The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces December 18, 1940
9 copies
Directive No. 21
"Operation Barbarossa"
The German Armed Forces must be prepared, even before the conclusion of the war against England, to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign ("Operation Barbarossa").
The Army will have to employ all available formations to this end, with the reservation that occupied territories must be insured against surprise attacks.
The Luftwaffe will have to make available for this Eastern campaign supporting forces of such strength that the Army will be able to bring land operations to a speedy conclusion and that eastern Germany will be as little damaged as possible by enemy air attack. This build-up of a focal point in the East will be limited only by the need to protect from air attack the whole combat and arsenal area which we control, and to ensure that attacks on England, and especially upon her imports, are not allowed to lapse.
The main efforts of the Navy will continue to be directed against England even during the Eastern campaign.
In certain circumstances I shall issue orders for the deployment against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the operation is timed to begin.
Preparations which require more time than this will be put in hand now, in so far as this has not already been done, and will be concluded by 15th May 1941.
It is of decisive importance that our intention to attack should not be known.
The preparations of the High Commands will be made on the following basis:
I. General Intention
The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armored spearheads. Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be prevented from withdrawing into the depths of Russia.
The enemy will then be energetically pursued and a line will be reached from which the Russian Air Force can no longer attack German territory. The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.
The last surviving industrial area of Russia in the Urals can then, if necessary, be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will then no longer be capable of action.
The effective operation of the Russian Air Force is to be prevented from the beginning of the attack by powerful blows.
II. Probable Allies and their Tasks
1. On the flanks of our operations we can count on the active support of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
The High Command of the Armed Forces will decide and lay down in due time the manner in which the forces of these two countries will be brought under German command.
2. It will be the task of Romania to support the attack of the German southern flank, at least at the outset, with its best troops; to hold down the enemy where German forces are not engaged; and to provide auxiliary services in the rear areas.
3. Finland will cover the advance of the Northern Group of German forces moving from Norway (detachments of (Group XXI) and will operate in conjunction with them. Finland will also be responsible for eliminating Hango.
4. It is possible that Swedish railways and roads may be available for the movement of the German Northern Group, by the beginning of the operation at the latest.
III. Conduct of Operations
A. Army (in accordance with plans submitted to me)!
In the theater of operations, which is divided by the Pripet Marshes into a Southern and a Northern sector, the main weight of attack will be delivered in the Northern area. Two Army Groups will be employed here.
The more southerly of these two Army Groups (in the center of the whole front) will have the task of advancing with powerful armored and motorized formations from the area about and north of Warsaw, and routing the enemy forces in White Russia. This will make it possible for strong mobile forces to advance northwards and, in conjunction with the Northern Army Group operating out of East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to destroy the enemy forces operating in the Baltic area. Only after the fulfilment of this first essential task, which must include the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, will the attack be continued with the intention of occupying Moscow, an important center of communications and of the armaments industry.
Only a surprisingly rapid collapse of Russian resistance could justify the simultaneous pursuit of both objectives.
The most important task of Group XXI, even during these eastern operations, remains the protection of Norway. Any forces available after carrying out this task will be employed in the North (Mountain Corps), at first to protect the Petsamo area and its iron ore mines and the Arctic highway, then to advance with Finnish forces against the Murmansk railway and thus prevent the passage of supplies to Murmansk by land.
The question whether an operation of this kind can be carried out with stronger German forces (two or three divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it will depend on the willingness of Sweden to make its railways available for troop transport.
It will be the duty of the main body of the Finnish Army, in conjunction with the advance of the German North flank, to hold down the strongest possible Russian forces by an attack to the West, or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and to occupy Hango.
The Army Group operating South of the Pripet Marshes will also seek, in a concentric operation with strong forces on either flank, to destroy all Russian forces west of the Dnieper in the Ukraine. The main attack will be carried out from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, while forces in Romania will carry out a wide enclosing movement across the lower Pruth. It will be the task of the Romanian Army to hold down Russian forces in the intervening area.
When the battles north and south of the Pripet Marshes are ended the pursuit of the enemy will have the following aims:
In the South the early capture of the Donets Basin, important for war industry.
In the North a quick advance to Moscow. The capture of this city would represent a decisive political and economic success and would also bring about the capture of the most important railway junctions.
B. Luftwaffe
It will be the duty of the Luftwaffe to paralyze and eliminate the effectiveness of the Russian Air Force as far as possible. lt will also support the main operations of the Army, i.e. those of the central Army Group and of the vital flank of the Southern Army Group. Russian railways will either be destroyed or, in accordance with operational requirements, captured at their most important points (river crossings) by the bold employment of parachute and airborne troops.
In order that we may concentrate all our strength against the enemy Air Force and for the immediate support of land operations, the Russian armaments industry will not be attacked during the main operations. Such attacks will be made only after the conclusion of mobile warfare, and they will be concentrated first on the Urals area.
C. Navy
It will be the duty of the Navy during the attack on Soviet Russia to protect our own coasts and to prevent the breakout of enemy naval units from the Baltic. As the Russian Baltic fleet will, with the capture of Leningrad, lose its last base and will then be in a hopeless position, major naval action will be avoided until this occurs.
After the elimination of the Russian fleet the duty of the Navy will be to protect the entire maritime traffic in the Baltic and the transport of supplies by sea to the Northern flank (clearing of minefields!).
IV. All steps taken by Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must be phrased on the unambiguous assumption that they are precautionary measures undertaken in case Russia should alter its present attitude towards us. The number of officers employed on preliminary preparations will be kept as small as possible and further staffs will be designated as late as possible and only to the extent required for the duties of each individual. Otherwise there is a danger that premature knowledge of our preparations, whose execution cannot yet be timed with any certainty, might entail the gravest political and military disadvantages.
V. I await submission of the plans of Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive.
The preparations made by all branches of the Armed Forces, together with timetables, are to be reported to me through the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
Translated plans for Operation Barbarosa
Translated plans for Operation Barbarosa
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces July 19, 1941
13 copies
Directive No. 33
"Continuation of the war in the East"
1. The second series of battles in the East has ended, along the whole front, with the breach of the Stalin Line and the deep thrust of the panzer forces. In the area of Army Group Center, mopping up of the strong enemy forces which still remain between the motorized formations will still require considerable time.
The northern flank of Army Group South is restricted in its freedom of movement and effectiveness by the fortress of Kiev and the Russian 5th Army in its rear.
2. The aim of the next operations must be to prevent any further sizeable enemy forces from withdrawing into the depths of Russia, and to wipe them out.
Plans will be made for this as follows:
(a) South-Eastern Front:
The most important object is, by concentric attacks, to destroy the enemy 12th and 6th Armies while they are still west of the Dnieper. The main Romanian forces will support these operations in the south.
The enemy 5th Army can also be quickly and decisively defeated and annihilated by co-operation between forces on the south flank of Army Group Center and the northern flank of Army Group South.
While infantry divisions of Army Group Center move southward, other forces, chiefly motorized, after carrying out the tasks assigned to them, securing their lines of communication and providing cover in the direction of Moscow, will advance south-eastwards in order to cut off the withdrawal of enemy forces which have crossed to the further bank of the Dnieper, to prevent their withdrawal deeper into Russia, and to destroy them.
(b) Central Part of the Eastern Front:
After the destruction of the many pockets of enemy troops which have been surrounded and the establishment of lines of communication, Army Group Center, while continuing to advance to Moscow with infantry formations, will use these motorized units which are not employed in the rear of the Dnieper line to cut communications between Moscow and Leningrad, and so cover the right flank of the advance on Leningrad by Army Group North.
(c) Northern Part of the Eastern Front:
The advance on Leningrad will be resumed only when 18th Army has made contact with Panzer Group 4 and the extensive flank in the east is adequately protected by 16th Army. At the same time Army Group North must endeavor to prevent Russian forces still in action in Estonia from withdrawing to Leningrad.
Early capture of the Baltic Islands, which might be used as bases by the Soviet Navy, is desirable.
(d) Finnish Front:
It remains the task of the main Finnish forces, reinforced by most of 163rd Division, to attack the enemy opposing them with the main weight of attack east of Lake Ladoga and, later, in conjunction with Army Group North, to destroy them.
The object of the attack under the direction of 36th Corps and the Mountain Corps remains as already directed, except that stronger support from the air cannot be expected for the moment and operations may therefore have to be temporarily delayed.
3. The task of the Luftwaffe is, in particular, as forces become available from the Central front, to support operations on the South-eastern front at their most important point by bringing air and anti-aircraft units into action, and, if necessary, by early reinforcement or regrouping.
The attack on Moscow by the bomber forces of 2nd Air Fleet, temporarily reinforced by bomber forces from the West, will be carried out as soon as possible as "reprisal" for Russian attacks on Bucharest and Helsinki.
4. The Navy will continue to ensure the free passage of sea-borne traffic, especially of supplies for the land forces, as far as enemy activity at sea and in the air allows. Further, with the increasing threat to enemy bases, appropriate steps are to be taken to prevent the escape of enemy ships to Swedish ports, where they would be interned.
As naval forces in the Baltic become free, motor torpedo boats and minesweepers -- one flotilla of each to start with -- will be transferred to the Mediterranean.
To support German operations in Finland, which might be hampered by the arrival of enemy reinforcements by sea, a few submarines will be transferred to the Arctic Ocean.
5. All three branches of the Armed Forces in the West and North will bear in mind the possibility of British attacks on the Channel Islands and the Norwegian coast. Plans must be made for the quick transfer of air forces from the West to all parts of Norway.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
of the Armed Forces July 19, 1941
13 copies
Directive No. 33
"Continuation of the war in the East"
1. The second series of battles in the East has ended, along the whole front, with the breach of the Stalin Line and the deep thrust of the panzer forces. In the area of Army Group Center, mopping up of the strong enemy forces which still remain between the motorized formations will still require considerable time.
The northern flank of Army Group South is restricted in its freedom of movement and effectiveness by the fortress of Kiev and the Russian 5th Army in its rear.
2. The aim of the next operations must be to prevent any further sizeable enemy forces from withdrawing into the depths of Russia, and to wipe them out.
Plans will be made for this as follows:
(a) South-Eastern Front:
The most important object is, by concentric attacks, to destroy the enemy 12th and 6th Armies while they are still west of the Dnieper. The main Romanian forces will support these operations in the south.
The enemy 5th Army can also be quickly and decisively defeated and annihilated by co-operation between forces on the south flank of Army Group Center and the northern flank of Army Group South.
While infantry divisions of Army Group Center move southward, other forces, chiefly motorized, after carrying out the tasks assigned to them, securing their lines of communication and providing cover in the direction of Moscow, will advance south-eastwards in order to cut off the withdrawal of enemy forces which have crossed to the further bank of the Dnieper, to prevent their withdrawal deeper into Russia, and to destroy them.
(b) Central Part of the Eastern Front:
After the destruction of the many pockets of enemy troops which have been surrounded and the establishment of lines of communication, Army Group Center, while continuing to advance to Moscow with infantry formations, will use these motorized units which are not employed in the rear of the Dnieper line to cut communications between Moscow and Leningrad, and so cover the right flank of the advance on Leningrad by Army Group North.
(c) Northern Part of the Eastern Front:
The advance on Leningrad will be resumed only when 18th Army has made contact with Panzer Group 4 and the extensive flank in the east is adequately protected by 16th Army. At the same time Army Group North must endeavor to prevent Russian forces still in action in Estonia from withdrawing to Leningrad.
Early capture of the Baltic Islands, which might be used as bases by the Soviet Navy, is desirable.
(d) Finnish Front:
It remains the task of the main Finnish forces, reinforced by most of 163rd Division, to attack the enemy opposing them with the main weight of attack east of Lake Ladoga and, later, in conjunction with Army Group North, to destroy them.
The object of the attack under the direction of 36th Corps and the Mountain Corps remains as already directed, except that stronger support from the air cannot be expected for the moment and operations may therefore have to be temporarily delayed.
3. The task of the Luftwaffe is, in particular, as forces become available from the Central front, to support operations on the South-eastern front at their most important point by bringing air and anti-aircraft units into action, and, if necessary, by early reinforcement or regrouping.
The attack on Moscow by the bomber forces of 2nd Air Fleet, temporarily reinforced by bomber forces from the West, will be carried out as soon as possible as "reprisal" for Russian attacks on Bucharest and Helsinki.
4. The Navy will continue to ensure the free passage of sea-borne traffic, especially of supplies for the land forces, as far as enemy activity at sea and in the air allows. Further, with the increasing threat to enemy bases, appropriate steps are to be taken to prevent the escape of enemy ships to Swedish ports, where they would be interned.
As naval forces in the Baltic become free, motor torpedo boats and minesweepers -- one flotilla of each to start with -- will be transferred to the Mediterranean.
To support German operations in Finland, which might be hampered by the arrival of enemy reinforcements by sea, a few submarines will be transferred to the Arctic Ocean.
5. All three branches of the Armed Forces in the West and North will bear in mind the possibility of British attacks on the Channel Islands and the Norwegian coast. Plans must be made for the quick transfer of air forces from the West to all parts of Norway.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces July 23, 1941
14 copies
Supplement to Directive No. 33
After a report by Commander-in-Chief Army, the Fuehrer on July 22nd issued the following orders to amplify and extend Directive 33.
1. Southern Part of the Eastern Front:
The enemy forces which are still west of thc Dnieper must be decisively defeated and dispersed. As soon as the state of operations and of supplies allows, Panzer Groups 1 and 2 will be concentrated under command of 4th Panzer Army and, with the support of infantry and mountain divisions will occupy the Kharkov industrial area and thrust forward across the Don to Caucasia.
The bulk of the infantry divisions will then occupy the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the area of Central Russia up to the Don. The security of the area immediately south-west of the Bug is to be left to the Romanian army.
2. Central Part of the Eastern Front:
After mopping-up operations around Smolensk and on the southern flank, Army Group Center, whose infantry formations drawn from both its armies are strong enough for the purpose, will defeat such enemy forces as remain between Smolensk and Moscow, by an advance on the left flank if possible. It will then capture Moscow.
Panzer Group 3 will come under temporary command of Army Group North to secure its right flank and to surround the enemy in the Leningrad area.
For the further task of thrusting forward to the Volga, the mobile forces of Panzer Group 3 will probably be once more available.
3. Northern Part of the Eastern Front:
The subordination to it of Panzer Group 3 will enable Army Group North to employ strong forces of infantry for an attack in the direction of Leningrad, and to avoid expending its mobile forces in frontal attacks over difficult terrain.
Enemy forces still in action in Estonia will be destroyed. Their embarkation and withdrawal across the Narva towards Leningrad will be prevented.
Panzer Group 3 is to be returned to Army Group Center on the completion of its task.
4. The High Command of the Army will plan further operations so that large parts of Army Group North, including Panzer Group 4 and some of the infantry formations of Army Group South, may be moved back to Germany as soon as the situation allows.
Panzer Group 3 will be rendered fully operational by drawing upon Panzer Group 4 for equipment and personnel. Panzer Groups 1 and 2 will, if necessary, supply themselves by merging units.
5. The orders given for Navy and Luftwaffe in Directive 33 remain valid.
In addition they are to ease the situation of the Mountain Corps: the Navy, by the determined employment of its forces in the Arctic Ocean (now reinforced); the Luftwaffe, by the transfer of several dive-bomber groups to the Finnish theater once the fighting around Smolensk is over. This will also reduce the temptation for England to intervene in the fighting along the Arctic coast.
6. The troops available for securing the conquered Eastern territories will, in view of the size of this area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power meets resistance, not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to resist.
The Commanders concerned are to be held responsible, together with the troops at their disposal, for quiet conditions in their areas. They will contrive to maintain order, not by requesting reinforcements, but by employing suitably draconian methods.
Signed: KEITEL
of the Armed Forces July 23, 1941
14 copies
Supplement to Directive No. 33
After a report by Commander-in-Chief Army, the Fuehrer on July 22nd issued the following orders to amplify and extend Directive 33.
1. Southern Part of the Eastern Front:
The enemy forces which are still west of thc Dnieper must be decisively defeated and dispersed. As soon as the state of operations and of supplies allows, Panzer Groups 1 and 2 will be concentrated under command of 4th Panzer Army and, with the support of infantry and mountain divisions will occupy the Kharkov industrial area and thrust forward across the Don to Caucasia.
The bulk of the infantry divisions will then occupy the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the area of Central Russia up to the Don. The security of the area immediately south-west of the Bug is to be left to the Romanian army.
2. Central Part of the Eastern Front:
After mopping-up operations around Smolensk and on the southern flank, Army Group Center, whose infantry formations drawn from both its armies are strong enough for the purpose, will defeat such enemy forces as remain between Smolensk and Moscow, by an advance on the left flank if possible. It will then capture Moscow.
Panzer Group 3 will come under temporary command of Army Group North to secure its right flank and to surround the enemy in the Leningrad area.
For the further task of thrusting forward to the Volga, the mobile forces of Panzer Group 3 will probably be once more available.
3. Northern Part of the Eastern Front:
The subordination to it of Panzer Group 3 will enable Army Group North to employ strong forces of infantry for an attack in the direction of Leningrad, and to avoid expending its mobile forces in frontal attacks over difficult terrain.
Enemy forces still in action in Estonia will be destroyed. Their embarkation and withdrawal across the Narva towards Leningrad will be prevented.
Panzer Group 3 is to be returned to Army Group Center on the completion of its task.
4. The High Command of the Army will plan further operations so that large parts of Army Group North, including Panzer Group 4 and some of the infantry formations of Army Group South, may be moved back to Germany as soon as the situation allows.
Panzer Group 3 will be rendered fully operational by drawing upon Panzer Group 4 for equipment and personnel. Panzer Groups 1 and 2 will, if necessary, supply themselves by merging units.
5. The orders given for Navy and Luftwaffe in Directive 33 remain valid.
In addition they are to ease the situation of the Mountain Corps: the Navy, by the determined employment of its forces in the Arctic Ocean (now reinforced); the Luftwaffe, by the transfer of several dive-bomber groups to the Finnish theater once the fighting around Smolensk is over. This will also reduce the temptation for England to intervene in the fighting along the Arctic coast.
6. The troops available for securing the conquered Eastern territories will, in view of the size of this area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power meets resistance, not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to resist.
The Commanders concerned are to be held responsible, together with the troops at their disposal, for quiet conditions in their areas. They will contrive to maintain order, not by requesting reinforcements, but by employing suitably draconian methods.
Signed: KEITEL
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces July 30, 1941
14 copies
Directive No. 34
The development of the situation in the last few days, the appearance of strong enemy forces on the front and to the flanks of Army Group Center, the supply position, and the need to give Panzer Groups 2 and 3 about ten days to rehabilitate their units, make it necessary to postpone for the moment the further tasks and objectives laid down in Directive 33 of July 19th and in the supplement of July 23rd.
I therefore order as follows:
I. 1. In the Northern Sector of the Eastern front the main attack will continue between Lake Ilmen and Narva towards Leningrad, with the aim of encircling Leningrad and making contact with the Finnish Army.
North of Lake Ilmen this attack will be covered in the Volkhov sector; South of Lake Illmen it will be carried north-eastwards only so far as is required to protect the right flank of the attack north of the lake. The situation around Velikiye Luki will have been previously cleared up. All forces not required for these operations will be transferred to take part in the flank attacking north of Lake Ilmen. The intended thrust by Panzer Group 3 against the high ground around Valdai will be postponed until armored formations are fully ready for action. Instead, the left flank of Army Group Center will advance sufficiently far north-eastwards to afford protection to the right flank of Army Group North.
Estonia must first of all be mopped up by all the forces of 18th Army; only then may divisions advance towards Leningrad.
2. Army Group Center will go over to the defensive, taking advantage of suitable terrain.
Attacks with limited objectives may still be mounted in so far as they are necessary to secure favorable spring-boards for our offensive against Soviet 21st Army.
Panzer Groups 2 and 3 will be withdrawn from the front line for quick rehabilitation as soon as the situation allows.
3. Operations on the Southeastern front will, for the present, be conducted only by formations of Army Group South.
Their objective must be to destroy the strong enemy forces west of the Dnieper and, in addition, by securing bridgeheads near to and south of Kiev, to establish the conditions necessary for bringing Panzer Group 1 later to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.
The 5th Red Army, fighting in the marshland northwest of Kiev, must be brought to battle west of the Dnieper and annihilated. Any danger that it might break through to the north across the Pripet must be countered in good time.
4. Finnish Front:
The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha will be halted. The threat to the flank of the Mountain Corps from the Motovski Bight is to be eliminated. Only so many forces are to be left with XXXVI Corps as are necessary for defense and to give the impression of further offensive preparations.
In the area of III (Finnish) Corps an attempt will be made to cut the Murmansk railway, particularly towards Louhi. All forces suitable for this attack will be moved to this area; other available forces will be transferred to the Karelian Army. Should difficulties of terrain bring the offensive to a standstill in the area of the III (Finnish) Corps too, the German forces will be withdrawn and employed with the Karelian Army. This applies particularly to mobile units, tanks, and heavy artillery.
The 6th Mountain Division will join the Mountain Corps, using all available transport routes. The Foreign Office will settle whether the railway through Sweden to Narvik may also be used.
II. Luftwaffe.
1. Northeastern Front:
The Luftwaffe will switch the main weight of air attack to the Northeastern front by attaching the bulk of VIII Air Corps to 1st Air Fleet. These reinforcements will be moved up in time to go into action at the beginning of the offensive by Army Group North and at its vital point (early morning August 6th).
2. Center:
The task of such units of the Luftwaffe as remain with Army Group Center is to afford such fighter cover as is absolutely necessary on the 2nd and 9th Army fronts and to support possible local attacks. Attacks on Moscow will continue.
3. Southeastern Front:
Tasks as already laid down. It is not proposed to reduce the strength of the air forces with Army Group South.
4. Finland:
The main task of 5th Air Fleet is to support the Mountain Corps. The offensive by III Finnish Corps will also be supported at favorable points.
Preparations are to be made for the employment of forces in support of the Karelian Army should this be necessary.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
of the Armed Forces July 30, 1941
14 copies
Directive No. 34
The development of the situation in the last few days, the appearance of strong enemy forces on the front and to the flanks of Army Group Center, the supply position, and the need to give Panzer Groups 2 and 3 about ten days to rehabilitate their units, make it necessary to postpone for the moment the further tasks and objectives laid down in Directive 33 of July 19th and in the supplement of July 23rd.
I therefore order as follows:
I. 1. In the Northern Sector of the Eastern front the main attack will continue between Lake Ilmen and Narva towards Leningrad, with the aim of encircling Leningrad and making contact with the Finnish Army.
North of Lake Ilmen this attack will be covered in the Volkhov sector; South of Lake Illmen it will be carried north-eastwards only so far as is required to protect the right flank of the attack north of the lake. The situation around Velikiye Luki will have been previously cleared up. All forces not required for these operations will be transferred to take part in the flank attacking north of Lake Ilmen. The intended thrust by Panzer Group 3 against the high ground around Valdai will be postponed until armored formations are fully ready for action. Instead, the left flank of Army Group Center will advance sufficiently far north-eastwards to afford protection to the right flank of Army Group North.
Estonia must first of all be mopped up by all the forces of 18th Army; only then may divisions advance towards Leningrad.
2. Army Group Center will go over to the defensive, taking advantage of suitable terrain.
Attacks with limited objectives may still be mounted in so far as they are necessary to secure favorable spring-boards for our offensive against Soviet 21st Army.
Panzer Groups 2 and 3 will be withdrawn from the front line for quick rehabilitation as soon as the situation allows.
3. Operations on the Southeastern front will, for the present, be conducted only by formations of Army Group South.
Their objective must be to destroy the strong enemy forces west of the Dnieper and, in addition, by securing bridgeheads near to and south of Kiev, to establish the conditions necessary for bringing Panzer Group 1 later to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.
The 5th Red Army, fighting in the marshland northwest of Kiev, must be brought to battle west of the Dnieper and annihilated. Any danger that it might break through to the north across the Pripet must be countered in good time.
4. Finnish Front:
The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha will be halted. The threat to the flank of the Mountain Corps from the Motovski Bight is to be eliminated. Only so many forces are to be left with XXXVI Corps as are necessary for defense and to give the impression of further offensive preparations.
In the area of III (Finnish) Corps an attempt will be made to cut the Murmansk railway, particularly towards Louhi. All forces suitable for this attack will be moved to this area; other available forces will be transferred to the Karelian Army. Should difficulties of terrain bring the offensive to a standstill in the area of the III (Finnish) Corps too, the German forces will be withdrawn and employed with the Karelian Army. This applies particularly to mobile units, tanks, and heavy artillery.
The 6th Mountain Division will join the Mountain Corps, using all available transport routes. The Foreign Office will settle whether the railway through Sweden to Narvik may also be used.
II. Luftwaffe.
1. Northeastern Front:
The Luftwaffe will switch the main weight of air attack to the Northeastern front by attaching the bulk of VIII Air Corps to 1st Air Fleet. These reinforcements will be moved up in time to go into action at the beginning of the offensive by Army Group North and at its vital point (early morning August 6th).
2. Center:
The task of such units of the Luftwaffe as remain with Army Group Center is to afford such fighter cover as is absolutely necessary on the 2nd and 9th Army fronts and to support possible local attacks. Attacks on Moscow will continue.
3. Southeastern Front:
Tasks as already laid down. It is not proposed to reduce the strength of the air forces with Army Group South.
4. Finland:
The main task of 5th Air Fleet is to support the Mountain Corps. The offensive by III Finnish Corps will also be supported at favorable points.
Preparations are to be made for the employment of forces in support of the Karelian Army should this be necessary.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?
The High Command Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces August 12, 1941
14 copies
Supplement to Directive 34
The Fuehrer has issued the following order for the prosecution of operations in the East, supplementary to Directive 34:
1. Southeastern Front:
Through the battle of annihilation at Uman, Army Group South has won definite superiority over the enemy and freedom to undertake extensive operations on the further side of the Dnieper. As soon as it has gained a firm foothold east of the river, and has ensured the safety of its communications in the rear, it will possess the necessary strength, with corresponding action by allied forces and the cooperation of the Rumanian Army, to achieve with its own forces the far-reaching objectives which lie ahead of it.
Its next task is:
(a) To prevent the establishment by the enemy of a planned defensive front behind the Dnieper.
For this purpose the largest possible portion of enemy forces still west of the Dnieper must be destroyed, and bridgeheads across the Dnieper won as soon as possible.
(b) To occupy the Crimean peninsula, which is particularly dangerous as an enemy air base against the Romanian oilfields.
(c) To occupy the Donets area and the industrial area of Kharkov.
The battle for the Crimean peninsula may require mountain troops. The possibility of their use later, across the Kerch straits, in the direction of Batum, will be considered.
The attack on the city of Kiev itself will be halted. It is proposed to destroy the city by incendiary bombs and gunfire as soon as the supply position allows.
This entails a large number of tasks for the Luftwaffe. These cannot be carried out simultaneously, but must be accomplished one after another through the largest possible concentration of forces. Such concentrations will be achieved by the addition of dive-bomber units, first in the battles between Kanev and Boguslav, and then for the purpose of securing a bridgehead over the Dnieper.
2. Central Part of the Eastern Front:
The most important task here is to eliminate the enemy flanking positions, projecting deeply to the west, with which he is holding down large forces of infantry on both flanks of Army Group Center. For this purpose close cooperation in timing and direction on the southern flank, between the adjoining flanks of Army Group South and Army Group Center, is particularly important. The Russian 5th Army must be deprived of any further power to operate by cutting the roads to Ovruch and Mozyr by which it obtains supplies and reinforcements, and then finally annihilated.
On the northern flank the enemy must be defeated as soon as possible by the employment of mobile forces west of Toropets. The left flank of Army Group Center will then be moved as far northwards as is necessary to relieve Army Group North of anxiety about its right flank and to enable it to transfer infantry divisions to take part in the attack on Leningrad.
Apart from this, efforts will be made beforehand to move some one division (102nd Division) to Army Group North in reserve.
Only after these threats to our flanks have been entirely overcome and armored formations have been rehabilitated will it be possible to continue the offensive, on a wide front and with echeloning of both flanks, against the strong enemy forces which have been concentrated for the defense of Moscow. The object of operations must then be to deprive the enemy, before the coming of winter, of his government, armament, and traffic center around Moscow, and thus prevent the rebuilding of his defeated forces and the orderly working of government control.
Before the beginning of this attack on Moscow operations against Leningrad must be concluded, and the aircraft from 2nd Air Fleet which are at present attached to 1st Air Fleet must again be available to 2nd Air Fleet.
3. Northeastern Front:
The attack which is now in progress should result in the encirclement of Leningrad and a junction with the Finnish forces.
With regard to cooperation by the Luftwaffe, it should be a principle, as far as the position of our own airfields allows, always, if possible, to concentrate on a single point, in order to secure the utmost effect.
As soon as the situation allows, enemy air and naval bases on Dago and Osel will be eliminated by a combined operation by Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe.
It is urgently necessary that enemy airfields from which attacks on Berlin are evidently being made should be destroyed.
The Army is responsible for the coordinated planning of operations.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Signed: KEITEL
of the Armed Forces August 12, 1941
14 copies
Supplement to Directive 34
The Fuehrer has issued the following order for the prosecution of operations in the East, supplementary to Directive 34:
1. Southeastern Front:
Through the battle of annihilation at Uman, Army Group South has won definite superiority over the enemy and freedom to undertake extensive operations on the further side of the Dnieper. As soon as it has gained a firm foothold east of the river, and has ensured the safety of its communications in the rear, it will possess the necessary strength, with corresponding action by allied forces and the cooperation of the Rumanian Army, to achieve with its own forces the far-reaching objectives which lie ahead of it.
Its next task is:
(a) To prevent the establishment by the enemy of a planned defensive front behind the Dnieper.
For this purpose the largest possible portion of enemy forces still west of the Dnieper must be destroyed, and bridgeheads across the Dnieper won as soon as possible.
(b) To occupy the Crimean peninsula, which is particularly dangerous as an enemy air base against the Romanian oilfields.
(c) To occupy the Donets area and the industrial area of Kharkov.
The battle for the Crimean peninsula may require mountain troops. The possibility of their use later, across the Kerch straits, in the direction of Batum, will be considered.
The attack on the city of Kiev itself will be halted. It is proposed to destroy the city by incendiary bombs and gunfire as soon as the supply position allows.
This entails a large number of tasks for the Luftwaffe. These cannot be carried out simultaneously, but must be accomplished one after another through the largest possible concentration of forces. Such concentrations will be achieved by the addition of dive-bomber units, first in the battles between Kanev and Boguslav, and then for the purpose of securing a bridgehead over the Dnieper.
2. Central Part of the Eastern Front:
The most important task here is to eliminate the enemy flanking positions, projecting deeply to the west, with which he is holding down large forces of infantry on both flanks of Army Group Center. For this purpose close cooperation in timing and direction on the southern flank, between the adjoining flanks of Army Group South and Army Group Center, is particularly important. The Russian 5th Army must be deprived of any further power to operate by cutting the roads to Ovruch and Mozyr by which it obtains supplies and reinforcements, and then finally annihilated.
On the northern flank the enemy must be defeated as soon as possible by the employment of mobile forces west of Toropets. The left flank of Army Group Center will then be moved as far northwards as is necessary to relieve Army Group North of anxiety about its right flank and to enable it to transfer infantry divisions to take part in the attack on Leningrad.
Apart from this, efforts will be made beforehand to move some one division (102nd Division) to Army Group North in reserve.
Only after these threats to our flanks have been entirely overcome and armored formations have been rehabilitated will it be possible to continue the offensive, on a wide front and with echeloning of both flanks, against the strong enemy forces which have been concentrated for the defense of Moscow. The object of operations must then be to deprive the enemy, before the coming of winter, of his government, armament, and traffic center around Moscow, and thus prevent the rebuilding of his defeated forces and the orderly working of government control.
Before the beginning of this attack on Moscow operations against Leningrad must be concluded, and the aircraft from 2nd Air Fleet which are at present attached to 1st Air Fleet must again be available to 2nd Air Fleet.
3. Northeastern Front:
The attack which is now in progress should result in the encirclement of Leningrad and a junction with the Finnish forces.
With regard to cooperation by the Luftwaffe, it should be a principle, as far as the position of our own airfields allows, always, if possible, to concentrate on a single point, in order to secure the utmost effect.
As soon as the situation allows, enemy air and naval bases on Dago and Osel will be eliminated by a combined operation by Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe.
It is urgently necessary that enemy airfields from which attacks on Berlin are evidently being made should be destroyed.
The Army is responsible for the coordinated planning of operations.
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Signed: KEITEL
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces September 6, 1941
10 copies
Directive No. 35
Combined with the progressive encirclement of the Leningrad area, the initial successes against the enemy forces in the area between the flanks of Army Groups South and Center have provided favorable conditions for a decisive operation against the Timoshenko Army Group which is attacking on the Central front. This Army Group must be defeated and annihilated in the limited time which remains before the onset of winter weather. For this purpose it is necessary to concentrate all the forces of the Army and Air Force which can be spared on the flanks and which can be brought up in time.
On the basis of the report of Commander-in-Chief Army, I issue the following orders for the preparation and execution of these operations
1. On the Southern sector of the front the aim is the annihilation of the enemy forces in the triangle Kremenchug-Kiev-Konotop by the forces of Army Group South which are advancing northward across the Dnieper, acting in conjunction with the attack by the southern flank of Army Group Center. As soon as the completion of this task allows, those formations of and 6th Armies, and of Panzer Group 2, which have become free, will be reformed for the new operation.
Beginning about September 10th at latest, the motorized forces of Army Group South, reinforced by infantry divisions, and supported at the main point of attack by 4th Air Fleet, will make a surprise movement from the bridgehead secured by 17th Army north-westwards on and beyond Lubny. At the same time 17th Army is to gain ground in the direction of Poltava and Kharkov.
The offensive against the Crimea from the lower Dnieper will continue, with support from 4th Air Fleet; so will -- so far as available forces permit -- the offensive from the Dniepropetrovsk bridgehead. An advance by motorized forces south of the lower Dnieper towards Melitopol would be of substantial advantage for the mission of 11th Army.
2. On the Central front, the operation against the Timoshenko Army Group will be planned so that the attack can be begun at the earliest possible moment (end of September) with the aim of destroying the enemy forces located in the area east of Smolensk by a pincer movement in the general direction of Vyazma, with strong concentrations of armor on the flanks.
For this purpose mobile focal points are to be established with motorized units as follows:
On the southern flank (probably in the area southeast of Roslavl, the direction of the thrust being northeast), from the available forces of Army Group Center and 5th and 2nd Divisions, which will be released for the purpose.
In the 9th Army sector (the thrust being probably towards Bjeloj), by bringing the strongest possible forces from the area of Army Group North.
Only when Army Group Timoshenko has been defeated in these highly coordinated and closely encircling operations of annihilation will our central Army be able to begin the advance on Moscow with its right flank on the Oka and its left on the Upper Volga.
The Luftwaffe will support the offensive with the 2nd Air Fleet, which will be reinforced at the appropriate time, especially from the northeast area. It will concentrate on the flanks and will employ the bulk of its dive-bomber units (VIII Air Corps) in support of the motorized forces on both flanks.
3. On the Northeastern front, in conjunction with the Finnish Corps attacking on the Karelian peninsula, we must (after the capture of Schlusselburg) so surround the enemy forces fighting in the Leningrad area that by September 15th at the latest substantial units of the motorized forces and of 1st Air Fleet, especially VIII Air Corps. will be available for service on the Central front. Before this, efforts will be made to encircle Leningrad more closely, in particular in the east, and, should weather permit, a large-scale air attack on Leningrad will be carried out. It is particularly important in this connection to destroy the water supply.
In order to assist the Finnish advance beyond the fortification along the old Russo-Finnish frontier, as well as to narrow the battle area and eliminate enemy air bases, forces of Army Group North will move north across the Neva sector as soon as possible.
With Finnish cooperation, the Bay of Kronstadt will be so completely closed by mine-laying and artillery that enemy forces will be unable to escape into the Baltic to Hango and the Baltic Islands.
As soon as the necessary forces can be made available, the battle area around Leningrad is to be covered to the eastward and on the lower Volkhov. The link-up with the Karelian Army on the Svir will only take place when the destruction of the enemy around Leningrad is assured.
4. As regards further operations it is intended that the offensive towards Moscow by Army Group Center should be covered by a flank guard composed of available motorized forces in the Army Group South sector and advancing in a general northeasterly direction, and that forces from Army Group North should be moved forward on both sides of Lake Ilmen to cover the northern flank and to maintain contact with the Finnish Karelian Army
5. Any saving of time and consequent advance of the timetable will be to the advantage of the whole operation and its preparation.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
of the Armed Forces September 6, 1941
10 copies
Directive No. 35
Combined with the progressive encirclement of the Leningrad area, the initial successes against the enemy forces in the area between the flanks of Army Groups South and Center have provided favorable conditions for a decisive operation against the Timoshenko Army Group which is attacking on the Central front. This Army Group must be defeated and annihilated in the limited time which remains before the onset of winter weather. For this purpose it is necessary to concentrate all the forces of the Army and Air Force which can be spared on the flanks and which can be brought up in time.
On the basis of the report of Commander-in-Chief Army, I issue the following orders for the preparation and execution of these operations
1. On the Southern sector of the front the aim is the annihilation of the enemy forces in the triangle Kremenchug-Kiev-Konotop by the forces of Army Group South which are advancing northward across the Dnieper, acting in conjunction with the attack by the southern flank of Army Group Center. As soon as the completion of this task allows, those formations of and 6th Armies, and of Panzer Group 2, which have become free, will be reformed for the new operation.
Beginning about September 10th at latest, the motorized forces of Army Group South, reinforced by infantry divisions, and supported at the main point of attack by 4th Air Fleet, will make a surprise movement from the bridgehead secured by 17th Army north-westwards on and beyond Lubny. At the same time 17th Army is to gain ground in the direction of Poltava and Kharkov.
The offensive against the Crimea from the lower Dnieper will continue, with support from 4th Air Fleet; so will -- so far as available forces permit -- the offensive from the Dniepropetrovsk bridgehead. An advance by motorized forces south of the lower Dnieper towards Melitopol would be of substantial advantage for the mission of 11th Army.
2. On the Central front, the operation against the Timoshenko Army Group will be planned so that the attack can be begun at the earliest possible moment (end of September) with the aim of destroying the enemy forces located in the area east of Smolensk by a pincer movement in the general direction of Vyazma, with strong concentrations of armor on the flanks.
For this purpose mobile focal points are to be established with motorized units as follows:
On the southern flank (probably in the area southeast of Roslavl, the direction of the thrust being northeast), from the available forces of Army Group Center and 5th and 2nd Divisions, which will be released for the purpose.
In the 9th Army sector (the thrust being probably towards Bjeloj), by bringing the strongest possible forces from the area of Army Group North.
Only when Army Group Timoshenko has been defeated in these highly coordinated and closely encircling operations of annihilation will our central Army be able to begin the advance on Moscow with its right flank on the Oka and its left on the Upper Volga.
The Luftwaffe will support the offensive with the 2nd Air Fleet, which will be reinforced at the appropriate time, especially from the northeast area. It will concentrate on the flanks and will employ the bulk of its dive-bomber units (VIII Air Corps) in support of the motorized forces on both flanks.
3. On the Northeastern front, in conjunction with the Finnish Corps attacking on the Karelian peninsula, we must (after the capture of Schlusselburg) so surround the enemy forces fighting in the Leningrad area that by September 15th at the latest substantial units of the motorized forces and of 1st Air Fleet, especially VIII Air Corps. will be available for service on the Central front. Before this, efforts will be made to encircle Leningrad more closely, in particular in the east, and, should weather permit, a large-scale air attack on Leningrad will be carried out. It is particularly important in this connection to destroy the water supply.
In order to assist the Finnish advance beyond the fortification along the old Russo-Finnish frontier, as well as to narrow the battle area and eliminate enemy air bases, forces of Army Group North will move north across the Neva sector as soon as possible.
With Finnish cooperation, the Bay of Kronstadt will be so completely closed by mine-laying and artillery that enemy forces will be unable to escape into the Baltic to Hango and the Baltic Islands.
As soon as the necessary forces can be made available, the battle area around Leningrad is to be covered to the eastward and on the lower Volkhov. The link-up with the Karelian Army on the Svir will only take place when the destruction of the enemy around Leningrad is assured.
4. As regards further operations it is intended that the offensive towards Moscow by Army Group Center should be covered by a flank guard composed of available motorized forces in the Army Group South sector and advancing in a general northeasterly direction, and that forces from Army Group North should be moved forward on both sides of Lake Ilmen to cover the northern flank and to maintain contact with the Finnish Karelian Army
5. Any saving of time and consequent advance of the timetable will be to the advantage of the whole operation and its preparation.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquarters
of the Armed Forces December 8, 1941
14 copies
Directive No. 39
The severe winter weather which has come surprisingly early in the East, and the consequent difficulties in bringing up supplies, compel us to abandon immediately all major offensive operations and to go over to the defensive.
The way in which these defensive operations are to be carried out will be decided in accordance with the purpose which they are intended to serve, viz:
(a) To hold areas which are of great operational or economic importance to the enemy.
(b) To enable forces in the East to rest and recuperate as much as possible.
(c) Thus to establish conditions suitable for the resumption of large-scale offensive operations in 1942.
My detailed orders are as follows:
I. Army:
1. The main body of the Army in the East will, as soon as possible, go over to the defensive along a lightly tenable front to be fixed by Commander-in-Chief Army. Thereafter the rehabilitation of troops is to begin, armored and motorized divisions being withdrawn first.
2. Where the front has been withdrawn without being forced by the enemy, rear areas will be established in advance which offer troops better living conditions and defensive possibilities than the former positions.
To allow the enemy access to important lateral lines of communication can create danger for other sectors of the front not yet fortified. In such cases the timing of withdrawal in individual sectors must comply with the general situation.
3. The front line must be chosen with an eye to easy quartering and defense and simplification of supply problems, especially during the thaw.
Salient and rear positions will be determined and built as quickly as possible, using all available manpower.
4. Within the framework of these generally defensive operations the following special tasks must be achieved:
(a) Sevastopol will be captured as soon as possible. The future employment of the bulk of 11th Army (with the exception of units required for coastal defense) will be decided at the end of the fighting there.
(b) In spite of all difficulties, Army Group South must endeavor to establish conditions which, in favorable weather, even during the winter, would make it possible to attack and capture the lower Don-Donets line. This would provide favorable conditions for operations against the Caucasus in the spring.
(c) Army Group North will shorten its eastern and southeastern front north of Lake Ilmen, while still denying the enemy the road and railway from Tikhvin to Volkhovstroi and Kolehanavo. This will make it possible, after the arrival of reinforcements, to clean up the area south of Lake Ladoga Only thus can Leningrad be finally enclosed and a link with the Finnish Karelian Army be established.
(d) Should it turn out that the enemy has withdrawn his main forces from the coastal area south of the Bay of Kronstadt, and no longer intends to defend this area seriously, that coast will be occupied in order to economize our forces.
II. Luftwaffe:
1. The task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the rehabilitation of the Russian forces by attacking, as far as possible, equipment and training centres, particularly Leningrad, Moscow, Rybinsk, Gorki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Krasnodar, etc. It is particularly important to harass, day by day, those enemy lines of communication which enable him to exist and by which he threatens our own front. Besides engaging the enemy air force, the Luftwaffe will support the Army by all available means in defense against enemy attacks on the ground and in the air.
2. I approve of the proposed distribution of planes between the Army Groups and of the proposed strength of the air forces which will remain in the East. On the conclusion of land operations, individual air units may be withdrawn for rest and training as the situation allows.
3. In order to offer effective defense against possible attacks during the winter and in view of our own forthcoming winter operations (see 1.4), a ground organisation will be maintained which allows for a quick switch of forces and for reinforcement by units in the rear. To this end rest areas will be set up as close to the Eastern front as possible.
4. Continual wide-ranging protective air reconnaissance is particularly important in order to detect and observe enemy regrouping. The Army and Luftwaffe must coordinate their forces and their operations for this purpose.
5. I reserve to myself the right to authorize the withdrawal from the Moscow front of those forces still allocated for service with Commander-in-Chief South.
6. The Air Defence will be responsible for the protection of our own troops in their billeting and supply areas and for the defense of important communications in the rear. Plans will be made for the speedy concentration of our own fighter forces in special areas, in order to deal with concentrated enemy air attacks.
III. The Navy will ensure that the sea-route to Helsinki, rendered safer by the capture of Hango and Osmussaar, can be fully utilised for cargo traffic and supplies to our troops in Finland.
The number of small supply ships being built in Germany and occupied countries (particularly for use across the Black Sea and in the Aegean) must be still further increased even at the expense of all not absolutely essential claims and security measures.
IV. The replacement of personnel of the Armed Forces for 1942 must be ensured even in the event of heavy casualties. As the Class of 1922 will not be sufficient alone for this purpose, drastic steps are necessary.
I therefore order:
1. All Armed Forces troops which can be released from Germany or from special employment (e.g. Military Mission Rumania) will be made available, by wholesale redeployment, to the fighting front.
Younger soldiers who are serving at home or in rear areas will take the place of older fighting soldiers.
2. The movement of forces between the Eastern and Western theatres will be made on the following principles:
Divisions of the second and third wave and armored divisions in the West, if fully fit for action, will relieve divisions in the East which have been exhausted by particularly heavy fighting. We are justified in risking a purely temporary weakening of our forces in France during the winter.
Battle-tried officers, non-commissioned officers, and men from the divisions in the East which are to be relieved may be posted to these divisions in the West.
Beyond this I will decide whether divisions in the West which cannot be employed in the East as full formations should be disbanded and employed to reinforce seasoned divisions on the Eastern front. This decision will be reached when the Army's general plans for reorganization and regrouping are submitted to me.
At all events the strength of the Army in the West must be maintained so that it is capable of coastal defense and of carrying out "Undertaking Attila".
3. Young workers classified as essential will be released from their employment on a large scale and will be replaced by prisoners and Russian civilian workers, employed in groups. The High Command of the Armed Forces will issue special orders in this respect.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
of the Armed Forces December 8, 1941
14 copies
Directive No. 39
The severe winter weather which has come surprisingly early in the East, and the consequent difficulties in bringing up supplies, compel us to abandon immediately all major offensive operations and to go over to the defensive.
The way in which these defensive operations are to be carried out will be decided in accordance with the purpose which they are intended to serve, viz:
(a) To hold areas which are of great operational or economic importance to the enemy.
(b) To enable forces in the East to rest and recuperate as much as possible.
(c) Thus to establish conditions suitable for the resumption of large-scale offensive operations in 1942.
My detailed orders are as follows:
I. Army:
1. The main body of the Army in the East will, as soon as possible, go over to the defensive along a lightly tenable front to be fixed by Commander-in-Chief Army. Thereafter the rehabilitation of troops is to begin, armored and motorized divisions being withdrawn first.
2. Where the front has been withdrawn without being forced by the enemy, rear areas will be established in advance which offer troops better living conditions and defensive possibilities than the former positions.
To allow the enemy access to important lateral lines of communication can create danger for other sectors of the front not yet fortified. In such cases the timing of withdrawal in individual sectors must comply with the general situation.
3. The front line must be chosen with an eye to easy quartering and defense and simplification of supply problems, especially during the thaw.
Salient and rear positions will be determined and built as quickly as possible, using all available manpower.
4. Within the framework of these generally defensive operations the following special tasks must be achieved:
(a) Sevastopol will be captured as soon as possible. The future employment of the bulk of 11th Army (with the exception of units required for coastal defense) will be decided at the end of the fighting there.
(b) In spite of all difficulties, Army Group South must endeavor to establish conditions which, in favorable weather, even during the winter, would make it possible to attack and capture the lower Don-Donets line. This would provide favorable conditions for operations against the Caucasus in the spring.
(c) Army Group North will shorten its eastern and southeastern front north of Lake Ilmen, while still denying the enemy the road and railway from Tikhvin to Volkhovstroi and Kolehanavo. This will make it possible, after the arrival of reinforcements, to clean up the area south of Lake Ladoga Only thus can Leningrad be finally enclosed and a link with the Finnish Karelian Army be established.
(d) Should it turn out that the enemy has withdrawn his main forces from the coastal area south of the Bay of Kronstadt, and no longer intends to defend this area seriously, that coast will be occupied in order to economize our forces.
II. Luftwaffe:
1. The task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the rehabilitation of the Russian forces by attacking, as far as possible, equipment and training centres, particularly Leningrad, Moscow, Rybinsk, Gorki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Krasnodar, etc. It is particularly important to harass, day by day, those enemy lines of communication which enable him to exist and by which he threatens our own front. Besides engaging the enemy air force, the Luftwaffe will support the Army by all available means in defense against enemy attacks on the ground and in the air.
2. I approve of the proposed distribution of planes between the Army Groups and of the proposed strength of the air forces which will remain in the East. On the conclusion of land operations, individual air units may be withdrawn for rest and training as the situation allows.
3. In order to offer effective defense against possible attacks during the winter and in view of our own forthcoming winter operations (see 1.4), a ground organisation will be maintained which allows for a quick switch of forces and for reinforcement by units in the rear. To this end rest areas will be set up as close to the Eastern front as possible.
4. Continual wide-ranging protective air reconnaissance is particularly important in order to detect and observe enemy regrouping. The Army and Luftwaffe must coordinate their forces and their operations for this purpose.
5. I reserve to myself the right to authorize the withdrawal from the Moscow front of those forces still allocated for service with Commander-in-Chief South.
6. The Air Defence will be responsible for the protection of our own troops in their billeting and supply areas and for the defense of important communications in the rear. Plans will be made for the speedy concentration of our own fighter forces in special areas, in order to deal with concentrated enemy air attacks.
III. The Navy will ensure that the sea-route to Helsinki, rendered safer by the capture of Hango and Osmussaar, can be fully utilised for cargo traffic and supplies to our troops in Finland.
The number of small supply ships being built in Germany and occupied countries (particularly for use across the Black Sea and in the Aegean) must be still further increased even at the expense of all not absolutely essential claims and security measures.
IV. The replacement of personnel of the Armed Forces for 1942 must be ensured even in the event of heavy casualties. As the Class of 1922 will not be sufficient alone for this purpose, drastic steps are necessary.
I therefore order:
1. All Armed Forces troops which can be released from Germany or from special employment (e.g. Military Mission Rumania) will be made available, by wholesale redeployment, to the fighting front.
Younger soldiers who are serving at home or in rear areas will take the place of older fighting soldiers.
2. The movement of forces between the Eastern and Western theatres will be made on the following principles:
Divisions of the second and third wave and armored divisions in the West, if fully fit for action, will relieve divisions in the East which have been exhausted by particularly heavy fighting. We are justified in risking a purely temporary weakening of our forces in France during the winter.
Battle-tried officers, non-commissioned officers, and men from the divisions in the East which are to be relieved may be posted to these divisions in the West.
Beyond this I will decide whether divisions in the West which cannot be employed in the East as full formations should be disbanded and employed to reinforce seasoned divisions on the Eastern front. This decision will be reached when the Army's general plans for reorganization and regrouping are submitted to me.
At all events the strength of the Army in the West must be maintained so that it is capable of coastal defense and of carrying out "Undertaking Attila".
3. Young workers classified as essential will be released from their employment on a large scale and will be replaced by prisoners and Russian civilian workers, employed in groups. The High Command of the Armed Forces will issue special orders in this respect.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER
Will our dirty little war against Yugoslavia be known in the future as the "War of the Blue Dress"?