HAVE TO ASK THIS QUESTION...

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
There ARE two paragraphs. Major problem is the system. I'm going to leave
five spaces between each sentence in this one. But I will bet that they get squashed
together like the ones above. I actually thought I'd kept the sentences in the post
above at pretty reasonable length (for me, anyway). Now to see what happens when
I hit "OK"

Mike, your sentence length is fine. You tend to emulate conversation in your grammar, mechanics, and usage, but informality is what this kind of communication is all about. Your prose is appropriately idiomatic and lively. You are a good writer.

Your paragraphs are, though, too long, particularly for the casual reader. A good rule of thumb is, "If you have more than four sentences in a paragraph, look for a way to break it up."

Of course, the Matrix forums are hardly the place to talk about all this highfalutin' academic nonsense.

[pasternakski]

ORIGINAL: crsutton
Simply by taking two or (better) three bearings on a single radio transmission, the Allies were able to accuratly pinpoint the location of the sub sending the signal.

We used to do this at NSA back in the Cold War. Unfortunately, all our RDF shots showed that the transmission originated from Racquel Welch's p#ssy.

Here's an example of one of our best three-way shots:

[testarossa]

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

We used to do this at NSA back in the Cold War.

What is NSA?

[dtravel]

ORIGINAL: testarossa

ORIGINAL: pasternakski

We used to do this at NSA back in the Cold War.

What is NSA?

there is No Such Agency.

[mlees]

HF/DF reply:

The model is ok, IMO, in the Japanese ASW effort, which was criminally negligent historically.

Example:
The Japanese divided up the regions under their command into 10 seperate districts for merchant shipping, each with its own officer in charge of scheduling convoys and assigning escort assests. Frequently, he operated with only a few men on his staff, (These were considered "collateral duties". That is, this wasn't the officer's sole, or even main job.), and occasionally alone. Information on sub sightings was not shared between the district commands, or sometimes even between the Army and Navy in the same district. Even convoy arrival times from one district into another, frequently, was not shared info.[X(]

At least half of the time, escorting aircraft could not communicate by radio with the convoy's in their patrol area (either because of broken radio sets or wrong frequency settings).

HF/DF was in service well before the war for the IJN. While the HF/DF system was one of the rare instances where the IJA and IJN freely shared info on sub sightings, the info was worthless by the time it was collated. (The Maizuru Naval District, responsible for the Sea of Japan, reported that it had never located an enemy submarine using radio bearings.)

Source: "The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW II" by Mark P Parillo, chapter 8.

[spence]

HFDF became a significant "killer" of subs when the sets were widely introduced aboard escort vessels and a/c. Triangulation of different bearings on submarine radio signals to obtain a general location had been in use from the very first day of the war. The plots were useful for planning an a/c patrol and for diversion of convoys but not accurate enough to mass ASW assets to effect a kill.

Tactically a convoy escort could run down a bearing line obtained on a strong signal (close by), force a UBoat to dive and sit on it for a while, causing the UBoat to lose contact with the convoy or perhaps killing it. Even though the equipment was available earlier, the escorts were spread so thin through early 43 that the tactic could seldom be fully implemented.

[mogami]

Hi, Concerning only the USN.
In the 24 months prior to Japan forming ASW command and Escort commands
22 USN submarines were lost.
In the 19 months after this 30 USN submarines were lost.
Of the 38 USN submarines known to have been lost as a direct result of Japanese action
17 were sunk (or forced to scuttle) by Japanese surface ships. At least half of these had also been spotted by Japanese ASW aircraft.

So prior to Japan forming ASW efforts the monthy avg loss of USN submarines was .91
After it was 1.58 (not quite 2x as effective but other factors might need to be addressed such as there being a shortage of ASW DD but reflecting increased performance of remaining vessels. )

If any one has data on loss for RN and Dutch submarines please post.

The question in my mind is "Are WITP loss rates caused by too high ASW ratings of Japanese or by
1. Increased ASW effort by Japanese
2. Over aggressive use by Allies

People are aware are they not that the submarines located in PI at start historically withdrew. They did not go on war patrols early in war. I think they went to Darwin and then to Perth (or was it to Perth and then to Darwin)
Many of the PI boats went all the way to South Pacific bases before going on first war patrols.

Result in WITP is more then 3 times the number of Allied submarines are on patrol in first month. Allied submarine force commanders normally did not have more then 1/3 of total available subs on patrol at one time (and then 1/3 in refit/repair and 1/3 coming from or going to patrol)

The Japanese certainly did the same.

[Charles2222]

ORIGINAL: crsutton

Remember, the real killer of enemy subs in the Atlantic was Huff Duff or RDF intercepts. Simply by taking two or (better) three bearings on a single radio transmission, the Allies were able to accuratly pinpoint the location of the sub sending the signal. It remained to simply vector nearby aircraft or ASW ship to the location. This was the prime reason that the Allies were so sucessful at killing subs in the mid to later stages of the war.

The Allies were pretty good at this in the Pacific as well. They were very adept at using radio intercepts to pinpoint enemy ships-surface as well as subs. That is half the battle if you know where an enemy sub is operating. The Japanese used radio intercepts but I don't think they were as good at it.

This, i believe is not factored in the game.

"NOT" factored in the game? If anything it's way over factored. Do you know how many JA subs get attacked by convoys no less, before they've even fired a round? And that's on 12/7/41!

[mlees]

People are aware are they not that the submarines located in PI at start historically withdrew. They did not go on war patrols early in war. I think they went to Darwin and then to Perth (or was it to Perth and then to Darwin)
Many of the PI boats went all the way to South Pacific bases before going on first war patrols.

I have "Silent Victory" by Clay Blair at home. In the Appendices is a list of every war patrol conducted by U.S. subs, sorted by date, homeport, and patrol results. I will post the patrols that departed from PI bases. My point is that I believe that the number might surprise you, Mogami. (Than again, maybe nuthin surprises you...) Allied Sub Doctrine was "on", though,so the results were less than stellar.

[mlees]

HFDF became a significant "killer" of subs when the sets were widely introduced aboard escort vessels and a/c. Triangulation of different bearings on submarine radio signals to obtain a general location had been in use from the very first day of the war. The plots were useful for planning an a/c patrol and for diversion of convoys but not accurate enough to mass ASW assets to effect a kill.

Again, that was the Allies/Atlantic experience. The Japanese HF/DF system was not managed properly, so the info gathered by HF/DF shore stations was not delivered timely enough or accurately enough for the District Commanders to route convoys around a sub. For example, a sub can sail 180 miles (15kts x 12 hours, or 3 game hexes) before the info reaches the District commander.

As a further clarification of the District Commanders woes, the ASW assets were not tactically under his control. They were "on loan" from the local area commanders, who may have other priorities. This made detailed plotting of aircraft patrol routes extremely difficult.

Tactically a convoy escort could run down a bearing line obtained on a strong signal (close by), force a UBoat to dive and sit on it for a while, causing the UBoat to lose contact with the convoy or perhaps killing it. Even though the equipment was available earlier, the escorts were spread so thin through early 43 that the tactic could seldom be fully implemented.

This is also the case in the Pacific sub war also where the U.S. sub transmits in the vicinity of a convoy. However, the standard doctrine for U.S. subs up until mid '44 was "lone wolf" deployments, were a U.S. sub would shoot first, and send a contact report later. Shipboard HF/DF doesn't help before then. HF/DF mounted on ships had much shorter range than shore installations, so it provides info that gives the escort commander less time to react than shore based info.

[Nikademus]

Asiatic Command attempted a classic pre-war coastal defense of the PI's by sub campaign at the beginning of the war, and learned the hard way just as the Germans did that it doesn't work.

Overall a dismal and unprofitalbe effort that exposed major flaws in the Silent Service at that time.

Blair's book held no punches in this regard.

[mogami]

Hi, US submarines in Dec 1941 compiled 281 days of patrol. To me this indicates around 12 submarines were on station. There were 50 something submarines in the Pacific.
They sank 6 ships in Dec. (well they claimed to have sank 6 ships in Dec)

[mlees]

You have me chomping at the bit, Mog. I won't get home for another 5 or 6 hours...[:)]

[Philbass]

ORIGINAL: Mogami
If any one has data on loss for RN and Dutch submarines please post.

I'm not quite sure what's being debated, but here is the data regarding RN submarines.

Only three RN submarines were lost in the Pacific and Indian Ocean:

1) STRATAGEM - depth charged by Japanese patrol craft off Malacca, 22nd November 1944
2) STONEHENGE - overdue on 20th March 1944 (one possible scenario is here: http://web.ukonline.co.uk/chalcraft/sm/stonehenge.html)
3) PORPOISE - bombed by Japanese aircraft in the Straits of Malacca, 16th January 1945

I wouldn't suggest using the RN losses as a model for anything as:

• They operated mainly inshore
• By 1944/1945 only lightly defended targets remained (deck gun tended to be used more often than torpedoes)
• RN submarines weren't in strength in the Indian Ocean until late 1943/1944. They moved to the Pacific in 1945 and ended up with one flotilla operating out of Subic Bay
• They were used for other missions such as landing agents, reconnaissance and nailing the U-boats and blockade runners coming out of Penang harbour

As for results, British submarines sank 34 ships of over 500 GRT aggregating 71,875 tons (including by mines laid by subs).

As for doctrine/commanders, I would say that the British commanders were aggressive - over 41% of all tonnage sunk by RN subs were warships (although this reflects the lack of merchant targets) including the heavy cruiser ASHIGARA (and another through midget subs).

Alastair Mars (1971) Submarines at War 1939-45 (London: William Kimber) makes the point that the pre-war commanders had all been lost or moved to non-operational posts by mid-war and when RN submarines return in strength to the Indian Ocean/Pacific they are commanded by officers who had cut their teeth in the Med and North Sea. They were experienced and fairly well trained. While the 'S' and 'T' boats weren't really suited to the theatre on behalf of their lack of range, lack of habitability and room to stick radar etc, they were reliable and did the job within the constraints of the target and the situation.

Interestingly, while 2 volumes of the Naval Staff History covered RN Submarines in WW2, there doesn't appear to be one on the submarines in the Indian Ocean Pacific. Although Hezlet (he who sank the ASHIGARA)has recently published something on this (I haven't read it yet) and then there is also: Wilson, Michael (2000) A Submariner's War: The Indian Ocean 1939-1945 (London: Tempus Publishing), which is next in the pile to read.

Regards,

Philip Bass

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, US submarines in Dec 1941 compiled 281 days of patrol. To me this indicates around 12 submarines were on station. There were 50 something submarines in the Pacific.
They sank 6 ships in Dec. (well they claimed to have sank 6 ships in Dec)

IIRC on Blair...only 2 were confirmed.

[mlees]

Thanks for the titles of your references! Something new to add to my budding library.[:)]

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Asiatic Command attempted a classic pre-war coastal defense of the PI's by sub campaign at the beginning of the war, and learned the hard way just as the Germans did that it doesn't work.

Overall a dismal and unprofitalbe effort that exposed major flaws in the Silent Service at that time.

Blair's book held no punches in this regard.

It would have helped if they were at sea. What would really have helped is Whacky Mac having an ounce of living brain tissue during the campaign and prior. Lingayen Gulf should have been a trap, not a welcome mat.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker


It would have helped if they were at sea.

Not really. The SS's problems were mainly in pre-war doctrine and training which stressed caution over aggressiveness and punished commanders for taking what were perceived as "risks".

[Philbass]

ORIGINAL: mlees

Thanks for the titles of your references! Something new to add to my budding library.[:)]

For the other side of the story there is an excellent book about airborne ASW patrols in the Indian Ocean:

Banks, Arthur (1996) Wings of the Dawning; Battle for the Indian Ocean 1939-1945 (Malvern Wells, Worcs. UK: Arthur Banks Images Publishing)

On another track...I'm not sure if anyone has posted this here before, or even if any WiTP players are involved in this project, but a classic paper-based wargame on the US Pacific Sub offensive is due out later on in 2005.

The link to the site that explains about the playtest is here: http://homepage.mac.com/marksearle/SW_test/.

From what I remember about this project, the guys pretty much built an ASW model based on all of the available data and had lots of nice research notes and data in the downloads.

**** Oh, bugger just checked the links and they've been deactivated due to approaching publication. I'm sure all will be revealed when it comes out**** Sorry to tantalise and run.

Regards,

Philip Bass

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Concerning only the USN.
In the 24 months prior to Japan forming ASW command and Escort commands
22 USN submarines were lost.
In the 19 months after this 30 USN submarines were lost.
Of the 38 USN submarines known to have been lost as a direct result of Japanese action
17 were sunk (or forced to scuttle) by Japanese surface ships. At least half of these had also been spotted by Japanese ASW aircraft.

So prior to Japan forming ASW efforts the monthy avg loss of USN submarines was .91
After it was 1.58 (not quite 2x as effective but other factors might need to be addressed such as there being a shortage of ASW DD but reflecting increased performance of remaining vessels. )

JMO, but I think there are several factors that explain the historical increase in sinkings of US subs other than the establishment of an IJN asw/escort command (in 11/43?):

- Japan's empire shrank, leading to much shorter convoy routes and a relative increase in the effectiveness of IJN's asw assets due to the smaller area covered

- I haven't done any research on this but I think the number of IJN escorts increased in absolute numbers while the number of Japanese merchies decreased in absolute numbers leading to: more escorts produced + fewer merchies = greater ratio of escorts to merchies

- more US subs on patrol due to production

- US subs started to operate more frequently off the coast of Japan or in the Sea of Japan, both inherently dangerous places to operate

- distance to patrol zones became greater until forward sub bases were established. I can't prove this but . . . as time on patrol became shorter and the targets became scarcer, I would think US sub commanders started taking greater risks

- japanese asw equipment became better and more available

I really wanted to make this into one paragraph.[:@]