Question about Low Oil Production

[moonfog]

Hello everybody

At the moment I'm playing a '41 PBEM Game as Germans. For my comming Summeroffensive, I have two opportunities: 1. Attacking Moscow with huge losses (my opponent expects me attacking there, so he will be prepared) or 2. Conquering the Caucasus, which seems quite undefended.

To make the right decision I need some help and I hope someone of you could give me a hint. Does anybody know whether a low oil production really has an effect (if yes, what kind of effect) on the units in the frontline? I think I will surely be defeated, if I concentrate on taking the oil fields and there will be no countable benefit. In the '42 Campaign it seemed to me that there is only a minor benefit from holding the oil centres as the Germans.

Is there anyone who can help me on this, please.

Thanks a lot
moonfog

[RickyB]

Originally posted by moonfog:
Hello everybody

At the moment I'm playing a '41 PBEM Game as Germans. For my comming Summeroffensive, I have two opportunities: 1. Attacking Moscow with huge losses (my opponent expects me attacking there, so he will be prepared) or 2. Conquering the Caucasus, which seems quite undefended.

To make the right decision I need some help and I hope someone of you could give me a hint. Does anybody know whether a low oil production really has an effect (if yes, what kind of effect) on the units in the frontline? I think I will surely be defeated, if I concentrate on taking the oil fields and there will be no countable benefit. In the '42 Campaign it seemed to me that there is only a minor benefit from holding the oil centres as the Germans.

Is there anyone who can help me on this, please.

Thanks a lot
moonfog

There is definitely a readiness problem when oil is below 100. Also, I think there are fewer ops points available, but I am not sure here. You have a risky strategy but if you use fairly small forces it won't hurt too bad if it fails. Attacking dug in defenders around Moscow can be just as risky.

[g00dd0ggy]

My own view on this is that you have to attack initially in the South.

In 42 the crucial thing is to establish momentum early and start a war of movement that the Soviets will find difficult to handle as they have no tank armies. Attacking in the Moscow sector risks playing to the Soviet strengths - defence in depth, favourable terrain, a manageable front line (ie one that is anchored in the swamps to the North and, if you are putting the Schwerpunkt in the Centre, not threatened to the South) well dug in troops with plenty of local armoured support (lots of independent tank bdes/regts). Breaking that line will cost you heavily, and the line will probably reform quickly, because deep penetrations will be difficult (because of the defence in depth).

If you know that the Soviets are strong in front of Moscow - or even if they aren't particulalry - I would suggest a drive in the South. Here initial momentum is easier to build, and the Soviet player struggles to deploy a second line, because the Southern flank is always in the air and cannot be anchored. Once the drive has started you have a choice - drive for the Caucasus or swing North and attack Moscow from the South.

Personally I feel that one of Hitler's critical mistakes was to effectively call off the drive beyond Voronezh and commit all of Army Group A to the Stalingrad/Caucasus attack. The difficulty with that area is that it swallows huge numbers of troops, leaves with a hopelessly exposed flank in the Winter (cue Stalingrad) and probably will not bring the Red Army to battle - leaving it strong enough to launch a devastating Winter offensive.

Had the Germans turned North they would surely have brought the Reds to battle and probably destroyed a large section of the Army - which in '42 would have been ha to replace. Pressing to Stalingrad netted only a handful of small encirclements (20-30k prisoners I think) the rest of the Soviet losses were suffered in head to head action where German/Axis sattelite losses were also heavy.

So...start a drive on Voronezh/Rostov, break up the Southern wing, then either press to Stalingrad/Caucasus or turn North to Moscow. But remember the words in the manual - "once the German player gives up attacking Moscow, he resigns himself to a draw or to defeat" - or something similar

My 2 cs

[Josans]

Originally posted by moonfog:
Hello everybody

At the moment I'm playing a '41 PBEM Game as Germans. For my comming Summeroffensive, I have two opportunities: 1. Attacking Moscow with huge losses (my opponent expects me attacking there, so he will be prepared) or 2. Conquering the Caucasus, which seems quite undefended.

To make the right decision I need some help and I hope someone of you could give me a hint. Does anybody know whether a low oil production really has an effect (if yes, what kind of effect) on the units in the frontline? I think I will surely be defeated, if I concentrate on taking the oil fields and there will be no countable benefit. In the '42 Campaign it seemed to me that there is only a minor benefit from holding the oil centres as the Germans.

Is there anyone who can help me on this, please.

Thanks a lot
moonfog

Your primary objective is destroy the Red Army as fighting force. This is the key of success.Once the soviets are in disarray you can go to the objectives. I know is difficult but...

The lack of oil drops the readiness of the units and have less OP to waste. Useful against the soviets in 42 campaign.If you get the oil fields from Caucasus surely you win the war.

[moonfog]

Thanks for the answers. If I understood you right, there is no crippeling effect on the soviet offensive capabilities when they loose their oilfields in the Caucasus (in my opinion there should be, because motorised armies are quite useless without oil).

I think I'll take the risky way and attack Moscow as primary target. Since I'm holding positions in the deep flanks of the soviet line (Vologda in the North and Voronezh in the South) this could eventually end up in a massive encirclement of a big part of the russian army around Moscow. I hope I get through the dug in lines behind the Volga an Oka rivers. Perhaps I'm lucky.

If the encirclement succeeds, I will post a battle report.

Panzer Marsch!
moonfog

[RickyB]

Originally posted by moonfog:
Thanks for the answers. If I understood you right, there is no crippeling effect on the soviet offensive capabilities when they loose their oilfields in the Caucasus (in my opinion there should be, because motorised armies are quite useless without oil).

I think I'll take the risky way and attack Moscow as primary target. Since I'm holding positions in the deep flanks of the soviet line (Vologda in the North and Voronezh in the South) this could eventually end up in a massive encirclement of a big part of the russian army around Moscow. I hope I get through the dug in lines behind the Volga an Oka rivers. Perhaps I'm lucky.

If the encirclement succeeds, I will post a battle report.

Panzer Marsch!
moonfog

The loss of oilfields will reduce the Soviet offensive capability. With lower readiness their strength will be lessened by the same percentage as the readiness loss, and fewer ops points means fewer plots/attacks/moves/transfers/readiness boosts, which also translates to a weaker attack. However, I would normally try for the army than the resources as recapturing the oil fields will normally result in a return to full strength very quickly for the Soviets. Good luck and let us know how you do.

[Rundstedt]

Is it possible to execute the same type of operations as Hitler did in real life, and still the war?

By the way! I'm currently reading a book by B. H. Liddell Hart named "The Other Side of The Hill". It's a British officer/historian interviewing German commanders just after the war, receiving their thoughts on different operations during the war. People like von Rundstedt, Manteuffel, Model and Blumentritt are among those who are questioned about their impressions of the war and how they thought about Hitler, the Red Army and many other aspects of the conflict.

Now, In the book von Rundstedt is being asked how he thought "Operation Barbarossa" should have been executed from the beginning. He said that it probablt was a mistake to even think of attacking in the south in 1941, and that he thought the main effort should have been concentrated on capturing Leningrad and perhaps Moscow as soon as possible. Ironically, he was the one commanding Army Group South in 1941, thus his own thoughts made his command obsolete in theory.

My question is, do you agree with Rundstedt (the real one I mean) on the theory to attack Leningrad and Moscow, while almost ignoring the Ukraine and Caucasus? Personally, I've always thought a swift and powerful offensive directed towards Caucasus in 1941 could have ended the war by mid-1942. What do tou think?

Best regards, Rundstedt

[ July 24, 2001: Message edited by: Rundstedt ]

[Mist]

Originally posted by Rundstedt:

My question is, do you agree with Rundstedt (the real one I mean) on the theory to attack Leningrad and Moscow, while almost ignoring the Ukraine and Caucasus? Personally, I've always thought a swift and powerful offensive directed towards Caucasus in 1941 could have ended the war by mid-1942. What do tou think?

ignoring central and northern direrctions would mean more saved Soviet strength to defend Caucasus. Besides, Caucasus was out of range of direct attack in 1941. Do not also forget that Moscow and Leningrad were big centers of industry and communications. I think that Germans performed quite well in 1941(disregarding that barbarossa was quite poor plan for German General Staff) but attacking Moscow in November was madness. As well as attacking Caucasus and Stalingrad at the same time in 1942. Especialy after Stalingrad was literaly rubbed to earth by Luftwaffe.