Japanese Strategies

[grumbler]

Back on the board after a considerable absence...

I think that the gamble of not waging war on the USA was simply too great for the Japanese to consider. If the US declares war on Japan when japan attacks the Dutch and British (as the japanese certainly expected would be the case, and I think that history supports their fear), and the Japanese have done nothing to neutralize the US forces in Hawaii and the PI, then Japan is screwed. The amount of air power in particular that would be needed to keep the PI out of play would cripple the Japanese advances in the DEI and Burma.

If it turned out that Japan needed to take the PI anyway, say in 1942, the task would be much more difficult as the US and Filipino troops in the islands would have had time to prepare better for action. I think that the IJA could still win the action, but how many of the 13 divisions available for action in the Southwest Pacific would it have taken? What offensive actions would have to be postponed until these troops (and the aircraft that supported them) were finished with their campaign? If their is going to be a battle in the PI (which was at least highly likely) then it was best for the Japanese to get it over with as early as possible.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese DID withdraw a signficant number of troops and aircraft from the PI campaign once the initial battles were over, and the US/Filipino forces were bottled up on Battan. To that extent, the "bypass" strategy was adopted (although the blockade was a bit closer than Skeets' or Chiteng's scenario). I cannot honestly fault the Japanese use of their limited forces in the early battles, other than leaving Hiryu and Soryu to be potentially ambushed at Wake.

In short, the downside to leaving the US the option of when to start the war (a potentially significant interdiction of japanese supply routes to Southeast Asia) simply outweighed the cost of taking the PI(especially as the forces used there could not be logistically supported in amphibious operations elsewhere in the first three weeks of the war - it took all the japanese had available to support the malaya campaign in those early days).

Pages 72 and 73 of HP Wilmot's Empires in the Balance deal with this very topic. The book is, IMO, essential reading if you want to discuss the topic of Allied and Japanese strategic options in 1941 and early 1942.

[Chiteng]

Well if you accept JFD's argument of 'surprise'
being a force multiplier:

Japan would have been very foolish to bypass the
PI. They would never get that advantage again.

[TIMJOT]

I think that the gamble of not waging war on the USA was simply too great for the Japanese to consider. If the US declares war on Japan when japan attacks the Dutch and British (as the japanese certainly expected would be the case, and I think that history supports their fear), and the Japanese have done nothing to neutralize the US forces in Hawaii and the PI, then Japan is screwed. The amount of air power in particular that would be needed to keep the PI out of play would cripple the Japanese advances in the DEI and Burma.

---

Where does history supports this claim? Yes they certainly had to expect that it could happen, but would it be any more of a risk than picking a fight with the worlds largest industrial powers? Furthermore why would it take more airpower than it historically did? They were able to simutaneously mount all those operations historically. Even if the US could have declared full scale war imediately (VERY UNLIKELY)the Japanese could held in reserve all the forces that they historically use to attack the PI and due to its rather isolated geographic position quickly isolate and blocade it. Then the USN would be forced to travel hundreds of miles across hostile seas to releive it. However like I stated before I dought FDR could get an imediate declaration of war. He probably would be limited to cutting off diplomatic relations, expanding the embargo and increasing lend/lease. You have to remember there was no formal treaty obligations between the USA and Britain or Holland. In fact Churchill had tried to get such a guarantee, FDR refused or was unable to give it.

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:


Where does history supports this claim? Yes they certainly had to expect that it could happen, but would it be any more of a risk than picking a fight with the worlds largest industrial powers? Furthermore why would it take more airpower than it historically did? They were able to simutaneously mount all those operations historically. Even if the US could have declared full scale war imediately (VERY UNLIKELY)the Japanese could held in reserve all the forces that they historically use to attack the PI and due to its rather isolated geographic position quickly isolate and blocade it. Then the USN would be forced to travel hundreds of miles across hostile seas to releive it. However like I stated before I dought FDR could get an imediate declaration of war. He probably would be limited to cutting off diplomatic relations, expanding the embargo and increasing lend/lease. You have to remember there was no formal treaty obligations between the USA and Britain or Holland. In fact Churchill had tried to get such a guarantee, FDR refused or was unable to give it.

---

I suspect Japan's fear was not an immediate declaration of war, but that after Japan attacked Singapore and the DEI, the U.S. would massively reinforce the Philippines and then declare war. Even if the Japanese beat us to the punch and declared war first, they could no longer expect to have the element of surprise. In either case, the Japanese land forces necessary to root out the Americans and Filipinos and neutralize the air and sea threat, would be much higher than it was historically.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by Blackhorse:


I suspect Japan's fear was not an immediate declaration of war, but that after Japan attacked Singapore and the DEI, the U.S. would massively reinforce the Philippines and then declare war. Even if the Japanese beat us to the punch and declared war first, they could no longer expect to have the element of surprise. In either case, the Japanese land forces necessary to root out the Americans and Filipinos and neutralize the air and sea threat, would be much higher than it was historically.

---

Well, I do agree with you, that the US would have massively reinforced the Philipines if the Japanese had attack SE Asia, but it would have taken months to accomplish this. By that time Japan would have conquered SE Asia. Those troops would then be available for operations in the Philipines if the US decides at that point to declare war. Yes it would definitely be much harder for the Japanese than it was historically, but they would also have the advantage of attacking with more force than was available historically. You must remember no matter how reinforced the PI is still geographically isolated and would be extremely difficult to maintain as a base in event of war. However again I think its highly unlikey the US declares war with out being directly attacked. Furthermore, regardless of popular revisionist history, FDR did not want a war with Japan. He was even quoted to have said war with Japan would be the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. Meaning he felt strongly that Germany was the real menace to the world.

[grumbler]

TIMJOT,

I think I have answered your question about where hisory supports my claim in the geopolitical thread, see here.

Where does history support your contention that the japanese in 1941 seriously considered going to war on Britain and the Netherlands exclusively? Wilmott states categorically that this is not the case.

[chanman]

Hi all, TIMJOT, remember it is not just the PI that would get reinforced, but also the islands along the way. IJN would be cramped if they had to deal with a reinforced Guam (a couple of additional airfields, shore defenses, put a couple of divisions there, some bombers, some fighters, etc.), a reinforced Wake (build out the airfields, more bombers, fighters, a Marine division, some real shore defenses, subs) and a reinforced Midway (see Wake just previous). One of the reasons that the PI campaign was "easy" for the Japanese to prosecute was the ease that they were able to isolate them. Guam has to be reduced, spam and all, before the Japanese can isolate PI and later turn their attention South towards Australia and New Guinea.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by chanman:
Hi all, TIMJOT, remember it is not just the PI that would get reinforced, but also the islands along the way. IJN would be cramped if they had to deal with a reinforced Guam (a couple of additional airfields, shore defenses, put a couple of divisions there, some bombers, some fighters, etc.), a reinforced Wake (build out the airfields, more bombers, fighters, a Marine division, some real shore defenses, subs) and a reinforced Midway (see Wake just previous). One of the reasons that the PI campaign was "easy" for the Japanese to prosecute was the ease that they were able to isolate them. Guam has to be reduced, spam and all, before the Japanese can isolate PI and later turn their attention South towards Australia and New Guinea.

---

I admit that Guam would be also heavily reinforced, but one only has to look at a map and see that Guam is even more isolated and vulnerable than to PI. Its the only island in the Marianas not controlled by the Japanese. Its surrounded on all sides from major Japanese bases on Siapan, Tinian, Yap and Ulihti. There is a limit to how many planes that could operate there due to its relative small size. Likewise I think Guam would sink before you could cram 2 divisions on it. That being said, I agree it would be much more difficult operation, but there is simply no place to hide and in the end Guam is still a goner eventually. A reinforced Wake on the other hand, I agree would be too far away and too close to US bases on Midway and Hawaii for the Japanese mount a successful invasion. However Wakes main value is as a leg of the air bridge to the PI. Without Guam this is nullified.

Regarding the other operations you speak of. Remeber we are talking about the US not being in the war up to then. So New Guinea is most likely already secured as part of DEI campaign. Austrailia was never seriously considered a realistic objective, but if you are talking about operations against Fiji and New Calendonia to cut off Austrailia from the US. Then you also have to consider that even any Jminor apanese advances in those areas would have the added effect of compelling the US to divert considerable resources to that area at the expense of the PI, becuase the US could ill afford the lifeline to Austrailia to be severed.

Furthermore, who ever said the PI campaign was easy? Of all the operations undertook by the Japanese it turned out to be by far the most difficult. It took 5 months to do what it only took several weeks to do in Malaya,DEI and Burma. That being said I still think the Japanese eventually win a reinforce PI. Remember we are talking a USN cira 1942 that would be incabable of taking the IJN head on, on anything close to equal terms.

[madflava13]

Just wanted to say I'm back... I've been gone for quite some time and am now in the process of catching up on these two threads so I can begin annoying Byron and others once more... <img src="tongue.gif" border="0">

[chanman]

Hi TIMJOT, byron, Madflava and all the rest,

my point wasn't that Guam could be held, but that a healthy Guam (for a while) extends the PI campaign, making it even longer. Combined with an intact Pacific Fleet, the IJN strategic position would be a bit tough. Reducing a reinforced Guam would take a while, and a healthy and reinforced Wake would make it difficult. You point out that Guam is in reach of several large Japanese bases, but the reverse is true too. Remember that the sooner the 'meat grinder' mentioned in other posts (on other threads?) wipes out the initial Japanese aircrew pool, the poor quality of the replacements means that the Allies can think more offensively.

Others have commented on the Japanese sealift difficulties, allowing the USN to forward base its submarines out of Wake and Guam would further complicate the issue. One of the limiting factors facing the USN submarine war was the long trek the subs had to make to/from the Japanese shipping lanes. Not to mention the thought of the Black Cats operating in the heart of the Japanese shipping lanes instead of on the periphery as they historically did. The flip side of Guam being surrounded is that Kwajalein and Truk would be tough for the Japanese to reinforce until Guam is out of the picture and a healthy Wake would still be a problem.

You don't have to hold them, just use them to occupy IJN attention and bloody them until the reinforcements of '43 and later start coming into play. Should Guam not fall until second quarter '42, and PI not until fourth quarter '42, Japan is in trouble. The perimeter has not been established, the resources have probably not been captured and here come the Essex's, P38's, F6F's and F4U's. I think that Japan loses in early '44 in such a scenario.

That's just my opinion. I could be wrong.

Chanman