info about the Australian 10th:

The mythical 10th Australian division for the invasion of Japan seems to pop up reasonably frequently with these discussions. Many years ago I searched to find out where this came from. I could find only 1 source. Unfortunately I can't remember the author. I do however remember that they did not list where the notion came from. So I would be more than willing to find out the sources of this information.

The planned Australian contingent for any operations in Japan - according to the 7th volume of the Australian army OH, was the 9th division. At the time of the final operations the 6th and 7th divisions were being wound up as the AIF volunteers were being given the option of going home if they had chalked up 5 years service. These divisions each lost about a third of their manpower however many more volunteered to fight on. Thus the 9th division would have been assigned to the operation, along with a plethora of corps assets - a tank brigade, commando regiment, AA, AT, Pioneer, beach force, engineers and medium artillery that went to rounding out pretty much any of the Western Allied armies of 1945.

The 10th division did exist. It was a militia division raised in early 42 to oversee the troops deployed in the Newcastle region. From about August 42 the brigades under its command were slowly redeployed elsewhere and the garrison battalions were slowly decreased in standing manpower, thus the division was disbanded in the August - October 42 time frame and was not reformed.

Some other reasons why the 10th division would NOT have been the Australian division to invade Japan:

The 10th division was a militia force unit. As such it could legally NOT serve north of the equator. NO AIF soldier would have served voluntarily in a Militia formation. No AIF divisions were formed after Japan entered the war.

When Australian divisions were disbanded they were NOT reformed. Witness the formation of the 11th division in February 43 and the formation of the 12th division in 45. The 10th was not reactivated.

The page I found this is: forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?p=504041

I have no idea as to the authenticity of this comment but it does tie in with Aussie practice regarding division numbering etc.

Andrew

[Philbass]

Blackhorse,

There is a rather convoluted chapter on the Commonwealth Corps for CORONET in: Ehrman, John (1956) Grand Strategy Vol VI October 1944-August 1945 (London: HMSO)pp257-273 that I've just flicked through. It seems that by 8th August 1944 the British Defence Committee (highest political body) had agreed to a proposal from MacArthur that the Corps (1 Brit, 1 Canadian, 1 Australian) would be:

... trained in American methods, lifted by British assault shipping, but equipped and supplied by the Americans.

This agreement was signalled to the Americans and planning started in the UK.

It then goes on to say that:

... On 10th August, when the atomic bombs had been dropped, and the Japanese leaders were contemplating surrender, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to the new proposals from London. 'Analysis,' they then remarked, '...has proceeded to a point where the United States Chiefs of Staff question very seriously the feasibility of utilising any British forces requiring both United States equipment and amphibious training in an assault role.' Much debate must have lain ahead before British troops could have waded ashore onto the beaches of Honshu.

This seems to me that the US is putting the stops on a Commonwealth Corps, at the same time that they had rejected a British attempt to muscle into the Pacific War decision making process, had frozen Australia completely out of the loop and as Halsey had prevented the British Pacific Fleet from being involved in the final strikes on the remains of the Japanese fleet in the Home Islands (although the BPF did actually bag an escort carrier).

To my reading, this is a British attempt to get involved in the post-war settlement while realising they can't actually support the troops themselves (hence the American equipment - apart from the uniforms). Its a familar British play that they is similar to that tried in 1942/1943 to drag the Americans into a committment to the Indian Ocean (as opposed to just supporting the airlink to China). I think therefore the idea of the Commonwealth Corps is a non-starter " Much debate must have lain ahead... sounds like ye olde British understatement!

Also, there is no British amphibious shipping lift for 3 divisions (plus Corps slice). What was in the East Indies was clapped out and it struggled to do OP ZIPPER in August 1945 on a less-than-three division scale. I think the Chiefs of Staff are kidding themselves here.

Finally, the British Pacific Fleet logistics had effectively broken down by August 1945. Any attempt to support the Commonwealth Corps would have required the withdrawal of the carrier fleet - its a trade off for shipping and manpower (can't man the fleet train and the amphibious fleet at the same time).

The reason the Chiefs of Staff insist on the British Pacific Fleet (as opposed to an Indian Ocean amphibious offensive or the 'Middle Strategy' from Northern Australia through the Indies) is that there isn't the manpower to support logistically anything more ambitious. But of course if the Americans could pay for it, then sure, the Brit staffs would squeeze the warm bodies for the assault force if someone else supplies and hauls the beans and bullets. But I'm also sure the Brit Chiefs of Staff knew that the Americans wouldn't fall for this (MacArthur not withstanding), and they could make it look as if the offer had been made and turned down and therefore couldn't be accused of bad faith.

Now having said all that, I dimly recall seeming something in the 'War in the Far East: Volume V' Official history on this. I'll check when I get to work. So this may have organisational detail. I'll report back (add to list of things to do).

Now the long range bomber force is much more viable and the Americans requested that 617 Squadron (Dambusters) be used with Tallboy 12,000lb bombs to drop the bridges between Tokyo and Shimonoseki as well as the Kammon tunnel linking Honshu and Kyushu, in advance of Op OLYMPIC. Chokes away Biggles!! Now the Tallboy would be a fun device to add to the database...

Regards,

Philip Bass

[2ndACR]

ORIGINAL: Lemurs!

2ndACR,
I think the total squads for an engineer battalion(seperate) in the Japanese OOB is accurate.
In other words remember that 12 squads in a battalion are infantry and 27 squads or so are support.

Mike

Sorry, I meant in the internal engineer battalions of the divisions. Not the independent engineer battalions. Those seem about right.

Independent Const Batt. (in game)

5 Infantry squads
36 Engineer squads
36 support squads

But now that I look at it, that would put the number of personnel at about 850 men or so.
But I can find nothing that tells me if the Engineer regiments are 2 or 3 Batt's strong. Because if the Regiments are supposed to be 3 Batt strong, then the regiments in the game are undersized. If you use the above construction battalion as a standard form across the board.

[Lemurs!]

Some of the units in the game are regiments some are battalions but labeled as regiments.

Mike

[Blackhorse]

Phil, Andrew -- thanks for your quick feedback.

The source for the "mythical 10th" Australian Division was apparently Codename Downfall by Thomas B Allen & Norman Polmar. According to a second-hand quote pulled off of the web (how's that for an authoritative source!) Allen & Polmar say:

"The Australian Goverment wanted the 7th & 9th, to be used by MacArthur as an acknowledgement of the American assistance to Australia." . . . Eventually after much arguing "The British & Australian governments chose the 10th Australian Division, in Borneo at the time and already trained in amphibious operations, for the Commonwealth Corps for the Honshu campaign. The divisions officers and men had already fought besides the Americans in the SW Pacific."

If the citation is correct, then the book is seriously in error -- as the 10th didn't exist at the time. It was a militia division created in 1942 and disbanded 5 months later in order to beef up other understrength units.

From what I can gather the intent in 1945 was to recruit enough volunteers from the returning ETO veterans to form one new Australian division. Might it have been named the 10th since the militia division didn't exist anymore? If not, what would the next number be for a 'new' regular division?

Apparently, Canada had already succeeded in recruiting a new division (the 6th) from veterans returning from the five European divisions.

The UK's contribution -- the 3rd Division -- also seems to be firmly grounded in reality. One battalion had already been deployed to the US for re-equipping and training when the war ended.

Phil, your points about the lack of command enthusiasm for the Commonwealth Corps and the logistics strain are well taken. Re: logistics -- British air and fleet units would be moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific in late '45. Could enough amphibious transport come from the ETO to meet the need?

Overall, I'm tilting strongly towards the conclusion that a "Commonwealth Corps" could not have been organized, trained and equipped in time to participate in the early phases of a March 1946 invasion of Japan. The British 3rd Division, and Canadian 6th, would at least be available as a reinforcement. Australia's mysterious Division "X" could also appear as 1946 reinforcements -- if enough soldiers were willing to volunteer to fill it out.

Is there any material suggesting that other Commonwealth LCUs were going to transfer to the Pacific after VE Day?

[Blackhorse]

Now having said all that, I dimly recall seeming something in the 'War in the Far East: Volume V' Official history on this. I'll check when I get to work. So this may have organisational detail. I'll report back (add to list of things to do).

Now the long range bomber force is much more viable and the Americans requested that 617 Squadron (Dambusters) be used with Tallboy 12,000lb bombs to drop the bridges between Tokyo and Shimonoseki as well as the Kammon tunnel linking Honshu and Kyushu, in advance of Op OLYMPIC. Chokes away Biggles!! Now the Tallboy would be a fun device to add to the database...

Phil,

Thanks for checking. If the US couldn't drop "Little Boy" it'd definitely need the "Tallboys."

Do your sources have details on the proposed composition of "Tiger Force" -- the British air command slated to reinforce the Pacific? One source says that it was to include over 500 Lancasters -- half of them to be used as transports. Any information on the assets the US 8th 8th Air Force was planning to move to the Pacific in 1945 is also appreciated.

[akdreemer]

Here are some modifications for the US Infantry Divisions I would like to submit:

WWII Infantry Divisions and Regimental Combat Teams:

Several things need to be included in the US Army formations. First, several new unit types need to be added (*). Second, there were no 75 or 76 mm ATG organic to the division. Third, the 4.2 inch mortar was not organic to the Division. Create separate Chemical Mortar BN’s instead. Make another entry for the 57mm with no upgrade path. Looking at the TOE in game terms for the platoon level up as follows:

Platoon:
3 x USA Rifle Squads

Company:
3 x Platoons
2 x Weapons Squads*
3x 60mm Mortars*

Battalion:
3 x Companies
1 AT Platoon
3 x 37mm ATG (1941)
3 x 57mm ATG (November 1942)
6 x 81mm Mortars
1 USA Engineer Squad

Regiment:
3 Battalions
1 Cannon Co
6 x 75mm How (1941)
6 x 105 How (7/42)
1 AT Company
12 x 37mm ATG
12 x 57mm ATG

Division:
Self Defense Platoon
3 x USA Rifle Squad
3 x Regiments
1 x Engineer BN
27x USA Engineer
6 x Engineer Vehicle
1 x Recon Troop
9 x M8 Armored Car
3 x USA Rifle Squad
1 x 81mm Mortar
3 x 105 How Battalions
12 x 105 How
1 x 155 How BN
12 x 155mm How

Div Totals:
249 USA Rifle Squads – Upgrade path okay
54 USA Weapons Squads – No upgrade path
36 USA Engineer Squads – Upgrade path okay
72 0.50 Browning AAMG
90 60mm Mortars
55 81mm Mortars
63 ATG (37mm then upgrade to 57mm - although Forty mentions that the 37mm was in service in for much of the war in the Pacific)
18 75mm GMC Halftrack (until early 1943)
36 + 18 105mm Howitzer (July 1942 add 18 regimental pieces)
12 155mm Howitzer
9 M8 Armored Cars
650 Support

Regimental Combat Team:
82 USA Rifle Squads
18 USA Weapons Squads
12 USA Engineer Squads
24 0.050 Browning AAMG
27 60mm Mortars
18 81mm Mortars
21 37mm ATG – Upgrades to 57mm ATG
6 75mm GMC Halftrack – Upgrades to 105mm Howitzer
12 105mm howitzer
3 M8
200 Support
* No 155mm Howitzers
** No 4.2 inch Mortars




Unit Specs:

Name: 60mm Mortar USA Weapon Squad M8 Armored Car
Type: 19-Army Weapon 23-Squad 22-AFV
Range: 2 0 1
Accuracy: 8 0 9
Effect: 3 0 2
Ceiling: 0 0 0
Armor 0 0 20
Penetration: 5 0 70
Dud Rate: 0 0 0
Anti-Armor: 10 25 78
Anti-Soft: 10 40 28
Load Cost: 2 9 10
Available: 4112 4112 4112
Upgrade: Same Same Same
Build rate: 20 25 30

. 50 cal Browning - The Division had over 236 of these weapons authorized, many of them mounted on AA rings on trucks.

The 60mm mortar is a crucial firepower unit of the Company.

The USA Weapon Squad represents the organic 0.50 M2 MG and the 0.30 M1919 MG found in the weapons platoon of the company.

The M8 was the standard US armored car.

Sources include:

Forty, George
1996 US Army Handbook 1939-1940.

US Army
1944 Catalogue of Standard Ordinance Items, Vols. I-III. US Army Ordinance Technical Division

Wilson, John B.
1998 Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series

[Philbass]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse

Do your sources have details on the proposed composition of "Tiger Force" -- the British air command slated to reinforce the Pacific? One source says that it was to include over 500 Lancasters -- half of them to be used as transports. Any information on the assets the US 8th 8th Air Force was planning to move to the Pacific in 1945 is also appreciated.

Blackhorse,

Alas, I have very few books on the RAF.

I have only one source with any lengthy discussion of TIGER FORCE. The section that follows is drawn from: Probert, Air Commodore Henry (1995)The Forgotten Air Force: The Royal Air Force in the War against Japan 1941-45(London: Brassey's) pp291-295

I apologise for a post that is long on narrative and short on hard OOB facts, but I think it illuminates where the 500 Lancaster story comes from. Basically it goes like this:

1) In October 1944, the Air Ministry in the UK starts planning for a 'politically driven' RAF contribution to the direct assault on Japan. Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd ('energetic and enthusiastic')was appointed Force Commander Designate, and until April 1945 he and his staff were co-located with Bomber Harris' HQ, where Bomber Command gave them planning ideas and help.

2) By early 1945, AM Lloyd and the Air Ministry had developed plans including a force of 20 squadrons (400+ aircraft, I guess) of bombers and 3 squadrons of support aircraft based in Northern Luzon. This would mean 2,000 mile round trips to Southern Japan, and 3,500 miles as far as Tokyo. Chief of the Air Staff Portal 'hoped 3,000 mile flights with 6,000lb would be achievable'. This force would be built around Lancasters and its successor the Lincoln (sorry, I'm not an aircraft buff so I don't know much about this aircraft). Trials of in-flight refuelling had been conducted, in an attempt to solve the range/payload trade off problems, ' but it was becoming increasingly clear that this offered no realistic solution in relation to the technology of the day'. AM Lloyd's staff based these plans on the assumption that the US would build the airfields for the British in Luzon, while it was supported logistically all the way from the UK (14,000 miles).

3)In February 1945, Chief of Air Staff Portal meets with General Kuter (USAAF Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistical Planning) who quickly filled him in on the reality that the Americans couldn't even meet all their own construction needs, and therefore the Brits would have to do it alone and be respondable for all development from ' from tide water to aircraft'. At the same time, AM Lloyd was in Washington for detailed discussions and he got the same message, that while the USAAF were welcoming of a Brit bomber force, there was no getting away from the hard fact that the British would have to build and maintain the force all by themselves. When Lloyd got back to London he told Portal that the plans that would now have to be developed for a self-supporting force might show the difficulties were too great and the cost too expensive.

4) Indeed in April 1945, the detailed report of the British Principal Administrative Officers (PAO) Committee (made up of the administrative heads of the three services the Fourth Sea Lord, the Quartermaster General and the Air Member for Supply and Organization) showed that in their view, the whole project was impracticable. To build a base for 20 heavy bomber squadrons in the Cagayan Valley in North Luzon would require 71,500 RAF and 34,500 Army personnel (note - not sure if this is construction phase only or operational as well), and the first airfield wouldn't be ready until February 1946.

5) Despite this, when the Brit Chiefs of Staff discussed the PAO Committee report in mid-April they weren't prepared to abandon the idea of having a bomber force participating in the final assault on Japan.

6) Meanwhile, events had moved on. With the invasion of Okinawa at the beginning of April, the American thoughts also turned to a plan to invade the island of Miyako (in the Sakishima Gunto), to the south, which they would offer to the British as a base for the RAF. This would be 450 miles closer to Japan than the proposed bases in Luzon. AM Lloyd was back in Washington having talks and when this was offered, was unsurprisingly enthusiatic. (Note - the Brits would have to build the bases as there was a shortage of American airfield construction troops at this stage).

7) Even though this offer had been made, Lloyd wrote at the end of April 1945, ' the future of TIGER FORCE did not look promising.' He still felt the logistical problems were insolvable:

• The Army had made no provision for a committment to support and defend an RAF force in the Pacific;
• There were inescapable Army and RAF committments in NW Europe and SE Asia that couldn't be cut;
• Attempts to persuade the Canadians to provide engineering support (alongside operational squadrons had got nowhere;
• There was a serious shortage of shipping

The planners in London believed that there was a straight choice between TIGER FORCE and Op Zipper (the invasion of Malaya scheduled for late 1945). This reinforces the view that an expanded Pacific committment and major amphibious operations in the Indian Ocean were mutually exclusive - and the British Pacific committment was supposed to take priority.

8) Then on 5 May the Americans cancelled the assault on Miyako...

...and then...

9) In May 1945 General Marshall told Chief of Air Staff Portal that it might be possible to host TIGER FORCE on Okinawa itself. AM Lloyd went back to Washington and at the end of May he found the Americans 'increasingly enthusiastic'; General Eaker told him that the initial deployment would have to be restricted to 2 squadrons, unless the British could give firm reassurances on the level of logistical support they could provide. AM Lloyd returned to London with an American proposal for 10 squadrons (200+ aircraft, including Mosquitos) to be based in Okinawa under American control; 10 more squadrons may follow later.

10) The British Chiefs of Staff accepeted this proposal and in mid-June Churchill told Marshall of his strong support for this plan. Meanwhile, the PAOs had evaluated the logistical problem and that only 15,000 RAF operational personnel would be needed, supported by 7,500 constructors and 12,390 Army personnel. The Chiefs of Staff accepted this and dispatched the first convoy of constructors from Liverpool to the Pacific via Panama (this was called SHIELD FORCE).

11) Meanwhile, South East Asia Command just woke up to the fact that this would mean that yet again, that their plans for amphibious offensives would be retarded. Mountbatten and his air commander Air Chief Marshall Park, complained to London, but were told firmly to wind their necks in as it was long agreed policy that the Pacific had priority!

12) In July, AM Lloyd and his team visited Guam, Okinawa and Manila and laid plans with the Americans. It was agreed that the British construction troops would work within the overall American plan and under their orders (as opposed for the originally independent force planned for Luzon); many of the supplies for construction and operation would be provide by the Americans and that a staging post would be established in Manila. Meanwhile, the second convoy (VACUUM FORCE) had been dispatched from the UK.

13) Detailed planning decided that 5 Group from Bomber Command would be the first formation to deploy from Europe (to be commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Constantine) and would be based in Okinawa alongside 8th US Air Force, and would operate directly under Strategic Air Forces HQ.

14) Spaatz (Commanding General Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific) asked if two Tallboy squadrons could be made operational by 15 October 1945. These were to be used to drop 12,000lb bombs on the transportation choke points highlighted in my previous post in advance of the invasion of Kyushu planned for 1 November.

15) The Brits agreed and No 9 and No 917 squadrons were selected (Lancasters), preparations started and shipping chartered in late August, by which time the SHIELD FORCE convoy had reached Okinawa and VACUUM FORCE wasn't far behind (total in both convoys of 2,500 airbase engineers/constructors and 500 representing elements of base and force HQs).

15) I then checked my Ehrman, John (1956) Grand Strategy Volume VI on TIGER FORCE, and as well as confirming the above (well, it would as it would have been written from the same source, albeit while the files were still closed), it shows that the original offer was made in October 1944 and provisionally included forty squadrons of long-range bombers, of which twenty would act as tankers in flight. As mentioned, in-flight refuelling was found not to work.

So there you have it - the first 10 squadrons of No 5 Group were probably all that would have been there in time for CORONET.

Now all the stuff in the above post is based on Probert (1995) and this in turn is drawn primarily from Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyds despatch in the National Archives/Public Record Office at this reference

Link - Lloyd's despatch

If someone can give you the 5 Bomber Group orbat in May 1945, that may do it, otherwise when I'm next in the Public Record I'll have a look at the Despatch.

I hope this is of some value, or at least of interest as to the origins of TIGER FORCE and its force structure.

Regards,

Philip Bass

[Kereguelen]

Regarding the TOE of Japanese triangular infantry divisions (in addition to 2ndACR's earlier post):

Even the TOE's of Japanese triangular divisions was somewhat variable:

Divisions that included Recon Rgt were:

1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 10th, 12th, 14th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 27th, 34th, 39th, 48th, 51st, 53rd, 54th, 56th, 57th, 104th, Imperial Guards

Divisions that included Cavalry Rgt were:

4th, 6th, 9th, 11th, 25th, 28th, 29th, 40th, 52nd, 55th

Divisions that did not include Recon or Cavalry Rgt were:

15th, 21st, 22nd, 32nd, 33rd, 35th - 38th, 41st (but the 15th included a Recon Company)

1st Division included additional organic Tank Troop and some divisions included organic armoured vehicle companies:

15th, 17th, 22nd, 32nd, 36th - 38th, 56th


It seems that the artillery strength of IJA divisions is somewhat overstated:

The artillery components of divisions were extremely variable too: While all divisions had at least 12 75mm field guns (4 in each Rgt), the compositon of the divisional artillery regiments varied a lot:

While generally there was a standart TOE of 36 75mm guns in every artillery regiment (and thus 48 in the division), 105mm howitzers (and 150mm) were a rare occurance in most divisional TOE's.

Divisional artillery regiments with 24x75mm and 12x105mm: 28th, 51st, 53rd, 54th, 57th, Imperial Guards

Divisional artillery regiments with 12x75mm and 24x105mm: 10th, 12th, 6th; 8th, 14th, 24th and 25th (with additional 12x150mm)

Some other divisional arty rgt varied individually:

1st (9x75mm, 18x105mm, 9x150mm), 2nd (18x75mm, 9x150mm), 4th (24x75mm and 24x105mm), 6th (27x75mm), 23rd (12x75mm, 12x150mm), 55th (48x75mm, 12x105mm)


Sources: Japanese Army Handbook by G.Forty and Leo Niehorster's website.

[Philbass]

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse


The UK's contribution -- the 3rd Division -- also seems to be firmly grounded in reality. One battalion had already been deployed to the US for re-equipping and training when the war ended.

Phil, your points about the lack of command enthusiasm for the Commonwealth Corps and the logistics strain are well taken. Re: logistics -- British air and fleet units would be moving from the Atlantic to the Pacific in late '45. Could enough amphibious transport come from the ETO to meet the need?

There are two problems with amphibious transport. Firstly, most of the British stuff in Europe is designed to go from shore-to-shore, and isn't necessarily suitable for longer distances. I don't know where CORONET would have been launched from, but if it involves a significant sea/ocean journey, then there may be problems. Most of the larger amphibious transport has already started to be returned to civilian use (don't forget Britain is a bombed-out, bankrupt mess, and food rationing in some areas carries on into the 1950s - need the shipping to start supporting industry), or has to support the Army in NW Europe/Mediterranean, or to return time-expired soldiers from SEAC...well you get the picture. The Pacific is one of many committments, and even if it is the most important there are still limits. Secondly, the problem isn't just with the availability of appropriate shipping, but of the crews to man them. The Admiralty were already decrewing the older, war damaged capital ships to free up manpower, and this would have to have been accelerated to provide the crews for amphibious operations.

Having said that, if necessary it would have been possible to find the shipping at the cost of shutting down SEAC completely and cutting the British Pacific Fleet train (and hoping that the Americans will continue to unofficially meet its needs). There was an almost two division lift capability in SEAC in August 1945 (used in Op ZIPPER), but it isn't very impressive. You could move this to the Pacific, but I don't see much additional being made available.

Overall, I'm tilting strongly towards the conclusion that a "Commonwealth Corps" could not have been organized, trained and equipped in time to participate in the early phases of a March 1946 invasion of Japan. The British 3rd Division, and Canadian 6th, would at least be available as a reinforcement. Australia's mysterious Division "X" could also appear as 1946 reinforcements -- if enough soldiers were willing to volunteer to fill it out.

Is there any material suggesting that other Commonwealth LCUs were going to transfer to the Pacific after VE Day?

I think you are leaning in the right direction, not the least because when the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the British participation would be subject to MacArthur's agreement, he indicated that it should be integrated into the US plan with no separate national sector and that it would part of the 'assault reserve'. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that '...We provide a force which, though possibily not in the assault, should take part in the very early stages of the operation'. Source: Erhman (1956), Grand Strategy p270 (Again!)

I can't see that there were any plans for any additional Commonwealth LCUs going to the Pacific. MacArthur would not accept Indian troops in the invasion of Japan, SEAC was already being stripped of experienced British troops and Britain had strong committments in NW Europe, Mediterranean (Greece and Palestine) and India (close to revolt). 3 Div plus Corps troops seems all that would have got there.

In June 1945, the Australians had decided to reduce from six divisions and two armoured brigades to an operational force of three divisions by the end of 1945. These were to be deployed as follows:

• one brigade group to the Solomon Islands;
• one brigade group to New Guinea;
• one division of three brigades to New Britain;
• one division to the operations against Japan
• probably one brigade to SE Asia

Of these, the division for Japan would have priority.

So, yep you could have the Aussie's Division 'X'.

But don't we have a huge problem as we can't really do wholesale LCU reorganisations or withdrawals? (Unless you are planning this as a stand alone CORONET scenario). I hope this helps

Regards,

Philip Bass

[Blackhorse]

ORIGINAL: Philbass

I apologise for a post that is long on narrative and short on hard OOB facts, but I think it illuminates where the 500 Lancaster story comes from. Basically it goes like this:

Phil,

No need to apologize. This is tremendously helpful. Since there never was a 1946 invasion of Japan, creating an OOB requires some reasoned guesstimating. Your narrative spells out the constraints and leads, in a nice, logical, easy to understand way, to a conclusion about what forces realistically would have been available. That's all I can ask for (and more information on the ground support force than I could have hoped to get).

A couple of clarifying questions:

Did the first ten squadrons of No. 5 Group include the No. 9 and No. 917 Squadrons, or were they in addition to them?

Did the book identify which British ground units composed SHIELD and VACUUM force?

The original "Tiger Force" plan called for all the involved squadrons to use the Lancaster/Lincoln bomber. Your source mentioned Mosquitos. Did it mention how many?

The original "Tiger Force" plan was for three commands, each with 22 squadrons. One command was going to consist solely of RCAF squadrons. The Canadians had started squadron conversions / Lancaster training when the war ended. Does Probert mention anything about the Canadian role?

So, yep you could have the Aussie's Division 'X'.

But don't we have a huge problem as we can't really do wholesale LCU reorganisations or withdrawals? (Unless you are planning this as a stand alone CORONET scenario). I hope this helps

It is a problem, but I think I have a workaround. As of now I would suggest including the Canadian 6th Division and the British 3rd Division (with US TO&Es) as available reinforcements in early '46. They were both net *increases* to their country's existing forces in the Pacific. I will *not* recommend adding an Australian division. Since the Australians were planning to reduce their forces in the Pacific, and the game has no mechanism to automatically demobilize the existing ground units, it would not be appropropriate to increase Australia's ground forces by adding another division -- even if I could figure out what number it would be! [&:]