Its not too much of a stretch at all. Considering that Churchill was was deathly afraid of just such a thing. He repeatidly tried to convince FDR to base USN ships at Singapore and to give a formal declaration that attack on the UK would constitute war with the US. Politically, FDR would not or more accurately could not make such formal assurances. Add this to the fact there was historically no treaty obligations with the UK or Dutch and you have a very real possiblty the US declaration of war would not be automatic.Originally posted by mdiehl:
A decent idea that last one. There should be some teeth in it to mitigate against a Japanese strategy that attempts to overrun everything-but-American-possessions and then entrench. Probably US factory expansions and ship FRAM and new a/c designs should be significantly enhanced, as a protracted peace would have allowed the US to focus on infrastructure rather than mobilization. By 1941 the US plan was to go to war anyhow; it was merely a matter of wanting to mobilize more equipment before the shooting started. Such a change would also see the nominal Phillippine divisions turned into the real thing.
Is it too much of a stretch, though, to think that a Japanese attack against UK or Commonwealth nations would provoke a US DOW anyhow?
I agree that you would need to put some teeth into the varible. I would suggest that every Japanese conquest would increase the percentage chance that the US would Declare war. For example any move expanding toward Austrailia or the south pacific ferry routes would increase the chance greatly. The US player would not have to just stand idly by and watch the Japs conquer the pacific. Like you suggest the US could benefit from some sort of production bonuses. He could be eligible to receive emergency reinforcements from the Atlantic (ie additional carriers). He could have the option of sending aditional supplies to the Brits, Dutch and Aussies. He could even have the option of escorting convoys to Austrailia and secureing Allied bases such as Fiji,Tonga,New Caladonia and even the Solomons. Sort of a pacific Lend/Lease so to speak. All of which would not be a stretch historically. All these variables would prevent a Japanese decision not attack the US from becoming a defacto slam dunk. It would be very risky in that he could never no what move could provoke war and thus risk being unprepared or out of position to meet such a threat. He would have to weigh the risk and rewards of watching the US secure a line of communication to Austrailia , reinforceing its bases on the PI, Guam, Wake and building up its Fleet assets virtually unmolested. It really would make for a lot of interesting "What ifs"
