Japaense Fuel question - help wanted

[Supervisor]

I think the question of how to limit global resources in this game should be added, if at all, as a player option on the Game Options Menu.

I have yet to find a single reference in secondary sources to Japanese Fuel stocks beyond the usual brief mentions about the tanker campaign in 1944 which is beyond the scope of the game. Dunnigan's and Nofi's "Pacific War Encyclopedia" has annual figures for the Japanese Strategic Reserve, production and consumpion which show that the Japanese consumed the Reserve and all of their production in 42 and 43; then the entire system crashed in 44 when the allies sank their tankers in 44 and began capturing or destroying the oil production and refining facilities in the South Pacific. There are references to existing fuel stocks at Japanese bases.

A series of monographs written by surviving Japanese participants and translated into English exists but only the ones pertaining to the outbreak of war have been posted on the net. Several monographs deal with different aspects of the campaign in the South Pacific but I don't know without seeing them if there is any hard statistical information. I think we're talking about the National Archives, Library of Congress or somewhere with a real research library if real numbers exist.

Do you want to know that bad?

[Bulldog61]

Just found a passage in Richard B. Frank's Guadalcanal that collaborates some data provided by Mogami.

Of the imminent clash between US and IJN Carrier forces in Oct 42, Page 370 2nd Paragraph states ”Of two immediate concerns looming over Kondo’s Support Force, fuel came first. The operational design called for by the Combined Fleet to cover both the reinforcement convoy and, one week later, the land assault during one excursion from Truk. Colonel Tsuji had been warned in late September that the Support Force could remain at sea for only about two weeks because of fuel considerations. Even this period strained the meager supplies available; oil had to be siphoned from battleships Yamato and Mutsu at Truk into tankers for transfer to vessels at sea. Moreover, the oil problem compelled Kondo to abruptly abandon his bid for a fleet action in mid-October, and concomitant interdiction of the supply lines to Guadalcanal, to conduct refueling between October 16 and 18.”

Mike

[Supervisor]

Mogami, meant to ask you earlier and just to back to this question: Did you find any hard numbers anywhere on fuel storage capacity at Truk or fuel inventories on any given dates? Or even any indicators on source on that data?

[babyseal7]

Fuel was the number 1 concern for the Japanese throughout the war. At no point did they have "fuel to burn"...all operations planned with fuel considerations in mind. Giving the IJN player "unlimited" fuel ANYWHERE would distort "reality" (whatever that is).

For this campaign fuel shouldn't be the axis it revolves around, but it definitely should be limited to the point that it's a constant nagging low grade worry for the IJN player.

[mogami]

Hi, ED I hope to have that sort of detailed data in a week or so.

If IJN TF's composed of 4 BB 4 CA and 1 CL 9 DD can be sent down the slot on a sustained basis (even with ships available) While at the same time a CV TF is out to sea, and subs prowling about. etc etc then I'd would say from what data I have seen so far, something would be 'rotten in Denmark'

[Supervisor]

Thanks, for the feedback. I'm glad some one has found some hard data.

[Chiteng]

I must interject that what the Japanese in the Solomans needed were merchant ships that did NOT
get located and bombed. That isnt quite the same thing as neutralizing the airbase. Nor was it immpossible to achieve. We tend to focus on the
convoys that did get intercepted. Not all of them did.

[Marc]

I found the following information in the book "Kaigun, Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941" http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0870211927/qid=1014416079/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_3_1/103-1800113-2863859

I hope it helps a little.

All numers are millions of kiloliters
First year of the war:
1. Reserves at the start of the year: 8.4
2. Japanese domestic production: 0.26
3. Synthetic production: 0.24
4. Imports from S.E. Asia: 1.49
5. Total supply: 10.39
6. Consumption: 8.25
7. Navy's consumption: 4.85
8. Remainder at year's end: 2.14

Second year:
1. 2.14
2. 0.27
3. 0.27
4. 2.65
5. 5.33
6. 6.62
7. 4.28
8. -1.29

Third year:
1. -1.29
2. 0.25
3. 0.22
4. 1.06
5. 0.24
6. 4.68
7. 3.18
8. -4.44

A note to the negative numbers in point 8.:
A large quantity of Southeast Asian petroleum was fueled to navy vessels at Palembang, Sumatra and this probably accounted for the difference between supply and consumption.

Another passage:
"The navy calculated that after the start of hostilities, on average, it would consume about 233,000 tons of fuel monthly, ..., for an average annual expenditure rate of not quite 2,800,000 tons. In fact, during the Pacific War, despite extreme economy measures, the navy consumed well over 12,000,000 tons of petroleum. This was about 4,400,000 tons more than anticipated...
In all, it amounted to a staggering 60 percent of Japan's total consumption of petroleum during the war, by one estimate."

[Marc]

I found another interesting source.
The diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki. http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/ts/exchange-glance/Y02Y3839817Y7148420/qid=1014423133/sr=1-1/103-1800113-2863859

Friday, 14 August 1942 (he is onboard Yamato in homewaters)
"Staff officers Miwa and Watanabe returned from Tokyo last night. They reported there will be a shortage of fuel in November this year. I hope the Munitions Bureau will preapre so that operations might not be affected by it."


Sunday, 30 August 1942 (onboard Yamato at Truk)
"The tanker Tatekawa Maru arrived, so the Eleventh Division started its belated refueling. Another Third Fleet tanker also arrived from home waters. As fleet activities in this area increased, fuel consumption reached a huge amount, so the arrangement of fleet tankers reinforced by those belonging to the navy minister was strained to the utmost. This place [Truk] is supposed to be an advanced naval base for this area, yet installations were exceedingly poor. Not even a fuel tank has been completed ashore."

Sunday, 20 September 1942 (still Truk)
"The fleet's daily fuel consumption amounts to ten thousand tons lately, and the shortage of tankers was acute in the Rabaul area, as before. The fuel stock at Kure is said to have decreased to 650,000 tons, which is extremely discouraging. I hope it won't hamper the fleet's operational movements. It's also essential for the fleet to economize on fuel by refraining from unnecessary movements."

Sunday, 18 October 1942 (still Truk)
"The tanker Kenyo Maru, attached to the advance force, arrived with an empty stomach. As she had no time to go back to the homeland to fill up with fuel, she took forty-five hundred tons each from Yamato and Mutsu and some from Nissho Maru. She will leave here tomorrow morning, heading for the rendezvous point with the advance force.
In the afternoon two more ships came alongside Yamato. Battleships turned into floating tanks! The oil consumption was so much that even the full operation of tankers was not enough. The fuel storage at the homeland is also running short, and a strict order to produce fuel oil has been issued to the oil-producing area in the south. The fact that we now possess those resource-rich districts is our strong point anyway. And because of this we will not be beaten down."

[mogami]

Hi, very good excellent . only I think the Navy stock at Kure was 65000 not 650000 (650000 is more then a years supply)

[Marc]

Originally posted by Mogami:
Hi, very good excellent . only I think the Navy stock at Kure was 65000 not 650000 (650000 is more then a years supply)

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Hi Mogami,

no. The book says 650,000 tons. At least that is what Ugaki heard. Not a number we should rely on.

Marc

[Bulldog61]

Hi Marc!
The 65,000 number is mentioned in a couple of other sources. It could have been a misprint in the book. I think the point here is that the IJN was severly restricted by fuel in there ops even in mid to late 42.


Mike

[Marc]

Originally posted by Mike Kraemer:
I think the point here is that the IJN was severly restricted by fuel in there ops even in mid to late 42.


Mike

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Right. My opinion.

Marc