Japanese Strategies

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by madflava13:
Granted the PI Air was old and useless except for a couple B-17s and P-40s, but imagine the damage even a single Omaha class CL could cause to a convoy of tankers full of oil. You could definitely stash a bunch of ships in and around the PI and use them as raiders like the Germans did in the Atlantic. Japan had to respect that, along with the other ideas mentioned here.
As for attacking the US, I agree with the statement that war was inevitable anyways. Plan Orange was created because planners saw that well in advance on our side as well as the Japanese. If Japan attacked the DEI and singapore, I think the US would have reacted regardless of an attack on Pearl. We were running war patrols in the Atlantic in 1940, even though we weren't at war. The same thing would have happened in the Pacific.
Last thing - And I apologize for not remembering who said it, but whoever said the US Fleet would be destroyed worse than at Pearl if it was in the PI is wrong. If we moved the fleet to the PI, they would have been on a war footing, or else the move wouldn't have happened. I don't see the US napping in that scenario. We'd take losses, but nothing like Pearl, IMHO.

---

Actually USAAF in PI had 36 B-17 and 104 P-40's it was hardly useless, it was just made that way because of imcompentence that allowed the vast majority of this planes to be destroyed on the ground hours after learning of the attack on Pearl harbor

The Asiatic Fleet based in PI had a Omaha class CL "USS MARBLEHEAD" along with a modern CL "USS BOISE", A CA "USS HOUSTON" and 12 DD's. This ships where sent packing to NIE percisely becuase too dangerous to maintain them in the PI. Contrary to your statement that it would be easy to "stash" them There was simply nowhere to hide once the Japanese gained air superioty. In fact all these vessels where either sunk or put out of action in little over a month of operating in the even larger NEI arhepelego.

Finally war was not enevitable in 41/42. FDR had been trying for almost 2 years to get the US in the war, but the public and congress were not buying into it. Yes war patrols in the Atlantic, but even the sinking of 2 US DD's were not enough to bring into the war. Japan attacking British and Dutch colonies would not be enough either. The US had no formal treaty with the British or the Dutch.So the US had no grounds for war. FDR would probably be requlated to broadening the already extensive embargos on Japan, increasing Lend/lease shipments and heavly reinforceing the PI. Atlhough it could never be made into large naval base for reasons allready stated.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Chiteng:
re Bryon:

Not at all. My original post on this topic was a simple musing.

Politicly the Japanese HAD to take the Phillipines.
However the question comes,
Did they have to invade at the outset?
Did they have to stay there once they destroyed
the USA presence.

Since the IJA was a pack of carpet eaters I can
say I agree that Japan would never willingly leave. But that doesnt equate with making it WORTH staying. If nothing else it would provide slave labor.

---

Please explain to why politically the Japanese had to invade the Philipines? In fact the original IJA plan did not include attacking the PI . They wanted to concentrated all forces on secureing NIE and British Malaya. It was included only after the Navy insisted. Interestingly enough the IJA was also against the Pearl Harbor attack.

[byron13]

The only dog I have in this fight is the proposition that, if the Japanese attacked the U.S., they had to capture the Philippines. I'll let the other folks defend the idea that either the U.S. had to be attacked or that Japan had to attack the Philippines for political reasons.

If I were a Japanese staff officer, and I saw that the navy was going to strike Pearl Harbor, I would try to put myself in the shoes of my adversary. I would know that America would be in the war, but I would not know how much damage would be done at Pearl Harbor - heck, the fleet may have been spotted before it reached Hawaii. I would also know that the P.I. contained the largest American bases west of Hawaii, that it was governed by an American governor general, and that there were numerous American farming and business interests there. I would believe that, once war started, America would not voluntarily abandon the Philippines if it were not captured outright. After all, what were the 100,000+ soldiers going to do? Swim home? Would the American public allow the military to surrender a possession they considered to be theirs without a fight? No, the Americans would stay as long as Japan left them there.

The Army Air Corps was largely destroyed on December 8th, but the Japanese didn't know that would happen. Pearl Harbor was completely successful, but the Japanese didn't know that would happen either. The Japanese had no other choice than to plan for a still dangerous adversary that could resupply the Philippines.

When the military situation became untenable for the Americans, due entirely to defeats on land, the puny fleet was withdrawn. If the Americans weren't forced to leave, would they have left some ships and aircraft there that could be a hindrance to my operations? I think so. The Japanese would have been hard pressed to eliminate the U.S. raiding activity by sea and air by patrolling over 7000 islands covering an area as large as Delaware, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Maryland put together. Much of this area was beyond the range of their aircraft - unless of course they captured airfields in the P.I.

By not taking the P.I., the Japanese are leaving what is essentially a safe zone for America to exploit any time it wants. Run a couple of destroyers up there from Australia and raid convoys based on real-time information passed down by the airplanes launched from the Philippines. Weather's bad? No problem: just drop anchor off of island #5,349 until the weather passes and then get on with sinking Marus. How about shuttling B17's in and out? Its about 2400 miles from California to Hawaii, but only 1400 miles from northern Australia to the southern Philippines. Wouldn't that be fun? Fly up at night, refuel and then go wandering around the sea lanes for a day or two before flying back to Australia. Heck, just base some PBY's out of there; they could land anywhere and, with a range of 2,500 miles and a flight endurance of 20 hours, they could sure do a lot of scouting and drop the occasional bomb on a tanker. Why bother with the Doolittle raid? You can send Catalinas up to Japan every night. Yeah, that'll make the Japanese military popular with the masses. And, since most of the repair facilities at Clark and Manila Bay weren't destroyed and have been moved, the Americans now have full round-the-clock maintenance facilities for your repair pleasure if you need them.

Let's face it guys, if you don't control the land mass and all you have to face is air and naval patrols, it not much different than operating out of any forward base during the war. Supply would certainly be a problem, but the Japanese wouldn't want a Henderson Field right in the middle of their backyard. Have fun finding and destroying in an area the size of New England the 3 PBY's that are telling American intelligence all about your fleet movements. And the American army has nothing to do all day long but build fortifications and keep training a very large Filipino army with supplies dropped at night (don't have to worry too much about being accurate since there are 20 million friendlies to help police up the bundles - and no Japanese). The Americans couldn't wait to break through to the P.I. because - hey! There's a whole Filipino army just waiting to get into the fight once it is given modern weapons. Oh, and the 80,000 Americans that were captured are now fit for duty. Thanks, Japan, for letting America keep a forward air base garrisoned by 100,000 American soldiers that would have otherwise been captured. I was afraid that I would have to recapture it after a long and bloody fight.

All I gotta say is that I wish I were in charge of Philippine operations if the Japanese weren't going to invade. I would've made your lives miserable to the point that you would've had to invade - and against a much better prepared army, too.

[Chiteng]

Well I must say that was an intresting post.

First as to B-17 and B-24 and PBY.

Those aircraft have an enourmous logistical tail.
One or two planes - I'll buy that.
More than ten at a time, I dont think so.

There is also a thing called an 'escort'
I dont care if the USA sent an undamaged
Boise CL to raid. Two Fubuki class destroyers will win EASY.

As for SUBS well we know now that the Torps
didnt work, so we also know now that they were not
a threat really. However there is no way anyone
would have known that ahead of time.

PT boats is a good point but you must remember that PT boats demand gasoline not diesel fuel.
That high speed consumes alot of gas.
There is no indigenous supply on the PI.

As for the garrison, that is all it would be.
After 6 months or so it would dawn on even the dullest mind that the Japs were NOT comming.
The urge to fortify would abate.
Not unlike the germans in 1943 at Normadie.
They did very little until Rommel showed up.

100.000 or 500,000 its all the same to me.
The largest self supporting interment camp
in the orient. However, yes I think it not a far
stretch to assume that 'fighter' aircraft could still fly. I doubt it is any fun to be on a ship being strafed by P-40's

However,
You could always invade, defeat the enemy,
and leave. That is an interesting thought.

I would also question the island produces enough
food to feed its own population, let alone
the US army.

As you pointed out, there are other airbases
already there at the outbreak of war.
There is no intrinsic need to take the Clark field.

Other than PRIDE. A political motive. We must crush the US resistance. We must sweep all before us.

[moore4807]

Pretty good thread guys,
For my two cents- I still think reducing India to ashes in the beginning has a two fold purpose
1) Historically the Brits had all they could handle with the Germans and Africa- commit more resources to Indian battle? not possible in 1942-1943. No continual A/C sqdrns flooding into China, no LCU's arriving with 60's & 70's exp after 1943

2) Eliminates being back doored post-1943, DEI and Singapore are safe. By then I have pretty much what I want and begin fortifying as fast as I can... I usually let the AI control the South Seas and they will overrun the Solomons but I then turn off AI after 1943, and contest as little as possible there while backfilling my units (split LCU's- watch em grow)and moving them into Phillipines/DEI. Again shipping is vital and I escort my convoys as much as possible. I usually get into 1944 with 3-4 CV's intact since I'm not warring actively- then most fights seem to occur around Central Pacific (Wake,Guam etc.)
China is a wasteland for me and occasionally I get to win cities there , but I pretty much don't commit any more there than what is hardcoded for the Japanese.
Feel free to abuse me- I fight my fight and dont always win, we've had this discussion before...VBG

Chiteng- PT's were gas boats? I was under the impression from PT-109'movie they were diesels (not saying your wrong- movies lie all the time)
Hmmm, interesting....
Jim

[ August 25, 2001: Message edited by: moore4807 ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by byron:
Exactly. See? Good things do come out of war. Well done, Skeets. Your check is in the mail.

Timjot: I have the same concerns you do about the first battle between the U.S. Fleet and the IJN. I think Madman was pointing out that if the U.S. was not attacked, the Pacific Fleet would make a deliberate move to the Philippines. I also think Madman is assuming that they would have waited until more of the existing carriers could go. Assuming the Ranger stayed in the Atlantic and the Hornet has finished its shake-down, that would give the U.S. six carriers - if you don't count the Langley. Madman is assuming that they're sailing west looking for a fight, and they'll go with as much force as can be mustered, including more than three carriers.

---

Well, if you are suggesting that sail for the PI only after they concentrate forces from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, then I agree the odds get considerably better. However, still probalbly no better than even. I am assumeing PI land base planes are elimanated as they were historically. Under these circumstances I still think IJN is victorious in early 42. Equality in numbers would not be enough to offset tactical and technical deficiencies that the USN was operating under in early 42. First even if the US had brought in all 6 carries it is doughtful that they would have concentrated. USN doctorine dictated that they be used in small 1 and 2 CV TF to scout ahead of the Battle fleet. Their job was to find the enemy battle fleet atrit it as much as possible and then stand back and let the big guns deliver the coup de grace. The Japanes tactic of concentrating the carrier forces into an offensive strike force was uniquely Japanese concept. I am guessing that that the individual USN Task Forces , would have been pick off one by one leaving the Battle fleet to there mercy. Another tactical disadvantage was the US carriers were notoriously over bombered and under Figthtered. US carries carried only 18 fighters woefully inadequate for the duo roles of CAP and fighter escort. It took months of battle expirence before this flaw was recognized. Add the fact that USN TBD'S were next to useless and their torps were useless and you have the makeings of a disastourous defeat. Its important to point out that I am talking about this being an initial battle takeing place in early 42.

[D. Olenick]

Great topic. My thought on why the Japanese decided to attack the PI is simple. They were in the business of empire building. The "cover plan" for the entire war was the creation of the Greater South East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese attacked because they wished to govern the land. It was an Imperialistic policy.

Also, the Imperial Staff did not think the US could beat their Army and Navy. They were undefeated for what, a millenium? For the most part these were provincial people with little understanding of the West.

Plus leaving occupied territory in your year is just piss poor strategy. Regardless of how little a threat the island's garrison posed after its air and naval units were destroyed or pulled back. You just don't do it.

[byron13]

Timjot: I think whoever proposed the sailing west was proposing that Japan had not attacked the U.S. yet and that the Pacific Fleet was sailing to the P.I. in prepared for the war to fight. In that scenario, Clark would still be intact and on more of a war footing. Other than that, I agree with everything you say.

Moore: I think Chiteng's right about the PT boat engines. I'm not sure the military had any diesels in the inventory. Trucks were gas as were the tanks. In fact some Shermans had aircraft engines in them. I wouldn't be surprised if the PT boats didn't have aircraft engines (or a variant thereof) in them.

I think your India/Burma first strategy is very legitimate. I've done it in PacWar. As you say, it reduces the threat of being backdoored later in the war plus it doesn't absorb nearly as much resources once you've taken it as it hold the line there. Of course, the flip side is that it takes probably a year to do all that, and you've probably sacrificed some gains to the east that could be costly. So I'm not going to nail you on it.

Chiteng: Once cut off, the Philippines would definitely be operating on a shoestring. But I believe you could keep it sufficiently supplied to make it a constant irritant to the Japanese. No small factor that you can bomb Japan from there (though not effectively). After awhile, I think you might actually be able to build up camoflaged repair facilities and maybe even some fuel storage facilities, though getting the fuel there would be sporty. In the end, the P.I. just has to much potential to cause trouble and is too close to Japan and its vital sealanes to ignore.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by byron:
The only dog I have in this fight is the proposition that, if the Japanese attacked the U.S., they had to capture the Philippines. I'll let the other folks defend the idea that either the U.S. had to be attacked or that Japan had to attack the Philippines for political reasons.

If I were a Japanese staff officer, and I saw that the navy was going to strike Pearl Harbor, I would try to put myself in the shoes of my adversary. I would know that America would be in the war, but I would not know how much damage would be done at Pearl Harbor - heck, the fleet may have been spotted before it reached Hawaii. I would also know that the P.I. contained the largest American bases west of Hawaii, that it was governed by an American governor general, and that there were numerous American farming and business interests there. I would believe that, once war started, America would not voluntarily abandon the Philippines if it were not captured outright. After all, what were the 100,000+ soldiers going to do? Swim home? Would the American public allow the military to surrender a possession they considered to be theirs without a fight? No, the Americans would stay as long as Japan left them there.

The Army Air Corps was largely destroyed on December 8th, but the Japanese didn't know that would happen. Pearl Harbor was completely successful, but the Japanese didn't know that would happen either. The Japanese had no other choice than to plan for a still dangerous adversary that could resupply the Philippines.

When the military situation became untenable for the Americans, due entirely to defeats on land, the puny fleet was withdrawn. If the Americans weren't forced to leave, would they have left some ships and aircraft there that could be a hindrance to my operations? I think so. The Japanese would have been hard pressed to eliminate the U.S. raiding activity by sea and air by patrolling over 7000 islands covering an area as large as Delaware, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Maryland put together. Much of this area was beyond the range of their aircraft - unless of course they captured airfields in the P.I.

By not taking the P.I., the Japanese are leaving what is essentially a safe zone for America to exploit any time it wants. Run a couple of destroyers up there from Australia and raid convoys based on real-time information passed down by the airplanes launched from the Philippines. Weather's bad? No problem: just drop anchor off of island #5,349 until the weather passes and then get on with sinking Marus. How about shuttling B17's in and out? Its about 2400 miles from California to Hawaii, but only 1400 miles from northern Australia to the southern Philippines. Wouldn't that be fun? Fly up at night, refuel and then go wandering around the sea lanes for a day or two before flying back to Australia. Heck, just base some PBY's out of there; they could land anywhere and, with a range of 2,500 miles and a flight endurance of 20 hours, they could sure do a lot of scouting and drop the occasional bomb on a tanker. Why bother with the Doolittle raid? You can send Catalinas up to Japan every night. Yeah, that'll make the Japanese military popular with the masses. And, since most of the repair facilities at Clark and Manila Bay weren't destroyed and have been moved, the Americans now have full round-the-clock maintenance facilities for your repair pleasure if you need them.

Let's face it guys, if you don't control the land mass and all you have to face is air and naval patrols, it not much different than operating out of any forward base during the war. Supply would certainly be a problem, but the Japanese wouldn't want a Henderson Field right in the middle of their backyard. Have fun finding and destroying in an area the size of New England the 3 PBY's that are telling American intelligence all about your fleet movements. And the American army has nothing to do all day long but build fortifications and keep training a very large Filipino army with supplies dropped at night (don't have to worry too much about being accurate since there are 20 million friendlies to help police up the bundles - and no Japanese). The Americans couldn't wait to break through to the P.I. because - hey! There's a whole Filipino army just waiting to get into the fight once it is given modern weapons. Oh, and the 80,000 Americans that were captured are now fit for duty. Thanks, Japan, for letting America keep a forward air base garrisoned by 100,000 American soldiers that would have otherwise been captured. I was afraid that I would have to recapture it after a long and bloody fight.

All I gotta say is that I wish I were in charge of Philippine operations if the Japanese weren't going to invade. I would've made your lives miserable to the point that you would've had to invade - and against a much better prepared army, too.

---

Byron I completely agree with you that if Japan and the US are at war than the PI must be taken. Its a no brainer one only have to look at the map. My only contention was that initiating a war with the US was not neccessary to accomplish Japanese aims. However that being said and assumeing that the US and Japan are at war. The best strategy in IMHO would have been not to attack Pearl but do attack and cut off the PI then sit back and let the US Pacific Fleet come to you and destroy it in a decisive battle of your choosing. But that assumes that the Japanese new just how superior there carrier arm was and that the day of the BB's were over. Two things they had no way of knowing at that time. Except for Yamamoto who belived as much, which makes it even more unexplicable that he felt it so neccessary to sink those BB's at Pearl. In fact he was against building the Yamato class BB's because he was so sure the days of the BB was over.

[madflava13]

Hey guys, I haven't posted lately, and you all covered a lot of ground while I was away...
Just a couple comments/questions. Does anyone know what kinda of stockpiles were available at Clark field/Cavite Bay? If there were large gas stockpiles, I don't see it being too difficult to refuel a couple squadrons of PTs and PBYs almost indefinitely... Also, those US ships that I think TIMJOT mentioned which were wiped out? They got sunk/put out of action operating with the ABDA forces against vastly superior Japanese surface action groups.. Thats not the tactics I recommend... Use them as hit and run raiders, and they're around a lot longer, I bet...
As for sailing west in a Plan Orange scenario... I agree the Jap air arm is superior to the US for a long time and poses a big threat. However, they only destroyed the fleet at Pearl because it was Sunday, half or more of the crew compliments were ashore, the ammo boxes were locked, the bulkhead doors open, the fleet sleeping and no CAP airborne... Not saying they couldn't do damage, but... A war-ready US Fleet, regardless of tactics and all, WILL NOT sail into harms way without everything watertight, CAP up, scouts out, and every friggin gun locked, cocked and ready to rock... Flawed tactics may give the Japanese an edge, but maneuvering ships shooting back make much more difficult targets than anchored ships asleep on a Sunday. I don't know the outcome of such a battle, but its not a hands down US defeat... Thats my opinion.
BTW- Byron, I think I am starting to agree with some things you say.. I better lie down.

[madflava13]

TIMJOT-
One other thing in re: your last post... Yamamoto attacked Pearl assuming the carriers would be there. He wasn't after the BBs at all. The Utah, an old BB converted into a target ship with a lot of planking over its deck somewhat resembled a CV to the Japanese attackers. Since it was docked at the carrier berths, it took some nasty punishment. I don't know numbers exactly, but I know it took many hits and turned turtle...We just got lucky with our CVs being at sea delivering reinforcements to Wake, Johsnton, etc...

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by byron:
Oh, and don't forget that Clark Field can provide some air cover for the carriers on defense and provide another threat for the INJ carriers to worry about.

---

Clark field was in range of all those Japanese airfields in Formosa and consequently qickly made useless. USAFFE were aware of its vulnerability and were in the process of building a B-17 base on Mindanao that was out of range, but was also too remote to be effective as a major stageing base.

[TIMJOT]

[QUOTE]When the military situation became untenable for the Americans, due entirely to defeats on land, the puny fleet was withdrawn. If the Americans weren't forced to leave, would they have left some ships and aircraft there that could be a hindrance to my operations? I think so. The Japanese would have been hard pressed to eliminate the U.S. raiding activity by sea and air by patrolling over 7000 islands covering an area as large as Delaware, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Maryland put together. Much of this area was beyond the range of their aircraft - unless of course they captured airfields in the P.I.

[/QUOTE}
I agree with most of your post in that the US would be compelled to come to the rescue of the PI especially if the fleets still intact. Politally, emotionally and even militarly dictated that. However I do think you underestimate the difficulty of maintaining PI as a viable base under a Japanese siege. The PI is completely surrounded. In the norh you have Jap held Formosa. In the west you have Jap held China coast and French Indo-china. In the east they controlled Palua, Caroline and Mariana island groups. In the south they quickly gained bases in borneo and the Celebes. Thats a pretty tight blockade. In fact early on we tried to send blockade runners up from the NIE and all but one were sunk and that one only made it as far as Mindanao. Air drops are unfeasible without air superiorty. Even if you could do night drops there was simply not enough C-47s available in 41/42 to make it viable. B-17's did not make good transports and B-24 were just comming on line. All that being said I agree the Japanese would still have take the islands to fully nuetralize it as a threat.

[TIMJOT]

Chiteng- PT's were gas boats? I was under the impression from PT-109'movie they were diesels (not saying your wrong- movies lie all the time)
Hmmm, interesting....
Jim

---

Have to defend Chiteng here; US PT's use high octane AVGAS, regardless of Hollywood.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by gonzo:
Great topic. My thought on why the Japanese decided to attack the PI is simple. They were in the business of empire building. The "cover plan" for the entire war was the creation of the Greater South East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese attacked because they wished to govern the land. It was an Imperialistic policy.

Also, the Imperial Staff did not think the US could beat their Army and Navy. They were undefeated for what, a millenium? For the most part these were provincial people with little understanding of the West.

Plus leaving occupied territory in your year is just piss poor strategy. Regardless of how little a threat the island's garrison posed after its air and naval units were destroyed or pulled back. You just don't do it.

---

Yes the Japanese were interested in empire building but they were only interested in the PI as a means of protecting that empire. I would like to point out that the PI were due to be granted there independence in 1945. In fact MacArthur was in the PI to build a Philipine Army so they could protect themselves when they came independent. An idependent PI would not be much a threat to there newly won Empire. Again I say they should have gambled and not attacked the US They could have taken the NIE and Malaya. Then sit back and force the US to act. Keep in mind FDR said war with Japan would be the wrong war, fighting the wrong enemy at the wrong place at the wrong time. Meaning he wanted war with Germany not Japan

[ August 25, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by madflava13:
Hey guys, I haven't posted lately, and you all covered a lot of ground while I was away...
Just a couple comments/questions. Does anyone know what kinda of stockpiles were available at Clark field/Cavite Bay? If there were large gas stockpiles, I don't see it being too difficult to refuel a couple squadrons of PTs and PBYs almost indefinitely... Also, those US ships that I think TIMJOT mentioned which were wiped out? They got sunk/put out of action operating with the ABDA forces against vastly superior Japanese surface action groups.. Thats not the tactics I recommend... Use them as hit and run raiders, and they're around a lot longer, I bet...
As for sailing west in a Plan Orange scenario... I agree the Jap air arm is superior to the US for a long time and poses a big threat. However, they only destroyed the fleet at Pearl because it was Sunday, half or more of the crew compliments were ashore, the ammo boxes were locked, the bulkhead doors open, the fleet sleeping and no CAP airborne... Not saying they couldn't do damage, but... A war-ready US Fleet, regardless of tactics and all, WILL NOT sail into harms way without everything watertight, CAP up, scouts out, and every friggin gun locked, cocked and ready to rock... Flawed tactics may give the Japanese an edge, but maneuvering ships shooting back make much more difficult targets than anchored ships asleep on a Sunday. I don't know the outcome of such a battle, but its not a hands down US defeat... Thats my opinion.
BTW- Byron, I think I am starting to agree with some things you say.. I better lie down.

---

Well the PI did have quite large stocks of fuel and supplies. They had been made a priority in late 41 and consequently supplies poured in from Sept. to Dec 41. The problem was that the Japanese advance was so quick that much of those stockpiles were loss becuase there was not enough time to move them to Bataan.

RE: the atack on the PI was not a suprise. The forces there were on a war footing and both Clark and Cavite were still put out of action on the first day.

RE: Surface raiders; the day of the surface raiders went out with the advent of air power. The germans were somewhat successful in the early stages of the war. In the vast expanses of the south atlantic and indian oceans, but the South china sea is a relatively confined area surrounded by Japanese airbases. There would have been no where to hide. Even the German raiders were all eventually hunted down sunk. US raiders operating in the South china sea would not last long. Now submarines are another story, but they were ineffective until late 43 because of defective torps.

RE US FLEET; Adm. Nimitz believed that the fleet being caught at Pearl was a blessing in a disquised. It was his opinion that had the Japanese fleet been detected, Kimmel would have sailed the fleet to meet the threat. It was his opinion that the resulting battle on the open sea would have ended with a even greater destruction and loss of life. He further stated that at that time, we just had nothing even close to matching the power of their carrier strike force

RE; being prepared for war. Unfortunately the only guns that mattered were AA guns. Something USN ships were severly lacking. US BB's at that time only had a few obsolete 3" AA guns and a hand full of 1" MG's, none of of the 20mm and 40mm bofors that would be so effective later in the war. The sinking of the Prince of Whales and Repulse proved once and for all that BB's could not stand alone against Air attacks on the open sea. The sinking of the super BB's Yamato and Musashi soley by air attack would put an exclaimation point to this fact.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by madflava13:
TIMJOT-
One other thing in re: your last post... Yamamoto attacked Pearl assuming the carriers would be there. He wasn't after the BBs at all. The Utah, an old BB converted into a target ship with a lot of planking over its deck somewhat resembled a CV to the Japanese attackers. Since it was docked at the carrier berths, it took some nasty punishment. I don't know numbers exactly, but I know it took many hits and turned turtle...We just got lucky with our CVs being at sea
delivering reinforcements to Wake, Johsnton, etc...

---

True enough, but he was after both. He was informed that they were not in harbor prior to attack. If he thought it was critical then maybe he should have ordere Nagumo on a search and destroy mission to find those missing carriers.

[TIMJOT]

Sorry for takeing so long on these replies.

I would just like to say that this is a much more interesting thread than those god awful boreing production threads you usually find on this forum.

[Ringbolt]

My final thought on Philipines bypassing is if it would be so easy to run it after the Japanese moved on then why was keeping Guadalcanal so hard?
I think because it would have been nigh on impossible to bring anything of any significance. Look how much trouble it was getting to an island, Guadalcanal, at the outside edge of the IJN's planes range. Now imagine trying to run a gauntlet of air bases deep inside their territory to get to Manila. I dont think it is possible in any meaningful amounts, and therfore I think all the proposed air/sea operations are moot.

Remember, they thought this war was going to be 6 months long. I think they would have been better served in the short term to have used that manpower somewhere more important, like Fiji. I could be wrong though (and it wouldnt be the first time).


Ringbolt

[Warpup]

TIMJOT, you've sold me on the idea of bypassing the PI, at least to the extent that the game should allow you to try it and see what happens.

As for the production threads being boring, I started one of those and suggested some slider bars, a simple tool that wouldn't detract too much from the play with the historical units, which is what I really want to do. People who want to play with radically different production might enjoy playing Axis & Allies: Pacific. Heresy!!!! <img src="biggrin.gif" border="0">