Worst misstakes on the eastern front

Kuniworth · Post by **Kuniworth** » Tue Jul 17, 2001 3:58 am

Yep there are a lot of them. I would rank the worst five like this based on strategic importance and outcome of the conflict.

1. Russian front-defence june-august 41. Total disaster resulting in 1 million captured and 900,000 dead or wounded. Minsk, Smolensk, Bialystok, Uman-pocket and so on. Names that will live in warfare infamy.

2. German failure to take Stalingrad early in 42-offensive. It resulted in a weak flank not secured on the volga which later costed wehrmacht 300,000 men.

3. Kiev-pocket september 41. STAVKA Gave away Ukraine, achieving nothing except delaying AGC advance towards Moscow by a month. In a way thereby successful, but a total waste of human lives.

4. German unpreparness of russian winter. Could have costed the wehrmacht deerly but Stalins failure to concentrate his counteroffensive saved him

5. Russian kharkov-offensive may 42, a complete disaster that opened up for fall blau.

6. Kursk-offensive july 43. The panthers couldnt weight up the delay by 2 month.

out of list; Russian

Mist · Post by **Mist** » Tue Jul 17, 2001 4:08 am

out of list; Russian what?

Kuniworth · Post by **Kuniworth** » Tue Jul 17, 2001 4:12 am

russian kharkov-offensiv march´43. Against Manstein you couldnt advance without securin your gains. He would look for every chance to punish you.

Mist · Post by **Mist** » Tue Jul 17, 2001 1:12 pm

Originally posted by Kuniworth:
russian kharkov-offensiv march´43. Against Manstein you couldnt advance without securin your gains. He would look for every chance to punish you.

It is hardly the worst mistake considering its small consequences. Though it was made on such stage of the war when only true wonder could save Germany from a certain defeat. It was the time for Germany to make their worst mistakes like operation Citadele, holding Crimea, Korsun cauldron, battle for Byelorussia, sacrificing Army Group North, battle for Budapest and the greatest mistake was continuation of totaly desperate war with no hope to achive anything but more victims.

SoleSurvivor · Post by **SoleSurvivor** » Wed Jul 18, 2001 12:19 am

Direct invasion of Stalingrad and Sevastopol instead of encircling, short siege w/ artillery and finally invasion with massive forces. Instead: house battles etc

Transferring the idea of air-supplying a korps (Demjanks 1941/42) to the idea of air-supplying a whole army (Stalingrad 1942/43)

not killing/arresting Hitler on front visit (at least they tried)

strategic difference between military and political leadership (lead to redeploying tanks during the advance on Moscow more than once before Aug)

Ed Cogburn · Post by **Ed Cogburn** » Wed Jul 18, 2001 10:02 am

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor:
Transferring the idea of air-supplying a korps (Demjanks 1941/42)

Could you expand on this please? A web search on 'Demjanks' has no hits. Was it an infantry korps, or a panzer corps? Was it moving and fighting or stationary and on the defensive? Was the air supply good enough to support them indefinitely, or was the air supply just able to allow them to survive a little longer?

jager506 · Post by **jager506** » Wed Jul 18, 2001 10:30 am

Originally posted by Ed Cogburn:

Could you expand on this please? A web search on 'Demjanks' has no hits. Was it an infantry korps, or a panzer corps? Was it moving and fighting or stationary and on the defensive? Was the air supply good enough to support them indefinitely, or was the air supply just able to allow them to survive a little longer?

Hi Ed

The forces trapped at Demyansk (several ways to spell this town) were from Army Group North's 16th Army. Don't have specifics on how large the force was, but I'd estimate no more than 3 or 4 infantry divisions. In Jan 1942, all the panzers were (I believe) either with Army Group Center or South, none left in the north.

The Demyansk pocket was supplied for around 3 months or so. There were also other small German pockets (probably of similar size) around Kholm and south of Vyazma (according to Glantz) and these were also
resupplied by air for some months. All in all, probably a total of eight or so infantry divisions, compared to some 22 at Stalingrad.
Plus of course the Luftwaffe was relatively much better off in early 1942 than a year later. Hope this helps.

Mark

SoleSurvivor · Post by **SoleSurvivor** » Wed Jul 18, 2001 3:57 pm

Even in Demjansk (sorry I interchanged k and s) Luftwaffe needed to withdraw virtually all ZBV units (transport, Ju 52 & Stuff) from the front to manage that situation.

The Demjansk pocket was II. Armeekorps (Gen. Graf Bockdorff-Ahlefeldt) and parts of the X. Armeekorpsthis is roughly 6 Inf. Divisions. By the time Air supply really began it was a distance of 120 km from the front to the pocket. Luftwaffe mostly lacked winter equipment and service personal for the huge amount of planes drawn from everywhere in the German controlled Area. Goal was 300 tons per day.

Ed Cogburn · Post by **Ed Cogburn** » Thu Jul 19, 2001 12:34 am

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor:
Even in Demjansk (sorry I interchanged k and s) Luftwaffe needed to withdraw virtually all ZBV units (transport, Ju 52 & Stuff) from the front to manage that situation.

The Demjansk pocket was II. Armeekorps (Gen. Graf Bockdorff-Ahlefeldt) and parts of the X. Armeekorpsthis is roughly 6 Inf. Divisions.

Thanks for the info, sounds like another Stalingrad pocket air supply attempt. I'll bet 6 stationary infantry divisions, like the 6th Army at Stalingrad, are not as difficult to supply as keeping 3+ armored/motorized divisions on the move behind enemy lines, but by this time Germany didn't own the skies above the pocket.

Grisha · Post by **Grisha** » Thu Jul 19, 2001 1:42 am

Yes, Demyansk in winter '41 gave the Germans false assessment of their air-supply capabilities, opening the door for the air-supply disaster at Stalingrad. It should be noted that the Soviets were keenly aware of the similarities between the two operations, and had made improvements with VVS countermeasures towards such.

One more disaster I'd like to add: destruction of Army Group Center in summer of 1944 as a result of Belorussian campaign. In fact, the entire summer Soviet offensive was a disaster for the Germans as the Soviets' use of maskirovka and razvedka had matured to the extent of operating smoothly at the strategic level.

SoleSurvivor · Post by **SoleSurvivor** » Thu Jul 19, 2001 1:56 am

It should be noted that several Luftwaffe Generals , one of them Richthofen, said right from the start it wasn't possible to supply stalingrad via air alone.

Now you can't call collapsing due to inferior strength hardly a misstake i think

Muzrub · Post by **Muzrub** » Thu Jul 19, 2001 2:56 pm

The strategic idea of a "feste Platze". Strong holds much like the during the middle ages with Castles.

The idea had merit if the surrounded forces had either an option of later retreating or if there were enough forces to relieve the units after the enemies offensive.
The idea, making supply and communication difficult and the tying up enemy troops was valid. But in practice it proved a disaster.
If you cant break through and recapture the lost ground then your troops marched all the way to Siberia, instead to a victory parade in Berlin.

Mighty Muzrub

Micha · Post by **Micha** » Thu Jul 19, 2001 3:01 pm

SoleSurvivor, as far as I know, EVERYONE agreed that it would be impossible to fly in the necessary supplies, except Hitler and Goering. It was one more instance where Hitler believed he could make facts bend to his will.

Muzrub · Post by **Muzrub** » Thu Jul 19, 2001 3:30 pm

Now you can't call collapsing due to inferior strength hardly a misstake i think

You call it a mistake when you believe that the enemy has no more reserves and cannot sustain an attack or seige but when the actual case is the opposite.

They made the mistake in believeing the Soviets did not have the strength and they made a mistake when they thought they did.

Thats what a mistake is.

Mighty Muzrub.

Jeff Norton · Post by **Jeff Norton** » Fri Jul 20, 2001 6:40 am

How about not making the Ukranian people a part of the war? Stalin killed off over 5 million Ukrans by starvation for their support of the Whites.

If a *thinking* Hitler/OWK could have used the 1 million + able Ukranian male population, made them a part of the war, use their nationalism, give them a cause to fight for (free from Stalin), and supplied them with captured Sov weapons, that would have bucked-up the Germans and made the war not one of idealogies, but one of liberation from opression.

...At least that's what my wife's family says...They're Ukranian.

Ed Cogburn · Post by **Ed Cogburn** » Fri Jul 20, 2001 1:22 pm

Originally posted by Jeff Norton:
How about not making the Ukranian people a part of the war? Stalin killed off over 5 million Ukrans by starvation for their support of the Whites.

If a *thinking* Hitler/OWK could have used the 1 million + able Ukranian male population, made them a part of the war, use their nationalism, give them a cause to fight for (free from Stalin), and supplied them with captured Sov weapons, that would have bucked-up the Germans and made the war not one of idealogies, but one of liberation from opression.

...At least that's what my wife's family says...They're Ukranian.

Good idea, but the problem is all available division slots are filled, so there isn't any room to represent Ukrainian forces as infantry divisions, unless you remove some current infantry divisions from the game.

matt.buttsworth · Post by **matt.buttsworth** » Fri Jul 20, 2001 1:26 pm

Agree entirely with your point about the Ukraine.
That was one of Hitler's fatal mistakes.
Here is some information on Damyanask I posted to the wrong discussion group.
I have forgotten where the discussion over the Demyanisk pocket began but I will continue here as it is relevant. 6 divisions surrounded, including Totenkopf, in total 95,000 men and 20,000 horses. The Germans were surrounded in January 1942 and survived until Spring, when a corridor to the West was opened.
AT the highpoint the Luftwaffe was able to airlift 300 tonnes per day, but later it was much less than that (half). The Germans survived only just, and Totenkopf which stayed in the bridgehead was totally decimated and lost two thirds strength.
No major offensive activity was undertaken. All they could do was hold on for their lives and this in a front which was only tens of miles, not hundreds as in the Caucasus or Stalingrad case, from the German lines.
I rest my case about German airlift capabilities and the capacity of the Germans to attack using air supply alone.

SoleSurvivor · Post by **SoleSurvivor** » Fri Jul 20, 2001 7:27 pm

I have a book "Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Osten 1944" by Rolf Hinze. ("The collapse of Army Group Center in the east 1944") Motor Buch Verlag ISBN 3-87943-681-9 4th Edition 1994 which covers the entire period in great detail. Yes they made some mistakes but I don't see a real chance to prevent either losing all power to resist for the next soviet attack which would have been a matter of weeks or breaking down. The book has extensive information on both side's oob, number of artiellery pieces etc. I don't know how reliable these numbers were but soviet power is overwhelming here.

g00dd0ggy · Post by **g00dd0ggy** » Sun Jul 22, 2001 12:54 am

Seems to me one of the biggies was driving for the Caucasus in 42 at all.

Had the Axis not stopped their advance at Voronezh, but wheeled North I think that the Red army could have been destroyed in the field in Summer 42. Remember that in June/July 42 they were in total disarray - falling back in disorder. By pressing to Stalingrad they were given the chance to just retreat (Stalin having accepted - until end of July at least - that stand and fight orders wouldn't cut it).

Wehrmacht arrived at Stalingrad at the end of August (about 22nd I think)having added 300-400 miles to its lines of supply and not inflicted significant casualties. Had the fighting taken place around Voronezh the supplies would have been available, and 6 - 8 weeks not been wasted just marching into space.

Not sure if people will agree this is a "mistake" as such, but it does seem to me that the strategy was flawed, and by the time Hitler had finished messing with Blau, entirely unworkable.

The Soviets could not have refused battle if the Wehrmacht had wheeled North, and might well have been fatally wounded.

This is obviously a grand strategic issue, but bear in mind that Fall Blau was originally intended only to push to Stalingrad, cut the Volga and destroy the arms factories. In July Hitler intervened and ordered a stop at Voronezh and split Army Group A to drive on Stalingrad AND the Caucasus (Astrakhan and the Eastern Caucasus seabord)- which wasn't originally the plan at all.

Mist · Post by **Mist** » Sun Jul 22, 2001 2:06 am

Drive to Moscow was exact thing Soviet commandment was expecting for. Most of reserves were concentrated to defend Moscow. IIRC Zhukov in his memories says that Stalin refused to send reinforcements to South because he was still expecting this obvious move from Germans.