The speech that never was

[JustAGame]

For many years, there was an arguement that Stalin had made a speech in August 1939 wherein he presented his plan for another world war. Since there was only heresay, the arguement was dismissed and those who had recounted phrases from his speech or provided any representation of the text debunked as frauds by mainstream historians.

In 1994, Russian historian T. S. Bushuyeva found an archived version of the speech in the USSR Special Archives. I was unable to find any criticisms by mainstream historians since the authoritative document was discovered. Curiously, it seems as though American historians choose to just not discuss it.

Stalin's speech to a Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939:

The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western powers. War would be avoided, but down the road events could become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept Germany's proposal and conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will of course invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England in that would be unavoidable. Western Europe would be subjected to serious upheavals and disorder. Under those conditions, we would have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war.
The experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist movement is never strong enough to seize power. The dictatorship of such a party will only become possible as the result of a major war.

Our choice is clear. We must accept the German proposal and politely send the Anglo-French mission home. Our immediate advantage will be to take Poland to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia ...

For the realization of these plans it is essential that the war continue for a long as possible, and all forces, with which we are actively involved, should be directed toward this goal ...

Let us consider a second possibility, that is, a victory by Germany ... It is obvious that Germany will be too occupied elsewhere to turn against us. In a conquered France, the French Communist Party will be very strong. The Communist revolution will break out unavoidably, and we will be able to fully exploit this situation to come to the aid of France and make it our ally. In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a victorious Germany will also become our allies. This presents for us a broad field of action in which to develop the world revolution.

Comrades! It is in the interest of the USSR -- the workers' homeland -- that war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French block. Everything should be done so that this drags out as long as possible with the goal of weakening both sides. For this reason, it is imperative that we agree to conclude the pact proposed by Germany, and then work that this war, which will one day be declared, is carried out after the greatest possible passage of time...

The Russian historian Bushuyeva noted that while this document clearly confirms that Stalin had aggressive intentions, she cautiously added a quote by Clausewitz which essentially reminds that wars tend to a follow a path of their own, regardless of what is planned or said.

I have tried to "dig" other variations of this speech since it is translated, but this seems to be the only translation published.

[matt.buttsworth]

excellent quote, could you post or email me the exact reference author, title publisher city year page of the reference so that I can use it academically later. Astonishing that this quoted has not been reprinted in many other texts and that I have not seen it before. I do not believe it is used by German authors either.
Dr Matthew Buttsworth matt.buttsworth@freesurf.ch

[Mist]

Yes, good quote JustAGame! Though it is not new to me, it one more time uncovers aggressive intentions of Stalin's politic in August 1939. If I am not mistaken, USSR was not only country which had very optimistic sights of future. Even Poland in 1939 had no defence plans at all. Situation in 1941 was slightly different.
By the way, western powers also hoped that Hitler will counter communistic threat in the same way as Stalin hoped that Hitler will weaken capitalistic enemies. Senator Hary Truman said once: "... and let them kill each other as long as possible ...". There is a Russian saying which says "living among wolves makes you to howl like wolf" which very good suits for politics of all times.

[MagnusOlsson]

I remember distinctly reading in Churchill's memoirs that Stalin offered even more raw materials and oil to Germany just before Barbarossa. Evidently, Schulenberg (not sure about the spelling) who was the ambassador (?) for Germany in Moscow tried to persuade Hitler to press Stalin for more supplies instead of wage war, he even had with him promises and guarantees for increased trade.
All this is perhaps Churchill's own impressions, and if I remember correctly his memoirs was written in the early 50's, so a lot of data was then unavailable.
Point is, however, that if Stalin was prepared to strengthen the cord between USSR and Germany by giving Germany what they needed most, then his mind cannot have been set on waging war at that moment.

Another point (counterpoint?) to be made is that Churchill countinously used the USSR-Nazi pact as an argument against Stalin when demands for a Second Front arised, claiming that Stalin himself created the opportunity for Hitler to remove the allies from the continent by signing the pact and offering raw materials and oil. It is thus in Churchills interest to perhaps exaggerate the benefits for Hitler of the pact.

/Magnus

[Mist]

Originally posted by MagnusOlsson:
Another point (counterpoint?) to be made is that Churchill countinously used the USSR-Nazi pact as an argument against Stalin when demands for a Second Front arised, claiming that Stalin himself created the opportunity for Hitler to remove the allies from the continent by signing the pact and offering raw materials and oil.
/Magnus

Mr. Churchil had probably forgot that Munchen agreement (which is also known by Munchen plot) was already signed by between Western powers and Germany and made Hitler to believe in his innate magic power, by the time of Molotov-Ribentrop pact. Relations between USSR and western powers were very far from friendly ones. In fact, Stalin was to choose the allies and Hitler was more agreeable than Churchil.

[ July 03, 2001: Message edited by: Mist ]

[MagnusOlsson]

True. Theirs was truly not a happy marriage, and Churchill certainly has his very own way of 'remembering' history. But to his defence must be said that he was a fierce opponent to the Munich agreement from day one.

[troopie]

Originally posted by MagnusOlsson:
True. Theirs was truly not a happy marriage, and Churchill certainly has his very own way of 'remembering' history. But to his defence must be said that he was a fierce opponent to the Munich agreement from day one.

Your statement reminds me of a 'what if'. What if Churchill and the old fox Blum had led the UK and France at Munich, instead of 'Shades of Grey' Daladier and the 'Boneless Wonder' Chamberlain?

troopie

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by JustAGame, Stalin's speech:
Let us consider a second possibility, that is, a victory by Germany ... It is obvious that Germany will be too occupied elsewhere to turn against us. In a conquered France, the French Communist Party will be very strong. The Communist revolution will break out unavoidably, and we will be able to fully exploit this situation to come to the aid of France and make it our ally. In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a victorious Germany will also become our allies. This presents for us a broad field of action in which to develop the world revolution.

This speech really isn't that revealing, actually. The fact that Stalin had the fantasy of a world wide Communist Revolution, or that he hoped the Capitalist West and Nazi Germany would wear each other down in conflict is not new. Its been largely assumed that due to ideology, the USSR and Nazi Germany would clash inevitably. Stalin knew it and obviously Hitler did too. What this speech doesn't help us with is the argument over the alleged Soviet planned attack on Germany in 1941, which was the subject of the debate in the other thread.

The paragraph above suggests Stalin, after a long period to allow the West and Germany to exhaust themselves fighting each other (was he expecting the same as what occurred in WWI?), expected Communists in the defeated West to rise up and continue to occupy Germany's attention. He saw the USSR coming to the aid of those Communist rebellions in the West, catching Germany by surprise with a big part of their forces still in the West.

Obviously, none of this happened. In June '41, Germany was master of Western Europe, with no Communist rebellions going on anywhere in German controlled areas, although this would occur later on in Yugoslavia (was any of the French partisan units Communist?), and Stalin was still working on rebuilding the Army, after the debacle in Finland showed just how bad the condition of the Army was, and the German army was not occupied elsewhere, it was of course massing on the Russian frontier.

I don't believe Stalin would still consider an attack at this point. Later certainly, but not then. In fact, all the evidence which indicated an imminent German attack was rejected by Stalin, basically because he was in denial. This to is evidence, I think, that Stalin was not planning any offensive in '41, and could not believe the Germans would be ready to attack him in '41.

[ July 03, 2001: Message edited by: Ed Cogburn ]

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

What this speech doesn't help us with is the argument over the alleged Soviet planned attack on Germany in 1941, which was the subject of the debate in the other thread.

Ed, I agree with you. Too many other unresolved questions remain on both sides of the issue of whether Stalin was planning his own offensive.

This speech only clarifies that Stalin has aggressive intentions. I feel it also demonstrates that he was more cunning and politically astute than what post-war history has painted for us of that Georgian hillbilly.

Since this discussion began, my desire to learn more has driven me to spend nearly all of my spare time in "digging" for relative material. The real difficulty has been that so much of the material has been discovered or verified as authentic long after the mainstream history was written.

One thing I have noticed in reading Hitler's and Stalin's speeches is that the history of WWII, as documented in books and video, doesn't capture the epic struggles of the time. I don't mean the epic struggles of man and machine in combat, I am talking about the daily realities of colonial imperialism, the notion that war was inevitable, superpowers everywhere, booming confidence in the marvelous technological advances in industry and weaponry, bitter resentments over the last war and the ever increasing strength and appeal of communism.

The discussion over whether Stalin was planning to invade Germany in 41 will not resolve the question for any of us with a single tidbit of information or fact. I think it may be that I enjoy this topic so much because I realize I do not really know the answer. In fact, it would be a lie to say I do not have reservations about the view that I support; afterall, I was educated by the same system and books as you.

[ July 04, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

[Grisha]

Interesting post. However, it does not mix well with what actually happened. Stalin actively sought an alliance with Britain, France, and Poland before siging the pact with Nazi Germany. Representatives from these four countries actually met to discuss such an alliance. However, Britain & France sent low level military and diplomatic officials with no power to sign anything, merely to attend. Poland was very determined to not allow Soviet troops passage through their country in the event of a joint attack on Germany, and neither France or Britain felt any need to persuade Poland otherwise. The only positive note was that a few French delegates were very receptive to an alliance, but having no authority they could do nothing more than sympathize with the Soviet delegates.

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by Matthew Buttsworth:
excellent quote, could you post or email me the exact reference author, title publisher city year page of the reference so that I can use it academically later. Astonishing that this quoted has not been reprinted in many other texts and that I have not seen it before. I do not believe it is used by German authors either.
Dr Matthew Buttsworth matt.buttsworth@freesurf.ch

T. S. Bushuyeva originally published it with her commentary in the Novy Mir (No. 12, 1994).

In German, Wolfgang Strauss reported on the speech in the Nation und Europa (April 1996). I do not know whether he included the text of the speech or not.

Adolph von Thadden cited many of Stalin's speeches in Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg ("Stalin's Trap: He Wanted War"), by Adolf von Thadden. Rosenheim: Kultur und Zeitgeschichte/Archiv der Zeit, 1996. (Available from: Postfach 1180, 32352 Preussisch Oldendorf, Germany). Hardcover. 170 pages. Photos. Bibliography.

I hope this information at least provides you with enough direction to find the information.

[JustAGame]

Originally posted by Grisha:
Interesting post. However, it does not mix well with what actually happened. Stalin actively sought an alliance with Britain, France, and Poland before siging the pact with Nazi Germany. Representatives from these four countries actually met to discuss such an alliance.

Unless I'm mistaken, Stalin was still meeting with all of the delegates at the time of the speech. Additionally, wasn't the Molotov-R&^$# err Soviet-Nazi pact signed just days after the date of this speech?

[Mist]

Zhukov refers in his memories that such meetings were held right before Stalin's speech(15 and 17 August 1939). Possible military actions were discussed as well as exact numbers of troops which Soviet Union could send in case of German attack to France or Poland (70% of British and French troops which means if Brits and Frenchs send 100 divisions, then SU sends 70 divs etc). Requirement for Poland to let Soviet troops to pass through were also made by SU.
There are also similar words which were said by Grisha above about Western representatives.

[MagnusOlsson]

Originally posted by troopie:


Your statement reminds me of a 'what if'. What if Churchill and the old fox Blum had led the UK and France at Munich, instead of 'Shades of Grey' Daladier and the 'Boneless Wonder' Chamberlain?

troopie

In that case, Munich had never happened. He was a true believer of 'Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum'; and would have taken some kind of action around the time of the Rhineland occupation (or invasion, or whatever that move is to be called).
But if he had come to power immediately before the Munich 'plot' (I liked that expression), knowing well that Britain and France needed to build up their war machinery a bit before taking on Germany; then he might have had to turn to the negotiating table.

I remember one very amusing passage in Churchills memoirs; when he was invited to meet Hitler in the early/mid 30's during a trip in Germany. Hitler never turned up and Mr Churchill says that (not an exact quote) 'later on, I was to receive several new invitations to meet Herr Hitler, but then, much had come to pass, and I excused myself'.

I recently bought a set of 4 CD's from amazon.com containing historic speaches. Chamberlains declaration of war against Germany is well worth listening to; as is Churchills first address to Britain after becoming Prime Minister & Minister of Defence.

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by JustAGame:


Ed, I agree with you. Too many other unresolved questions remain on both sides of the issue of whether Stalin was planning his own offensive.

This speech only clarifies that Stalin has aggressive intentions.

I agree, Stalin was just as interested in a Greater Communist USSR as Hitler was interested in a Greater Germany.

I feel it also demonstrates that he was more cunning and politically astute than what post-war history has painted for us of that Georgian hillbilly.

Well, I'm not sure. There is a document I read somewhere which spoke to the days leading up to 22/6. This article/book/whatever wasn't about the Soviet attack in '41 theory, its subject was Barbarossa. In it they pointed out that Stalin refused to take the warnings of imminent attack seriously. There was the huge number of overflights by German recce aircraft, a massive increase in radio activity, Soviet spies discovering evidence pointing to an immenient attack and reporting it to Moscow. There was even a defector who crossed the border and told the Soviets the date and time of the attack, and Stalin had the man executed because he was convinced Hitler would not break the Pact. They also said Stalin went into some kind of shock and withdrew to his personal quarters for some signficant period of time after the attack commenced (can't remember exactly how long it was, maybe a day or three?). He apparently left control of the country up to his subordinates during this time. I wish I could remember where I read this.

In his speech Stalin described a future scenario that turned out to be woefully incorrect. Add this to what I read above, and I just don't see a politically or militarily astute person here. At least after some time, despite his continued paranoia about the Red Army, he allowed the military to run the war, unlike Hitler.

[ July 04, 2001: Message edited by: Ed Cogburn ]

[Grisha]

Originally posted by JustAGame:


Unless I'm mistaken, Stalin was still meeting with all of the delegates at the time of the speech. Additionally, wasn't the Molotov-R&^$# err Soviet-Nazi pact signed just days after the date of this speech?

The meeting between French & British military delegates was on 12 Aug 1939. The German Nonaggression Pact was signed in Moscow 23 Aug 1939. It is true that communications were ongoing with Ribbentrop from before the meeting with the French & British, but on 7 Aug the Soviet government informed Ribbentrop that it considered a secret protocol unsuitable. It was only after the French/British talks failed that Stalin gave the go-ahead.

I might also mention that in the end it was the Germans who were aggressively pursuing a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, not the other way around. At times, communiques from Ribbentrop regarding an agreement with the Soviet government almost had an air of an 'ultimatum' to them, they were so adamant. Germany was most eager to begin Case White, but needed to insure no interference would come from the Soviets during the invasion of Poland.

[ July 04, 2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[jager506]

A few points on why I believe Stalin was not planning on attacking in 1941:

1) General unpreparedness of Soviet forces on 22 June. Many units had not received adequate ammo, modern equipment, communications below battalion level non-existent etc. If they were preparing to attack, this would hardly have been the case. An army preparing a major offensive would not have been caught with its pants down to such a degree.

2) The rapid conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece gave Stalin quite a fright and he ordered increased supplies/raw materials to be sent to Germany. In fact, a couple hours or so before the German attack, the last trainload of supplies chugged across the border. I think I read this in Shirer's Rise and Fall of Third Reich.

3) Stalin suffered a small nervous breakdown when news of the German attack reached him. It was Foreign Minister Molotov who broke the news of the German attack to the country on 22 June. Stalin only recovered sufficiently to broadcast his speech on July 3rd. This from Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy. Also in Diplomacy, the Soviets tried via the Bulgarians to send peace feelers to Berlin during the first months of Barbarossa. The Bulgarian ambassador's reply was noteworthy, something along the lines of, "Don't worry. You'll kick their butts in the long term." Talk about foresight.

4) Ed mentioned that Stalin ordered the German deserter shot on the eve of the attack. Zhukov barely managed to get him to order a semi-alert or something to that effect, and by that time, the bombs had already started falling.

5) When German ambassador Schulenburg delivered the declaration of war to Molotov on June 22, the latter was so shocked that all he could manage was "So it's war. Do you think we deserve that?" Something along those lines. Molotov was part of Stalin's inner circle and would almost certainly have been privy to plans to attack Germany. Why the shock?