Geopolitical Rules

[TIMJOT]

The Japanese used more than two divisions in Burma. Initially, it is true, that only 33rd and 55th divisions were deployed, and they were successful, by late February, in taking Rangoon. However, the Japanese had to reinforce 15th army with the equivelent of three more divisions, 18th, 56th, and tank units, plus over 400 aircraft, before they were ready for the decisive campaign in central and northern Burma. These units would not have been available for Burma had they been sent to the PI.

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I stand corrected on the two extra divisions. However like I said the 56th division wasnt even used by Yamashita and I tend the believe that the 18th division was sent to Burma as a afterthought because the the Malaya campaign was expected to take 100 to 150 days and therefore it could not have been included in the original Burma plan. I was under the impression that the capture of Rangoon was the decisive part of the campaign, since after its fall it was pretty much a rout and a running retreat all the way back to the Indian border.

[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

However, the Japanese could, as you suggest, muster up to eight divisions to attack the PI (if, of course, no garrison forces of divisional strength were needed in Malaya or the DEI, which was not the case in reality). However, these forces could not have been lifted simultaneously, so they would have to attack in some sort of sequential order. While I doubt that the decision on when to declare war would be exclusively based on MacArthur's ideas of what "ready" meant, it is probably not unreasonable to assume, as you do, that a 5-6 month wait would be undertaken in order to reinforce the PI and (especially) the LOC to the PI.

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Well it wasnt just MacArthur, it was also the opinion of Gen.Marshall, Army general staff and Gen.Arnold Airforce Chief. It was based on production schedules, weapons stocks, unit readiness and shipping availabilty. All agreed that it would take until least April 1942 for the PI to be ready. "Ready" means being able to successfully defend against a Japanese invasion. Athough I dought even these forces earmarked for the PI would have been enough to tharwt an concentrated Japanese invasion once the DEI and Malaya was secured. By the way the Japanese didnt use front line Inf.Division for occupational duty they used special independent brigades and what they termed square divisions made up of 2nd tier troops for this job. Historically the Japanese simutaneously landed 2 Div. each in Malaya and PI. Plus 6 independent SNLF's and IJA detatchents. So I dont think landing 4-5 div. simutaneously is much a stretch and due to the close proximity of bases on Formosoa, Hainain, Ryukus, Borneo, Marianas and Palua it would be faily east to set up workable ferrying operation.

[ October 03, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

In that case, the garrison of the Pi could easily have included several additional US Army divisions, plus the 11 divisions in the PI. Since the japanese were limited in the available invasion sites on Luzon, this would have made their task quite difficult. Far more so than was the historical case, certainly, especially as the air would be contested.

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I am not so sure about that. MacArthur's plans for defense didnt include any additional US divisions. In fact Marshall had offered him the National Guard 41st Div. in Nov 41 and he rejected it, on the grounds that he lacked the facilities for another division and that it would ultimatetly detract from the building up of his Philipine Army divisions. He requested only one US army regular regiment to bring the Philipine div. up to strength. However lets say in lieu of the Japanese attack on Malaya and DIE US decides to send the PI additional div. regardless. I dought very much that the US could ship several divisions by mid Febuary as you suggest. Probably 1 div. with ancillary support, arty, eng, AA, units could be all that could feasibly deployed in that short period of time. There was a critical lack of shipping in late 41 early 42. For example that regiment that MacArthur had requested was sitting in SanFran just waiting for shipping when war broke out. The 41st div. was sent to Austrailia in Jan 42 and didnt arrive in its entirety until April. Now as you said they would have had those 11 PA div., but I dought an additional two months training would have made them that much more effective than they were historically.

[TIMJOT]

Actually, this would model far more the US concept of the decisive battle than the Japanese one. The US would be arriving via the Central Pacific rather than via the Gilberts and Marshalls. They would thus avoid the guantlet of japanese air attacks. Meanwhile, Manila would be supporting a vast array of submarines, which would make life quite difficult for the japanese transport forces (and the poor merships trying to get those vital resources back to Japan). With aerial reconnaisance the subs could prove to be quite deadly, poor torpedoes or not.

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Funny I always thought the Gilbert and Marshalls were in the central pacific. But for your sake lets call it the south central pacific and the US I am guessing that you mean would advance through the north central pacific via Wake. Well you still could not avoid the Marianas, not to mention the thousands of miles of open left flank subject to attacks from Jap bases in the Marshalls, Gilberts, and Carolina islands. Maybe thats why historically we did advance via those island groups.

I dont understand how you can say it doesnt model the IJN plan for a decisive battle. Up until Yamamoto came along and changed everything with his PH idea. The excepted IJN plan was to lure the USN into a decisive battle near the PI. Attriting it along the way from land based aircraft and submarines operating from bases in the central pacific; period! Thats what every naval staff officer was taught from 1900-1940.

Regarding subs; Hisorically I think something like 30 modern subs were dispatched to the PI prior to the outbreak of war, to go along with about a dozen older S-Class subs already there. They were far from deadly due to the poor torps you pointed out. You cant just dismiss that fact those subs were historically unable to stop or even delay the invasion. The torps just didnnt work! What are they going to do ram them?

[TIMJOT]

However, this does not take into account the impact of no American entry until 1942 on the resistance of the other allies in the area. Perhaps Malaya and the DEI would fall sooner if the USA was not on their side when they faced their final challenges. For those reasons, as wel as domestic politics, I think the US delaying a DoW is not likely.

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I dont think the allies resistance could have been any shorter than it was. as it was the few US forces that fought in the DEI, the asiatic fleet, a few B-17,PBY's,P-40's and 1 arty bn. didnt delay the japanese advance a lick.

its precisely the domestic poltics involved that I think would cause at least a delay a DOW.

[ October 03, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>

[TIMJOT]

Grumbler; I apologize about all the seperate post, but for some reason I was not able to edit all your quotes onto one post. <img src="frown.gif" border="0"> So make sure you go back and read them all.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by moore4807:
Grumbler & TIMJOT,
I have read your posts with interest about the Pacific War variations. My personal opinions tend to lean towards TIMJOT's, as I continually play Pacific War and do the very precise thing he advocates as the Japanese player. I'm not even in the same category or as well read as both of you. (You've both given me a lot of reading material to catch up on!) I just notice some things in the game for the US forces that is discussed here.

1) To reinforce and supply PI and Guam from the beginning, you virtually have to strip the west coast of transports and tankers (most of these getting sunk in the game, by the way...) These wouldnt be replaced nearly as fast if the US isnt at war....
2) The IJN Fleet carriers are pretty much free to split up (my choice is 2CV-1CVL with fleet support)giving exactly the freedom to move south and west if needed. The US is not very likely to rush into Japan's back yard when 3CV's is all they have to fight with for the first 18 months!

I note this is hindsight and computer AI play for the most part, but I thought it may be pertient to the discussion. I "think" the Japanese could have caused us bigger headaches NOT attacking PH and getting the DEI oil riches. India could have been taken then with no US interference until that point and its a much different war then.
Again only my opinion-feel free to disagree...
Jim

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Game or not, your absolutely right about both the lack of adequate shipping and the diffuculty this presents to reinforce the PI. I also agree with you, that there was a lot of miss potential in a Indian ocean campaign. However an intact US fleet would make it difficult to risk a large concentration of forces needed in a successful India campaign. Athough the rewards might be worth the risk. Especially if the Germans had opted for Operation Orient instead of Operation Barbarosa.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
If war is declared immediately as you suggest then Guam is a goner. Warning or not, the garrison was only a couple hundred Marines, no artillary, no fighters and right in the middle of the Japanese held Mariana's. The Japanese would just dispatch its South Seas Detachment from Palau as it historically did, before the US could ever get reinforcements to it. Regarding Wake I have already conceded that the Japanese would probably have to forget about taking that island, but as I pointed out Wake is a tiny atol with no harbor and I believe its closer to 500miles from the Marshalls not 1000. In fact Wake was bombed almost daily from bombers from Kawajalen in Dec.41
It was exactly for these reasons that the recapture of Wake never figured greatly in US pacific strategy.

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The Japanese could not KNOW that war would be declared by the US right away, and so could not count on the South Seas Detachment to sieze Guam unaided. They would HAVE to plan on the possibility of an invasion opposed by US naval forces and thus had to plan on supporting the invasion with naval and air forces of their own. These forces could not, then, be allocated in their plans for a strike elsewhere, as they would be leaving the initiative in American hands. They would be far better off striking immediately and knowing that their forces could then be made available elsewhere (and also know that the American fleet would be nowhere near Guam when the axe fell).

Wake is apparently some 630 miles from Kwajelein - I didn't do a very good job with my quick map measurements! Again, however, an "indefinate" jump-off date for the japanese conquest of the island would have to account for the (even greater) likelihood of US intervention, and would have tied up forces Japan needed to use elsewhere. Leaving the initiative on when war was declared in US hands would have tied down yet more japanese resources.

[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: grumbler ]</p>

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
null Only the 48th division was withdrawn from the PI to assist in the invasion of Java, in which it was hardly needed. The 4th division from Shanghia was quickly dispatched to replace it. For the sake of arguement though, give Imamura's 16th Army the 48th. Yamashita had 4 div. in which he only use three, the 5th,18th,Guards. He didnt bother to use the 56th becuase logistically it wasnt worth it. Now add that to the Southern Army reserve 21st Div, 32nd Div, 21 mixed Bgd., to Homma's 16th Div, 4th Div, 65th Bgd. and you have more than enough forces to cover a PI operation. Remember if war is declared immediatly as you suggest then the PI has no more significant forces than it did originally and would not need anymore than the 2 divisions it used originally. As far as airforces are concern the IJA 5th air div. was used in the PI operation, while the 3rd air Div. and 11 Naval air flottilla was used in the southern operarion so no conflict there. The only major naval units withdrawn south ther the CVL Ryujo and 2 Seaplane tenders. Hardly significant since with no PH you now have the 1st carrier feet available.

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The Japanese 65th Brigade was sent into the PI only in January (possibly late December) and was not really a combat formation. It had six infantry battalion, but no support arms, and the troops had only one month's basic training. (Wilmott, p. 369). The 4th infantry division only arrived on 27 February (and since the 48th was withdrawn on January 2, hardly an "immediate" replacement). The Japanese may not have had the lift to carry their South Army reserve into the PI.

Of the 300 japanese planes used to neutralize the Philippines in December and January 1941, some 200 were part of the 11th Air Flotilla, which was subsequantly withdrawn to support the attack in the DEI. Absent these forces (21st and 23rd Air Flotillas), the 5th air division would be hard-pressed to gain air superiority over the Americans - a prerequisite to amphibious attack. Further, the Japanese could not count on using the bases on Jolo island to break the Dutch. this would have made air support for the DEI much more difficult to arrange.

In essence, you argue here that japan both could sustain the Malayan, PI, and DEI operations simultaniously (something I don't think even van der Vat claims), and that they would know the timing of the US DoW and be able to make plans accordingly. I don't think either of these contentions bears closer examination. If the Japanese are maintaining the forces necessary to attack the PI at the ready, then they lack the lift, troops, and aircraft necessary to take out the DEI.

Better for them, I think, to sieze the initiative and eliminate the Amerricans according to a schedule they control, so that forces can be freed up in time for the crucial assault on the DEI. Remember that their oil situation made the capture of the DEI at the first opportunity a crucial factor in the war. To delay that while waiting for the US to declare war invited disaster.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I think "extensively" is an exageration. After PH the 1st carrier fleet covered landings on Rabaul with a garrison of few hundred Aussies and a handful of catalina's, then it covered the Ambon island invasion that had a small garrison of Dutch and Aussies with an airforce of 2 Brewster Buffalos, 12 Hudsons and a few catalina's. Next was Timore with even less garrison forces, Then the unneccessary raids on Darwin and Indian ocean. The 1st carrier divison was greatly under utilized in the DEI campaign, but again for the sake of arguement I say 2 carriers would have been more than sufficient complete these minor operations, save the Darwin and Indian Ocean raids which again in IMHO were unneccessary.By the way the 1st carrier fleet didnt take part at all in the Malaya campaign.[ October 04, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]

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The activities of the Kido Butai were indeed extensive in the post-PH period. They launched attacks to clear the approaches of Singapore and cut off reinforcements (although, as you point out, they didn't directly intervene in the fighting, as that was the job of the army air forces and 22 Air Flotilla). It is true that their attacks often were against targets that, in hindsight, were not worthy of their might, but to claim that the japanese "under-utilized" their forces is monday-morning quarterbacking (you might as well argue that the US underutilized their air defenses at Pearly Harbor, since all the fighters were not airborne and 100% of the AA guns were not manned and ready).

The Japanese were pros, and used their forces as best professional judgement told them they should be used. To argue that they should have followed an alternative course of action, you have to show that they KNEW they were underutilizing their forces, and I don't think that you can do this.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I dont want to turn this into the battle of the OOB's, but The I repeat the Southern Area Army under Gen.Count Teruchi, which encompassed the 14,15,16 and 25th armies, had at his disposal a reserve that included the 21 and 32 divisions and the 21 mixed Bgd. The 4th division as I also pointed was availabe and actually used in the PI operation.

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But you are assuming that availability also means that these troops both (1) had no other missions (i.e. were in reserve specifically to be committed to the theaters we are discussing), and (2) that the japanese had the lift to deliver them all simultaneously to the PI, DEI, and malaya. In think that if the japanese had had this capability, they would have used it. In other words, there would have been no debate babout the order in which they attacked the three objective areas, but rather they would historically have attacked them all. This is clearly not the case, so I maintain that, had the Japense kept an invasion force for the PI in reserve just in case the US declared war immediately, then they could not have conducted the DEI operations until the Malayan ops were complete. This says nothing, of course, about air power, which I pointed out earlier was even more phased than the military ops. 21 and 23 Air Flotillas were required both by the PI ops and the DEI ops. They could not be in both places at the same time.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I stand corrected on the two extra divisions. However like I said the 56th division wasnt even used by Yamashita and I tend the believe that the 18th division was sent to Burma as a afterthought because the the Malaya campaign was expected to take 100 to 150 days and therefore it could not have been included in the original Burma plan. I was under the impression that the capture of Rangoon was the decisive part of the campaign, since after its fall it was pretty much a rout and a running retreat all the way back to the Indian border.

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Read H.P Wilmott and it will become more clear to you, I think, that the Central Burma campaign was much more in doubt than you think. The fall of Rangoon was, indeed, a major Allied disaster and a major Japanese coup (the japanese didn't think they could do it with their initial forces, but in typical Japanese style just pushed until they were stopped, and the Allies paniced and filed to defend rangoon even when they had the troops to do it - another reason why I grant the conclusion that the japanese would have won a prolonged struggle in the reinforced PI - they just seemed to know better how to take advantage of breaks). Burma's capture, as you note, came much earlier than the Japanese had palnned, but they needed to plan for it, as it had resources they needed.

Another reason to attack the PI as soon as possible, in order to free up troops.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Funny I always thought the Gilbert and Marshalls were in the central pacific. But for your sake lets call it the south central pacific and the US I am guessing that you mean would advance through the north central pacific via Wake. Well you still could not avoid the Marianas, not to mention the thousands of miles of open left flank subject to attacks from Jap bases in the Marshalls, Gilberts, and Carolina islands. Maybe thats why historically we did advance via those island groups.

I dont understand how you can say it doesnt model the IJN plan for a decisive battle. Up until Yamamoto came along and changed everything with his PH idea. The excepted IJN plan was to lure the USN into a decisive battle near the PI. Attriting it along the way from land based aircraft and submarines operating from bases in the central pacific; period! Thats what every naval staff officer was taught from 1900-1940.

Regarding subs; Hisorically I think something like 30 modern subs were dispatched to the PI prior to the outbreak of war, to go along with about a dozen older S-Class subs already there. They were far from deadly due to the poor torps you pointed out. You cant just dismiss that fact those subs were historically unable to stop or even delay the invasion. The torps just didnnt work! What are they going to do ram them?

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As pointed out by Comparative IJN and USN interwar strategies - Pacific Strategy Evolution by Joseph Czarnecki 10 February 2001, the japanese war plan (1923, the last time it was updated) assumed "(1) Destroy U.S. Asiatic Squadron. (2) Invade Philippines and Guam. (3) Attrite advancing U.S. Fleet with light forces based in the Mandates. (4) Decisive Battle occurs in daylight between the Bonins and the Marianas." (Numbers added by me for clarity).

The US plans assumed "A trans-Pacific transit would only be possible pre-hostilities..." In the event of war being forced upon the US, "Kimmel's plan was to seek a fleet battle northeast of Wake, outside Japanese land-based air range."

Evans and Peattie in Kaigun "Kaigun" page 475, had Yamamoto noting, "while fleet training had been based on the wait-and-react strategy leading up to the classic gun battle, in past war games and maneuvers, the navy never did succeed in winning such an encounter."

Thus, a decisive fleet battle on the Wake-Marianas approach, with an unreduced PI behind the Japanese, did not conform to japanese expectations. Indeed, japanese naval plans for the Decisive battle specifically included the seizure of the PI ahead of time. The US plans did not (although by 1936 the US army and navy, expecting the PI to be an early target of the japanese, did not expect it to hold out). Thus, the plan you suppose, which allows the US to time its entry into the war, DOES conform more to USN plans than IJN ones.

The USN sent a dozen new subs to the PI in 1941, not 30. The total force in the Asiatic Fleet in December 1941 was 29 subs, of which 6 were "S" class "pigboats" and the rest "fleet" submarines of between 6 and 3 years' service. Two fleet boats were immediately destroyed, and 9 were unavailable to oppose the landigs because they were on too distant patrol. None of them, in fact, attacked any of the Japanese landing forces becuase they were not in position to do so. It is hard to say what affect they may have had with some advance warning and proper time to reposition. Torpedoes, as we both note, were a major concern (although they were not 100% inperfect and the transports made very large and slow targets).

[grumbler]

TIMJOT,

I meant to include in the above post something else "Electric Joe" noted in his paper, that might actually help your argument (but you can decide that) <img src="smile.gif" border="0"> "Much is made of MacArthur's and the Army's reversal on the issue of defending the Philippines in July 1941. What is ignored, or generally unknown, is that this was predicated upon the assumption that war would not break out before April 1942. Thus, had the war broken out before then, sans Pearl Harbor, but otherwise per history, the USN still would not have committed to relieving the Philippines. In fact, there's no guarantee the USN would have agreed to do so even in April 1942."

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
I dont think the allies resistance could have been any shorter than it was. as it was the few US forces that fought in the DEI, the asiatic fleet, a few B-17,PBY's,P-40's and 1 arty bn. didnt delay the japanese advance a lick.

its precisely the domestic poltics involved that I think would cause at least a delay a DOW.

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I think that, from the Japanese standpoint, the existance of an Australian division at Singapore, the return of two more from the Middle east (which surely they would have heard at least something about), and the reinforcement by the US of the DEI with several thousand troops (given that the Dutch themselves only had 40,000 troops in the DEI) and aircraft meant that they could take nothing for granted. Additionally, the Dutch and british were certainly at least somewhat heartened by the fact that they had the (at least potential) might of the US on their side.

In the end, I agree, all the US shoestring efforts in the DEI were pretty much for nought. However, this was not seen as such at the time and the Dutch, at least, might have seen their way into following the french action in Indochina had not the US been involved in the war. for Japan, the benefits of taking all the Dutch oil fields intact would have been incalculable.

So, I don't dismiss the possibility that a delayed US entry into the war would have been of no value to Japan. We just don't know.

For japan to have counted on it was too much of a gamble on her part, however. That is the crux of my argument.

[grumbler]

Originally posted by TIMJOT:
Grumbler; I apologize about all the seperate post, but for some reason I was not able to edit all your quotes onto one post. <img src="frown.gif" border="0"> So make sure you go back and read them all.

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I actually prefer the point-by-point posts. It makes it easier to focus in on what we think is important in our differences! <img src="smile.gif" border="0">

I hope you are enjoying this debate as much as I am!

[grumbler]

Originally posted by moore4807:
Grumbler & TIMJOT,
I have read your posts with interest about the Pacific War variations. My personal opinions tend to lean towards TIMJOT's, as I continually play Pacific War and do the very precise thing he advocates as the Japanese player. I'm not even in the same category or as well read as both of you. (You've both given me a lot of reading material to catch up on!) I just notice some things in the game for the US forces that is discussed here.

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How, in game terms, do you avoid war with the US? The fact that the US is hostile is hard-coded into the game. The US air zones from the PI prevent Japanese conoys from transporting oil and resources from the south to Japan.

1) To reinforce and supply PI and Guam from the beginning, you virtually have to strip the west coast of transports and tankers (most of these getting sunk in the game, by the way...) These wouldnt be replaced nearly as fast if the US isnt at war....

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This assumes that Japanese AZOCs block supplies via normal convoy to the PI. Not the case if Japan and the US are not at war. It is true, however, that even a PI left to "wither on the vine" becomes useless pretty quickly, because of game assumptions about US air activities in the PI.

2) The IJN Fleet carriers are pretty much free to split up (my choice is 2CV-1CVL with fleet support)giving exactly the freedom to move south and west if needed. The US is not very likely to rush into Japan's back yard when 3CV's is all they have to fight with for the first 18 months!

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You are basing this on the assumption (contrary to Japanese expectations) that Amboina and Timor are not major air bases with significant bomber forces. You have much better data than the japanese had, and so are more willing to split their forces than the Japanese were.

I note this is hindsight and computer AI play for the most part, but I thought it may be pertient to the discussion. I "think" the Japanese could have caused us bigger headaches NOT attacking PH and getting the DEI oil riches. India could have been taken then with no US interference until that point and its a much different war then.

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Would you agree that this decision might be different if the US was given the option of when to begin the war? Imagine having all of your forces concentrated on Malaya and the DEI and suddenly finding that the US has reinforced Guam with a division from hawaii, packed Wake and Guam with navy aircraft and the PI with Army aircraft, and then declared war! You would have to rapidly redeploy your own air to keep the AZOCs of the Americans from completely cutting off your own forces, and then engage in a major campaign in the PI to get rid of the problem. you would win, but in the meantime you would have no air forces for the vital capture of the DEI. You might not get around to that until june or July of 1942, by which time your fuel would have started to run out.

I think the japanese made the smart choice, which was to tae out their enemies while Japan had a dominant hand. To delay war on the US and allow the US to pick the time of going to war was far, far too risky. The success of their actual plans argues strongly that they knew exactly what they were doing.

[TIMJOT]

The Japanese could not KNOW that war would be declared by the US right away, and so could not count on the South Seas Detachment to sieze Guam unaided. They would HAVE to plan on the possibility of an invasion opposed by US naval forces and thus had to plan on supporting the invasion with naval and air forces of their own. These forces could not, then, be allocated in their plans for a strike elsewhere, as they would be leaving the initiative in American hands. They would be far better off striking immediately and knowing that their forces could then be made available elsewhere (and also know that the American fleet would be nowhere near Guam when the axe fell).

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No they could not KNOW that the US would declare war right away, but they could have the same forces at the ready as they historically did, in case they did. You say it was too risky to not attack the US becuase they might declare war immediately upon the Japanese strike south. If they did they could have all the forces ready and followed the historical plan in its historical sequence. Again if war is declared immediatley then there is no way the USN could send naval forces to defend Guam in time. Now if the US does not declare war right away then I already admitted that makes things much more tricky for the Japanese. Because then the US could continue to reinforce the PI, wake and Guam unhinderd. There would be nothing the Japanese could do about it without committing an overt act of war against the US. I'll paraphrase a quote of FDR in a previous post. He states that that the US could probably not declare war if the Japanese just attacked the British and the Dutch, but sooner or latter the Japanes would make a mistake to cause war. I am sure FDR was hopeing the Japanese would try in stop such a reinforcement. He desperately wanted and felt he needed the Japanese to commit the first overt act. In fact the war warning sent to PH and PI said as much. It stated and Im paraphaseing again "We believe war may be immenent, However we wish Japan commmit first overt act if possible". You cant have it both ways though. You believe in an immediate DOW but all the risks you describe for the Japanese seem to more inline with a delay DOW.

[TIMJOT]

Wake is apparently some 630 miles from Kwajelein - I didn't do a very good job with my quick map measurements! Again, however, an "indefinate" jump-off date for the japanese conquest of the island would have to account for the (even greater) likelihood of US intervention, and would have tied up forces Japan needed to use elsewhere. Leaving the initiative on when war was declared in US hands would have tied down yet more japanese resources.

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Again, I have already conceded the Japanese probably could not take Wake in my scenerio. I just say without Guam its insignificant for all the reasons I have already stated. Its usefullness as part of the airbridge to the PI without Guam is nullified.

[TIMJOT]

Originally posted by grumbler:


The Japanese 65th Brigade was sent into the PI only in January (possibly late December) and was not really a combat formation. It had six infantry battalion, but no support arms, and the troops had only one month's basic training. (Wilmott, p. 369). The 4th infantry division only arrived on 27 February (and since the 48th was withdrawn on January 2, hardly an "immediate" replacement). The Japanese may not have had the lift to carry their South Army reserve into the PI.

Of the 300 japanese planes used to neutralize the Philippines in December and January 1941, some 200 were part of the 11th Air Flotilla, which was subsequantly withdrawn to support the attack in the DEI. Absent these forces (21st and 23rd Air Flotillas), the 5th air division would be hard-pressed to gain air superiority over the Americans - a prerequisite to amphibious attack. Further, the Japanese could not count on using the bases on Jolo island to break the Dutch. this would have made air support for the DEI much more difficult to arrange.

In essence, you argue here that japan both could sustain the Malayan, PI, and DEI operations simultaniously (something I don't think even van der Vat claims), and that they would know the timing of the US DoW and be able to make plans accordingly. I don't think either of these contentions bears closer examination. If the Japanese are maintaining the forces necessary to attack the PI at the ready, then they lack the lift, troops, and aircraft necessary to take out the DEI.

Better for them, I think, to sieze the initiative and eliminate the Amerricans according to a schedule they control, so that forces can be freed up in time for the crucial assault on the DEI. Remember that their oil situation made the capture of the DEI at the first opportunity a crucial factor in the war. To delay that while waiting for the US to declare war invited disaster.

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Yes the 65th was slated to be the occupational force. Whats your point? You still have to count it as part of Homma's Army. Occupational forces are important in these types of campaigns becuase they free up combat formations to do there thing. Besides it did end up seeing a lot of combat. The 4th wasnt sent sooner becuase it wasnt thought to be needed. They had already captured Manila and thought all they had to do was to mop up a few thousand remaining troops on Battaan. They had no idea there was some 70,000 troops on Bataan at that time. Even up to the time of Bataan's surrender they had only expect some 30,000 prisoners.

I dont think sea lift had anything to do with not commiting the reserve to the PI operation. I think first and foremost it was politcal. The High command was not happy with Homma or the pace fo the PI operation. All other operations were executed flawless and a head of schedule. Only Homma has dragging behind. The High command simply didnt think he deserved more troops. They finally grudgly gave him the 4th which was a 2nd tier Div. and the reserve 21 mixed Bgd. The other reason was tactical. The 32 Div. was acually used in the invasion of Summatra not becuase it was planned but becuase the collaspe of the British in Malaya opened the oportunity push up the attack ahead of schedule.

Now we have to get one thing straight here. I never advocated that the Japanese take every objective in the the South simutaneously as your post seem to imply. If you got back to my original post. I said they should have attacked on the line Malaya, DEI. meaning Malaya initially with a follow on to DEI. Basically exactly what they did historically minus the PI operation. Which was follow up the initail assault on Malaya with attacks on the outlying DIE islands. Borneo, Celebes, Ambon,Timor,Bali and finally converging on the main islands of Java and Sumatra. These preferal opeations were carried out simutaneously with PI and Malay operations so there is no conflict there.

[ October 05, 2001: Message edited by: TIMJOT ]</p>