I'm tired of folks saying B-17s and B-24s weren't used to attack shipping...

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: Zeta16

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

While we are talking about things that "never happened", let's bring up the Japanese players who use their
BB's (not BC's) all over the Pacific to exploit the failings of the "bombardment" rules. Please show me ONE
example of this actually happening in the War. Japanese Naval doctrine was to keep these in home waters
for the "Decisive Naval Battle". Japanese players a-historically use them all over to pound ports and airfields.
And then complain bitterly when the Allied players use massed 4-engined bombers to exploit another weakness
in the games programming.

There are plenty of "exploits" in the game on both sides that call for work. Let's get them all into play and work
on some fixes.

Then since the allies never attack from Darwin into the DEI that should never happen. Come on, there where a lot of things that did not happen in the war that people do. So if we are always going to pick on the Japanese lets conform the allies to do what they did in the war too. This is a game people will do things that did not happen, however 4E bombers being more lethel is a game issue not play issue.

I don't think you've caught the spirit of this. It isn't just "4e bombers" that are faulty. The entire frigging game is at odds with reality. Are four-engine bombers too effective in an anti-shipping role? Yes they are, based on what I know of history. Are two-engine bombers too effective in the anti-shipping role? Yes they are, based on what I know of history. Are only American two-engine bombers too effective in an anti-shipping role? No, based on what I know of history the Japanese two-engine bombers are also too effective in this role. Are American four-engine bombers more effective than Japanese four-engine bombers? Now tell me, what's wrong with that question?

The reason, just for example, that the Japanese in the game can (I'm told) invade in force places like Karachi, for God's sake, and simply swipe the Chinese armies off the map! is that the game model is so out of whack in so many areas. None of that happened in real life. It didn't happen in real life because it couldn't happen in real life. Don't you suppose the Japanese would have been pleased to "take over" the entire country of India? Didn't they try their best to "swipe away" the Chinese armies? And how long did they did keep trying that? How long were they unsuccessful trying that?

If anyone could reasonably figure out what was and what was not physically possible to do in the war (forget all the cultural and political imperatives), and then conscientiously designed a game that conformed to this good awareness, that would be a great deal. But you know what? This game apparently wasn't designed with that in mind. So it's left up to players to find a comfort zone. And as it turns out that'll be imperfect, too.

Re an Allied move out of Northern Australia into the DEI: my knowledge tells me this was perfectly doable for the Allies had they only wished to move that way. This should have proved no more difficult, if not easier still, than their actual move along the northern coast of New Guinea--it would have merely been a matter of planning a bit differently when it came to the logistics. As the Allies came to excel in all things logistics I've no doubt a campaign of that description would have been a resounding success. It would have, however, probably slowed down the march back into the Philippine Islands, and so MacArthur got his way and followed the route he did.

What I hear from you strikes me as Japanese bias. Is that the side you prefer to play? If so, fine. No problem there. But I've got to tell you, if there's an issue with historical "balance" in the game then it goes in favor of the Japanese, not against them. That's just the way it is. Take away their ability to move on China and India and where would they stand in terms of victory points? Screwed to the floor, that's where. And as that's precisely where they found themselve in real life, and for easily identifiable reasons, why have a game system that portrays it otherwise? You want to do "better" than the Japanese did in real life? That's fine, too. But how about if players of this ilk be expected to accomplish this through realistic means and superior play over the board and not phony-baloney game design?

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

While we are talking about things that "never happened", let's bring up the Japanese players who use their
BB's (not BC's) all over the Pacific to exploit the failings of the "bombardment" rules. Please show me ONE
example of this actually happening in the War. Japanese Naval doctrine was to keep these in home waters
for the "Decisive Naval Battle". Japanese players a-historically use them all over to pound ports and airfields.
And then complain bitterly when the Allied players use massed 4-engined bombers to exploit another weakness
in the games programming.

There are plenty of "exploits" in the game on both sides that call for work. Let's get them all into play and work
on some fixes.

Mmmh, apples and oranges.... We should distinguish between A) 'being able to do sth but unwilling to do it for some reason', i.e. Jap BBs not used for bombardments, or no convoys until too late, and B) 'badly wanting to do sth but being unable to do it or ineffective in doing so', i.e. CV air strike coordination [:D], Jap ASW, Allied 4E bombers hitting moving targets...

IMO 4E bombing accuracy in WitP is okay, there are just too many of them available for massed strikes. The Allies may have wanted to base 200+ B-17s at Port Moresby to bomb the heck out of every convoy to/from/at Rabaul - but it was impossible to stack and supply that many 4E-planes at that place IRL. In WitP, it's no problem as soon as the first large base force shows up. I still think it is a good idea to base the maintenance and 'air base capacity' requirements on number of engines rather than number of airframes, and to do away with the 'above 250 air support anything goes'-rule. This should lower the number of operational 4E bombers amassed at any single base to a more reasonable level.

That'd be an excellent start. Mike's pushed for that some time now. The base capacity/supply/resupply is another serious problem which not only cans the air model but the naval model as well--as long as you mentioned bomardments and such.

As always there's a lot to look at, and I wish Wood would. (Or is that how much wood can a woodchuck chuck?)

[BigB]

dude if it didnt exactly happen the way it happend in history books people are going to bitch and cry about it. Save your typing and just accept nobody will ever be happy unless it happens in their PBEM the way they read it.

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: BigB

dude if it didnt exactly happen the way it happend in history books people are going to bitch and cry about it. Save your typing and just accept nobody will ever be happy unless it happens in their PBEM the way they read it.

Some of us wonder if some of the rest of us ever read it to begin with. [8D]

[BigB]

shut up im drunk and feisty

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: Tristanjohn
Some of us wonder if some of the rest of us ever read it to begin with. [8D]

Doesn't matter, just want to keep my 'posts counter' going up [:D]

[doktorblood]

B-17 should be able to attack shipping ... Their original specification was for that exact role when the Army ordered them in the 30's ... admittedley before they were morphed into a heavy bomber, bristeling with guns.

It panned out that they weren't all that effective in that role as they were used historically ... in smaller scale strikes composed of less than 30. Who knows how effective they might have been had they been massed in large numbers to carpet bomb some hapless transports?

I don't see any problem if the Allied player wants to concentrate all of his heavy bomber strength in one spot. He should be able to position his forces as he sees fit. If the Japanese player is dopey enough to park his fleet units in a port within range of 200 B-17 he deserves to get clobbered.

However I do think that there are too many B-17 available to the Allies in the game. ETO had a big priority on these ... even after B-24 became available because they were better at withstanding German flak and fighters than B-24.

[LargeSlowTarget]

Original: doktorblood
Who knows how effective they might have been had they been massed in large numbers to carpet bomb some hapless transports?

I don't see any problem if the Allied player wants to concentrate all of his heavy bomber strength in one spot. He should be able to position his forces as he sees fit. If the Japanese player is dopey enough to park his fleet units in a port within range of 200 B-17 he deserves to get clobbered.

Right, no one knows the effects of mass-carpet bombing of transports. But we do know that concentrating 200 B-17s requires a certain amount of space to park the planes and set up shops, stores and dumps, plus a lot of run- and taxiways to get them all into the air within a reasonable amount of time in order to ave a concentrated 200-plane strike, and so on. Add to this the port size required to unload all the supplies and fuel needed to keep 200 Forts in the air. I would say that a lot of locations in WitP simply did not have the space to set up a giant base or several closely-bunched smaller ones to accomodate a force like this (unless the über-ENG units are allowed terraforming). I know it's a 60 mile hex, but how much space is really available for airbase construction, esp. in rugged terrain? Most extreme examples are atolls - most of them can be built up to accomodate 200 planes without capacity penalty - but looking at a map and pictures of Betio (one of the few island suitable as an airbase in the Tarawa atoll) I'm wondering how 200 Forts and the installations necessary to operate them could be squeezed onto this tiny speck of land. That's why I'm for restricting air base capacity based on number of engines, not on airframes.

EDIT: And change the base sizes, like size 1 = a/c capacity 12, size 2 = 24 and so on, and set more reasonable limits for the individual locations, like capacity 240 for Tarawa (= 60 4E bombers) or so. Same for ports, size 1 = one ship un/loading at wharf or pier, size 2 = 2 etc. (all other ships considered un/loading over the beach) up to whatever SF or Tokyo could have handled simultaneously in those days.

Just dreaming, of course...

[Tristanjohn]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

ORIGINAL: Tristanjohn
Some of us wonder if some of the rest of us ever read it to begin with. [8D]

Doesn't matter, just want to keep my 'posts counter' going up [:D]

Oh. [:D]

[tsimmonds]

Here is an interesting web page from the Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center:

Ryujo (Aircraft Carrier, 1933-1942) --High-Level Bombing Attack, 24 August 1942
In the afternoon of 24 August 1942, after Ryujo had been disabled by USS Saratoga's dive bombers and torpedo planes and while her crew was abandoning ship, she was the target of Army Air Force B-17 bombers. These bomb runs, well-photographed but little noticed by historians, missed the immobile aircraft carrier by wide margins, reinforcing the evidence already obtained during the Battle of Midway that high-level bombing was a very ineffective way of attacking ships.
This page features all the images we have of a 24 August 1942 high-level bombing attack on the Japanese aircraft carrier Ryujo.

Interesting pics. Seems like the USN was not impressed with the results of this attack. Course that might just be a dig at the AAF! But I do suspect that AAF training and doctrine may have focused on priorities other than bombing ships.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Here is an interesting web page from the Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center:

Ryujo (Aircraft Carrier, 1933-1942) --High-Level Bombing Attack, 24 August 1942
In the afternoon of 24 August 1942, after Ryujo had been disabled by USS Saratoga's dive bombers and torpedo planes and while her crew was abandoning ship, she was the target of Army Air Force B-17 bombers. These bomb runs, well-photographed but little noticed by historians, missed the immobile aircraft carrier by wide margins, reinforcing the evidence already obtained during the Battle of Midway that high-level bombing was a very ineffective way of attacking ships.
This page features all the images we have of a 24 August 1942 high-level bombing attack on the Japanese aircraft carrier Ryujo.

Interesting pics. Seems like the USN was not impressed with the results of this attack. Course that might just be a dig at the AAF! But I do suspect that AAF training and doctrine may have focused on priorities other than bombing ships.

Nice find (and nice results depicted)! [;)]


Leo "Apollo11"

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant
But I do suspect that AAF training and doctrine may have focused on priorities other than bombing ships.

See Billy Mitchell for details [:D].

[SpitfireIX]

ORIGINAL: Zeta16

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

While we are talking about things that "never happened", let's bring up the Japanese players who use their
BB's (not BC's) all over the Pacific to exploit the failings of the "bombardment" rules. Please show me ONE
example of this actually happening in the War. Japanese Naval doctrine was to keep these in home waters
for the "Decisive Naval Battle". Japanese players a-historically use them all over to pound ports and airfields.
And then complain bitterly when the Allied players use massed 4-engined bombers to exploit another weakness
in the games programming.

There are plenty of "exploits" in the game on both sides that call for work. Let's get them all into play and work
on some fixes.

Then since the allies never attack from Darwin into the DEI that should never happen. Come on, there where a lot of things that did not happen in the war that people do. So if we are always going to pick on the Japanese lets conform the allies to do what they did in the war too. This is a game people will do things that did not happen, however 4E bombers being more lethel is a game issue not play issue.

When it comes to ahistorical strategies and tactics, I believe the test that needs to be applied is "could the real-life commanders reasonably have taken the action in question, given the knowlege they had at the time?" Japanese sub doctrine, for example, represents deeply ingrained cultural issues within the IJN; Tokyo's simply issuing orders to "attack more merchantmen and fewer warships" would have had little effect, because the sub commanders had all been infused with the ideas of Bushido, which teaches that a warrior's only worthy adversary is another warrior.

There will always be gray areas, of course; I'd say Japanese BB bombardment is one of those. Yes, the idea of preserving the BBs for the final climactic battle with the US fleet was a major factor in Japanese doctrine; however, as the war progressed, both sides did attempt to modify doctrine (with varying degrees of success) as circumstances and experience dictated.

Another issue to be considered is, of course, hindsight. No game can perfectly eliminate this; and no player, no matter how hard he might try, can totally avoid having his knowledge of history color his decision-making process. Some people enjoy the Monday-morning quarterback style of play; others choose to attempt, as far a possible, to play the role of the historical commander. These are largely issues of personal preference, and (in a multi-player game) should be discussed with ones opponent or opponents ahead of time.

Finally, there is the issue of what is "gamey" and what is simply unorthodox. This can also have gray areas. To expound on an example that has been brought up before, suppose that, for whatever reason, the Doolittle Raid had not taken place IRL. Now suppose that WitP had more detailed carrier operation rules, allowing some land-based planes to take off from (and maybe even land on; this did happen very rarely) CVs, based on the aircraft's flight characteristics and the length of the CV's deck. Suppose also that the Japanese player took a huge political-point hit (and the Allies got a big boost) if Tokyo were bombed in 1942. The first time an Allied player managed to launch a squadron of B-25s on a suicide mission against Tokyo, some players would undoubtedly decry the action as "gamey," "unrealistic," etc. So what is and is not an "exploit" is not always black-and-white (sometimes it is, though).

[rtrapasso]

Want to tear Japanese shipping around New Guinea/New Britain a new hole? Build up Port Moresby, fly in a hundred or so B-25s and Mauraders and B-17s, put them on Naval Attack with 10% search, set their altitude at 1000/2000/4000 feet (doesn't much matter from what I can see, so I usually let it ride at 1000) and . . . any and all Japanese ships foolish enough to shape a course under normal range of those bombers will be dutifully . . . savaged.

IIRC - this is EXACTLY what happened in real life. Once Allied air forces got strong enough, they used similar tactics (well, skip bombing, anyway) to destroy about anything moving around New Guinea (i.e. - Battle of Bismarck Sea) and literally starved out the Japanese. Convoys could not reach their bases, and the Japanese resorted to building barges and wooden ships to try to sneak stuff in - and those got sunk, too.

As far as i can determine, the damage model (i.e. effectiveness of bombers in shipping attacks) is not too bad. The ability of ground crews to keep airplanes flying may be off. In the Japanese case, even minor damage meant that the airplane probably wouldn't fly for the rest of the war. The Allied ability to repair is rather overrated in the game also.

[tsimmonds]

Yes, the idea of preserving the BBs for the final climactic battle with the US fleet was a major factor in Japanese doctrine

Another thing to consider here, IJN clearly considered the Kongos to be in a different class than their battle line ships (which of course they were). The Kongos were the red-headed step children of the Combined Fleet, usable for just about any mission and apparently thought of as being more or less expendible (at least until a couple of them got expended).

[tsimmonds]

suppose that, for whatever reason, the Doolittle Raid had not taken place IRL.....The first time an Allied player managed to launch a squadron of B-25s on a suicide mission against Tokyo, some players would undoubtedly decry the action as "gamey," "unrealistic," etc. So what is and is not an "exploit" is not always black-and-white (sometimes it is, though).

Excellent observation.

[TIMJOT]

I think this issue would basically go away if

1) Return op damage and repair rates for 4e Bombers back to old UV rates. They were acutally much more closer to real life even though so many players complained.

2) Require 1 Aviation support per engine on a/c. Reqireing 4 times the support of a fighter for 4e bombers seems about right.

3) Increase Flak, morale and fatique hits on 4e bombers below 10,000 feet.

4) Decrease production rates on all 4e bombers.

None of which seem terribly difficult to implement, mostly just a matter of changing values not writting new code.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Zeta16

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

While we are talking about things that "never happened", let's bring up the Japanese players who use their
BB's (not BC's) all over the Pacific to exploit the failings of the "bombardment" rules. Please show me ONE
example of this actually happening in the War. Japanese Naval doctrine was to keep these in home waters
for the "Decisive Naval Battle". Japanese players a-historically use them all over to pound ports and airfields.
And then complain bitterly when the Allied players use massed 4-engined bombers to exploit another weakness
in the games programming.

There are plenty of "exploits" in the game on both sides that call for work. Let's get them all into play and work
on some fixes.

Then since the allies never attack from Darwin into the DEI that should never happen. Come on, there where a lot of things that did not happen in the war that people do. So if we are always going to pick on the Japanese lets conform the allies to do what they did in the war too. This is a game people will do things that did not happen, however 4E bombers being more lethel is a game issue not play issue.

You miss the point entirely. The air attack rules make it far to easy and rewarding too use large 4-engined bomber
formations for Anti-shipping attacks. The bombardment rules make them far too easy and rewarding to blast every-
thing on any coast.. Both are exploits of poorly designed rules and combat results. If Darwin is correctly shown
without Rail connections and difficult to supply in any meaningful quantity, and the Allies want to expend the shipping
resources to try and support an effort there, I have no problem with it. In the game as released, an Allied Offensive
from that area IS another exploit of a poor design choice, and belongs on the same list as the level bomber and bomb-
bardment foolishness. All need to be fixed.

[Zeta16]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Zeta16

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

While we are talking about things that "never happened", let's bring up the Japanese players who use their
BB's (not BC's) all over the Pacific to exploit the failings of the "bombardment" rules. Please show me ONE
example of this actually happening in the War. Japanese Naval doctrine was to keep these in home waters
for the "Decisive Naval Battle". Japanese players a-historically use them all over to pound ports and airfields.
And then complain bitterly when the Allied players use massed 4-engined bombers to exploit another weakness
in the games programming.

There are plenty of "exploits" in the game on both sides that call for work. Let's get them all into play and work
on some fixes.

Then since the allies never attack from Darwin into the DEI that should never happen. Come on, there where a lot of things that did not happen in the war that people do. So if we are always going to pick on the Japanese lets conform the allies to do what they did in the war too. This is a game people will do things that did not happen, however 4E bombers being more lethel is a game issue not play issue.

You miss the point entirely. The air attack rules make it far to easy and rewarding too use large 4-engined bomber
formations for Anti-shipping attacks. The bombardment rules make them far too easy and rewarding to blast every-
thing on any coast.. Both are exploits of poorly designed rules and combat results. If Darwin is correctly shown
without Rail connections and difficult to supply in any meaningful quantity, and the Allies want to expend the shipping
resources to try and support an effort there, I have no problem with it. In the game as released, an Allied Offensive
from that area IS another exploit of a poor design choice, and belongs on the same list as the level bomber and bomb-
bardment foolishness. All need to be fixed.

Well I have come to think that there is not going to be any great changes to the game. It is pretty much in it's complete state. One way to make things closer to the truth is to make a limit to the amount of planes on a base, not just limited to base forces. Say level x 50 plus 50 per field is the max. For the Japanese make the 2e torp planes fly on pnly from base size 6 or higher as it is a bigger base with torp and make the range trops can be used a smaller range. Land combat who knows that is not why I play the game. Also I am not Japanese fanboy. I have 4 PBEMs as the Allies and 2 as Japan. If you play the game with in historical guidelines it works great.

[pompack]

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

4E bombers vs ships is not one but two completely different things.

4E bombers vs stationary ships should be vicious. The owners of such ships are gambling and must expect to pay the ante.

4E bombers vs moving ships were notoriously ineffective. It was almost impossible to hit a maneuvering target from 20,000 feet. In the time it takes a bomb to fall that far a ship moving at 15 kts is a quarter of a mile from where it was when the bombs were released. Plus, a 4E bomber does require a bomb run of some seconds duration that is relatively undisturbed by maneuvering such as might be required to track a ship that was maneuvering in an effort to avoid being hit by bombs.

Precisely. Feinder's data presented above supports this. Given a chance to synchronize, clear weather, light steady winds and a good electrical supply, the Nordan (sp??) bombsight was quite capable of consistently hitting a stationery, merchie sized target from 10,000 feet. Targets evading desperately, especially at high speed, were a different thing entirely. Doctrine for bombing a moving target was to estimate the speed, lead the target "by eye" spread out a formation of at least nine planes, then all drop on the leader and hope that the resulting dispursed pattern hits something. Note that most of the incidents reported above were against shipping "in harbor".